Three months after Germany's attack on the USSR, the German military attaché in Hungary, Rabe von Pappenheim, in his letter addressed to Major General von Greiffenberg, expressed the following thought: “A German soldier in battle is a warrior, but not a gendarme. For such "appeasement tasks" Hungarians are more suitable. " This idea was soon realized.
Hungarians in the USSR, a brief history
Pappenheim looked into the water: already in the first months of the battles on the Eastern Front, the Hungarian ground units, which were used by the German command mainly to pursue the retreating Red Army troops, suffered significant losses. Only the Hungarian mobile corps continued to participate in the battles, which included cavalry, motorized and tank formations. But parts of the so-called "Carpathian Corps", which consisted of the 8th border brigade and the 1st mountain rifle brigade, were actively used by the Germans as occupation troops.
Hungarian soldiers take prisoners of the Red Army, 1941
In the fall of 1941, the battered mobile hull was withdrawn from the front. The German command demanded that Hungary put forward a significant contingent of occupation forces as a replacement. The political leadership of Hungary began to send rifle brigades, which were stationed in two different regions, to ensure occupation activities on the territory of the USSR. The 111th, 123rd and 124th brigades were stationed in the Ukraine in the Poltava region, where it was relatively calm. But in the south of the Bryansk forests, where the 102nd, 105th and 108th infantry brigades were deployed, the picture was completely different - partisans were operating there.
By the beginning of 1942, these six brigades, as well as smaller units in the occupied Soviet territory, had a total of more than 40,000 Honvedians. On February 12, 1942, all Hungarian brigades were renamed light divisions, which were significantly weaker both in personnel and equipment in comparison with the German ones. This was done at the suggestion of the chief of the Hungarian General Staff, Lieutenant General Szombathely, who strove, at least in terms of the number of formations participating in the occupation of the USSR, to successfully compete with Romania. Hungary had special scores with her: one of the most important factors that forced both Hungarians and Romanians to declare war on the USSR to please the Third Reich was their mutual territorial claims. However, already in the middle of 1942, Hungary, both in the number of divisions and in the number of troops sent to the Eastern Front, significantly surpassed Romania: the 206,000th 2nd Hungarian Army arrived to help the Germans. She participated in the summer-autumn battles in the Don bend, after which her task was to hold the defense line along the western Don line.
And the Hungarian occupation group continued to remain on the territory of the USSR. Its command, which was first located in Vinnitsa, and then in Kiev, supervised the actions of all Hungarian occupation units. However, in fact, it was only engaged in solving issues related to the supply and maintenance of discipline, and in military-tactical terms, all Hungarian formations were subordinated to the local German command on a territorial basis. In the areas occupied by the Hungarians, there were also numerous auxiliary units formed from German units and a police recruited from the local population.
Hungarian soldiers cleaning weapons. Eastern Front, summer 1942
The Hungarian units, as well as the SD (German Sicherheitsdienst - security service) and GFP (German Geheime Feldpolizei - secret field police) units responsible for this territory, had to work closely with each other - until the summer of 1942, each Hungarian division had a group of GUFs was seconded, consisting of 50-60 people. These police groups were divided into 6-8 groups and distributed among the Hungarian battalions. Their task was to interrogate local residents and captured partisans, as well as to carry out the sentences of the military court. Therefore, when considering the atrocities of the Hungarian occupation forces on the territory of the USSR, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the Hungarian occupation forces all the time acted together with the Germans or under German control. However, the Hungarians themselves in their punitive actions against the civilian population were zealous beyond all measures.
This was especially evident in the actions of the divisions that found themselves at the border of the RSFSR and Belarus. For example, a multi-week military operation to clear the Bryansk forests from partisans by the forces of the 102nd and 105th light divisions, which ended on May 30, 1942, ended, according to Hungarian data, with the following results: 4375 "partisans and their accomplices" were destroyed, 135 prisoners, and only 449 rifles, as well as 90 assault rifles and machine guns were captured from weapons. From this it is possible to draw a quite definite conclusion - the overwhelming majority of the liquidated "partisans" did not have any weapons.
The total losses of the "partisans" were almost nine times higher than the losses of the attackers, and from the indicated number of captured weapons it follows that at most 600-700 partisans could have died in battles, the rest were civilians. Similar actions in 1941-1942. were carried out repeatedly. In total, the Hungarian occupation forces from November 1941 to August 1942, according to incomplete data, killed 25-30 thousand "partisans", while it is obvious that the overwhelming majority of them were civilians.
Such an idyll could have been created for an official photo with local residents.
However, sometimes the Hungarian occupation units were forced to participate in hostilities against Soviet troops. For example, after a long resistance from the Hungarian General Staff, the 108th division was sent to the command of the commander of the German 6th Army Friedrich Paulus and on March 19 entered into battle with Soviet troops near the village of Verkhniy Bishkin, Kharkov region. Wilhelm Adam describes further in his book "Memoirs of Paulus's Adjutant":
“What happened was that Paulus had feared as early as March 1. The division retreated. The VIII Army Corps also had to be pulled back ten kilometers, since the Hungarian security brigade under the command of Major General Abt was unable to resist the advancing enemy. Soviet tanks were stationed 20 kilometers from Kharkov. "
The Germans managed to turn the tide of the battle, but it became quite obvious to them that the Magyar light divisions, apart from punitive actions, were no longer good for anything.
Soon the same thing turned out in relation to the field 2nd Hungarian army, which in a matter of days in January 1943 was utterly defeated during the Ostrogozh-Rossosh offensive operation of the Soviet troops. Only about 60,000 Hungarian soldiers were able to get out alive from the encirclement. The surviving units of the 2nd Army returned to their homeland in the spring of 1943, but not all: some of them, after being reorganized and replenished with people, were moved to Ukraine and became part of the occupation forces, which were still stationed in Ukraine (7th Corps) and in Belarus (8th building).
Cross, earth, freedom ... and many, many crosses. A tablet reminding ungrateful Russians of their happiness
Over time, the Germans realized that Hungarian methods in no way contribute to a real fight against the partisans. This is evidenced, for example, by the report of Lieutenant Colonel Cruvel:
“Taking into account the enemy's propaganda, their (Hungarian) indiscipline and absolutely arbitrary behavior towards the local population could only harm German interests. Looting, rape and other crimes were common. An additional hostility of the local population was obviously caused by the fact that the Hungarian troops could not defeat the enemy in hostilities. "
Since 1943, the Hungarian occupation forces have carried out fewer and fewer major actions against the partisans. One of their main tasks was to ensure the safety of the railway: for this, the Hungarian formations stretched for thousands of kilometers. Due to the huge territory, the protection of the railway could only be solved with the help of fortified outposts, located several hundred meters from each other, which kept under control the strip cleared of vegetation on both sides of the railway embankment. However, the Hungarians, of course, did not forget about the punitive actions against civilians.
The 90-thousandth Hungarian occupation contingent continued to engage in this until the Soviet troops liberated the Left-Bank, and then the Right-Bank Ukraine. When, as a result of the Proskurov-Chernivtsi operation in April 1944, the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the Dniester and reached the foothills of the Carpathians, there was practically nothing to occupy the Magyar occupation forces.
Directive No. 10 and other normative documents
The most brutal repressions were carried out by the Hungarian and German occupiers in areas where there was even a shadow of a partisan threat. What were the Hungarian military leaders guided by in carrying out their occupation policy? First of all, this is an analytical report of the 4th department of the Hungarian Royal General Staff on the experience of fighting the Soviet partisans, which was published in 1942 - more often it is called simply "directive number 10". He summarized information about the composition, structure, tasks and methods of fighting by Soviet partisans and, most importantly, about the organization of countering them by units of the Hungarian army.
Not only the Germans liked to be photographed with the executed. Magyars and the "Jewish partisan" hanged by them, 1942
For example, in the section “Types of partisan gangs. Their human material. Methods of their staffing ”described the methods by which the partisan leaders recruited new members into their ranks:
“To involve them, organizational departments (squads) use the following methods; the persons to whom the recruitment is entrusted, usually at night, under the pretext of a friendly visit, visit the intended victim at the apartment. Taking drinks with them, they solder the given person to whom they came with a "visit", and when he is already pretty drunk, they try to persuade him to join their ranks; if this does not work, they resort to violent means. First, they openly call for joining, and in case of refusal, threats, intimidation, night visits and insults will follow. Finally, those who refuse are forcibly taken away and also shot. "
Directive No. 10 recommended that special caution and intransigence be shown towards young women and Jews:
“Russian people are not talkative by nature; whoever speaks a lot and willingly is suspicious, a young woman is always suspicious, and if she is a stranger (not from these places), then she is necessarily a partisan agent. Among the elders there are many who, out of fear, are for the partisans. But the partisans also have like-minded people among the Ukrainian auxiliary police. The Jews, without exception, are on the side of the partisans. Therefore, their complete neutralization is of paramount importance. "
The report also did not ignore the Ukrainian topic:
“The Ukrainian people are not racially identical with the Russian, which means they cannot pursue the same policy with them. The Slavic blood of the Ukrainians is strongly mixed with the blood of the Turanian and Germanic peoples. As a result, they (the Ukrainians) are more intelligent, stronger, dexterous and resilient than the Russians. In racial terms and due to their abilities, they are much closer to the Western cultural peoples than to the Russian. An important vocation awaits Ukrainians under the new European order. In contrast, the Russians, under the tsarist and the red regimes, for centuries only oppressed and exploited the Ukrainian people and did not give them the opportunity to fulfill their aspirations, as well as their aspirations for culture and civilization. They can only find a better and happier future for themselves on the side of the Axis powers. "
However, “a better and happier future” the Hungarian Honvedians brought closer as they could, punishing the recalcitrant with fire and sword, not making out whether the Ukrainian was in front of them or not. In the section "Techniques for fighting partisans," the item titled "Retaliation" read:
“The defeat of the partisan detachments must be followed by the most inexorable and ruthless retribution. There is no room for indulgence. Unmerciful cruelty deprives everyone of the desire to continue to join the partisans or support them; the guerrillas themselves could mistake mercy and pity for weakness. The captured partisans, subjecting, if necessary, to interrogation, immediately on the spot must be finished off (shot), or, for intimidation, somewhere in the nearest village to be publicly hanged. We must also act with the exposed, who fell into our hands, partisan assistants. It is important that the broadest possible layers of the population know about retaliation ”.
In fact, "retaliation actions among the broad strata of the population" were most often carried out without "defeating partisan detachments." Moreover, in addition to the Hungarian instructions and orders, there were also orders of the German occupation authorities. The commanders of the Magyar units were obliged to follow their instructions, and they were no less stringent than the measures provided for in the Hungarian directive number 10. For example, in addition to Directive No. 33 of the German High Command of July 23, 1941, it was said:
“The troops allocated to carry out the security service in the occupied eastern regions will be enough to carry out tasks only if all resistance is eliminated not by judicial punishment of the guilty, but by the spread of such fear and horror from the occupation authorities that will discourage the population from any desire to counteract. The commanders must find means to maintain order in the protected areas, not asking for new guard units, but using appropriate draconian measures. "
Everything is written very clearly and understandably: "fear and horror" and "draconian measures." The implementation of the directives was appropriate.
War crimes of the Hungarians
The Hungarian occupation units diligently sowed fear and horror on the occupied land. Here are just a few examples. Peasant woman of the Sevsky district of the Bryansk region V.F. Mazerkova:
“When they saw the men of our village, they said they were partisans. And the same number, i.e. On May 20, 1942, they seized my husband Mazerkov Sidor Borisovich, born in 1862, and my son Mazerkov Alexei Sidorovich, born in 1927, and tortured them, and after these torments they tied their hands and threw them into a pit, then lit straw and burned them in a potato pit. On the same day, they not only burned my husband and son, they also burned 67 men ".
The partisans captured by the Hungarians are for some reason very similar to ordinary inhabitants. 1942 year
E. Vedeshina, a peasant woman in the same area:
“It was in the month of May on the 28th day of 1942. I and almost all the inhabitants went into the forest. These thugs also followed there. They are in our place, where we (inaudible) with our people, shot and tortured 350 people, including my children were tortured: daughter Nina 11 years old, Tonya 8 years old, little son Vitya 1 year old and son Kolya 5 years old. I remained a little alive under the corpses of my children ".
A resident of the village of Karpilovka R.S. Troy:
“In our village Karpilovka, only Hungarian units (Magyars) perpetrated atrocities and atrocities, especially in the period from May to August 1943 […] they ordered us to take shovels, gathered us to an anti-tank ditch about 40 people and ordered us to bury an anti-tank ditch with executed corpses. […] The ditch was about 30 meters long and 2 meters wide. The corpses lay in disarray, and it was difficult to establish traces of firearms, for it was a bloody mess of old men, old women and teenagers. There was a terrible picture, and I could not look closely where their wounds were and where they were shot. ".
The Honvedians also did not stand on ceremony in their treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. For example, during the retreat in 1943 from the Chernyansky district of the Kursk region, Hungarian military units drove with them 200 Red Army prisoners of war and 160 civilians from the local concentration camp. On the way, all of them were closed in the school building, doused with gasoline and set on fire. Those who tried to escape were shot.
The caption to the original photo says that Hungarian soldiers are talking to an arrested Red Army soldier. Judging by his clothes, in fact, he could be anyone
There are also eyewitness memories. Former prisoner of war, military doctor of the 3rd rank Vasily Petrovich Mamchenko spoke about the regime in the Dulag-191 concentration camp located at a brick factory:
“The prisoners were herded into brick-drying sheds, where there were no windows or a ceiling. They slept on bare ground. The sick and wounded were in the same conditions. There were no medicines or dressings available. The wounds of the patients festered, worms grew in them, gas gangrene developed, there were often cases of tetanus. The camp regime was very cruel; the prisoners worked for 10-12 hours on earthworks. They were fed in the morning and in the evening with gruel - warm water and flour, a few spoons each. Occasionally, as a handout, they cooked rotten horse meat. The camp doctor Steinbach did not have the specialty of a surgeon, but he practiced operations on prisoners and killed many. When hungry soldiers on their way to work bent down to pick up beets or potatoes dropped from the wagon, Magyar guards shot them on the spot. "
The 3rd rank military doctor Ivan Alekseevich Nochkin, who lived in captivity in this camp for six months, said that on September 17, 1942, when the prisoners of war were at work, the Nazis put explosives in the stove of the barrack, which housed 600 people. Returning from work in the evening, people lit up the stove. A deafening explosion followed. Those who tried to escape through the doors were shot by Hungarian guards. Corpses blocked the entrance. Acrid smoke suffocated people, and they burned out. 447 people died.
The graves of Hungarian soldiers in the village of Polnikovo, Ukolovsky District, Voronezh Region (now Krasnensky District, Belgorod Region). Two soldiers were killed on July 21, 1942 in a nearby forest. By whom and how - it is not known, probably, the Red Army men leaving the encirclement, but local residents were accused of involvement in this. In the late 90s of the last century, the remains of the Hungarians were exhumed and reburied at the united Hungarian cemetery in the Voronezh region
Resident of the city of Ostrogozhsk, Voronezh region Maria Kaidannikova:
“There was a fire burning brightly. Two Magyars held the prisoner by the shoulders and legs and slowly roasted his belly and legs over the fire. They either raised him above the fire, then lowered him lower, and when he was quiet, the Magyars threw his body face down on the fire. Suddenly the prisoner twitched again. Then one of the Magyars thrust a bayonet into his back with a swing. "
German propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels made a very remarkable assessment of the actions of the Hungarian troops against the Soviet population in his diary. Describing the situation in the Bryansk region in May 1942, he noted:
“To the south of this region, Hungarian formations are fighting. They need to occupy and pacify one village after another. When Hungarians claim that they have pacified a particular village, it usually means that there is not a single inhabitant left there.This, in turn, means for us that we will hardly be able to carry out any agricultural work in such an area. "
It was necessary to be able to make Goebbels regret the excessive sacrifices among the "Untermens". The Hungarians did it. It is not surprising that in our time the elderly residents of the Kursk, Voronezh, Belgorod regions, recalling the times of the occupation, say that the Hungarians were worse than the Germans.
Residents of the village of Polnikovo, accused of the deaths of Hungarian soldiers, are digging their own grave. Vasily Kondratyevich Pashkov, 54 years old, Pakhom Platonovich Polnikov, 52 years old, and Grigory Kudinovich Pashkov, 18 years old, who were driving for hay at the time of the discovery of the dead Hungarians were arrested. They were hanged without any interrogation or analysis.
The participants in the events from the opposite side also left their written testimonies. For example, here is a quote from the diary of the Honved Ferenc Boldijar (company 46 / 1.2., Field mail 115/20):
“When we entered the village, I set fire to the first three houses myself. We killed men, women, children, burned the village. Let's go further ... Our magnificent hussars set fire to the village, the third company set fire to rockets. From there we went on to reconnaissance. During the time we spent in reconnaissance, the hussars burned six villages ... "
The concept of "intelligence" used by Boldijar is hardly appropriate - rather, it is total extermination. And here is a quote from the report of Major General Karoi Bogani of June 25, 1942, in which the concept of "extermination" is present in a very specific way:
“I got the impression that combing the forests that stretch to the west of Putivl did not bring results, because some of the partisans live in the surrounding villages constantly, disguising themselves as civilians, or periodically flee there from the forest. Therefore, Yatsyno, Cherepovo, Ivanovskoye, Sesyulino and further surrounding villages, which the 32nd Infantry Regiment should define, are to be burned, and the entire male population from 15 to 60 years old - exterminated. "
An excerpt from the order of the commander of the division, Major General Otto Abt, dated January 13, 1942, is also interesting, in which there is a certain pride:
“The performance of the Hungarian units had a great impact on the partisans. This is proved by a radio message intercepted on the night of December 24-25, which says: "Partisans, be very careful where the Hungarians are, because Hungarians are even more cruel than the Germans."
The contemporary Hungarian historian Tamás Kraus summarizes in his article "War - Massacres in the Mirror of Documents":
“According to a general judicial source based on an investigation by an emergency state commission, German and Hungarian military bodies and military units in the territory of the Chernigov region alone killed about 100,000 Soviet civilians, and also killed“ thousands of Soviet prisoners of war ”. In one city of Kobrin, Brest region, 7000 people were killed, and several tens of thousands of people were deported to work in Germany. The atrocities of the 105th and 201st Hungarian Infantry Division are especially often mentioned in the documents. A lot of documents, eyewitness testimonies of the events tell with tremendous force about the numerous murders committed in the Kursk region, along the banks of the Oskol River, in Novy and Stary Oskol and their environs, about mass night executions and torture of civilians. "
Contemporary Hungarian historiography
However, the aforementioned Tamas Kraus, and even Eva-Maria Varga, are, in fact, the only Hungarian historians today who do not hesitate to talk about the atrocities that Hungarian soldiers committed on Soviet soil. In their joint work Hungarian Troops and the Nazi Extermination Policy in the Soviet Union, they write:
“In modern 'mainstream' historical literature one cannot find a single word about the 'exploits' of our soldiers in the USSR. For example, having leafed through the most significant books of academician Ignaz Romshich, the reader will not find practically any data about this. [...] Peter Szabo, in his book Bend of the Don, also reprinted many times over, which captures the memory of the bravery of the soldiers of the 2nd Hungarian Army, essentially passed over in silence the crimes of Hungarian soldiers committed in the Don region, although it can be assumed that in the archives and handwritten the department of the institute and the museum of military history keeps a lot of materials on this topic. "
The famous Hungarian historian Peter Szabo, mentioned in the quote, opposes Kraus in his interview with the Hungarian newspaper Flag, reproaching him for the excessive use of information from Russian archives:
“In the collection of Tamas Kraus and Eva-Maria Varga, one can find numerous protocols of interviews with witnesses collected by the Soviet territorial commissions. Among the witnesses interviewed mainly in 1943, there are many illiterate or semi-literate people whose contradictory testimonies were easily distorted or exaggerated by the commissioners. "
It is difficult to understand what Szabo is trying to prove with these words. The witnesses interviewed by the commission saw with their own eyes the death of relatives and fellow villagers. It is not clear what their level of literacy has to do with this. In the same interview, Szabo describes the actions of the partisans, apparently wanting to equalize the murders of civilians committed by the Magyars and the hostilities against an armed enemy:
“The methods of warfare of the partisans were extremely brutal. First of all, they relied on sudden raids, ambushes, often wearing Hungarian or German uniforms. The prisoners were not left alive. For example, they lured the machine-gun company of the 38/1 battalion of the 2nd Hungarian army into a trap in the forests in the vicinity of Dubrovichy. They surrounded the Honvedians in a forest glade and shot them with machine guns. After that, they were stripped naked, as they needed uniforms. Only one or two soldiers survived the massacre. ".
At the same time, Szabo himself does not deny the facts of the reprisals of the Honvedians against the civilian population:
“In 2012, I also published a study about the unfortunate incident that happened on December 21, 1941 in the Ukrainian Reimentarovka. [...] In the material published in the Military Historical Documents, I described the chronology of the unsuccessful anti-partisan operation, during which the partisans managed to get out of the encirclement. After the Honvedians suspected the help of the villagers in this, they committed a bloody massacre. The Hungarian Royal Army from time to time held trials against the perpetrators of such unacceptable incidents, but this did not happen here.
Alas, Szabo did not give a single example of "litigation from time to time" - perhaps there were none at all. Like Szabo, other contemporary Hungarian historians simply ignore the "exploits" of Hungarian soldiers in the USSR. Kraus and Varga are regularly accused in the Hungarian media of the fact that the FSB is behind them, that the sources of the archival documents they used are unreliable and were written under pressure, etc.
Hungarians, armed with Soviet self-loading SVT rifles, and local residents, driven into the pit. Shooting? Intimidation action?
It should come as no surprise that the overwhelming majority of Hungarian readers commenting on the cited works consider Tamás Kraus and Eva Maria Varga to be traitors and are outraged by such a desecration of the memory of their soldiers. In a recent interview on the radio, Tamás Kraus frankly spoke about the ostracism of the Hungarian society at all levels, accusing him of lying and slandering his own people.
Causes of the cruelty of the Hungarians
Reading about the atrocities of the Magyars and their massacres against the civilian population and prisoners of war, one cannot but ask the question: what is the reason for such bestial cruelty? Indeed, there was no Nazi regime in Horthy Hungary, Hungary remained the only country that joined Germany, whose political structure remained unchanged during the war, right up to the German occupation. There existed in the country, albeit a very limited, but legal leftist and liberal opposition. All the same Kraus and Varga in their work "Hungarian troops and the Nazi extermination policy on the territory of the Soviet Union" tried to give the following explanation of the cruelty of the Hungarian troops:
“How can one explain the mass and frequent burning of adults and children alive, the mass rape of women with their subsequent brutal beating or murder? Why did you need to destroy everyone who survived after the burning of settlements? Here we need to talk about a complex chain of reasons. At first. A decisive role in this was played by the authoritarian regime fraught with fascism, which gave the Hungarian soldiers a moral, spiritual and cultural "upbringing". […] From the first minute the predatory, immoral nature of the war was evident. From the memoirs of Hungarian soldiers, it turns out that under the influence of the defeat on the Don, many of them began to doubt: for what purpose are they almost two thousand kilometers from their homeland, in a foreign country, not understanding either the language or the feelings of the locals? […] Secondly. We can rightfully assume that among the reasons is the feeling that gradually gripped everyone, connected with the hopelessness of war, with the inexorable approach of death, with the meaninglessness of what is happening, with the “inaccessibility” and “incomprehensibility” of the enemy, the strangeness of his habits, with pangs of conscience, fear committed atrocities criminals, with the desire to destroy the witnesses of these atrocities. To this must be added greed, the possibility of free robbery, the consciousness of impunity, moreover, the desire to present intimidation, terrorizing the population in the form of a heroic myth that helped justify all punitive actions. […] Thirdly. Feeling of revenge. Many documents say that massacres and atrocities were especially frequent after major defeats. This refers not only to the losses incurred in the fight against the partisans, but above all in the offensive of the Red Army at the turn of 1942-1943, about the breakthroughs at Stalingrad and the Don. "
Simply put, it turns out that the Hungarian Honvedians, unexpectedly finding themselves 2,000 kilometers from their homeland, not understanding "neither the language, nor the feelings of local residents" and experiencing "greed, the possibility of free robbery, a consciousness of impunity" defeats ”, decided to destroy as many of these local residents as possible, and at the same time unarmed prisoners of war from the very army that inflicted these major defeats on them.
However, I repeat: Tamás Kraus and Eva-Maria Varga are supporters of an objective approach to the history of the stay of Hungarian troops on the territory of the USSR. But in modern Hungary, a different approach prevails. State funds are used to glorify the armies that took part in the attack on the USSR and the robbery and physical destruction of the civilian population that lasted for almost three years.
Three Hungarian soldiers, ethnic Serbs and Slovak, surrender. The Hungarians were taken prisoner very reluctantly, but apparently not in this case. Summer 1942
In support of the above, we can recall that as early as 23 August 2011 in Warsaw, the ministers of justice of the EU member states signed a declaration on the occasion of the European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Totalitarian Regimes. The declaration says, among other things: "... their suffering will not disappear into obscurity, their rights will be recognized, and the perpetrators will be brought to justice"... On this wave in Hungary, an attempt was made to investigate the war crimes committed by the Soviet army at the end of World War II. The National Investigation Department announced that while an investigation is underway on one fact: the shooting on March 22, 1945, of 32 residents of the village of Olasfalu, located in the Transdanubian region. They were boys and men between the ages of 16 and 30, some of them ethnic Germans. The reasons are unknown: either the Red Army men suspected Hungarian partisans in the local residents, or it was punishment for the brutal murder of wounded Red Army soldiers and nurses from the medical battalion in the city of Szekesfehervar by the SS.
“Representatives of many European nations fought against the USSR - Italians, French, Spaniards, Romanians, Belgians ... But the Germans and Hungarians were especially cruel. Against this background, Hungary's claims against Russia will look ridiculous. This is tantamount to the fact that Mongolia will demand compensation from Russia for the fact that the inhabitants of Kozelsk burned the ambassadors of Batu. "
Nevertheless, the efforts of modern Hungarian official circles, aimed at whitewashing the historical role of the Horthy occupation forces, continue. For example, in the article "Sleep, mute army", dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the defeat of the 2nd Hungarian army and published in the magazine "Magyar Hírlap" (one of the most loyal Hungarian pro-government publications), the author Zoltan Babuch writes:
“For decades, they hammered into us, the 'sinned nation', that in 1943 soldiers of the 2nd Hungarian Army sacrificed to German interests, that our Honvedians fought and froze in the endless steppe for unrighteous goals, or rather, for nothing. […] The piles of regimental newspapers that have come down to us prove that the Honvedians had a fairly good idea of what they were looking for far from their homeland. Corporal of the 7th Infantry Regiment Laszlo Niri, for example, sent home the following lines in the fall of 1942: “I sincerely would like to convey the personal feelings of the lack of culture of the Russians, which reduced them to an animal state [...] the incredible poverty that seemed to our eyes is clearly felt. Each soldier compares with disgust this terror-controlled paradise to our beautiful Motherland. I don't even know what would have happened if these people could have looked around us. Then he would have the right to say that he visited the heavenly booths, because our Motherland, compared to their country, is a real paradise, if we describe it even without any bias ”. […] But it is clear that we are a “sinned nation”, because to this day we pay some for the war traumas that befell their families, but those whose father or close relative gave their lives for the Motherland are not worth words of gratitude. In the winter of 1943, not only tens of thousands of Honvedians and civil servants remained on the Don, but our honor also remained there ”.
Perhaps one can agree with the author in this: indeed, not only Hungarian soldiers remained on the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, but also their honor, shame and conscience, which they lost during their lifetime, committing their bloody atrocities.
Literature:
- Abbasov A.M. Voronezh front: chronicle of events - Voronezh, 2010
- Analytical review of the 4th department of the Hungarian Royal General Staff on the experience of fighting the partisans, April 1942, Budapest (The publication was prepared by E.-M. Varga, N.M. Peremyshlennikova, D.Yu. Khokhlov)
- The Great Patriotic War, 1942: Research, documents, comments / Otv. ed. V.S. Khristoforov - Moscow: Publishing House of the Main Archival Administration of the City of Moscow, 2012
- Kraus Tamas, Eva-Maria Varga. Hungarian troops and the Nazi extermination policy in the Soviet Union - Journal of Russian and East European Historical Studies, No. 1 (6), 2015
- Filonenko N.V. History of military operations of Soviet troops against the armed forces of Horthy Hungary on the territory of the USSR. Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Historical Sciences - Voronezh, 2017
- Filonenko S.I., Filonenko N.V. The collapse of the fascist new order in the Upper Don (July 1942 - February 1943) - Voronezh, 2005
- Filonenko S.I. Battles on the Voronezh land through the eyes of the Russians and the invaders. 1942-1943 - Voronezh, "Kvarta", 2012
- http://perevodika.ru
- http://www.runivers.ru
- http://svpressa.ru
- http://all-decoded.livejournal.com
- http://istvan-kovacs.livejournal.com
- http://www.honvedelem.hu
- http://magyarhirlap.hu
70 years ago, on October 29, 1944, the strategic Budapest operation began. The fierce battle for Hungary lasted 108 days. During the operation, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts defeated 56 divisions and brigades, destroyed almost 200 thousand. enemy grouping and liberated the central regions of Hungary and its capital, Budapest. Hungary was pulled out of World War II.
Background. Hungary on the road to war and World War II
Back in 1920, the authoritarian regime of Miklos Horthy was established in Hungary (Politics of Admiral Horthy). Former admiral and commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungarian navy, Horthy suppressed the revolution in Hungary. Under Horthy, Hungary remained a kingdom, but the throne remained empty. Thus, Horthy was regent in a kingdom without a king. He relied on the conservative forces, suppressing the communists and openly right-wing radical forces. Horthy tried not to tie his hands to any political force, focusing on patriotism, order and stability.
The country was in crisis. Hungary was not an artificial state with long-standing state traditions, but the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in World War I deprived Hungary of 2/3 of its territory (where, in addition to Slovaks and Romanians, millions of ethnic Hungarians lived) and most of the economic infrastructure. The Treaty of Trianon left an imprint on the entire post-war history of Hungary (agreements between the victorious countries in the First World War and the defeated Hungary). Romania received Transylvania and part of Banat at the expense of Hungary, Croatia, Backa and the western part of Banat went to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Austria received Hungarian lands.
In order to channel the people's discontent and thirst for revenge, Horthy blamed all the troubles of Hungary on communism. Anti-communism has become one of the main ideological pillars of the Horthy regime. It was complemented by the official national Christian ideology, which was oriented towards the wealthy strata of the population. Therefore, in the 1920s, Hungary did not establish relations with the USSR. Horthy considered the Soviet Union a source of "eternal red danger" for all mankind and opposed the establishment of any relationship with him. Revanchism was part of the ideology. So, on the occasion of the conclusion of the Treaty of Trianon, national mourning was declared in the Kingdom of Hungary, and all official flags were lowered until 1938. In Hungarian schools, pupils read a prayer for the reunification of their homeland every day before lessons.
Miklos Horthy, Regent of Hungary 1920-1944
At first, Hungary focused on Italy, in 1933 relations with Germany were established. The policy of Adolf Hitler aimed at revising the terms of the Versailles Agreement was completely satisfactory for Budapest. Hungary itself wanted to revise the results of the First World War and advocated the abolition of the terms of the Trianon Treaty. The hostile attitude of the countries of the "Little Entente", which received Hungarian lands and were suspicious of Budapest's attempts to reconsider the outcome of the war, and the coldness of France and England, made Hungary's pro-German course inevitable. In the summer of 1936, Horthy visited Germany. The Hungarian leader and the German Fuhrer found understanding in terms of rapprochement and rallying of forces under the banner of anti-communism. Friendship continued with Italy. When the Italians invaded Ethiopia in 1935, Hungary refused to set restrictions on trade and economic relations with Italy, as demanded by the League of Nations.
After Germany seized Austria, Horthy announced a program of armament for Hungary - the army at the beginning of 1938 numbered only 85 thousand people. Strengthening the country's defense was named the main task of Hungary. Hungary abolished the restrictions on the armed forces that were imposed by the Trianon Treaty. By June 1941, Hungary had a strong army: three field armies and a separate mobile corps. The military industry also developed rapidly.
After that, Horthy saw no other choice but to continue rapprochement with the Hitlerite Reich. In August 1938, Horthy visited Germany again. He refused to participate in the aggression against Czechoslovakia, trying to preserve the autonomy of Hungary, but was not against the solution of the territorial issue in favor of Budapest through diplomatic means.
Hitler and Miklos Horthy take a walk on the footbridge during Horthy's visit to Hamburg for Hitler's 50th birthday in 1939
Under the terms of the Munich Treaty, on September 29, 1938, Prague was obliged to resolve the "Hungarian question" in accordance with the agreement with Budapest. The Hungarian government did not agree to the option of autonomy for the Hungarian community within the framework of Czechoslovakia. The first Vienna arbitration of November 2, 1938, under pressure from Italy and Germany, forced Czechoslovakia to give Hungary the southern regions of Slovakia (about 10 thousand km2) and the southwestern regions of Subcarpathian Rus (about 2 thousand km2) with a population of more than 1 million. human. France and England did not oppose this territorial redistribution.
In February 1939, Hungary joined the Anti-Comintern Pact and began an active restructuring of the economy on a war footing, sharply increasing military spending. After the occupation of all of Czechoslovakia in 1939, Subcarpathian Rus, which declared independence, was occupied by Hungarian troops. Hitler, wishing to tie Hungary to Germany as closely as possible, offered Horthy the transfer of the entire territory of Slovakia in exchange for a military alliance, but was refused. Horthy preferred to remain independent in this matter and solve the territorial issue on an ethnic basis.
At the same time, Horthy tried to continue a cautious policy, trying to maintain at least relative independence of Hungary. Thus, the Hungarian regent refused to participate in the war with Poland and to let German troops pass through Hungarian territory. In addition, Hungary received tens of thousands of refugees from Slovakia, Poland and Romania, including Jews. After the Soviet Union regained Bessarabia and Bukovina, which Romania captured after the death of the Russian Empire, Hungary demanded that Bucharest return Transylvania. Moscow supported this demand as fair. The Second Vienna Arbitration of August 30, 1940, by decision of Italy and Germany, transferred Northern Transylvania to Hungary with a total area of almost 43.5 thousand km and a population of about 2.5 million. Both Hungary and Romania were unhappy with this decision. Budapest wanted to get all of Transylvania, but Bucharest did not want to give anything away. This territorial division aroused territorial appetites for the two powers and tied them more strongly to Germany.
Although Horthy still tried to leave the Hungarian kingdom aside from the great European war. So, on March 3, 1941, Hungarian diplomats received instructions which read the following: “The main task of the Hungarian government in the European war until its end is the desire to save the military and material forces, human resources of the country. We must at any cost prevent our involvement in a military conflict ... We must not risk the country, the youth and the army in anyone's interests, we must proceed only from our own. " However, it was not possible to keep the country on this course, too powerful forces pushed Europe to war.
On November 20, 1940, under pressure from Berlin, Budapest signed the Triple Pact, entering into a military alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan. Hungarian industry began to fulfill German military orders. In particular, Hungary began to produce small arms for Germany. In April 1941, Hungarian troops took part in the aggression against Yugoslavia. Hungarian Prime Minister Pal Teleki, who tried to prevent Hungary from being drawn into the war, committed suicide. In his farewell letter to Horthy, he wrote "we have become perjurers", because we could not keep the country from "acting on the side of the villains." After the defeat of Yugoslavia, Hungary received the north of the country: Bachka (Vojvodina), Baranya, Medzhumur County and Prekmurje.
War against the USSR
Hitler concealed his plans for the USSR from the Hungarian military-political leadership to the last. Back in April 1941, Hitler assured Horthy that relations between Germany and the USSR were "very correct" and that nothing threatened the Reich from the east. In addition, the German command counted on a "lightning war" in the east, so Hungary was not taken into account. Compared to the Wehrmacht, the Hungarian army was weak and technically poorly armed, and, as they thought in Berlin, could not strengthen the first and decisive blow. It is also worth considering the fact that the German Fuhrer was not sure of the complete loyalty of the Hungarian leadership and did not want to share his secret plans with him.
However, when the war broke out, Berlin revised its plans for Hungary's participation in the war. Part of the Hungarian leadership itself was also eager to take part in the carve-up of the "Russian bear skin". The Hungarian National Socialist Arrow Cross Party, although it was regularly banned, had massive support in society, including in the military environment, and demanded the country's participation in the war with the USSR. The Hungarian military, having tasted victories in the war with Yugoslavia and impressed by the military successes of the Wehrmacht in Europe, demanded to take part in the war. In the spring of 1941, the chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General Henrik Werth, demanded from both the Regent Horthy and the Prime Minister Laszlo Bardosi to raise the issue with Germany about the indispensable participation of the Hungarian army in the "crusade" against the Soviet Union. But Horthy bided his time, as did the government.
Hungary entered the war after an incident on June 26, 1941, when unknown bombers attacked the Hungarian city of Kosice. According to one version, the Soviet aviation made a mistake and had to bomb the Slovak city of Presov (Slovakia entered the war with the USSR on June 23), or the Soviet command did not doubt the future choice of Hungary, an accidental strike is also possible, due to the chaos in the command of troops at the beginning war. According to another version, the provocation was organized by the Germans or Romanians in order to drag Hungary into the war. On the same day, a proposal was received from the high German command to the general staff of the Hungarian army to join the war against the Union. As a result, Hungary declared war on the USSR. Hungary opened its territory for the transit of military materials from Germany and Italy. In addition, during the war, the Kingdom of Hungary became the agrarian base of the Third Reich.
In late June - early July 1941, the Carpathian group was sent to the Eastern Front: the 8th Kosice Corps (1st Mountain and 8th Border Brigades) under the command of Lieutenant General Ferenc Szombathely and the Mobile Corps (two motorized and one cavalry brigade) under the command of General Bela Miklos. Hungarian troops were attached to the 17th German Army as part of Army Group South. In early July, Hungarian soldiers engaged the 12th Soviet Army. Then the Hungarian troops took part in the battle of Uman.
Hungarian troops in the Don steppes, summer 1942
In September 1941, several more Hungarian divisions were transferred to the USSR. They were used to protect communications and to fight partisan formations in Ukraine, in the regions of Smolensk and Bryansk regions. I must say that the Hungarians "distinguished themselves" by a number of atrocities in the Chernigov region, Bryansk region and near Voronezh, where Hungarian soldiers thanked "God" that they could participate in the destruction of the "Slavic and Jewish infection" and without mercy killed the elderly, women and children. The Hungarians were noted for similar atrocities in the occupied lands of Yugoslavia. In the Serbian Vojvodina, soldiers of the Szeged corps of General Fekethalmi (the future head of the General Staff of the Hungarian army) carried out a massacre. Serbs and Jews were not even shot, but drowned in the Danube and hacked with axes.
Therefore, the monument to the Hungarian soldiers, which was erected on the Voronezh land in the village of Rudkino, as well as the memorial burials to foreign discoverers in other villages of the Voronezh land, where the Magyar Hungarians carried out the most outrages, is a real blasphemy against the memory of Soviet soldiers, a betrayal of Russian civilization. This is the gradual introduction of enemy programs of political tolerance and political correctness.
By the beginning of 1942, the number of Hungarian soldiers in the USSR had increased to 200 thousand people, and the 2nd Hungarian Army was formed. The Hungarians soon paid for their atrocities. During the Soviet counteroffensive during the Battle of Stalingrad, the Hungarian army was practically destroyed. The Hungarian army lost 145 thousand killed and captured (most of them were exterminated like mad dogs, our ancestors did not stand on ceremony with evil spirits) and most of the weapons and equipment. The 2nd Hungarian Army practically ceased to exist as a combat unit.
Hungarian soldiers killed at Stalingrad
After that, Adolf Hitler did not put the Hungarian troops in the forefront for a long time, the Hungarians now performed rear missions in Ukraine. Horthy, worried about the future fate of Hungary, replaced the government of Bardosi with the government of Kallai. Miklos Kallai continued the policy of supplying Germany with everything necessary, but at the same time the Hungarians began to seek contacts with the Western powers. So, Budapest pledged not to fire on Anglo-American aircraft over Hungary. In the future, the Hungarian government promised to go over to the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition, after the invasion of the Western powers in the Balkans. At the same time, Budapest refused to negotiate with the USSR. In addition, the Hungarians forged ties with the emigrant governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia, trying to preserve the pre-war territorial gains. Negotiations were also conducted with Slovakia, which was also supposed to go over to the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition, after Hungary went over to the side of England and the United States.
Hungary's attempt to withdraw from the war
In 1944, the situation escalated sharply. The Wehrmacht and the Romanian army suffered severe defeats in the southern strategic direction. Hitler demanded that Horthy carry out a total mobilization. The 3rd Army was formed in Hungary. But Horthy continued to bend his line, for him the inevitability of the defeat of Germany, and therefore Hungary, was already obvious. The internal situation in the country was characterized by the growth of economic difficulties and social tension, the growth of the influence of radical pro-German forces.
Hitler, doubting the reliability of Budapest, forced Horthy in March 1944 to agree to the entry of German troops into Hungary, and with them the SS troops. In Hungary, the pro-German government of Döme Stoyai was established. When an anti-German coup took place in Romania on August 23 and Romania sided with the countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition, the situation for Hungary became critical. August 30 - October 3, 1944, the troops of the USSR and Romania conducted the Bucharest-Arad operation (Romanian operation) against the Wehrmacht and the Hungarian army. In the course of this operation, almost all of Romania was liberated from the German-Hungarian troops and the Red Army occupied the initial areas for the offensive into Hungary and Yugoslavia. In September 1944, Soviet troops crossed the Hungarian border. Later, in the course of the East Carpathian operation (Ninth Stalinist blow: East Carpathian operation), the 1st Hungarian army suffered heavy losses, was essentially defeated.
On the basis of military defeats in Hungary, there was a government crisis. Horthy and his entourage tried to gain time and prevent the entry of Soviet troops into Hungary in order to preserve the political regime in the country. Horthy deposed the pro-German Stoyai government and appointed General Geza Lakatos as prime minister. The military government of Lakatos was opposed to Germany and tried to preserve the old Hungary. At the same time, Horthy tried to continue negotiations with Britain and the United States to conclude an armistice. However, the solution of this issue could no longer be opposed without the participation of the USSR. On October 1, 1944, the Hungarian mission was forced to arrive in Moscow. The Hungarian envoys had the authority to conclude an armistice with Moscow if the Soviet government agreed to the participation of Anglo-American troops in the occupation of Hungary and to the free evacuation of the Wehrmacht from Hungarian territory.
On October 15, 1944, the Hungarian government announced an armistice with the USSR. However, Horthy, unlike the King of Romania Mihai I, could not bring his country out of the war. Hitler was able to keep Hungary for himself. The Fuhrer was not about to lose his last ally in Europe. Hungary and East Austria were of great military and strategic importance. It housed a large number of military factories and had two significant sources of oil, which the German military was in dire need of. The SS detachment stole in Budapest and took hostage the son of Horthy - Miklos (Younger) Horthy. The operation was carried out by the famous German saboteur Otto Skorzeny (Operation Faustpatron). Under the threat of deprivation of his son's life, the Hungarian regent abdicated and transferred power to the pro-German government of Ferenc Salasi. Power was received by the leader of the Nazi Arrow Cross Party and Hungary continued the war on the side of Germany.
In addition, the Fuhrer sent large armored formations to the Budapest area. In Hungary, a powerful grouping was deployed - Army Group South (German 8th and 6th armies, Hungarian 2nd and 3rd armies) under the command of Johannes (Hans) Friesner and part of the forces of Army Group F.
Admiral Horthy was sent to Germany, where he was held under house arrest. His son was sent to the camp. Part of the Hungarian military, led by the commander of the 1st Hungarian Army, General Bela Miklos, went over to the side of the Red Army. Miklos made a radio appeal to the Hungarian officers to go over to the side of the USSR. In the future, the army commander will head the Provisional Hungarian Government. In addition, the formation of Hungarian units within the Red Army will begin. However, the majority of the Hungarian army will continue the war on the side of Germany. Hungarian troops will actively oppose the Red Army during the Debrecen, Budapest and Balaton operations.
The 2nd Hungarian Army will be defeated during the Debrecen operation, its remnants will be included in the 3rd Army. Most of the 1st Hungarian Army will be destroyed in the stubborn fighting in early 1945. Most of the remnants of the 3rd Hungarian Army will be destroyed 50 km west of Budapest in March 1945. The remnants of the Hungarian formations that fought on the side of the Germans will retreat to Austria and surrender only in April - early May 1945 on the outskirts of Vienna.
Ferenc Salasi in Budapest. October 1944
To be continued…
The message on "VO" that the Minister of Defense of Hungary came to Voronezh on a visit aroused interest. Some of the readers expressed surprise at both this fact and the fact that there are burials of Hungarian soldiers on the territory of the region.
We will tell you about one of these burials.
Actually, there was already a story about him, three years ago, but everything is changing, people come, it is not always possible to keep up with everything. So let's repeat ourselves.
Already on June 27, 1941, Hungarian aircraft bombed Soviet border posts and the city of Stanislav. On July 1, 1941, the border of the Soviet Union was crossed by parts of the Carpathian group with a total number of more than 40,000 people. The most efficient unit of the group was the Mobile Corps under the command of Major General Bela Danloki-Miklos.
The corps consisted of two motorized and one cavalry brigades, support units (engineering, transport, communications, etc.). Armored units were armed with Italian Fiat-Ansaldo CV 33/35 tankettes, Toldi light tanks and Hungarian-made Csaba armored vehicles. The total strength of the Mobile Corps was about 25,000 soldiers and officers.
By July 9, 1941, the Hungarians, having overcome the resistance of the 12th Soviet Army, advanced 60-70 km deep into enemy territory. On the same day, the Carpathian group was disbanded. The mountain and border brigades, which could not keep up with the motorized units, had to perform security functions in the occupied territories, and the Mobile Corps became subordinate to the commander of the German Army Group South, Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt.
On July 23, Hungarian motorized units launched an offensive in the Bershad-Gayvoron area in cooperation with the 17th German Army. In August, a large group of Soviet troops was encircled near Uman. The encircled units were not going to surrender and made desperate attempts to break through the encirclement. The Hungarians played an almost decisive role in the defeat of this group.
The Hungarian Mobile Corps continued the offensive along with the troops of the 11th German Army, participating in heavy battles near Pervomaisk and Nikolaev. On September 2, German-Hungarian troops captured Dnepropetrovsk after fierce street fighting. Hot battles broke out in the south of Ukraine in Zaporozhye. Soviet troops repeatedly launched counterstrikes. So, during the bloody battle on the island of Khortitsa, an entire Hungarian infantry regiment was completely destroyed.
In connection with the growth of losses, the warlike ardor of the Hungarian command decreased. On September 5, 1941, General Henrik Werth was removed from his post as Chief of the General Staff. His place was taken by infantry general Ferenc Szombathely, who believed that it was time to curtail the active hostilities of the Hungarian troops and withdraw them to defend the borders. But Hitler managed to achieve this only by promising to allocate Hungarian units to guard supply lines and administrative centers in the rear of the German army.
Meanwhile, the Mobile Corps continued to fight at the front, and only on November 24, 1941, the last of its units went to Hungary. Losses of the corps on the Eastern Front amounted to 2,700 killed (including 200 officers), 7,500 wounded and 1,500 missing. In addition, all tankettes, 80% of light tanks, 90% of armored vehicles, more than 100 vehicles, about 30 guns and 30 aircraft were lost.
At the end of November, "light" Hungarian divisions began to arrive in Ukraine to carry out police functions in the occupied territories. The headquarters of the Hungarian "Occupation Group" is located in Kiev. Already in December, the Hungarians began to be actively involved in anti-partisan operations. Sometimes such operations turned into very serious military clashes. An example of one of such actions is the defeat on December 21, 1941 of the partisan detachment of General Orlenko. The Hungarians managed to surround and completely destroy the enemy base. According to Hungarian data, about 1,000 partisans were killed.
In early January 1942, Hitler demanded that Horthy increase the number of Hungarian units on the Eastern Front. Initially, it was planned to send at least two-thirds of the entire Hungarian army to the front, but after negotiations, the Germans reduced their requirements.
To send to Russia, the 2nd Hungarian Army was formed with a total number of about 250,000 people under the command of Lieutenant General Gustav Jan. It consisted of the 3rd, 4th and 7th Army Corps (each has three light infantry divisions, similar to 8 conventional divisions), the 1st Panzer Division (actually a brigade) and the 1st Air Force (actually a regiment ). On April 11, 1942, the first units of the 2nd Army went to the Eastern Front.
On June 28, 1942, the German 4th Panzer and 2nd Field Armies went on the offensive. Their main target was the city of Voronezh. The offensive was attended by the troops of the 2nd Hungarian Army - the 7th Army Corps.
On July 9, the Germans managed to break into Voronezh. The next day, to the south of the city, the Hungarians came out to the Don and consolidated their foothold. During the battles, only one 9th Light Division lost 50% of its personnel. The German command set the task for the 2nd Hungarian army to eliminate the three bridgeheads that remained in the hands of the Soviet troops. The Uryvsky bridgehead posed the most serious threat. On July 28, the Hungarians made the first attempt to throw its defenders into the river, but all attacks were repulsed. Fierce and bloody battles broke out. On August 9, Soviet units launched a counterattack, pushing back the advance units of the Hungarians and expanding the bridgehead near Uryv. On September 3, 1942, the Hungarian-German troops managed to push back the enemy beyond the Don near the village of Korotoyak, but the Soviet defense held out in the Uryv area. After the main forces of the Wehrmacht were transferred to Stalingrad, the front here stabilized and the fighting took on a positional character.
On January 13, 1943, troops of the Voronezh Front, supported by the 13th Army of the Bryansk Front and the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front, struck at the positions of the 2nd Hungarian Army and the Alpine Italian Corps.
The very next day, the defense of the Hungarians was broken through, some parts were seized by panic. Soviet tanks entered the operational space and smashed headquarters, communications centers, ammunition and equipment depots. The entry into battle of the 1st Hungarian Panzer Division and units of the 24th German Panzer Corps did not change the situation, although their actions slowed down the pace of the Soviet offensive. During the battles in January-February 1943, the 2nd Hungarian Army suffered catastrophic losses.
All tanks and armored vehicles were lost, virtually all artillery, the level of personnel losses reached 80%. If this is not a rout, then it is difficult to call it anything else.
Hungarians inherited great. To say that they were hated more than the Germans is to say nothing. The tale that General Vatutin (a deep bow to him and eternal memory) gave the order “not to take the Hungarians prisoner” is absolutely not a fairy tale, but a historical fact.
Nikolai Fedorovich could not remain indifferent to the stories of the delegation of residents of the Ostrogozhsky district about the atrocities of the Hungarians, and, perhaps, in his hearts, he dropped this phrase.
However, the phrase spread through parts with lightning speed. This is evidenced by the stories of my grandfather, a soldier of the 41st Rifle Corps of the 10th NKVD Division, and after being wounded - the 81st Rifle Corps of the 25th Guards. page division. The soldiers, being aware of what the Hungarians were doing, took it as a kind of indulgence. And they dealt with the Hungarians accordingly. That is, they were not taken prisoner.
Well, if, according to the grandfather, they were "especially smart", then the conversation with them was also short. In the nearest gully or forest. "We pinned them up ... When trying to escape."
As a result of the battles on Voronezh land, the 2nd Hungarian army lost about 150 thousand people, in fact, all equipment. What was left was already rolled out on the land of Donbass.
Today, there are two mass graves of Hungarian soldiers and officers on the territory of the Voronezh region.
These are the village of Boldyrevka of the Ostrogozhsky district and the village of Rudkino Khokholsky.
More than 8 thousand Honved soldiers are buried in Boldyrevka. We have not been there, but we will definitely visit by the 75th anniversary of the Ostrogozh-Rossosh operation. As well as the town of Korotoyak, whose name in Hungary is known to virtually every family. As a symbol of sorrow.
But we stopped at Rudkino.
Some people are unpleasant that this is how cemeteries of Hungarians, Germans, Italians exist. Well-groomed such.
But: we Russians are not at war with the dead. The Hungarian government maintains (albeit with our own hands) the cemeteries of its soldiers. And there is nothing so shameful in this. All within the framework of a bilateral intergovernmental agreement on the maintenance and care of military graves.
So let the Hungarian warriors lie, under marble slabs, in a rather beautiful corner of the Don bend.
As an edification to those who suddenly still come to mind utter nonsense.
When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Hungary decided to take full-scale participation in hostilities.
After June 27, the northern Hungarian town was bombed from the air by an unknown plane, Hungary terminated diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and declared war on it. The Hungarian army elite expected a quick victory for Germany. At the end of June, Hungarian units were sent to the Eastern Front. Some of them advanced deep into Soviet territory together with German strike groups, while others ensured security in the rear of the German troops.
Subsequently, to its chagrin, Hungary found itself at war with Great Britain and the United States. The United States declared war on Hungary on June 5, 1942. In January 1942, under strong German pressure, Bardoshi promised to send additional troops to the Eastern Front. On March 9, 1942, primarily due to Germany's inability to quickly defeat the Soviet Union, Horthy dismisses Bardoshi. He appoints Miklos Kallai as prime minister, who continues his policy of open support for Germany, but at the same time holds secret negotiations with Anglo-Saxon forces in the hope of pulling Hungary out of the war. Meanwhile, in the period from April to June 1942, the 2nd Hungarian army of more than 200 thousand people is sent to the Eastern Front to strengthen the German grouping.
The Hungarian forces in the Soviet Union were insufficiently armed, and the available weapons were outdated, and poorly organized supplies led to a shortage of ammunition. The catastrophic defeat of the 2nd Hungarian Army in the Voronezh region during the winter of 1943 led to more than 120 thousand casualties alone, and was perceived in Hungary as a national tragedy. Captured Hungarian Soldiers After such a blow, Kallai, more convinced than ever, tried to pull Hungary out of the war. His secret diplomatic activities intensified, and his participation in military operations was sharply limited. This infuriated Hitler, who wanted Hungary's full participation in the war. Hitler was also upset by the secret negotiations of the Hungarian government with the Western allies aimed at the withdrawal of Hungary from the war. He was well informed of these negotiations from pro-German sources in the Budapest government.
Alarmed by the attempts of the Hungarian government to withdraw from the war, on March 19, 1944, Hitler sent German troops to occupy Hungary and force it to further participate in the war on the side of Germany. Under German pressure, Horthy had to appoint Deme Stoyai, a former Hungarian ambassador to Berlin known for his pro-German sentiments, to the post of prime minister. Anti-fascist parties were banned and politicians who were hostile to Germany were arrested. The Hungarian government was also forced to send additional forces to the Eastern Front to fight the Red Army. But the occupation also led to a weakening of the economic importance of Hungary for the Reich, due to significant costs of maintaining troops, mass arrests and deportation of Jews, as well as increased bombing by the Allies. In an attempt to weaken German influence, on August 29, 1944, Horthy appoints a new prime minister, Gez Lakatos, who ordered units of the Hungarian army to launch an offensive in southern Transylvania in order to delay the Soviet-Romanian invasion.
Realizing that the end of the war was near, Horthy sent a delegation to Moscow to negotiate an armistice with the Soviet Union, which was signed on October 11, 1944. On October 15, 1944, Horthy announces by radio the unconditional surrender of Hungary. But due to a lack of coordination with the chief of staff of the Hungarian army, Janos Vorosh, the army continued to fight, and Horthy's attempt to surrender failed. German units entered Budapest and forced Horthy to cede power to Ferenc Salashi, the leader of the pro-German fascist Arrow Cross party. Horthy was arrested by the Gestapo and taken to Germany with his family.
During the short reign of Salasha, a kingdom of terror was established in Hungary. Thousands of people, including many Jews who took refuge in Budapest, were arrested and executed, or sent to concentration camps. Meanwhile, the Soviet army continued to advance, and in December 1944 they laid siege to Budapest. Two and a half months later, the remnants of the German forces in Buda surrendered, and on January 20, 1945 in Moscow, representatives of the Hungarian government signed an armistice. Most of the hostilities in the country ended in February 1945, but the last German units were driven off Hungarian soil only in April 1945. The country got rid of German military control and came under Soviet control.
The history of relations between Russia and then the Soviet Union with Hungary has enough "blank spots". One of them is the fate of Hungarian prisoners of war in the USSR in 1941-1955. This article was written as a result of many years of fundamental research into the history of the detention of foreign prisoners of war on the territory of the Soviet Union in the period 1941-1956, the factual base of which was made up of documents from the central state archives of the USSR, including trophy documents.
The criminal policy of the leaders of Hitlerite Germany was the cause of the tragedy not only of the German people, but also of the peoples of the satellite countries. The people of Hungary, who were dragged into the war against the USSR, became a hostage to Hitler's political adventure. However, the historical past of the Soviet Union and Hungary did not have grounds for enmity and hatred between the peoples of these countries. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of the population of Hungary, including the personnel of the Hungarian army, was not interested in a war with the Soviet people, did not believe in the need for a war with the USSR, especially for the interests of Nazi Germany. According to the first post-war prime minister of Hungary, his country fought on the side of Germany because the Germans had created a fifth column before the war. Of course, this statement is not without foundation.
Pre-war Hungary was home to about a million Swabian Germans, a wealthy and privileged segment of the population. In percentage terms, Hungarian Germans accounted for 6.2% of the total population of the country on June 30, 1941. Many of the officers in the Hungarian army were of German descent. Some changed their surnames to Hungarian or modeled on Hungarian. Naturally, the Hitlerite government made the most of the possibilities of the Hungarian Germans and Hungarian fascists to involve Hungary in the war with the Soviet Union.
The accession of Hungary on November 20, 1940 to the tripartite pact Germany - Italy - Japan placed it in the category of direct opponents of the USSR and significantly influenced the nature of relations between the USSR and Hungary.
In view of this, the Hungarian government significantly increased its armed forces, which by the end of 1940 already amounted to about one million people. The population of the country and the personnel of its armed forces began to prepare for war. At the same time, people began to form an attitude towards captivity. As a result of mass propaganda work in the army, it was possible to arouse a steady fear of Soviet captivity among soldiers and officers. This mood lasted almost until the end of 1944. Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of Hungarian prisoners of war at the end of 1941 - beginning of 1942 declared that if they knew about the benevolent attitude towards the prisoners, they would surrender immediately upon arrival at the front. As events developed during the Second World War, by the beginning of 1944, anti-war and anti-German sentiments became widespread in the Hungarian army and among the population of Hungary (according to sociological research), and interest in our country began to increase. In particular, professor Zibar, a professor of the Lyceum in Ayud, expressed surprise at the high culture of Soviet officers, said: "... we were not sufficiently aware of Russia, and the whole of Central Europe did not understand Russia well."
Having entered the war with the Soviet Union, the Hungarian government sent to the front at first, albeit few in number, but elite troops. The number of Hungarian soldiers and officers who participated in hostilities against the USSR in the period from June 27, 1941 to 1943, is shown in Table 1.
Accordingly, the number of Hungarian prisoners of war also increased (see table 2).
It should be noted that on June 30, 1941, of the total population of Hungary (16 million 808 thousand 837 people), i.e. 100%, were: Hungarians (Magyars) - 82%, Germans - 6.2%, Ukrainians - 4 , 6%., Slovenes - 3.9%, Jews - about 3%, Romanians and other nationalities - 2.3%. To some extent, this determined the national composition of the prisoners of war from this army.
Hungarian prisoners of war, 1942-1943
In the official records of the Office of the NKVD of the USSR for Prisoners of War and Internees (UPVI of the NKVD of the USSR), which was directly and solely responsible to the Soviet government for the maintenance and registration of prisoners of war, there is no required clarity. For example, in some registration documents all Hungarian prisoners of war appear as "Hungarians", in others as "Magyars", and in others - "prisoners of war of the Hungarian army" or "Germans of Hungarian citizenship", etc. Therefore, it was not possible to make an accurate calculation based on ethnicity. The problem was only partially resolved.
An analysis of documentary materials for the 1st quarter of 1944 showed that on March 1, 1944, 28,706 prisoners of war of the Hungarian army were held captive in the USSR (2 generals, 413 officers, 28,291 non-commissioned officers and a private). Of this number of prisoners of war, according to the “Hungarians” column, 14 853 people (2 generals, 359 officers, 14 492 non-commissioned officers and privates) “pass”. What nationality were the remaining 13,853 prisoners of war remained unclear. In addition, there are arithmetic errors and typos in the official docs. All this required not only recalculating the data already collected, but also comparing them with materials from other archives and departments.
It was possible to establish the ethnic composition of the Hungarian army prisoners of war in the Soviet Union on January 1, 1948. Then 112 955 people were held captive. Of these - by nationality:
a) Hungarians - 111,157, and only 96,551 people were Hungarian citizens; the rest had citizenship of Romania (9,286 people), Czechoslovakia (2,912), Yugoslavia (1,301), Germany (198), USSR (69), Poland (40), Austria (27), Belgium (2), Bulgaria (1 human);
b) Germans - 1 806;
c) Jews - 586;
d) Roma - 115;
e) Czechs and Slovaks - 58;
f) Austrians - 15;
g) Serbs and Croats - 5;
h) Moldovans - 5;
i) Russians - 3;
j) Poles - 1;
k) Ukrainians - 1;
m) Turks - 1.
All prisoners of war of the listed nationalities had Hungarian citizenship. From official sources it is clear that from June 27, 1941 to June 1945, 526,604 military personnel and their equated citizens of Hungary were captured. Of these, on January 1, 1949, 518,583 people left. Those who had departed were distributed as follows: repatriated - 418 782 people; transferred to the formation of Hungarian national military units - 21,765 people, transferred to the registration of internees - 13,100; released from captivity as citizens of the USSR and sent to the place of residence - 2,922 people; freed men captured during the liberation of Budapest - 10 352; transferred to the GULAG camps of the NKVD of the USSR - 14 people; convicted by military tribunals - 70; sent to prisons - 510; escaped from captivity and was caught - 8; other departures - 55; died for various reasons - 51,005; were registered as prisoners of war and were held in prisoner of war camps on January 1, 1949 - 8,021 people.
On October 1, 1955, the total number of prisoners of war of the Hungarian army in the USSR was 513 767 people (49 generals, 15 969 officers, 497 749 non-commissioned officers and privates). Of these, from June 1941 to November 1955, 459,014 people were repatriated, including: 46 generals, 14,403 officers and 444,565 privates. 54,753 people died in captivity in the USSR for various reasons, including 3 generals, 1,566 officers and 53,184 non-commissioned officers and privates. The main causes of death were wounds and diseases resulting from participation in hostilities; industrial injuries; diseases caused by an unusual climate and poor living conditions; suicide; accidents.
The difference between the officially accepted number of Hungarian citizens captured by Soviet troops in 1941 -1945. (526,604 people), and our data on those held captive in the USSR (513,767 people) is 12,837 people. The fact is that 2,485 people were recognized as citizens of the USSR (and not 2,922, as it was determined on January 1, 1949), and the remaining 10,352 people were released from captivity in Budapest in April-May 1945 and were not taken to the territory of the USSR. ...
How did the Soviet state contain such a huge number of prisoners of war, how was it treated?
With the beginning of World War II, the Soviet state expressed its attitude towards prisoners of war of the enemy army in the Analysis of the content of the "Regulations on prisoners of war", shows that it observes and takes into account the basic requirements of international humanitarian law on the treatment of prisoners of war and the Geneva Convention on the maintenance of prisoners of war of July 27, 1929 of the year. General and special sections of the "Regulations on prisoners of war" were detailed, supplemented or clarified by decrees and decisions of the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, as well as orders and directives of the NKVD (MVD) of the USSR, UPVI (GUPVI) of the NKVD (MVD) of the USSR.
On the main fundamentally important issues of the maintenance of prisoners of war, their material, food and medical and sanitary support, the Soviet government made about 60 decisions from 1941 to 1955, which were communicated to officials and prisoners of war both directly and through the publication of departmental regulations. Such acts were issued only by the UPVI (GUPVI) of the NKVD (MVD) of the USSR during the specified period, about three thousand.
For the sake of historical justice, it should be recognized that the actual practice of POW camps was not always adequate to the norms of humanity.
For various reasons (disorganization, negligence in the performance of official duties, military and post-war difficulties in the country, etc.), in some prisoner-of-war camps, there were cases of low organization of public services, cases of lack of food, etc. For example, during a planned inspection by the commission of the GUPVI NKVD of the USSR of the front camp for prisoners of war No. 176 (Focsani, Romania, 2nd Ukrainian Front) in January 1945, which contained 18,240 prisoners of war (of which Hungarian - 13,796; officers - 138, non-commissioned officers - 3025, privates - 10 633 13, a number of shortcomings were revealed. Hot food was provided twice a day, the distribution of food was poorly organized (breakfast and lunch lasted 3-4 hours). The food was very monotonous (there was no fat and vegetables), sugar was not provided. the specified products, but the responsible officials did not do so in a timely manner. In December 1945, the Hungarian anti-fascist prisoners of war who were en route home through camp No. 176 should write a collective letter about the shortcomings they saw in the maintenance of prisoners of war to the secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party M. Rakosi. And he, in turn, sent it personally to K.E. Voroshilov. On this fact, the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs conducted an official investigation. The head of Camp 176, Senior Lieutenant Puras, was punished.
In terms of food and medical and sanitary supplies, Hungarian prisoners of war, like prisoners of war of other nationalities, were equated with the servicemen of the rear units of the Red Army. In particular, according to the telegram of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 131 of June 23, 1941 (and its content was duplicated by the telegram of the General Staff of the Red Army No. VEO-133 of June 26, 1941 and the orientation of the UPVI NKVD of the USSR No. 25/6519 of June 29, 1941 g.), the following food standards were established for one prisoner of war per day (in grams): rye bread - 600, various cereals - 90, meat - 40, fish and herring - 120, potatoes and vegetables - 600, sugar - 20, etc. etc. (14 items in total). In addition, voluntarily surrendered (deserters) in accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of November 24, 1942 were given a daily bread rate of 100 g more than the rest.
The Soviet government controlled the food supply for the prisoners of war. During the period from June 1941 to April 1943, three decrees were issued concerning the nutrition of prisoners of war and measures to improve it: resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1782-790 of June 30, 1941 and No. 1874-874 of November 24, 1942; Resolution of the USSR State Defense Committee (USSR State Defense Committee) No. 3124 of April 5, 1943.
To improve the food supply for prisoners of war, stalls were organized at each camp (although, due to wartime, they began to function only after 1944). For physically weakened prisoners of war, according to the order of the NKVD of the USSR of October 18, 1944, new nutritional norms were established (in particular, bread began to be issued at 750 g per day per person). The normal attitude of the Soviet state towards Hungarian prisoners of war is evidenced by numerous reviews written by them with their own hand, as well as photographic documents.
At the same time, it should be noted that in winter conditions, especially in the period from December 1942 to March 1943, the provision of food to servicemen during their evacuation from places of captivity to front-line camps (the distance to them was sometimes equal to 200-300 km) was poorly organized. There were no feeding points in sufficient quantity on the evacuation routes. Food was given out in dry rations for 2 - 3 days in advance. Weakened and hungry in the environment, people immediately ate all the products they received. And this sometimes led not only to a loss of strength, but also to death. Later, the noted shortcomings were eliminated.
The results of the study showed that Hungarian prisoners of war were mostly hostile to the Germans (citizens of Germany), they wanted to actively fight with weapons in their hands against them.
Of the 60,998 Hungarian prisoners of war held in the camps of the NKVD of the USSR on December 20, 1944, about 30% asked the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR (through the administration of the camps) to enroll them in the Hungarian Volunteer Division. Taking into account the mass wishes, on December 27, 1944, the head of the UPVI of the NKVD of the USSR, Lieutenant General I. Petrov personally sent to L. Beria a draft decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR on the issue of organizing the Hungarian Volunteer Infantry Division from prisoners of war. The project was developed jointly with the General Staff of the Red Army. The formation of the division was planned to begin in the city of Debrecen (Hungary): by 25% at the expense of Hungarian prisoners of war held in the rear camps, and by 75% from the number of Hungarians who surrendered in the front camps (there were 23 892 of them). It was planned to arm the personnel of the division with captured weapons. Matthias Rakosi was directly involved in solving this important political issue for Hungary. In total, 21,765 people were released from captivity and transferred to the formation of Hungarian military units.
It should be noted that if the recruitment of these military units with enlisted personnel did not cause difficulties, then there were clearly not enough officers. This was due to the fact that the commanding staff from among the Hungarian prisoners of war were mostly negatively opposed to the Soviet state and its policies. Some, for example, Major Batond and Zvalinsky, in February 1945 agreed to enroll them in the 6th Infantry Division of the Hungarian Army in Debrecen, as it turned out, with the aim of carrying out decomposition work among its personnel. They spread all kinds of rumors, such as: "The GPU will arrest the best people and send them to Siberia," and so on.
The repatriation of Hungarian prisoners of war was carried out systematically. So, according to the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1497 - 341 of June 26, 1945, 150,000 Hungarian prisoners of war were repatriated, and by order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2912 of March 24, 1947 - 82 Hungarian prisoners of war. According to his decree No. 1521 - 402 of May 13, 1947, "On the repatriation of prisoners of war and internees of Hungarians during May - September 1947," it was planned to repatriate 90,000 people, but in fact 93,775 were repatriated; according to the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1039-393 of April 5, 1948, 54,966 Hungarian prisoners of war were repatriated, etc. Before repatriation, a full cash settlement was made with each Hungarian prisoner of war: he received that part of the money earned in captivity in the USSR, which remained after deductions for his maintenance. Each of them left a receipt that the settlement with him was made in full and he did not have any claims against the Soviet state.
UPVI of the NKVD of the USSR in January 1945 was renamed into the Main Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR for Prisoners of War and Internees (GUPVI NKVD USSR)
TsGA, f. 1p. op, 01e, d. 35. ll. 36-37.
Ibid, f. 1p. op 01е, file 46 pp. 212-215, 228-232, 235-236; op. 30s. d., l.2
Suicide cases were committed mainly to avoid punishment for war crimes or because of nervous strain and weakness of spirit. So, on June 2, 1945 at 3:45 a.m. at the army reception center for prisoners of war No. 55 (Zwegl, Austria), the Hungarian prisoner of war Colonel-General Hesleni Jozsef, the former commander of the 3rd Hungarian army, which fought on the side of the Germans. Regarding this suicide, the Hungarian prisoner of war Lieutenant-General Ibrani Michal said: “Various rumors about the punishment of the perpetrators of the war, about the execution of the Hungarian generals showed him a hopeless future” (see TsGA, f. 451 p. Op. 3, d. 21, ll. 76-77).
TsGA, f. 4p. op. 6, d.4, ll. 5-7.
Ibid f. 1p. op. 5a, 2, ll. 294-295.
Ibid f. op. 1a, 1 (collection of documents)
Ibid f. 451p. op. 3, d.22, ll. 1-3.
Ibid. Ll. 7-10.
Ibid. Ll. 2-3.
Ibid f. 1p. op. 01e, 46, ll. 169-170.
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