Kulikov military. Anatoly Sergeevich Kulikov: biography. Not subject to oblivion

The authors of one of the reference books “Who is who in Russia” (1997) give such a cursory “shot through the biography of Kulikov.” They note that Kulikov’s military career was successful, and by the age of 42, after graduating from two academies, he entered the top elite of the internal troops. The brutal suppression of the armed conflict between Ossetians and Ingush became another step in his career.

Kulikov emerged from the October crisis of 1993 as a colonel general, and after the disaster in Budennovsk and Erina’s resignation, he became Minister of Internal Affairs. The “clean hands” operation he proclaimed - the fight against corruption within the Ministry of Internal Affairs - does not bring success. The promise to immediately curb crime also turns out to be impossible - murders are already taking place right under the windows of the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department.

Commanding a united group of the Russian army on the territory of Chechnya, Kulikov, as the authors of the reference book assess him, shows himself to be a supporter of extremely tough measures, but in the end he surrenders Grozny almost without a fight. He was also involved in the disgrace in Pervomaisk. Nevertheless, he is awarded the rank of army general.

As a Doctor of Economics, Kulikov unexpectedly begins to speak widely on macroeconomic issues. He proposes to nationalize some banks, which causes horror among bankers and laughter among most specialists.

At the same time, among the police, the authors continue, Kulikov enjoys great authority. In a short time, he manages to significantly increase the salaries of his wards, and also transform the Ministry of Internal Affairs into a second army, equipped with modern military equipment. The public showdown with Lebed was also given credit to him.

The appointment of Kulikov as Deputy Prime Minister caused shock in society. There was an assumption that economic reforms would be pushed with a police baton. But gradually it became clear that Kulikov would oversee only fiscal departments. The main general pastimes, the directory concludes, are hunting and fishing.

Here the compilers of the text ran through Kulikov’s biography with their assessments. We will go without haste, at a step, and the reader will have the opportunity to compare the assessments and make an independent conclusion.

On December 1, 1992, I arrived in Vladikavkaz, introduced myself, and attended the meeting. The day of December 2 was spent preparing troops for action, and on December 3 we carried out the first operation to disarm two settlements in North Ossetia and Ingushetia. They confiscated a lot of small arms, grenade launchers, ammunition, even guns, half a ton of alcohol, and a lot of counterfeit vodka. We carried out such operations until December 17 simultaneously on both Ossetian and Ingush territory. Each operation was carefully prepared in advance: a group went through, a video was taken of the advance route diagram, and in the evening, on the monitor, the commanders studied these routes, specifying where, what, when. As a result, the operations proceeded classically. One day, for example, a lot of snow fell and there was a threat of disruption due to the fact that vehicles would not pass through the mountains. But they launched tracked vehicles first, and then cars. Everything worked out. Several criminal groups were detained and a lot of weapons were seized. They themselves were neither killed nor wounded.

As a result of these actions, there in the Caucasus, on December 23, 1992, I was appointed commander of the internal troops - Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. On this day, Shakhrai called from Moscow to Vladikavkaz and said that a Presidential decree on such an appointment had been signed.

V.N. Who provided support here?

A.K. I may not know everything. We were behind Rutskaya and Shakhrai. When I was appointed, no one talked to me, including Minister Erin. On December 29, I arrived in Moscow and only then met with the minister. So I took command.

If we sum up what I succeeded and failed to do during my time leading the internal troops, we could note the following. The main thing that was possible was to prepare the forces and means of the troops for the beginning of the conflict in Chechnya in December 1994. If we had not done this, then I don’t know what the ministry’s role would have been in the fighting in Chechnya. It would be absolute zero.

At the beginning of 1993, we discussed at our Military Council, and then went to the board of the ministry with the concept of military development until 2005. The concept provided for an increase in operational units to 100 thousand people against the 40 thousand available at that time. It was proposed to fill the missing number of operational units by reducing the escort units and transferring the functions of guarding convicts to the penitentiary institutions themselves. It was meant that the vacated military camps, after the convoy units left the troops, would be transferred to the newly formed operational units. Active preparation of operational units began to conduct special operations to disarm illegal armed groups in the conditions mainly of the Caucasus.

Taking these circumstances into account, General Romanov was appointed to the post of deputy commander of internal troops for combat training. There was no better candidate for this position in the army. We adopted a new course of shooting, abandoned combined arms exercises, and instead prepared our own, arising from the peculiarities of actions against illegal armed groups. Soldiers were taught to perform one complex exercise during their entire service life. First, he shot at a stationary target, then at an emerging one, then at a moving one, and finally at a group target, including all this at night. Thus, we achieved not only the goal of training a soldier to perform the tasks of the internal troops, but also trained a qualified reserve soldier in the interests of the country’s defense.

V.N. Anatoly Sergeevich, however, in the media, in the conversations of the military and ordinary people of that time, the idea was exaggerated that there was an unlawful, unjustified saturation of the internal troops with military equipment and aviation, that the internal troops decided to outdo the army, that they were better supplied compared to other troops that their numbers are growing uncontrollably, that the money of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is being eaten up by internal troops, that instead of fighting crime they are purchasing airfield strips, and so on. Please comment on such judgments.

A.K. This reaction is probably somewhat natural. But at the same time, the number of internal troops was reduced. When I received troops, there were 318 thousand of them. Our concept provided for 237 thousand, and the President approved up to 220 thousand. Further. You need to understand what an operational regiment of internal troops or a division is. Zhirinovsky, for example, says that the internal troops have 25 full-blooded divisions. One may get the impression that these are like Wehrmacht divisions, dressed to the nines, equipped with modern equipment, just give a command and everything will move forward. In fact, a division of internal troops is scattered regiments stationed in

I consider today’s new reduction of internal troops by 110 thousand to be a gross strategic mistake. In 1952 - 1953, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs disbanded operational units to combat banditry in the Baltic states and Western Ukraine. But then 7-8 years had passed since the war. Now the curve of separatist sentiments in the Caucasus is creeping up, the number of terrorist acts, banditry, shootings of people, hostage-takings is growing, and at the same time we are reducing the forces that are the cheapest for the state, but which contribute to the localization of all these undesirable phenomena. Is this reasonable?

They say that instead we will have highly professional contract soldiers. This is absurd. Who and where can I get the money for this? I am an expert in this matter, this is the topic of my doctoral dissertation. Even from the point of view of the country’s mobilization readiness, we cannot create a purely professional army.

The optimal proportion in the numerical ratio of the armed forces is 70 percent professionals and 30 percent conscripts. Then this proportion makes it possible to prepare the country’s mobilization resources in order to conduct military operations in the event of a large-scale conflict breaking out. Even Operation Desert Storm was not launched in a timely manner due to the unpreparedness of the personnel and lack of strength. Only the island position of the USA, England, and partly Canada, and the lack of fear of aggression on the territory of these countries, gives them the opportunity to have purely professional armies. All other countries are recruited according to a mixed principle.

We are also deprived of the opportunity to have a professional army. Internal troops cannot be reduced, they must be reformed.

V.N. But now the words reform and army reduction have become synonymous in the minds of many politicians.

A.K. This is the most important misconception, because of which I got into trouble after speaking at the Academy of Military Sciences. Then I said that reform presupposes a qualitative improvement in the country’s defense capability.

No matter how much they scold me, Rossiyskaya Gazeta was right when it stated that under Kulikov there were no widespread militants going beyond the designated limits. During my time, a representative of the President was not captured, a column of generals and officers of the General Staff was not shot. Because they were afraid, I constantly kept a flight of combat helicopters ready, and said that while I was in power and if troubles occurred, I would raise this flight and strike. It had to be done and I

So, firstly, we somehow prepared the internal troops for combat operations in Chechnya.

Secondly, we, with discipline, to some extent managed to turn the situation around. Compared to 1990–1992, there were significantly fewer cases of unauthorized abandonment of units. In our country this began to decline earlier than in the army.

This ended our first long conversation with Anatoly Sergeevich. The author hoped to continue building the narrative logically, following the course of the hero’s life and subsequent developments of events. However, life made its own changes.

Our next meeting took place only three months later, in November 1998. During this time, Anatoly Sergeevich gave a number of interviews in which interesting questions were raised. These stories of his, naturally, are not as consistent and detailed as the beginning of our essay, but they highlight important points. We first use these materials, which will either take us forward or bring us back. Then we’ll tell you about our own final conversations with Kulikov.

As in the essays about previous ministers, let us return to the events of September-October 1993 in Moscow. After all, Kulikov at that time was Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs - commander of the internal troops. It was under his leadership that the internal troops in the above-mentioned events acted exactly this way and not otherwise.

And in those hot days, and even today, many contradictory opinions are expressed on this matter. Let's listen to the commander himself, who talks with a correspondent in the summer of 1994. The text of the conversation is published in the book “Moscow. Autumn - 93. Chronicle of confrontation” (M., 1994).

INTERNAL TROOPS IN OCTOBER 1993

Conversation with the commander of the internal troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs

Colonel General A. S. KULIKOV

Corr. Tell us how the internal troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs acted in September - October 1993?

A.K. In accordance with Russian legislation, internal troops provide assistance to internal affairs bodies in protecting public order and ensuring security during various types of public events. Troops are not used to suppress unauthorized rallies, demonstrations, processions, etc. And only if these demonstrations and processions turn into mass riots are the troops used with all their means. During the September and October events of 1993 in Moscow, internal troops acted in strict accordance with the law. From September 21 to October 3, they assisted law enforcement agencies in maintaining public order, mainly in the White House area. The number of military personnel involved was between 400 and 500 people. Then, after September 27, when aggressiveness began to appear on the part of supporters and residents of the White House, when they began to demonstrate weapons and form armed units, it was decided to increase the number of units: the group of internal troops was increased to one and a half thousand people. There were approximately the same number of police forces.

In addition, the troops, given the worsening situation, continued to increase their forces to protect vital facilities. By October 3, the Ostankino television center, a television studio on Shabolovka and a number of others, including facilities with nuclear components.

On the third of October, Sunday, at approximately 13.25 - 13.30, I drove past Kaluga Square and saw that there were about 500 people there. Somewhere at 14.00 hours, the radio network of the divisions of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of Moscow and the Main Directorate for the Protection of Public Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation reported that 12 thousand had already gathered on Kaluga Square. Believe me, a military man, collecting 12 thousand in half an hour is very difficult. Even a division of 10 thousand people, which is in a state of full combat readiness, cannot be put on vehicles and sent to complete a mission in such a time. This is the first sign that the concentration of people here was not accidental. The fact that everything was prepared in advance is evidenced by this fact, recorded by video footage: militants walked ahead of the demonstrators with weapons in their hands.

At 2:30 p.m. there was a report on the radio that the police barrier had been broken through on the Crimean Bridge. The distance from the Kaluga outpost to the White House was about four kilometers; those gathered covered it in less than an hour. It is not easy to overcome this distance so quickly. Everything was prepared and planned - this now gives me no doubt.

Corr. Why did the militants sweep away the police chains?

A.K. Apparently, the possible option of a rapid onslaught of such a mass of people was not fully thought out. And the attempts of the police to stop her at different points - on the Crimean Bridge, on Zubovskaya and Smolenskaya Squares - were unsuccessful. There was a hope that it would be possible to stop the crowd step by step, but the consistent introduction of small forces into the barriers did not allow achieving the goal, especially

Corr. How were the personnel equipped?

A.K. The personnel of the internal troops until October 3 inclusive were in police uniform, with rubber sticks, with shields, some had helmets with a visor, body armor - and that’s all. The soldiers did not have any means of destruction. And of course, they could not resist the “triumphal march” of the militant crowd with weapons in their hands.

With the arrival of “reinforcements” at the White House, immediately after the “reunion”, the storming of City Hall began. She was captured. The Mir Hotel was also captured. By the way, 141 unarmed servicemen were captured at the mayor's office. They were escorted to the White House. There is no evidence that the soldiers were beaten, but there are video footage of them being kicked, slapped on the head, pushed with rifle butts. They were stripped, took off their shoes, and took away their bulletproof vests. Everyone was offered to go over to the White House side, but no one did. By the way, journalist Veronica Kutsillo writes in her book that the captured soldiers did not show any activity. Moreover, this

A.K. At 14.30, after the first breakthrough on the Crimean Bridge, sensing that the situation would develop in this way, I ordered the commander of the Vityaz special forces detachment, Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Lysyuk (he was in reserve), to move to the White House. Although he himself is still for sure; did not determine what task he would perform there.

Until 15.40 on October 3, the troops were in the position of providing assistance to the police, but from 15.30 there was a qualitative leap in the development of events. Internal troops and internal affairs bodies had to move from protecting public order to eliminating riots, as pogroms, arson, and seizure of buildings began.

It was pointless to use weapons in that situation: after all, the militants were in a crowd where there were many children, women, and elderly people.

It became obvious that it was necessary to immediately bring the personnel of the internal troops into a state adequate to the current situation: put them on armor, arm them and return them to the city to guard objects and fight armed groups. The Minister of Internal Affairs approved this decision, and the Vityaz detachment ensured the withdrawal of the main forces. These were the shots shown on television when the armored vehicles were leaving the White House,

By the end of the day, a regrouping and rearmament of troops took place, and OMSDON units consistently stepped up to strengthen the security of individual objects, especially since there were about ten more attempts to seize, including at the 3rd Yamskaya (reserve television studio), ITAR - TASS

At approximately 16.05. The Vityaz detachment received instructions from me via radio to move forward to strengthen the security of the Ostankino television complex. Having received this task, Lieutenant Colonel Lysyuk began advancing along Mira Avenue. On the avenue, he caught up with 11 heavy vehicles and large buses with people, reported that there were armed people, and asked me what to do, should I use weapons? Naturally, I gave the command not to use weapons, because

Lysyuk’s detachment entered from the northern side of the television complex, immediately broke through the fence, and occupied studio complex number one. Then, when General Golubets arrived at Ostankino and clarified the task on the spot, they moved through an underground passage with part of their forces to studio complex number three and occupied it, preparing a perimeter defense.

Makashov led about 500 people to the television center. Most of them were armed. Now some people write that there seemed to be nothing terrible there. But television footage recorded how people with machine guns led the crowd. Makashovites began to gather a crowd, block roads, stop trolleybuses, drive citizens out of there and concentrate people in order to take Ostankino under their cover. Knowing that the soldiers would not shoot at unarmed people, they decided to take the people en masse. This is such a barbaric tactic. The seizure of Ostankino, according to the White House expert group, was the main, culminating moment. We have documents that came after well-known events, where it is emphasized in bold type: we must seize “Ostankino” at any cost and go on air. As a last resort, disable the television center.

At approximately 18.30, the platoon commander and the head of the security guard at the television center came out to Makashov and warned him at the door of the third studio complex that a special forces detachment had arrived for security. The special forces took up defensive positions and will carry out the order. “Therefore,” said the senior lieutenant, “I am officially warning you, asking you to take the people away and not take any measures for the assault. If there is an assault, there will be return fire.” Makashov ignored the warning; moreover, he began to convince the military personnel that all internal troops had already gone over to the side of the White House - the last “remnants” were here.

As a military man, he could not help but know that an attempt to storm the television complex would be doomed to failure, blood would be shed, that a special forces unit consisted of people who knew how to use both special means and weapons. Nevertheless, he gave the command to make passages to studio complex number three. This was done with heavy trucks on the ground floor. Moreover, the action was covered by armed people. The cameraman of the “Vityaz” detachment filmed this moment from the inside. When we compare the filming of the French cameraman who was there and our filming, the same people with weapons in their hands are very clearly visible, how they lead

I heard a report from the detachment commander to General Golubets on the radio: “I see a grenade launcher ready.” The general reported this to the command post. At 19:10, Private Nikolai Sitnikov was killed by a shot from a grenade launcher. His death served as a signal for a response to defend the complex. I repeat, the command to shoot to kill was given only after Nikolai Sitnikov died. Ridiculous death! Because he was behind a concrete shelter, only his head... He was killed by a direct hit from the tail of a grenade in the neck.

Stanislav Govorukhin is completely wrong when he writes that the military were the first to fire a shot. It's a lie. The conscience of the internal troops is clear: we did not shoot first anywhere.

When Makashov arrived at the White House at 11 p.m. and reported that Ostankino had not been taken, the euphoria was replaced by shock. After all, everyone, including Khasbulatov, believed that Ostankino had been taken. Although, if the same Makashov, as a military specialist, had assessed in advance the futility of the plan, there might not have been blood at Ostankino.

A.K. The fact is that our units, just like the military units of the Ministry of Defense, were harvesting potatoes. On September 23, I recalled the soldiers from the fields. At that time, OMSDON was less than 60 percent staffed. You already know the number of objects we protect. And therefore, the maximum that we could recruit was two thousand people. And of course, the Ministry of Internal Affairs could not do without additional help from army units. Apparently, the President took this circumstance into account when making his decision.

Corr. Why didn't they storm the White House at night?

A.K. If we had information, as it later became known, that by three o’clock in the morning there was already panic there, it would probably have been possible for special forces units to take its “inhabitants” with a decisive onslaught and swift actions. And then we wouldn’t have had to open fire on the blocked building and there wouldn’t have been those casualties.

The death of one person is already a tragedy. Many people say that there, in the White House, there were hundreds, thousands of people killed, they were supposedly taken out at night, and so on - all this is not true. From about 5 p.m. on October 4, I appointed Major General Arkady Baskaev as commandant of the White House. According to his report, 40 corpses were collected that night, another 19 victims were found near Ostankino. According to my calculations, the figure in the press (150 – 160 people) is close to the truth.

Corr. Why wasn't aviation used?

A.K. Three of our helicopters conducted reconnaissance, but we did not set ourselves the task of landing troops on the roof of the White House, since there were snipers on the neighboring houses. And if someone says that they did not exist, it is not true. Major General Anatoly Romanov, my deputy, who was personally there, from the Rochdelskaya side

To land troops on such a point would mean killing people. Therefore, we monitored the situation, the division commander reported to me, and I reported to the minister. The general panorama was captured on video, we have these frames.

Corr. What betrayal did Vasilyev, the former commander of an operational brigade, commit?

A.K. At 14.30 on October 3, I assigned the task to the commander of the Moscow District of Internal Troops to bring free reserves to the White House, again with one goal - to prevent bloodshed here. About 150 people arrived here, led by Colonel Vasiliev. He and his subordinates were in reserve in the area of ​​the Mir Hotel.

As Vasilyev later explained to me, they opened fire on the brigade personnel, wounded people appeared, and he turned to Rutskoi: “Please don’t shoot, I’m going over to your side.” That is, from his words it turned out that he wanted to deceive Rutsky and thereby avoid losses. And he actually left with some of the unarmed military personnel into the crowd near the White House. The officers and soldiers who followed him thought that they were going to strengthen the military chain of OMSDON, and they in turn believed, as we later found out, that the “Sofrintsy” were coming to their aid. What happened was the opposite: Vasiliev disengaged the crowd, which then united and stormed the Mir Hotel. It was at this moment, at 15.45, when Vasiliev was leading his unit towards the White House, that someone fired at his unit, and not earlier, as they write about it in the press, in particular in the newspaper “Zavtra”. In fact, it was the fact that he led people there that caused someone to use a weapon. Whom? I cannot say for sure today, because even the prosecutor’s office has not yet determined this, but five people were wounded.

Vasiliev’s betrayal did not end there. The fact is that even before the assault on Ostankino, at about 6 p.m., I personally talked to him on the phone. Vasiliev gave his explanations. I, not knowing the truth, believed him and asked: “Are you able to continue performing the task, do you have any problems?”

“Comrade commander, I will complete any task,” was the answer.

After that, I clarified the task: “Now General Golubets will approach you, take weapons for those soldiers who are at Ostankino, you are at his disposal for the defense of Ostankino, Makashov has gone there with the militants.” Vasiliev clearly reported: “Yes!”

General Golubets entrusted him with the defense of the first studio complex, and he and the “Vityaz” detachment moved to defend the third studio complex. Vasiliev arrived at Ostankino with ammunition and weapons for his unarmed 180 people who had previously been sent there.

But as soon as General Golubets went to the third studio complex, Vasiliev, abandoning his people, who lay under fire, hid with weapons and ammunition two kilometers from Ostankino. I couldn't find him for three and a half hours. Then, nevertheless, he indicated his presence on the radio through the commander of the Moscow District of Internal Troops. I called them and, in the presence of members of the Military Council, told Vasiliev: “You deserve a tribunal.” He began to explain what had happened by his cowardice, tearfully asked to trust him, said that he would wash away the shame with blood, etc. I removed him and assigned the command of the brigade personally to the commander of the Moscow District troops.

Initially, after the incident, the brigade was in reserve on the territory of one of the regiments of the Moscow District of Internal Troops. And from 16:00 on October 4, she was already carrying out the task of protecting the White House on her own. All other units, including units of the Ministry of Defense, were withdrawn from there.

Then we conducted an investigation, talked with all the officers, warrant officers, and soldiers. Vasiliev and his deputy Enyagin began to blame each other, which caused the indignation of all officers. Formally, Vasiliev and Enyagin could be put on trial. But, given that there were no harmful consequences, that not a single soldier, not a single officer supported either Vasiliev or his deputy, we limited ourselves to their dismissal from the troops.

By the way, all this was confirmed by explanatory notes written by them themselves and by their colleagues, and they did not deny this at the Military Council.

Corr. What are they doing now?

A.K. They showed me the newspaper “Zavtra”, where Captain Vladislav Shurygin describes the content of the conversation at the Military Council. And there was no one there except these two. Apparently, one of them voiced what was written, trying to whitewash himself and present himself as a hero. And, as I know, both are currently working for the former people’s deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Russia A. Korovnikov, now the president of the Russian Social Development Fund “Vozrozhdenie”, vice-president of the Russian Financial-Industrial Group, who took an active part in protecting the White House .

Corr. Why do the media accuse the internal affairs bodies and internal troops of losing control, retreating, etc.?

A.K. When we are reproached for losing control, for failing to complete a task, for being late for Ostankino, and for other “sins,” I always give two arguments in response. Were you late or not late, did you act correctly or incorrectly, did you lose control or not? The first is that not a single one of the vital facilities guarded by internal troops, plus over 80 more facilities guarded by internal affairs bodies, was captured by militants. And there were 11 such attempts only at facilities guarded by troops. Second, not a single Makashovite set foot on the territory of the studio complex.

At B.N. Yeltsin’s book “Notes of the President” contains a mention that he received information that the first floor of Ostankino had been captured. That night they often called me and said: there is information that a battle is already taking place on the fourth floor. It turned out that on the fourth floor of the first complex, a policeman, as a result of careless handling of a weapon, wounded himself in the arm with a burst of four cartridges. And one of the engineering and technical workers thought that the “Makashovites” were actually already on the fourth floor. I repeat, not a single militant set foot inside the complex.

Were you late, did you act correctly? Ensured the task was completed - yes!

As for command and control of troops and police. I know that not for a minute did I lose control of either the General Headquarters, created by the minister, or the headquarters of the internal troops. Moreover, where several units and units were operating, for example, from the Moscow District of Internal Troops and OMSDON, an auxiliary command post was created, as it should be. I sent General Golubets to Ostankino, he led the defense there. General Romanov was sent to the White House area on the morning of October 3,

Corr. There is also a question regarding the general lack of coordination between the internal troops, police, army, etc.

A.K. In the second half of the night we were given a task for the upcoming actions. The operations were carried out by completely different units from the Moscow region. The classic option: after a decision is made, reconnaissance is carried out to clarify the tasks on the ground. But here, almost everything

Corr. What is the general assessment of the role of internal troops in suppressing an armed rebellion?

A.K. Probably, it still needs to be said that the troops completed their task. They did not deviate one line, not one letter from the law, by the way, adopted by the same Supreme Council of the Russian Federation on September 23, 1992. I repeat, our conscience before the people is clear. We did not open fire first. The use of weapons was targeted. There was no continuous fire zone, which could have caused unnecessary casualties. Although formally signs of mass unrest appeared much earlier, with the events at the Crimean Bridge, when there was a clear break in the police line, with the storming of the mayor's office and the Mir Hotel, we still hoped for prudence. The death of people is on the conscience of those who demanded and called for the storming of Ostankino.

Of course, we have learned certain lessons and conclusions for ourselves. They analyzed the situation, held a press conference for the public and the press on October 7, 1993, and said that they were ready to report to any, including international, experts on the activities of the troops in September - October 1993. We have nothing to hide, everything is on the surface. The sacred duty of the troops is what they did. Whether it suits someone or not. There will be another commander, there will be another general sitting here - the troops will still carry out such tasks. They are designed for this.

Unfortunately, we are not succeeding so quickly in correcting or correcting the identified miscalculations as a result of these events. We have already made changes to the organizational structure of the troops, we are changing tactics and weapons somewhat, and we are introducing a number of other purely military-technical changes. Who could then imagine that in the conditions of a large city it would be necessary to use weapons and military equipment?

We were ready to release hostages, eliminate armed criminals somewhere in a separate building, a separate area, blockade areas, etc. But they did not expect to conduct combat operations in the city. But “Ostankino” was stormed not by a peaceful demonstration, but by armed professional military men from the same Terekhov Officers’ Union, although some people are spreading the lie to the masses that “Ostankino”’s hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher ended up in the hands of someone who couldn’t shoot at all.

They completed the task without any hesitation. Unfortunately, we lost five people killed, and then senior lieutenant Mikhailov, the sixth, died. About a hundred people were injured and suffered various types of injuries. We very much regret this, deeply mourn and sympathize with everyone who lost their relatives and friends in this conflict.

We have all the documents, all the instructions, all the orders, all the telegrams. All oral orders are confirmed by corresponding entries in the combat logs.

I would also like to say that parliamentarians arrived from there and offered to go over to the side of the Supreme Council. For me, as a military man, for a professional, as a commander, it was clear that if one of the other commanders, not necessarily of the internal troops, but of the military districts, had said that he was going over to the side of the Supreme Council, the country would begin there would be a civil war. Therefore, in that situation, in no case should one succumb to momentary emotions, but it was necessary to see the possible consequences for Russia.

And I am very glad that not a single member of the Military Council of the Internal Troops, not a single general, had a different point of view. Everyone at the Military Council was given freedom of choice in their actions.

I cannot say that we are outside politics. That's not how I would pose the question. We are beyond any party affiliation. But the internal troops themselves are essentially internal political troops; we are obliged to ensure the safety of the population. This is our policy. Let the opposition use any

July 1994

Later, already in 1998, a REN TV correspondent on the same issue will ask Kulikov the same questions.

Corr. Did you receive any reproaches or reprimands for the actions of the Sofrinsky brigade under the leadership of Vasiliev in October 1993?

A.K. No, I was not reproached. Today it is difficult to judge or punish such people. After all, besides Vasiliev, there were dozens of high-ranking generals and officers who were at a loss. They, like bosses, were thinking about whether or not to carry out incoming commands. Here a complex psychological factor comes into play, when even the most trained general can withstand the situation, not to mention lower-level commanders, brigade, regimental or battalion.

I repeat, I did not receive any reproaches. The Main Directorate of Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation is an operational-strategic command and control unit. There are quite experienced and respectable people there who are able to assess what happened and draw the necessary conclusions. We did not crave reprisals against Vasiliev; I felt sorry for him as an officer. In other situations he showed himself well, but not everyone can understand the conditions of such political shortcomings. After all, even today, after five years, many people give an ambiguous assessment of the events of 1993. Many people accuse us and ask why you, internal troops, shot at Ostankino? I have had to explain the situation many times already. And if an angry crowd (we have video footage of this, where there are also heated fascist thugs) went to destroy everything, what could happen? They are destroying the television complex and rushing inside. This begins what is called a civil war.

Corr. What is it like now, in 1998? Do you think that the situation is now stable enough to prevent a repeat of what happened in 1993?

A.K. I repeat that then the motives, circumstances and reasons were completely different. Although I still consider the situation to be quite serious and explosive. I would not exaggerate this danger to the point of being catastrophic, but at the same time, in contrast to some political observers and political scientists, I would not downplay it. The situation, especially outside Moscow, in the outback, is quite tense, complex and serious. But this is from a different area, from the area of ​​the need for the government to take measures. I hope that such measures will be taken, and some things are already being done.

Corr. And still. In 1991 and 1993, the internal troops found themselves on the side of, well, let’s say, the legitimate authorities, the President of Russia. And now, when the army and other law enforcement agencies find themselves in such a difficult situation, couldn’t it turn out that the army, internal troops, internal affairs officers will take neutrality in the worst case scenario?

A.K. It is difficult to predict the actions of these forces in a difficult situation, and I did not want such events to actually occur.

The army, police, internal troops will act if antisocial manifestations are associated with pogroms and so on. But I have not only no confidence, but also a great doubt that these forces will unconditionally act to disperse, say, political demonstrations or other acts of civil disobedience. Yes indeed

But one thing is clear: there will be no unconditional repetition of 1993 on the part of the command staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or other law enforcement agencies. Life has shown that these power structures were not always then protected by the state, by the authorities that directed them to perform certain tasks.

Five years have passed since those events of 1993. Recently I walked several times through those places from the White House to the Krasnopresnenskaya metro station. In numerous red and black leaves hung on trees, in photographs of the dead, in constantly updated leaflets and inscriptions here and today, at every step there is grief, sadness, tears, calls for vengeance.

Such a bitter page in people's memory will live for a long time.

The next difficult page in the life of both the country and Kulikov - first as commander of the internal troops, and then as minister of internal affairs - is the war in Chechnya.

As in the essay about Erin, we do not undertake to reveal a complete and consistent picture of the entire complex of issues related to this war. But to ask one of the main participants in these events with passion - this opportunity presented itself to me and Kulikov’s other interlocutors.

Here are questions from various people and his answers.

Television correspondent. Anatoly Sergeevich, in one of the programs you called yourself a person of Caucasian nationality. What did it mean to you to be born in the Caucasus, serve there, and then fight?

A.K. And that's what was said. I do not separate myself from the Caucasus: I was born there, studied there, grew up. Most of the service took place there. But besides purely official relations and functions, there is also such a thing as homeland. For me this is the Stavropol region, the Caucasus. Everything that happened and is happening there is especially painful for a person born in the Caucasus. I understand those politicians, those people who are dealing with this problem today, for example Abdulatipov. He perceives everything that happens on this earth more acutely and more painfully than others. This is what was meant.

Corr. This means that you think that today’s politicians have some misunderstanding of the problems and processes that are taking place there.

A.K. In order to effectively solve the problems of the Caucasus, you need to know this region well. Practice has shown: when the negotiation process was conducted by people from Moscow, alternating with each other and completely unaware of the specifics, each time again and again somehow growing into the situation, it did not bring success. The opposite side during the negotiations only became abusive. This was even more advantageous for prolonging negotiations.

Corr. When did preparations begin for sending troops into Chechnya?

A.K. I would leave the answer to this question outside of our conversation, since I believe that the time has not yet come for it. I can only say the following. We, the internal troops, already in 1991 after Dudayev came to power, then in 1992 and especially in 1993, felt that we would have to fight there and restore order. In the spring of 1993, I sent my reconnaissance group there not to conduct military reconnaissance, but to document on video all the outrages that were then happening in Chechnya. And they did it.

Eyewitnesses then said simply wild things. I subsequently tried to show this to federal leaders and to prepare public opinion. We felt that we would have to act, and people should know the whole truth about the real situation in Chechnya, see not only the signboard of the so-called national

And Dudayev acted quite skillfully in working with the federal media. Subsequently, we began to receive Dudayev’s documents, including those where it was proposed to allocate a million dollars for work with the media.

Corr. But they say that it seems to be a fake. Or were these real documents?

A.K. I believe that these were real documents that I saw myself as a primary source. I don’t want to say that many media workers were corrupt, but I have no doubt that this happened.

Corr. Please tell us about your son’s participation in the fighting in Chechnya. Did you know that he was one of the first to enter there?

A.K. Firstly, I never made any exceptions for my sons. The son transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the internal troops literally before these events, in October 1994. Their division operated in one of the main sectors, and their son was sent there as a liaison officer. I found out about this a few days later. He didn’t tell me about it himself and asked his superiors not to report it. Then I became aware

On New Year's Day 1995 I visited him. Maybe some thought that the commander of the troops had come to pick up his son and take him out of there. However, I handed him a sweater, a loaf of sausage, a bottle of vodka, a bulletproof vest, said: “Fight, son, continue to carry out the task,” and I flew off to another formation. I am glad that my children have never let me down, and I am proud of them.

Corr. How did your wife take it?

A.K. We tried for a long time to hide this fact from her. Then I told her that don’t worry, everything is fine, he’s under supervision, don’t worry. She is a mother, they tried to protect her as best they could. She, of course, showed concern. In general, it would not be difficult for me to translate it from there. But she understood everything and didn’t pose the question that way. My children and wife were raised in a different spirit.

Corr. For you, as the commander of the internal troops, and then the minister of internal affairs, what episode or period was the most difficult in the Chechen war?

A.K. Perhaps from the end of December 1994, with the beginning of the assault on Grozny, until approximately January 10, 1995. It was the most difficult time. People came from the depths of the country to participate in the war, there were great casualties, the greatest losses.

Corr. Now many sources and analytical studies say that before the start of hostilities in Chechnya, insufficient reconnaissance was carried out and the enemy was underestimated. Still, why could this happen?

A.K. This is probably one of the reasons for the failure. After all, the army then practically did not engage in reconnaissance on the territory of one of the federal subjects, and it should not have done so. The army is not intended to operate within the country, but to repel the aggressor and subsequent defeat on its territory. All intelligence agencies are aimed at this.

At the same time, I think that this is one of the omissions of the General Staff. He understood that part of the territory was being seized from Russia, but he did not carry out this work properly. As subsequent events showed, by the time hostilities began, neither the General Staff nor other structures knew the true state of affairs. Due to certain circumstances, the internal troops and the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a whole did not have any intelligence agencies. There was no reconnaissance as such, because the tasks performed by the troops and the police were absolutely unrelated to this. The internal affairs bodies have so-called operational-search activities, but they are related to the prevention and detection of criminal activities

So here there was a miscalculation not only of the General Staff, but also of the country’s political leadership. I repeat that there were all signs of the separation of part of the territory from the state, and this is already a threat to the territorial integrity of the country. Therefore, the Federal Security Service in the first place, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the part that concerns it, and the army had to conduct this reconnaissance, to know the true circumstances of what was happening in Chechnya. But this was not done and, I repeat, was one of the reasons for our failures

If other such military-technical reasons are considered, then this is the lack of preparation of all federal forces for such actions. No one thought of fighting on their own territory with their own people. This is not an easy matter. And the tactics of actions on the part of illegal armed groups do not fit into any statutory provisions. Neither the army nor other forces, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were prepared to conduct such a guerrilla war.

There was also unpreparedness of public opinion and a number of other factors. All this together led to this outcome. And the most important thing in the end is the lack of practical will of the country’s leadership. Even when it was necessary to bring the matter to an end, such will was absent.

Let me remind you that almost by June 1995, the entire territory, all regions of Chechnya were under the control of federal forces. But, starting in April 1995, when a number of successful operations were carried out to liberate Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Nazhayurt, Vedeno, and other areas, a large socio-political campaign had to be carried out

No one followed the troops to Chechnya. Everyone thought that it would be like in Germany: they would appoint a commandant there and everything would go well. But we couldn’t even appoint a commandant, because neither then nor today there is a law on a state of emergency. It’s absurd: the country lives in emergency conditions, but has no law on a state of emergency. Hence the prevalence of terrorist acts, militants, and murders of our people

It is no coincidence that I insisted on clarifying the concept of a rebellious territory in which federal laws are not implemented. Such legislation should have been adopted immediately. This should have been done by the Federal Assembly and the President. It was necessary to clearly outline the framework that would allow federal forces to operate in Chechnya. Outside this framework, normal life should have gone on and the negotiation process should have continued. This was not done. They sent a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, General Shevtsov, there and that was it. This is a wonderful person, a good officer, my classmate at the General Staff Academy. But he shouldn’t be in charge there. At a minimum, there should be the main one, either the Deputy Prime Minister of the government or the representative of the President, in charge of this problem. What is needed today is not so much interaction between law enforcement agencies (this, thank God, has already been learned), but rather ensuring interaction between federal ministries and departments. But this doesn't happen. And if the cause is not eliminated, the consequences will continue for a long time.

Corr. And yet, your forecast for the development of events in Chechnya.

A.K. They are developing here the way I predicted to Maskhadov himself back in February 1995, when, on my own initiative, I sat with him, Gelayev and Basayev at the negotiating table. I said then: “If you and I, Aslan, don’t stop this war today, it will continue for a long time. Even if we imagine that you remain in power here, you will still fight among yourself.” Unfortunately, this is what happened. The situation there will never go in the desired direction as long as thousands of people wield weapons uncontrollably. I think that Maskhadov himself is not able to overcome this situation; he needs help. Maskhadov needs to find more support within the republic, as well as gain support from Chechens living outside Chechnya. By the way, without their influence, without forming these Chechens not into some kind of opposition, but into supporters, sensible leaders on Maskhadov’s side, success will not be achieved. But this is difficult and, perhaps, not very realistic.

I think that in Chechnya itself the worst events are yet to come. And the most dangerous thing for the Russian Federation is that some of those forces that would not like the crisis to be resolved for the better are working very seriously outside of Chechnya. In particular, in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and a number of other Muslim republics. Not a single terrorist act that occurs in Dagestan and other places can be considered without the influence of “frostbitten” militants from Chechnya. They themselves do not deny this.

Corr. In your opinion, is it possible that in some critical situation Maskhadov himself will call the federal center for help and troops will be sent there again?

A.K. I think that such a period will probably not come. It is unlikely that Maskhadov will ask to send troops. Again, I’ll go back to February 1995. I then told Maskhadov that you would not be able to cope with the bandit formations on your own; you would still need federal forces to help you. As they say, God willing. But Maskhadov needs help, if not by sending troops, then in matters of logistics, as well as specialists. We previously suggested that he hire good specialists there as consultants and advisors.

It is no secret that since 1991, eight years ago, the personnel potential in Chechnya has been depleted. It does not have a personnel training system either in the internal affairs bodies or in the security agencies. Everything is limited to field experience and the remaining personnel, a significant part of which left the republic. There is now a large shortage of operational workers and other specialists. I, as the Minister of Internal Affairs, understood this myself and heard such requests from them themselves even earlier, when the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic was formed in the governments of Khodzhiev, Avturkhamov, Zavgaev. We suggested that they assign certain constituent entities of the Russian Federation to each region of Chechnya so that they would help them provide the internal affairs bodies with transport, organizational and special equipment.

It is impossible to send personnel from these federal subjects there today, since things are going downhill, especially with hostage-taking and human trafficking. From the first facts of the capture of people, we said that it was unacceptable to pay money for their release. As soon as the money came in, they realized that this was one of the sources for securing criminal proceeds.

Corr. To develop your thoughts: Do you believe that the last releases of soldiers from captivity, in which the well-known Berezovsky participated, and on the part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Rushailo, cost no money?

A.K. I don't believe there was no money. But I'm glad that people are freed. Of course, some part, based on the political situation, may be and was released, including in exchange for the release of persons in custody in Russia. I have dealt with such matters myself. We compiled lists of such persons and coordinated them with the prosecutor's office. We looked at who could be released to be exchanged for our people in Chechnya.

I continue to talk about Chechen affairs with Kulikov when we meet. One feels that he doesn’t really want to talk about the details of the company’s progress, our successes and purely military miscalculations. But there was so much in the media on this topic.

V.N. How did 1995 begin for you and how did subsequent events develop?

A.K. From January 26, 1995, by decision of the Security Council, although the decree was not issued until April 3, until July 1995, I served as commander of the joint group of federal forces in the Caucasus. On April 3, 1995, an official decree was issued on my appointment, and on July 6, 1995, on my appointment as minister. With my assumption of command, we established a normal methodology for assessing the situation and making decisions to defeat gangs. The work went well. I had good contacts and mutual understanding with groups of the Ministry of Defense, with all the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There were no problems in this regard. Gudermes, Shali, Argun were classically taken. The summer campaign was also quite successful. By mid-June 199

V.N. Excuse me, but can you tell us about the initial period of action, what we did this way and what we didn’t do that way? In the essay about Erin, we said that the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in general, was drawn by the course of events into carrying out tasks unusual for it, into conducting full-scale combat operations?

A.K. But if you follow this logic, then the Ministry of Defense has the right to say that they are intended to protect the country from an external aggressor. This is where I accuse the General Staff of the fact that it should have conducted active reconnaissance together with the FSB, and when it comes to seizing part of the territory, then for the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff it no longer matters who is trying to seize this territory - an external aggressor or separatist forces within, as it really was in Chechnya. But the General Staff not only did not engage in such work in advance, but also pushed away the planning of troop actions when the events had already begun.

So here it is. By mid-June 1995, the issue of control of the territory in Chechnya had been largely resolved. But this served as a reason for Basayev to carry out a terrorist raid in Budennovsk. If it were not for the intervention of politicians in its final resolution, the outcome could have been different. I think this final decision is fundamentally wrong. It was impossible to let them out of Budennovsk. It was necessary to carefully prepare the assault. Perhaps such an operation would not have been as successful as desired. But at least on the spot it was necessary to lead the forces, to convince both Chernomyrdin and the President not to let the terrorists leave the city, because this subsequently inspired them for a long time. Hence March 1996, with the attempt to capture Grozny, and August 1996, when Grozny was practically captured, not without the help of federal representatives. They had already fled from there by August 13, and then signed this Khasavyurt agreement and inspired the rebels. The swan flew in and gave the command to stop all forces. Although neither he, nor the Minister of Defense Rodionov, nor the Chief of the General Staff raised a finger in response to my repeated telegrams to send two army regiments to relieve the internal troops along the perimeter of Grozny. The idea was to use army forces to block the rebels, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to act inside. For this purpose, I sent 2.5 thousand people to Grozny immediately on August 6 after receiving information about militants entering the city.

The reason for the release of the positions held by Erin and Stepashin was the outcome of the Budyonnovsk tragedy. Apparently, I was appointed minister because they took into account the experience of commanding forces in the Caucasus. So I think. Chernomyrdin told me approximately the same thing in a conversation when he invited me to his place on July 3.

After I was appointed to the post of minister, I returned again to Grozny, as I was a participant in the negotiation process. The negotiations were difficult, but still proceeded with great benefit for the federal center. We managed to sign a unique military agreement on the military block of issues. But our partners behaved very insidiously. For example, the document contained a reference to the Law on Defense of the Russian Federation. They begged to remove two letters “RF” from the text, citing the fact that this is already clear, Chechnya does not have its own defense law, and the mention of the Russian Federation irritates the militants. When we agreed and excluded this mention of the Russian Federation, then overnight they printed on paper some of their own defense laws and began to say that the document contained a reference to the defense law of the Chechen Republic. This is an obvious fraud, the partners behaved undignifiedly. It was clear that the outcome of the negotiations was influenced by the elements of the field commanders, and not by common sense in the interests of the entire Chechen population.

Dudayev very seriously influenced the course of negotiations. We signed the agreement at night at 4:12 am on July 31, 1995. They, however, said that they again needed to go to Dudayev for a consultation, but I simply told them that I would not let you out of here, because if you leave, the agreement will not be signed. Stop fooling around. Negotiations have already been going on for 45 days. Then Shirvani Basayev left alone and returned with the project in the morning. They conferred some more, but then were forced to sign. The negotiations took place at the OSCE mission in Grozny.

They categorically did not want to sign an agreement on the political block of issues. Dudayev prevented this mainly because the discussion was about the status of Chechnya. We proposed not to discuss the status now, but nevertheless to continue to consider Chechnya a subject of the Russian Federation. They were categorically against it.

There is no legal concept of deferred status in international law. That is why it did not arise then. If such a definition had arisen then, perhaps we would have come to an agreement on this issue. This would be the best option.

V.N. Today it is already the end of 1998. If we try to somehow enlarge our conversation, then what did we do more or less normally in Chechnya, and what was wrong?

A.K. We suggested that Maskhadov leave two brigades of our troops in Chechnya - one from the Ministry of Defense, the other from the internal troops, so that they would help them in establishing a civilized order in the republic. But they refused.

As for today, until the federal government, both the legislative and the executive, and the President have decided on the essence of this conflict, the problem cannot be solved. It was not by chance that I proposed introducing the concept of “rebellious territory.” I don’t like the word “rebellious territory,” let’s replace it with “territory where federal laws do not apply.” What is unnatural here if this is what actually happens? To do this, the State Duma needs to determine the area, the border, that is, give legal norms to all forces involved in resolving this conflict. It is necessary to define the boundaries outside of which normal life occurs. Including for the republic in terms of the economy, transport, railways, oil, electricity, training, personnel and so on. That is, first determine those areas where everything is working normally, as for all subjects of the Federation, but at the same time determine the scope where it is abnormal. For example, movement at night is limited, strict control is carried out to prevent terrorist attacks, the number of checkpoints is limited, and so on. This is what it should be. Without this, the federal forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs cannot work normally. What is illogical and unreasonable about this?

No. They attacked and believe that I am a hawk, a representative of the war party. But in my opinion, these are elementary military-technical problems that need to be solved. But no one wants to solve them. Some people don’t know how to do it and don’t know how to do it. Others, due to their provincialism, are not able to understand this. They don’t know what the Caucasus is, what war is. The official sits somewhere close to those in power and juggles ideas that are far from reality. This is what we are talking about.

There are international terrorist centers in the world: in the Near and Middle East, even in Albania, in Tirana. But we naively think that there is no such work in Chechnya or Dagestan. You have to be narrow-minded people not to understand such things. But aren’t Khattab with his group and terrorist training agencies branches of such centers? Are all the actions to capture people, including the representative of President Vlasov, the murder of generals already this year, 1998, not their doing? By the way, until March

Until these issues are resolved regarding Chechnya, there will be no sense.

V.N. There are approximately three groups of reviews about your work as both minister and deputy prime minister. The first say that Kulikov is a great guy, he did what the situation forced him to decide in the first place, he achieved certain successes in the fight against crime, in maintaining law and order, in Chechnya, and on other issues. Others say that he worked in general, did some things, but did not particularly show himself. Still others say that the wrong person came. They appointed a soldier to the police who knows nothing about the activities of the internal affairs bodies. He planted his own people around, the crazy militarization of the police began, and so on.

What would you say to all these opponents? What did you manage to achieve from your plans, and what did you fail?

You have already said that Chechnya remains in limbo. The fight against corruption has also only just been proclaimed. This is a big national problem with many components. There is, among other things, a police role in tackling this problem. But, probably, the police are not the main ones here?

A.K. Any leader at the top, I don’t know who it will be - Ivanov, Petrov, Sidorov, Yeltsin, Primakov, Luzhkov - anyone who comes to the top, to the political Olympus, will not achieve final positive results if he does not eradicate and destroy the causes of corruption. This niche will be free. If you don’t create an anti-corruption government commission, which will temporarily subordinate special forces and resources from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, and the foreign intelligence service, that is, practically what I tried to do as Deputy Prime Minister, this problem will not be solved. The country will go downhill. Today, the scale of corruption is even difficult to imagine. Thank God that most citizens of the country do not know this scale. If they knew what was going on, they would be horrified.

I think that law enforcement comes last in the fight against corruption. The President and the Federation Council are constantly returning the law on corruption, which has already passed three readings in the Duma. The same thing applies to the law on legalization of illegal income. Sometimes we, law enforcement agencies, are told that the Criminal Code has an article on corruption, so use it. But that's not what this is about. The Corruption Law is not a criminal law. This is a law that excludes the prerequisites and conditions of a given phenomenon. It should talk about political and economic measures to combat this evil. And only then does the criminal law come into force.

You ask what the Ministry of Internal Affairs managed to do. I'll start with this. The troops have clear parameters for the procedure for inspecting formations, formations, units and subunits. There, after a certain time, all types of activities are checked, ranging from combat and mobilization readiness to military service. In the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a whole, in the internal affairs bodies, nothing like this exists. They send a group to inspect a region, but there is no order on the parameters of the inspection or any final assessments. No one even knows what rating to give to the organ: only satisfactory or unsatisfactory or something else.

V.N. But today there are no such strict criteria in, say, justice, public education authorities, or other bodies. After all, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is an intermediate organization between military and non-military.

A.K. Sorry, I was neither the Minister of Justice nor of Public Education. This should be asked from the relevant managers. But from childhood, for example, I remember that when inspecting any district department of public education, an open lesson is always held. And we, the children, knew about this, sat, worried, so as not to let the teacher down. We already knew the methodology for conducting this lesson.

In the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whether it is a military or non-military organization, everyone wears shoulder straps. Officers receive exactly the same amount for their rank as in the Ministry of Defense.

V.N. This was invented artificially. Employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with the exception of the internal troops, are not military personnel, and their ranks are not military, but special. These titles have been equalized in terms of pay in modern times.

A.K. I repeat: the Ministry of Internal Affairs, this important organization, does not have clear criteria and many were happy with this. This was liked by those who were not used to answering. It was easy to get sidetracked. I, as a military man, could not allow this. Besides, according to my horoscope, I am a Virgo and I love order.

For these purposes, I first created a headquarters. And not from the point of view of the militarization of all activities or militarization, as I was accused. It was about giving the Ministry of Internal Affairs a clear management system in order to achieve its goals in combating crime in the country. What's happened

V.N. The discussion on the issue of headquarters in the Ministry of Internal Affairs has been going on for 4 years. I remember how Shchelokov warmly and vividly said to Foreign Minister Gromyko: “How do you manage without a headquarters? It is a necessary control element in every large system.” But then, under successive ministers, headquarters in the Ministry of Internal Affairs either disappeared or reappeared, but not for long. With your departure, the Main Headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as you know, was abolished and reorganized into the Main Organizational and Inspectorate Directorate.

A.K. I am absolutely convinced that headquarters in the Ministry of Internal Affairs are necessary. Even now the heads of regional bodies confirm this to me; it has become easier for them to work. There is no need to make it a secret when we will inspect this or that body. There was an established procedure in the troops when the inspected unit was informed about this 10 days before the start. It is nonsense. When I came to lead the internal troops, I abolished this order. It's no longer a secret. In December of each year, we approved the inspection plan for the next year at the Military Council and announced it to the districts, formations, and so on. In the same way, we began to announce to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation which bodies were to be inspected. Based on this, the leaders pull themselves together, meet with the governors, and have time to correct something somewhere. This is not done for show, but to create normal conditions. And we managed to do something in this regard, starting in Moscow. The Operational Regimental Directorate, the Research Institute of Special Equipment and others were well placed. We received at least 150 new modern facilities thanks to the fact that we interacted well with Luzhkov and the Moscow government, and that we did not sit in offices. I did not leave the Government and the Ministry of Finance, just like the Deputy Minister for Logistics, General Durbazhev. And there were results.

V.N. Please tell us about the fate of the Deputy Minister for Logistics, Colonel General Durbazhev. He was facing serious charges. The press reported that during a search, a million dollars in cash was seized from his safe.

A.K. Durbazhev is a normal, honest, decent person. About a million dollars - it's all a lie and deception. The criminal case will be dropped. They contacted other people there. Yes, Durbazhev had his own money, which at that time was spent by bosses and higher up at high interest rates.

However, let's finish talking about inspection.

The fact that we managed to create an order on the procedure for such work is good. The order has not been canceled even now.

V.N. But the General Staff is no longer there.

A.K. This is very bad.

V.N. And the rear headquarters is no longer there, but again there is the Economic Directorate.

A.K. You can call it whatever you want. The main thing is to streamline all management activities.

I am, however, concerned about the voices now being heard calling for the abolition of already tested criteria for assessing the activities of authorities, such as, for example, the crime detection rate. You can abandon the old when new criteria have been invented. But there are none yet.

It's exactly the same as in the troops. You, as a military man, know that there is such a gradation of illegal phenomena: an emergency, a crime, a gross violation of military discipline, and other violations. There is no need to execute a commander because he records violations, punishes people for them, fights against these violations, thereby preventing crimes and emergencies, although no one is immune from this either. A demanding commander should not be punished just because he has more violations of discipline than his neighbor. The commander can be punished only for real omissions where he is to blame.

Likewise, the crime detection rate does not provide grounds for removing or not removing the head of an agency from office. You can start registering everything from the theft of slippers to serious injuries, and you should thank such a boss for this, although his detection rate will be low. Another leader, who is rubbing his glasses, will formally have a higher detection rate, but criminals do not allow people to live in peace. This is what we need to ask our bosses for, and not abandon the criterion of solving crimes.

They seem to be trying to take the public’s feedback on the work of the police as a new criterion.

V.N. But how to quantify this indicator?

A.K. Absolutely right. Finding objective criteria for such an indicator is not easy or even impossible. For example, a policeman at the post of a former traffic policeman took 100 rubles as a bribe. Based on this, some people conclude that the entire police force is corrupt, but this is not true. The opinion that the police is one of the most corrupt structures is erroneous. Strange as it may sound, this is the purest structure in law enforcement. I don’t dare to assess current affairs in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, this is not my business, I think it’s incorrect, but I can talk about the past. When I was a minister, I was responsible for the cleanliness of every deputy minister of internal affairs, every head of the main department, every minister of the republic, the head of the Main Department of Internal Affairs - the Department of Internal Affairs. There was not a single case of any of them becoming mired in criminal connections. Yes, there were cases when they received money from the administration, built apartments, and gave it to their close associates. This was the case in the Altai Territory, for example, where we were forced to remove such a leader. We handled such matters very strictly, and everyone knew it.

The Headquarters of the Fire Service had not inspected us for 18 years. The last time it was inspected was under Shchelokov. We are sending an inspection team there to look for flagrant financial violations. There are billions of rubles there. What I should do? I will conduct an investigation and remove the manager, telling him that you are not suitable for your position, and we will appoint you with a demotion. Just like the head of the Main Directorate of Execution of Punishments, where serious financial violations were also committed. But after I left, the first one was returned to his position again, and the second one was even appointed deputy minister in the Ministry

In many ways, in the new Russia we have not abandoned Bolshevik methods. The Bolsheviks nationalized everything in a few months. Chubais denationalized everything in the same amount of time. Now we are also transferring the penal correction system overnight from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice, without preparing for this and only because the Council of Europe said so.

In England, such a system is now also not in the Ministry of Justice, but in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. While there, I asked the English Deputy Home Secretary why they were not following the recommendations of the Council of Europe on this matter. He replied that they were quite happy when penitentiary institutions were located in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. “We,” he says, “have a country with centuries-old traditions. The Council of Europe only recommends. We don’t consider this expedient for ourselves, so we leave the order that suits us.”

We were told by a Western uncle, who does not know the essence of what is happening in Russia, that we need to act like this, and we quickly began to convey it. Yes, I repeat, this is the future. Maybe in 15-20 years, given a normal political and economic situation in the country, such a transfer of penal institutions would be justified and necessary. We have included in the documents

They accuse me that the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has not been reformed. It's a lie. In December 1992, I took over the Main Directorate of Internal Troops, and in April 1993 I already presented the concept of reforming these troops to the board of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The troops are developing and reforming in a difficult environment, but they are decent troops. Let's be frank. After all, today there are essentially no ground forces of the Ministry of Defense in the country. These are not my assessments, but those of the army generals themselves. However, here too we are doing the opposite: the situation is deteriorating, and internal troops are being reduced. This is the imbalance that can lead to disaster.

V.N. During our conversation, in other interviews, within the limits that you considered possible and acceptable, you touched upon issues of relationships with the upper echelons of power and other structures. Is there anything else you can add in this regard?

A.K. Many people do not know such a dramatic page of history in March 1996. Even then, on Yeltsin’s desk, I saw a draft Decree on my resignation from the post of Minister of Internal Affairs. Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, me, Barsukov were sitting, opposite Soskovets, Ilyushin and Egorov. Next there sat Korzhakov. It was at 6 o’clock in the morning on March 18, 1996 in the President’s office in the Kremlin, already in a new building. And before that,

I'm coming. Skuratov walked out from the President in front of me with his head bowed. I go in to see Boris Nikolaevich. He stood up and said that I intended to dissolve the Duma and ban the Communist Party due to the fact that they were making wrong decisions (I don’t remember exactly what decision they were talking about. It was not that legally significant, but there was a reason). I think that the President was prepared for this by Soskovets and Korzhakov.

“Okay,” said the President, “let’s do it.”

The first thing that came to my mind as a performer: in order not to repeat 1993, we must urgently spread disinformation, announce that the Duma has been mined, and on this basis take it under protection so that we don’t have to storm the White House like in 1993 . We went down to Korzhakov. Besides him, there were Soskovets, Barsukov, and, it seems, Skuratov.

From there I gave the command to urgently gather deputy ministers for a meeting, call the heads of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of Moscow and the region, and the command of the internal troops. Then he told them about the situation and gave them the task of preparing all the necessary calculations.

He gave all the instructions, but the computer in his head is already working on the political assessment of this presidential decision.

I'm calling Skuratov.

Kulikov: What do you think? Can you invite the Chairman of the Constitutional Court Tumanov to your place, and I will come to you?

Skuratov: Okay.

I came to them. It turns out that the President told them all that Kulikov was for this decision, Defense Minister Grachev was for it, and FSB head Barsukov was for it. Then Skuratov and Tumanov thought that since they were all in favor, then, apparently, they too should agree. However, at the meeting, I told them that this could not be done. Skuratov and Tumanov supported me. I also asked Tumanov what his answer to this was to the President. After all, this is unconstitutional.

Tumanov: Yes, of course. This is not in accordance with the Constitution.

Kulikov: But this cannot be allowed. Let's write down everything that was said in favor of holding such an action and what was against. Everyone justifies it all themselves. I have a meeting with the President at 5 p.m. I invite you to come along with me. The three of us will go to him and try to dissuade him.

And so they did. Meanwhile, the President has already given the command to Baturin, Orekhov, Shakhrai, Krasnov, headed by Ilyushin, to prepare a Presidential Decree on this issue. When we got up, they were all with him. We were asked to wait. Then they come out and look askance at us. It is clear that they were also not happy with this decision.

When we came to the President, I told him: “Boris Nikolaevich, the three of us came. After much consideration, we are of the opinion not to do this.”

Started to justify your decision

President: But you didn’t tell me about it this morning!

Kulikov: I couldn’t say right away. This needed to be understood. We believe that this cannot be done.

President: I'm not happy with you.

Kulikov: Boris Nikolaevich, but I respect you too much not to tell the whole truth. This is unacceptable from our point of view.

President: No. All. We will do it. You will receive a Decree.

Kulikov: Okay.

We left. We go to Ilyushin.

Kulikov: Are you writing a Decree?

They look at me.

Kulikov: Don’t even think about writing it. You see, from the window you can see Red Square. People walk hand in hand with children. Tomorrow there will be crowds of people lighting bonfires here. And it is unknown how many such outbreaks there will be throughout the country. You can't do this. I will resign, but I will not carry out this Decree.

I saw that this made an impression on them, their eyes became cheerful. Chernomyrdin is calling. It turns out that at first he didn’t know anything; Ilyushin, it seems, told him about it later.

Chernomyrdin: Anatoly, What’s there?

Kulikov: Viktor Stepanovich! Now we are preparing, making calculations of forces and means.

Chernomyrdin: How is this according to the Constitution?

Kulikov: This is unconstitutional. The Duma cannot be dispersed three months before the scheduled elections. But the President says that I will ask the Federation Council to postpone the deadline, I need two years.

Chernomyrdin: Well, look, Anatoly. Look.

I'm coming to work. I gathered my deputies and said:

I decided that this cannot be done.

You're right, they say. - We will support you.

Everyone was in favor. Only Kolesnikov was missing.

At 22.30 I call Grachev and find him at the dacha.

Kulikov: Pavel Sergeevich, do you know anything about the President’s decision?

Grachev: No.

Kulikov: And he didn’t tell you anything?

Grachev: But he called me and asked: “Are you ready to support Kulikov if necessary?” I replied: “Of course! He and I are friends. I'm ready".

Kulikov: Do you know what support is needed?

Grachev: No, I don’t know.

Kulikov: Well, okay.

At 23:00 Korzhakov calls and says that tomorrow at 6:00 am you will be with the President. I answer: “Okay.” Chernomyrdin calls somewhere around midnight:

Well, Anatoly?

Kulikov: I was told to be with the President tomorrow at 6 o’clock in the morning.

Chernomyrdin: Okay. I will also.

From this conversation I understood that no one invited Chernomyrdin. At 5:45 am we came with him to the President’s reception room. I told him that I am against such an action, this is a very difficult situation. I already had the justifications in my notebook. All this has been preserved, and I will write about this in detail in the book. The President interrupted me several times. He said that you are all communists there, that you are pulling me back, because you are not at your meeting. He said that the Central Internal Affairs Directorate of the Moscow Region is working well. Not like the central apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. (I think that it was said in order to sign the Decree on the appointment of a new minister. The draft of such a Decree was already on the table.)

Despite all this, I stood my ground until the end. Everyone sat with their heads hung proudly. I decided for myself that it would be better to be released now than to be cursed by millions of people later. Moreover, I understood that a lot depended on me. I do not exclude that this also served as one of the reasons for his resignation in March of the following year, 1997. Why would the President have a person who at some point will go against it?

True, later he said that we would forget about it. I answered:

I am ready to bow low at your feet and leave.

President: No. You work. Let's forget about it.

A.K. Continuing to answer your question about relationships, I can say the following.

I didn’t have any problems in relationships with colleagues, with other security officials. We worked together, including with Prosecutor General Skuratov, who expressed regret about my resignation. Despite all his difficulties, a certain constraint for him caused by political factors, I think that he is doing a great job.

Is there anything else you'd like to hear?

V.N. I wanted to. If we summarize all your disputes with Lebed, including legal ones, do you still think today that your position was correct and objective?

A.K. Yes. It remains unchanged today. This person, eager for power, should not be allowed at the federal level. It will bring a very big disaster, it can plunge the country into the worst times of the Inquisition and repression. Although, I think, any leader who comes will be forced to take unpopular measures. It will be terribly difficult for him. Anyone, because without unpopular measures it will be difficult to restore order in the country. But these measures must be legal. They must receive the support of the vast majority of the population. Not a new layer of bourgeoisie hostile to the people, but the overwhelming majority. If this support is available, then such measures can be implemented.

As for Lebed, let him work in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, show people there what he is capable of, and restore order. If he is able to do this there, then perhaps it will be possible to talk about the scale of the country. And vice versa: it won’t work out there, which means you can’t trust him.

V.N. Are you going to write something?

A.K. Yes. Going to.

V.N. A book?

V.N. Scientific, journalistic or what?

A.K. Firstly, I am now, in November 1998, flying to Paris, where my book was published in French. This book contains my speeches on issues of economic security and the fight against organized crime. It contains assessments of the criminal situation and measures to improve it.

V.N. Is this more spoken than written?

A.K. Yes. Secondly, I am starting work on a memoir book. Now I have some time, I will work on it. I wouldn’t like to guess, but I think that in 1999 there should be such a book.

V.N. How are you being used now by the Academy of Sciences?

A.K. I head the Council at the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences on problems of economic security. At the recently created International Academy of Spiritual Unity, I was offered to head the Economic Council. I give lectures at the Mining University on economic security. I often go to forums and speak there. Recently he spoke at the Carnegie Moscow Center on the fight against corruption in the country. I try to keep abreast of all problems regarding economic security.

V.N. I would like to hope that you will be in demand in another capacity, as a manager, as a person with extensive experience. (I’ll tell readers a secret that one of the offers to Kulikov after his resignation was an offer to head the structure dealing with fishing affairs in the country. He refused, commenting in a narrow circle like this: “I don’t have enough space in the safes to store money from bribes.” .)

A.K. There are some suggestions. It seems that the government is looking for such an opportunity. But I will be picky. I don't need to cling to everything to stay in the loop. I am not that kind of person. As I already said, no political ambitions. Therefore, what is important to me is not to cling to the government at any cost. No. I would like to take a position where, due to my experience and knowledge, I could bring benefit to the Fatherland. This is my vision.

I would especially like to note that I am very grateful that I ended up serving in the internal troops when they were commanded by Army General Ivan Kirillovich Yakovlev. And he led them for 18 years. This is a rather tough, demanding, but at the same time objective military leader. I know that many generals from the galaxy with whom he worked are offended by him. He fired some, criticized others. But what he managed to do was maintain the purity of the internal troops.

You remember how the internal affairs bodies worked at that time and how the troops worked. There are, say, nearby a military unit that is guarding and a ministry facility, a colony, that is to be protected. Heaven and earth. The troops work day and night, in the colony they drink vodka. If commanders come from Moscow to join the troops, they plow, and God forbid, Yakovlev finds out that a drinking party has been organized somewhere. And when they come to the police station or to the colony, continuous drunkenness begins. They do not appear at the police department or in this colony. This happened. And it was difficult for the military commanders to resist this during that period, including Yakovlev himself. And he only managed to resist himself, but he also raised us to be just as decent. For this we have to thank him. I myself am grateful to fate that I ended up serving during the period when Yakovlev was in command. Throughout my entire service I tried to follow this methodology, to maintain this purity. How this was achieved is not for me to judge. But in the general system in which the country found itself, I, with the troops and with the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a whole, managed to move forward to some extent in that direction, perhaps to be a little ahead of others.

If it weren’t for this upbringing, then perhaps I would have left the Ministry of Internal Affairs for other reasons. Today I walk with my head held high. I can confidently look every resident of the country in the eye. From the President to any policeman. I am not guilty of anyone. My conscience is clear. I didn't steal anything

For political reasons, some evil force has won today. But in life, common sense will ultimately triumph. My age and health still allow me to work. I think that I will be in demand by the Fatherland.

From the special report by Natalia Efimova “Anatoly Kulikov on maternity leave” (weekly newspaper “Version”, June 18 – 25, 1998).

“What does a person do who suddenly “fell out of the picture”? Especially if this clip is the government of the country, which still considers itself great by inertia. And the man is a military man, still far from retirement age. He is taking a vacation - fortunately, there are so many of them that theoretically he can go out until November 7th. (The ex-minister jokes: “I’m on maternity leave.”) Then he picks up carpentry tools and in his workshop at the dacha begins to replicate wooden shelves with his “brand” for neighbors and friends - as a keepsake. Now we are working on a craft called “VALENTINA’S Tavern”...

Would you like some wine?

This red one... Dagestan?

Yes, Russian... For now.

Why do you say bye?

Everything that happens there is very serious.

For the next five cue strokes, we tried to reach where, in Kulikov’s opinion, the possible border could go. But the general was silent.

However, what he thinks about the geographical situation in this zone, Anatoly Sergeevich said back in the fall of 1996, when he stated that the Khasavyurt agreements were “based on lies and ambiguity”, that the secret documents of the Chechen separatists provided for the creation of a unified Vainakh state, which would include Chechnya, Ingushetia and part of Dagestan with access to the Caspian Sea.

-...It is difficult to come to an agreement with the Chechens for many reasons. Firstly, they are always on equal terms with each other. Whether you are a hungry person, whether you have a hundred sheep, no one is subordinate to anyone, unlike other peoples of the Caucasus. I’m now rereading “The Caucasian War” again and I’m convinced again: our predecessors were right - you can’t come to an agreement with the mountain Chechens, you can’t even buy them. They will deceive anyway, it’s in their blood. For them, deceiving an Orthodox is valor. They will then brag for a long time about how they deceived us...

If you look at your career in recent years, you have managed to make enemies for yourself. Well, let’s say, you couldn’t help but understand how your proposal to nationalize some of the large corporations and banks would end?

Yes, one day at the end of a government meeting I stood up and said: “Dear members of the government! I do not understand. How many times have we been gathering here, but not once in eight months have we thought about how to replenish the revenue side of the budget. Tell me, today, for the past, say, month in value terms, what are the dividends of the state share of property in the country?” They look at me like I'm some kind of newbie. I explain: “Here

Nobody in the country even now knows this. That's the problem. State representatives who sit in these joint stock companies receive a lot of money. They live there, sign for all the plans that are dictated by the main owner - not the state. That's what I was trying to say. That’s why I talked about strengthening government control—it’s impossible without it. (Especially when the economy moves from one type to the completely opposite.) Yes, including the partial nationalization of banks that profited from the budget, stole, and gave nothing in return.

But this is what your department should have been doing.

Who is interested in this? What to rely on? I’m driving in the car today and I hear on the radio that the Duma is again seething about the impeachment of the president. But the same “Law on Privatization” is in the Duma. We don’t have a “Law on Privatization”, do you know that?! Chubais and Kokh carried out privatization according to presidential decrees, drawn up by them and under them... We have 18-20 percent of state property left, there is nothing left to divide, and there is still no law. All money from privatization went to the account of the Ministry of State Property, previously the State Committee. And the privatizers received the right from the government to spend a certain percentage on themselves, for their needs. They bought apartments for themselves, privatizing previously occupied ones and selling them later. In 1993-1995, individual managers paid alimony of 20 million at the expense of the state. In those years, this was a large amount, and this suggests that their salary was rather large.

And about Koch, I immediately reported to Viktor Stepanovich that he should not be appointed, showed him materials on how Koch spent 50 thousand dollars in Barbados in a week. It's like going for a walk to spend so much!

Your own money?

Who cares? Our own - former state ones. He went there with a high-ranking representative of the bank that Norilsk Nickel had privatized. And so they partied there. I say: “You can’t appoint him, he’s a dishonest person.” They gave the order to the prosecutor's office to check. She replies: “There is no corpus delicti.” Koch personally told me: “My dad is very rich, I have money, I don’t need anything.” When he was appointed, I said: “Sorry, guys, I can’t back down from my position. That's how bad I am... There is no evidence of a crime. But I have no doubt that he abused and is abusing.”

And then everything was just done. They took it with impudence. They chose their tactics well. For example, you need to push some document through the government. A draft of this document is sent out overnight. Will everyone rush to study it at night? And in the morning at ten one question is asked, then another, and this one is asked last. What is the last question? It’s already two o’clock, we haven’t gone out for lunch yet, no one has been in the toilet yet. “Well, have you looked? No objections?" Accepted. Using this method, for example, a draft resolution was presented, according to which Chubais was given the right to approve monthly limits for regions and all ministries. That is, neither the prime minister, nor the government presidium, just the minister of finance can do this. I managed to read the document and immediately understood: the chairman of the government is no longer needed, all governors will stand in line to see Anatoly Borisovich. And then at the meeting I raised my hand and asked what it was. How do you think it ended? Chubais ordered an investigation into how Kulikov got agents in his apparatus?

When you are “there” and know who is breathing what, it’s hard to even be there. But there are people who not only withstand it - they live by it, the whole meaning of life is in this. And therefore it seems to me that the current government is doomed. (Note that this was said and published on June 18, 1998, two months before the August collapse and resignation of the Kiriyenko government - V.N.) Whatever decision it makes is the most expedient, as soon as it comes to the interests of those people who They are afraid of subsequent responsibility; everything will be cut down immediately. And since there is more than one person there, there are enough of them, this is already a cementing layer. It’s like impenetrable ice from below.

If there are people who understand everything, why don’t they talk about it? Or is there not enough courage to open safes and get documents?

How many measures have we proposed regarding the same declaration of income! You see this dacha. Come and ask: “Kulikov, give me the documents for this dacha. What did you use to build it? Another has a Lincoln car, show me how much money you bought it with. Why doesn't anyone want to do this? Is anyone afraid to admit that this was done with stolen money?

You know about them, they know it... It’s probably scary. But many still did not understand why you were sent into retirement.

I explain this very simply: the time has not yet come to honestly serve the Fatherland with impunity.

Anatoly Sergeevich, why didn’t Chernomyrdin resist? After all, it seemed that he was gray-haired, highly experienced, already had a certain image, authority...

Viktor Stepanovich also pleased many and irritated many. But speaking objectively, he was not allowed to take those tough measures that suggested themselves.

Tell me, is the country already hopelessly lost to the oligarchs, in your opinion, or is there hope?

It's difficult to say anything about this. Everything will depend on who and what measures will be taken in the next year or two. In my opinion, this is the danger. A month ago, a group of UN experts prepared a report according to which Russia is no longer a developed state. You and I are a second-rate power, not economically developed. The country must have some signs of greatness, including economic one. One of these signs is the presence of mechanical engineering elements. What it is? Let's say the United Arab Emirates is richer than us, where everyone born there immediately receives a thousand dollars into their account. But can this country build its own plane, car? No, this can only be done by a country that has its own resources, workforce potential, scientific potential, etc. A country that has lost such an elemental base ceases to be a developed country, a great power. We have already reached this point. Remember that joke: “Our collective farm stood on the edge of the abyss for five years, but this year it took a step forward.” So we took this step.

What kind of relationship do you have with Erin?

In normal ones. There were no problems with him. He took a sensible point of view.

Why didn’t things work out so well between you and Lebed? Just because of the surname - “two birds cannot live in one den,” as he put it?

I didn't know him at all. I saw him a couple of times at meetings in the Ministry of Defense, at final annual meetings. And when he came to the post of Secretary of the Security Council, I was even happy, because it was difficult for me to defend some positions in the struggle for the implementation of some decrees

And there, when some were relieved of their positions, sympathizers gathered for a drink, the Generality, the heads of the main departments, the first deputy heads of the General Staff departments... And then, everyone who was there was listed to Lebed and presented as the State Emergency Committee.

Which service reported?

I don't know, I won't lie. Some kind of clerk.

Lebed needed a victorious blitzkrieg in Moscow. I tried to do it in different ways. In Moscow - launch a fight against crime. His fantastic draft decrees did not pass. And when, after several meetings with him, I realized that things could come to the point of “shooting” potential criminals, I began to be very wary of him.

Then, with an interval of one day, there was a story with the fact that he declared you to be the culprit of the failure in Chechnya, and you made a statement regarding the creation of the Russian Legion.

Yes, the main headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation even received a telegram from the Security Council - to begin forming the corps.

Signed by Lebed?

No, signed by one of his deputies. I thought seriously and the next day I told Chernomyrdin about this situation. I showed him the written tasks - they were copied from the secret tasks of the special forces, which included everything, including the elimination of the leaders of criminal regimes.

After his speech on TV about Chechnya, you tried to resign...

The President then called me and everything remained in place. And I still keep my report, it came back from the president unopened, I can open it in front of you...

What did the Swan burn on then? The Chechens told him: they say, Kulikov stole money here and they have evidence. Encouraged by the Chechens, he says: “I will tell you at a closed meeting who sold Chechnya and for how much.” Some time passes and three days before the meeting I send a telegram to Seleznev saying that I insist on an open meeting of the State Duma because I have no secrets. Let there be press, that's all. But Lebed insists on closed. But I had a feeling that everyone had already fallen under Swan. Everything that I said at the press conference then, I should have said at a closed meeting of the State Duma. But I was asked from above to come up with a “coordinated point of view” in order to prevent infighting. I did it. Although I already knew that Lebed’s subordinates did not bring any incriminating evidence against me (he sent his people, I even know where they passed and where they stopped). Because this compromising evidence did not exist and could not exist.

Now let’s turn again to the conversation between the REN TV correspondent and Kulikov.

Corr. There are different opinions about your resignation. Some say that the Chechens took Kulikov, that removing you is like a tribute to Chechnya in exchange for something. Others argue that this was a blow to Chernomyrdin and Luzhkov, since if you are not the same company, then you are close to each other. Please comment on this.

A.K. So according to Chernomyrdin or Luzhkov (laughs). Today I am not involved in any political group. It is unlikely that I will continue to do so, since I am a fairly independent person. It is not always comfortable for me to carry out the will of this or that politician without being in public service. This is about the issue of groups.

As for the reasons for resignation. Of course, I very much regret that no one explained these reasons to me, and formally I know no more about this than, say, you. Although I understand perfectly well in whose interests this was done and who was the initiator. By the way, later many did not hide this.

There were more than enough people who wanted my resignation. Not only, as you say Chechens. Probably, they were happy about it, too, but not everyone, but some leaders of illegal armed groups who were interested in such an outcome, knowing my intractability with them. But those who were associated with the criminal world here in Russia also rejoiced, since we acquired some experience in fighting organized crime and economic crimes. We have already achieved a lot. Good operational teams were formed, and people believed that it was possible to effectively fight crime using the example of the auto giant in Tolyatti and a number of other crimes that were solved. I won’t hide the fact that for some crimes we came up with fairly well-known figures. They were of course very interested in stopping this forward movement.

After my resignation, a number of heads of operational headquarters were removed. They were replaced not without petitions and the influence of a number of famous people. This is also one of the reasons for my resignation.

There were many rumors that supposedly some kind of printout of conversations was placed on the President’s desk, where Kulikov and Chernomyrdin or someone else almost shared new positions. But this is nonsense, stupidity. I have no political ambitions. I am a law-abiding citizen, I am ready today to carry out tasks in a position where I will benefit the fatherland. These rumors were spread, I think, in order to create some kind of background.

Some couldn’t believe that I wasn’t stealing or stealing. They sent me to check and look for real estate in my homeland, in the Caucasus, in Sochi, Kislovodsk, Stavropol, Divnoye. Even to Apanasenkovskaya, where it was not me, but my parents, who was born. We visited their home and wondered how the relatives of the Minister of Internal Affairs could live in such a dugout. As a result, they found nothing anywhere.

Corr. After your resignation, did you meet with the President?

A.K. I met him at V.S.’s birthday party. Chernomyrdin. It so happened that we unexpectedly ran into each other there. He was leaving, I was not far away. Boris Nikolaevich saw me and came towards me. He said hello. Knowing that they would not be allowed to talk with the President for a long time, I immediately told him: “Boris Nikolayevich, if someone put a paper on your table that says that I was preparing some kind of coup, then you know that this is a lie.” “What are you talking about, Anatoly Sergeevich,” the President answered, “

At the same time, I had the right to expect at least a call from the President with an explanation, or he could simply say that I signed the Decree, you are released.

Corr. If the President said so at the meeting, if you have maintained normal working relations with the new Minister of Internal Affairs Stepashin, then who in this case will organize the checks that you just mentioned?

A.K. Of course, I know who organized this or I can guess, but I would not like to talk about it. I'm not afraid of these checks. Even here, in the premises of the public movement “Warriors of the Fatherland”, the day before yesterday they walked around with a camera and monitored it. I know who does this. My relatives and I have the names of these people. And if, God forbid, something happens, then I know who will do it.

Corr. Has anyone turned away from you after your resignation?

A.K. There are fewer such people than there are fingers on one hand. These are two or three names. They were afraid of this and didn’t call. At the same time, the absolute majority, fortunately, turned out to be different. Such an example. I usually don't invite anyone to my birthday. This is the rule in our family, and friends, acquaintances who know about this come themselves. So, when I was a minister, from 30 to 70 people came to my dacha on such occasions. When I was sent into retirement, my daughter counted that there were 168 people. It's nice that people understand the situation and support me.

Corr. The question of the so-called reform of the internal troops. According to the Presidential Decree, they should be reduced by 54 thousand, but, as they say, this is not the limit. You are known as a person who strengthened the internal troops and increased their power. Aren't you sad that all this is falling apart? Or can what is happening be considered a normal process?

A.K. This process could be called normal if the situation in the country was moving toward stabilization. This has already happened in history. In the mid-50s, seven operational divisions of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs were reduced ten years after the end of the Great Patriotic War. Previously, they were engaged in the fight against the nationalist underground and banditry in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Baltic states. By the mid-50s, the severity of the struggle had passed, the situation was controlled by internal affairs and state security agencies. The reduction of these divisions was then completely justified.

Today the situation is different. It is clear even to an ordinary person, not to mention a military specialist, that there is no stabilization of the situation in the Caucasus. Have we already eliminated separatism? Is everything in order in our state, the economic situation is stable and there can be no mass protests? No, the situation in the country is different, alarming,

Let's look at this problem from other positions. If these troops were truly a burden for the state and required a lot of funds from the budget, then their reduction could be somehow understandable. In fact, internal troops are the cheapest option for maintaining the necessary force for the state. I have already said that one division of internal troops, for example, a separate division for operational purposes, is three times cheaper than one air defense regiment, which is armed with the S-300 missile system. It makes me bitterly ironic to say that we will transfer the internal troops to a professional basis. For what kind of money will we support professionals and how much will we pay them? Today we pay a conscript soldier 60 rubles, and that’s not always the case. But will a professional go to serve for just 400 rubles that we can offer him today? Tell me, here you are, Andrey, a journalist. Will you serve on a contract basis for 5 thousand rubles - this is the salary of a minister?

Corr. Hardly.

A.K. Does that mean you need 10 thousand rubles? And not everyone will do that. Here is the answer to your question. This is populism, politicking, absurdity and political shortsightedness of big and small politicians. Serious tests await us, including in the Caucasus. And at this time we are cutting the chicken that lays the golden eggs. This is the desire of individuals to show themselves as reformers, to be in the forefront, to help. The real reform of the internal troops and internal affairs bodies was approved by the President back in 1995. Then a concept was developed, to which changes were made over time, dictated by life. There is also a reduction in internal troops, but it is reasonable. It is impossible to reduce operational units, as well as special motorized police units, or transfer the latter to local subordination. Otherwise, it may turn out that these units will become a weapon in the hands of the separatists. Subsequently, when a favorable environment for such a transfer develops, this can be done. It is impossible now to reduce the internal troops to the mentioned limits; this is a big mistake. I once spoke on these issues at the Academy of Military Sciences, and one of the correspondents later stated that Kulikov is against military reforms, against a professional army. For now, it is impossible to transfer parts of the internal troops to local subordination, although this is the future. Now some criminal structures are striving for power, which is confirmed by the examples of Nizhny Novgorod and Leninsk-Kuznetsk. If you transfer troops to the subjects of the Federation,

Now we need to constantly build a strict vertical chain of command among agencies and troops. In the future, we can follow the German model. The lands have their own Ministry of Internal Affairs, which work independently. The central office of the German Ministry of Internal Affairs is 116 people.

Corr. But Bakatin was severely criticized precisely for the fact that he began to actively transfer powers downwards, that he seemed to have taken the wrong road.

A.K. I express my point of view based on the current situation in the country. In one of the Western Siberian regions, as a result of operational activities, we captured an entire program document, entered into a computer, about the ways of criminals coming to power not in one subject, but in a significant part of the Siberian region. This is what we are talking about.

Corr. Is it realistic that criminal cases involving the murder of Listyev, Kholodov and others will be solved?

A.K. I have already had to answer a similar question several times, including after my resignation. Today, the process of investigating criminal cases has become very complicated. This is facilitated by a number of circumstances, including the admission of lawyers at a very early stage. The lawyer has the right to take all the information in full, without giving away what he owns. The rights of the suspect are significantly more protected than was previously the case.

In such a situation, the high-profile cases you mentioned and other high-profile cases must be investigated very carefully so that they do not fall apart in court. All this takes a long time. But I believe that these cases will be solved

Corr. What are you doing now after retirement and what are your plans for the future?

A.K. I continue to be on vacation. I was asked to head the public organization “Warriors of the Fatherland”, and I agreed to do this on a voluntary basis. The purpose of this public association is social assistance to veterans of law enforcement agencies, the Armed Forces, and various associations, ensuring the participation of these veterans in social and political life. This is close to my spirit, which is why I agreed to such public work.

I am at the disposal of the President and hope that I will be offered some kind of work in the public service. The rank of army general allows you to remain in military service for up to 60 years. There seems to be no reason to fire me if I don’t want it myself. I also do not rule out that in 1999 I may run for the State Duma. Recently I visited my fellow countrymen, and they asked me about this.

And, finally, from A. Kulikov’s conversation with Felix Medvedev (Newspaper World, October 31, 1998, headline: “He knows the president’s secret”).

F.M. You touched enormous power and many looked upon you as a demigod. It is believed that power corrupts a person and eats the soul. Did you feel this at least to some extent?

A.K. Only “from below” it seems that there are demigods “above”. Clearly misleading. In fact, in terms of intelligence, Kremlin or ministerial celestials are often lower than those who think of them that way. And personally, a big government position and the opportunity to command large contingents of people did not corrupt me at all. I did not feel the blissful mercantile side of power.

F.M. Really, Anatoly Sergeevich, weren’t you offered bribes?

A.K. Of course, they offered, and even millions. This was done subtly, through mutual acquaintances and friends, but I still guessed who was seeking privileges, positions, and patronage. But I couldn’t bring a case against them, there was no direct evidence, and you couldn’t attach hints to the case. Never in my life have I been humiliated by bribery, and I have never allowed myself to be humiliated by this. That's why I can openly and honestly look anyone in the eye...

Some “interested” are in a hurry to give someone a big bribe so that Kulikov does not get the corresponding position again. Attempts are being made to check the financial activities of all military departments during my time as commander and minister. This task, in particular, was received by the prosecutor’s office, and the task was clearly given by those who are afraid of my return from a protracted “transfer to another job.”

F.M. Do you know from whom exactly the pressure is coming?

A.K. Of course I know. Or rather, I assume with a high degree of certainty. Moreover, even in the presidential administration they gave me the names of those who would not want to see me in the government.

F.M. You are a Doctor of Economics. What would you now, albeit as if from the outside, based on your professional ideas about the situation, consider necessary to do?

A.K. I have great hope for the new government, for Primakov, Maslyukov and Gerashchenko - solid people of the old school, capable of leading the country out of the crisis in a balanced manner, without fuss. The economic situation today does not tolerate haste. The practice of the Kiriyenko government has shown that one careless move can completely bring everything down. From my point of view, those economists are right who believe that Russia, being part of the world economy, cannot live in isolation and our crisis is a consequence of the global crisis. But it’s different things – to feel this crisis in the West and in Russia, at home.

F.M. You met with President Yeltsin more than once. Tell me, what impression did he make on you at the very first meeting? Psychologists believe that the first impression is almost always the most accurate.

A.K. The first time I met Boris Nikolaevich was in 1993 in Dzerzhinsky’s division (then I was the commander of the Internal Troops). He was in fairly good physical shape and responded quickly to the content of the report. During the conversation-discussion about the concept of reforming the army, he impressed me as a mature statesman, the leader of the country, and, naturally, I respected this man. As I remember, the meeting took place in the village of Novaya on September 16. Perhaps you haven’t forgotten the photograph of the president in a maroon beret that has spread around the world? It was mine

F.M. And then? How has your perception of Yeltsin’s personality transformed in the light of various circumstances, including those related to his illnesses?

A.K. When I worked in the government, we saw each other, of course, much more often. And it felt like he was giving up. Then he had an operation and I, like those who came into contact with him, felt alternately as a recovering person, then as an unhealthy person again. He made decisions less and less often, or rather influenced the content of certain proposals. Even when he agreed with some of my considerations and arguments and made a positive resolution, these documents were still not implemented.

F.M. Why? Was presidential control being lost? Did others make the decisions?

A.K. I think yes. And it was very difficult to fight with those officials who had to execute this or that document. Sometimes I had to do this: having received the necessary resolution from the president, I photocopied the paper and with a copy went directly to the prime minister, explaining that the president was very concerned about this or that issue and that this issue needed to be resolved. When it came to registering even a government decree that had already been signed, the officials took over and in every possible way prevented the document from being executed. And I increasingly understood that you couldn’t break a butt with a whip, and the Kremlin-bureaucratic games were very dangerous for the country.

F.M. Do you think Primakov will be able to break this state of affairs? In any case, many observers have noticed that the bureaucratic center of the state is moving to the White House.

A.K. I think that the new prime minister will be able to turn the situation around. I believe that Yeltsin will not agree to relieve Primakov from office, because with the political death of Primakov, the political death of Yeltsin himself will follow. Evgeniy Maksimovich is doing the right thing by concentrating real powers in the government.

F.M. In the process of communicating with the president, did you get the impression that his main concern is to stay in power at any cost?

A.K. There were such moments. Based on the content of this or that report or information, it would seem that the president had to make a tough decision, but he did nothing or simply ignored the essence of my appeal. When I returned to the conversation on this topic, he pretended that the question did not interest him. This has always puzzled me: why?

F.M. Who, according to your observations, exercises final power in the country?

A.K. I assume you know this, the answer is obvious.

F.M. Tatyana Dyachenko, Valentin Yumashev, family?

A.K. I think Valentin Yumashev. He comes first.

F.M. What happens, nothing has changed in Russia since the times of favorites, palace coups, gray cardinals, crown princes and princesses?

A.K. Of course, much of what is happening in the Kremlin is abnormal. And the factor of the president’s ill health plays a serious role in this. It is clearer than clear that such a huge state, and one that is still in a state of crisis, should be governed by a fully healthy person. How it is possible for a ballroom Supreme Commander to lead an army is incomprehensible to me. Yes, we know that President Roosevelt ruled America while sitting in his chair, or our general secretaries ruled the country while lying down, but this was acceptable at that time, because an insurance instrument like the Politburo operated flawlessly in the USSR. You may not know that you have 16 minutes to decide on a retaliatory nuclear strike. This is the case if the missiles’ separation from the “table” is detected at the moment of launch, but in practice this period may be even shorter. And in this minimum period of time, the owner of the button must receive a qualified assessment from experts, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the General Staff in order to make a fateful decision on a global scale. I, as a military man, understand that the Commander-in-Chief, who is regularly on the bulletin, cannot adequately respond to the situation.

God grant, as they say, health to Boris Nikolaevich, but his physical condition does not give him the opportunity to fully engage in important government affairs. And to prevent a similar situation from happening again, any candidate for the position of head of state must undergo a medical commission of independent experts.

Why is everything so complicated and dense with us?! Are foreign countries smarter than us or do they work harder than us? We are some kind of damned people! I can’t find an answer to many questions: “Why?”

F.M. Tell me, are you disappointed in Yeltsin?

A.K. Yes, I was disappointed. And not because I have reasons for personal grievance, although I was not the last on the list of politicians in the country, and the president could personally inform me of his resignation, and not through other persons. Boris Nikolaevich repeatedly said (and I did not pull his tongue) that he trusts me, that I am on the right path, that I work without any

And in those tragic days, and now I believe that the Internal Troops was right, because there was no other choice. We prevented the loss of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of lives that would have meant civil war. And in March 1996, I told the president that it was impossible to disperse the State Duma and the Communist Party. “You are the unifier of the nation, and such a decision can provoke blood, an unpredictable reaction from a huge mass of people,” I told Boris Nikolaevich.

In general, I have lent my shoulder to the president of the country more than once and I believe that his attitude towards me could have been more adequate, more fair.

F.M. Anatoly Sergeevich, what is the daily routine of the Minister of Internal Affairs? How did you navigate the priority of important things?

A.K. I usually got up at 6.30, did exercises, drank a glass of milk - and went to work. He appeared in the office at 8 o'clock. First of all, I listened to the leader of the group in the Caucasus, for 15-20 minutes. Then he listened to the duty department, focusing on the most serious crimes committed during the day. As a rule, such reports go on around the clock, the most important ones are reported home, but in the morning I received the most comprehensive information. Then planned work in a variety of areas. There is a lot of it, and my schedule for this part is drawn up a month in advance. As Deputy Prime Minister, I worked in the White House four times a week for half a day. He dealt with problems of economic security and replenishment of budget revenues. And, of course, trips to the regions. I have traveled almost the entire country, visiting more than sixty constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

F.M. Tell me, what struck you most when reading everyday reports about crimes committed, what was most memorable?

A.K. How can I tell you? In such a position, a person who has a complete picture of the crime situation in the country, don’t be surprised, seems to get used to it. There is little that can surprise or amaze him. So, what struck me most was the scope and stability of domestic crimes. Today, about 30 thousand murders and 65 thousand serious bodily injuries are committed per year. This is very, very much. Compared at least to the USA...

F.M. But doesn’t the minister have the right to inquire about any case to find out, say, how it is progressing?

A.K. The minister has the right to clarify, inquire about some matter, but, I repeat, neither he, nor the director of the Federal Tax Police, nor the head of the FSB have the right to interfere in the investigation process. A principled investigator can ignore any attempts by high authorities in this regard as violating the secrecy of the investigation.

F.M. And has no one ever put pressure on you with a request, or even a demand, to intervene, help, stop?

A.K. Yes, there were cases. Some leaders made complaints: why are my investigators working, say, on the Sobchak case in St. Petersburg. I answer that if the Prosecutor General’s Office has made a decision, we are obliged to provide operational support. No, they are stubborn, remove your investigators. How can I remove them? What will I say to my subordinate, the same investigator or the head of the Main Directorate for Combating Economic Crimes? How will I look them in the eyes? I, like all citizens, do not have the right to break laws?! Unfortunately, many people do not understand this.

It’s another matter when a minister takes some kind of investigation under his personal control. For example, I scrupulously followed the solution of the crime at the Kotlyakovskoye cemetery in Moscow. Every week he held meetings, briefings, got involved in the situation, and managed the entire course of administrative work. If necessary, he urgently strengthened the task force, helped with transport, contacted the FSB, asked for their help immediately after the crime was committed. I asked the Prime Minister by order to create an interdepartmental operational investigative group headed by the Deputy Minister, which was done. The result was immediate: we achieved what seemed impossible and the most complex, intimidated, bloody crime was solved based on absolutely secondary signs. I'm sure it will be brought to court. We reached out not only to the performers, but also to the customers and organizers. The solution to this, I would say, unprecedented, monstrous crime (as well as the crime itself, unfortunately) will be included in criminology textbooks.

So the vast majority of crimes, including complex ones, are solved...

F.M. I heard that there were three attempts on your life?

A.K. And I have not heard of a single attempt on myself.

F.M. Are you being guarded these days?

A.K. Yes. By order of the President, my car was left with me and 24-hour security was maintained.

F.M. Aren't you afraid that interested parties might, excuse me, “order” you?

A.K. How should I answer you? This cannot be ruled out. Moreover, my close friends and I know the names of the likely “customers.” And so, well, no one today is immune from the fact that one “wonderful” day a person will not be alive. And then I am a Russian person, a Christian, I believe in my destiny, in what is written in my family. But all this does not mean that you have to hide somewhere or be afraid of something. My conscience is clear, I am not ashamed to look people in the eyes.

F.M. I want to ask the most trivial question today: what about the presidential race? Look, you'll be late, there are already so many people willing to line up without any ranking. But it seems to me that God himself commanded you.

A.K. On the one hand, let them line up: the more candidates, the greater the choice of a worthy one. But, on the other hand, some people's ambitions make them smile. I see two candidates as the most serious: Primakov, who can become president due to two factors - if Yeltsin resigns early for health reasons, and

F.M. Is this why your beard has turned grey? By the way, six months ago there was no beard.

A.K. You're right, it wasn't. I am growing it for the second time in my life. The first was six years ago, when I was, as now, retired. Then I defended my PhD thesis on the problems of training human resources in the interests of the country’s defense, and also completed the construction of a dacha near Minsk. True, I soon had to sell it, and the money was useful for living in Moscow.

This time I didn’t let my beard grow right away, I doubted that I would meet someone I knew, would shy away from me, say, A. Kulikov started drinking and turned into a homeless person. And there are more and more business meetings. So I decided again - the beard is just pampering, because I have nothing to do. And there’s a lot of work ahead, so by the time this interview comes out, I’ll probably already be shaved again. It is believed that if you shave, you are born again.

Afterword by F. Medvedev:

“A.S. Kulikov was seen as a collected, tough, responsible, highly educated person. Many of his answers to questions were ready-made on paper, and in his personal editing he did not miss a single dubious detail, not a single comma. And it was not boring: from everything it is clear that this is how, seriously, he behaves in small things. Yes, Anatoly Sergeevich himself said that he is law-abiding even in small things. Such a person, having left a high government post, could not help but leave behind ill-wishers, and even enemies. Having asked Kulikov about a hypothetical attempt on his life, I turned out to be not so far from the truth: during the days of working on the interview, information was received about suspicious actions of some subjects near the office and apartment of the former head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And I also thought that our government sometimes generously scatters worthy personnel, increasing the layer of those dissatisfied with the Kremlin, although yesterday they were still loyal to it, politicians, cultivating an irreconcilable cohort of oppositionists. True, this almost does not concern Kulikov. In a political struggle for any post, including the highest,

These are the dialogues with the fifty-ninth Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia, Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, Army General Anatoly Sergeevich Kulikov. They give the reader a fairly convex image of this major statesman.

In the essay we part with him at the point when a somewhat prolonged pause is experienced. However, I believe in his bright destiny, in his star. She will still shine on people.