Military unit 3219 Labinsk

Mass riots in Tbilisi in 1956: the role of military unit 3219

Military unit 3219 - now the 378th separate Red Banner operational battalion of the Internal Troops (previously 451 operational regiment), stationed in the city of Labinsk Krasnodar region, - is usually mentioned in connection with the fighting in the North Caucasus. At the same time, indecently little is known about the unit’s previous combat path. Here we will talk about one of its most important milestones - the participation of the then 19th motorized rifle detachment of internal security (as the regiment of internal troops was designated in 1951-1968) of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the elimination of mass riots in the Georgian capital in March 1956.
Many of the available descriptions of the Tbilisi events tend to demonize the “8th Regiment” (the old actual name of military unit 3219, better remembered than others in Tbilisi and from there went into literature), and even Vladimir Kozlov, the author basic research about the unrest in the Union, did not avoid repeating erroneous information: “... as F. Baazova testifies, when after midnight (the night of March 9 to 10 - N.A.) the 8th regiment, armed with tanks, entered the city, its soldiers unexpectedly, without any warning, began to shoot schoolchildren and students point-blank”.
An analysis of archival documents from military unit 3219 itself, as well as materials from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, allows us to see a different picture.

How it all began
On March 4, 1956, in Tbilisi, near the monument to Stalin on the embankment of the Kura River, a crowd gradually gathered, numbering different estimates, from 1 to 2 thousand people. Those present were mostly young people who were going to honor the memory of Stalin on the eve of the next anniversary of his death. This was not the first time such gatherings had occurred - mourning rallies took place in March 1954 and 1955.
Although the events were informal, local authorities did not interfere with them, and they took place without incident. This time the police also did not intend to take any special measures, but 25 soldiers led by an officer were sent to the station next to the scene of events from military unit 3219, just in case.

The period from March 5 to 7 was marked by processions in which participants paid tribute to the late Secretary General and an increase in the number of people present at the monument. Perhaps everything really would have worked out relatively painlessly, but big politics intervened. On February 25, Khrushchev made a secret report on Stalin's personality cult, and information about this event leaked on March 6 gradually electrified the crowd. Both Stalinist sympathies and the national feelings of Georgians, for whom Stalin was not only a leader, but also a compatriot, were hurt.

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(KGB transcript about the rally in Tbilisi)

By evening the crowd dispersed, but many of them returned to the monument to Stalin.
Dzhandzhgava ordered additional patrols from the 19th detachment to be put on the streets, and for this, six unarmed groups (platoons) from the very companies that had dealt with the troublemakers the day before were sent to different police departments. In addition, the next morning, 40 people from the 24th detachment blocked the Marneuli highway to prevent the influx of additional demonstrators from outside into Tbilisi.

Climax
Although protest activity continued to grow, already acquiring an anti-Khrushchev character, until the evening of March 9, the personnel of military unit 3219 did not encounter any serious difficulties. The next few hours more than compensated for this relative calm.

Passions regarding Stalin were heating up, and shortly before the end of the day a fatal call was made - to move to where the means of communication and communication were located. mass media to notify the country and the world about what is happening in Tbilisi.
According to operational data, up to 30 or even 40 thousand people took part in the protests throughout the city, and some of these people rushed to the buildings of the House of Communications and the editorial offices of the newspapers Komunisti and Zarya Vostoka. All threatened objects were located on Rustaveli Avenue.

Unlike March 8, this time the guards of order began to prepare for more decisive actions, even before the main ones appeared. alarms. Already at 20.00, on the orders of Dzhandzhgava, the patrols of the 19th detachment were withdrawn and went to the unit to get weapons. An hour later, a group from the 2nd team, which did not participate in the events of the previous days, was sent to each editorial office. At 23.00, a military reserve from the 24th detachment - 100 people - was allocated to the duty officer in the city.

Distribution of responsibilities between internal security and Soviet army to protect important facilities, which was apparently arbitrary in nature, led to the fact that the personnel of military unit 3219 did not get to the site that turned out to be the most tense that night - the Communications House. The soldiers of the 1st Mechanized Division (military unit 06770), led by the commander himself, Major General Gladkov, fell into this trap (both tactical and subsequently ideological). As the crowd attempted to enter the building, gunfire began from the street and at least two soldiers were wounded. Warning shots into the air did not convince the people to stop the assault, and as a result, targeted fire was opened, stopping the onslaught.

"Counteroffensive"
In the first hour of March 10, in another part of Rustaveli Avenue, another crowd approached the newspaper editorial buildings, but everything turned out surprisingly peacefully: after shouting for a while, people dispersed. Apparently, the matter was, of course, not in the persuasion of the officers of the 19th detachment, noted in the documents, but simply in the fact that this crowd was initially less aggressive than the crowd at the House of Communications.
It was more difficult in the area adjacent to Rustaveli Avenue on Georgiashvili Street (now Chanturia Street), where a crowd of three thousand people was besieged by the city police officer of the Tbilisi police department. The chief of staff of the 19th detachment, Lieutenant Colonel Novozhenov, was sent with the 1st team and a group from the 2nd team to rescue the policemen and prevent the seizure of the weapons available in the building. Having inquired about the use of weapons against the attackers, he was instructed by Janjgava, who gave orders when dangerous situation fire upward first, and if this does not stop the violence, fire to kill.

Trucks with personnel arrived at the scene, and the soldiers, firing several volleys into the air, alarmed the crowd, which was throwing stones at the building and could break through the frail police cordon at any moment. Taking advantage of the resulting panic, the detachment’s fighters immediately rushed in a chain towards the accumulation of young people, and the psychological attack was quickly crowned with success. Thus, it was possible that it was possible to save not only the policemen and weapons from the crowd, but also the crowd from the policemen, because in a moment of desperation someone from the duty officer’s entourage could well have shot at the violators.

When the threat to important government facilities subsided, it was decided to end the crowd at the monument, and one battalion from the 1st Mechanized Division, led by unit commander Colonel Novikov, using armored vehicles, cordoned off the area on three sides. When the blockade was secured, the 1st and training teams of the 19th detachment, supported by a group from the 2nd team (about 150 people in total) and 50 policemen, were sent to force the public out, having a ban on the use of weapons.

Soldiers from military unit 3219, led by Colonel Chernikov, entered from the rear of the monument and, overcoming fierce resistance (a group of people even managed to knock one of the soldiers onto the pavement and temporarily take possession of his weapon, but the foreman was able to recapture both the soldier and the weapon), began to squeeze out protesters and push them off their pedestal.

Suddenly, as at the House of Communications, single shots were heard from the crowd (for example, a man with a TT pistol was caught, who almost shot one of the lieutenants participating in the operation), and the SA battalion unauthorizedly opened fire - mostly in the air, but several people Still got hit by bullets. Personnel The 19th detachment also could not stand it and began shooting upwards. Soon the officers managed to calm the soldiers, and the shocked and beaten crowd began to leave the area in panic along a specially open corridor in a cordon.
This was the end of active “police” actions for the detachment. Subsequently, he was again involved in patrolling, as well as guarding hospitals, where the bodies of those killed during the riots were taken. According to official figures, a total of 21 people were killed and another 54 were injured. varying degrees severity (the vast majority of all losses occurred in the area of the House of Communications).

Detachment 24 entered the case again, now working together with the police and state security to seize possible instigators and guard them in an internal KGB prison.
In total, about 300 people were indiscriminately arrested on the night of March 9 and the morning of March 10, most of whom later had to be released for lack of evidence of a crime.

False alarm
Already on March 9, threats were made at rallies that if by the 24th the demands of the protesters related to preserving the memory of Stalin and abandoning the course taken by Khrushchev were not met, then new protests would begin on that day. State security began to take preventive measures, and the police increased patrolling, to which the party and Komsomol activists were also involved.

The internal security did not stand aside either. Military unit 3219 allocated 224 people who, until March 26, were involved in the area of the House of Communications, the armory of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, police stations and in ensuring road cordons. In addition, one team was sent to the city of Gori, where protest activity was also recorded in the first ten days of March.
But nothing happened either on March 24 or later. It is extremely doubtful that after the events of the night of March 10 and numerous arrests, the people of Tbilisi would have the courage to take the risk again.

From the facts considered, the following conclusions can be drawn:
Contrary to stereotypes, military unit 3219 was not a merciless instrument of the “final solution” to the Tbilisi problem, thrown in for reprisals at the last moment, but a “fire brigade” activated long before things took a completely nasty turn. Even in the most difficult moments, the fighters of the 19th detachment did not use lethal weapons, limiting themselves to a terrifying effect.

The riots in Tbilisi in March 1956 are surrounded by no fewer myths than the events that would take place there (even in the same part of the city) in April 1989, and the myth about “sapper shovels” is partly rooted in horror stories about “8 -th regiment." But if attempts to understand what happened during the years of “perestroika” began immediately, then the episode of the “thaw” waited much longer.

March 11th, 2016

Military unit 3219 - now the 378th separate Red Banner operational battalion of the Internal Troops (previously 451 operational regiment), stationed in the city of Labinsk, Krasnodar Territory - is usually mentioned in connection with military operations in the North Caucasus. At the same time, indecently little is known about the unit’s previous combat path. Here we will talk about one of its most important milestones - the participation of the then 19th motorized rifle detachment of internal security (as the regiment of internal troops was designated in 1951-1968) of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the elimination of mass riots in the Georgian capital in March 1956.

Many of the available descriptions of the Tbilisi events tend to demonize the “8th Regiment” (the old actual name of military unit 3219, best remembered in Tbilisi and from there gone into literature), and even Vladimir Kozlov, the author of a fundamental study of the unrest in the Union, did not escape repetition of erroneous information: “<…>as F. Baazova testifies, when after midnight (the night of March 9-10 - N.A.) the 8th regiment, armed with tanks, entered the city, its soldiers unexpectedly, without any warning, began to shoot schoolchildren and students point-blank.”
An analysis of archival documents from military unit 3219 itself, as well as materials from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, allows us to see a different picture.

How it all began
On March 4, 1956, in Tbilisi, a crowd gradually gathered near the monument to Stalin on the embankment of the Kura River, numbering, according to various estimates, from 1 to 2 thousand people. Those present were mostly young people who were going to honor the memory of Stalin on the eve of the next anniversary of his death. This was not the first time such gatherings had occurred - mourning rallies took place in March 1954 and 1955. Although the events were informal, local authorities did not interfere with them, and they took place without incident. This time the police also did not intend to take any special measures, but 25 soldiers led by an officer were sent to the station next to the scene of events from military unit 3219, just in case.

On March 8, students with flags and portraits of Stalin, Lenin and Molotov staged a procession along the central streets of the city. Together with the townspeople who joined (in total there were at least 3 thousand people), they began to demand that March 9, the day of Stalin’s funeral, be given the status of a mourning non-working day.

Having voiced their demands, the crowd began to seize all the vehicles that came to hand, and at approximately 11 am a motley column of 200-300 buses, trucks and cars, accompanied by those who could not fit on them, moved along Myasnikov Street (now Gorgasali Street) towards the exit from Tbilisi.
The heated demonstrators were going to meet with Marshal Zhu De, Deputy Chairman of the People's Republic of China, who was visiting the USSR at that time. It was impossible to delay any longer, and almost at the same time as the convoy was moving forward, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia, Lieutenant General Vladimir Dzhandzhgava, ordered to stop the further movement of people and captured vehicles to the government dacha in Krtsanisi, where the marshal was staying.

Leaving the detachment of 25 people mentioned above in place, the commander of the 19th detachment, Colonel P.I. Chernikov deployed two teams (companies) from the 1st division (battalion) under the command of the division's chief of staff, Major Kalinin. One team went on a mission without ammunition, the other without any weapons at all. Trucks with soldiers were stationed in the area of the Avlabari bridge over the Kura River, where it was planned to stop the crowd. Very soon Kalinin realized that Dzhandzhgava’s order was impossible to implement - with the available forces, the major could not compete with the avalanche of people and machines.

Both teams rushed further to the area of the Ortachal hydroelectric power station (within Tbilisi). There they nevertheless tried in two ranks to prevent the movement of the demonstration, but the cars gradually pushed the soldiers back, and the students and their like-minded people for the first time began to show aggression and began throwing stones and other improvised means. Four soldiers of the 19th detachment, including the senior lieutenant, were injured.

The minister’s unrealistic plan was finally abandoned, and the battered teams were urgently transferred to Zhu De’s dacha, where 30 cadets from the detachment’s training team were already located. They also lined up in two lines at the closest approaches to the dacha to stop those who wanted to communicate with the marshal, but, of course, they turned out to be powerless in front of a hundred times larger crowd and a hail of stones and bottles.

The soldiers could only act as bodyguards for the Chinese guest. From the composition of the 24 convoy guard detachment stationed in Tbilisi under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Finenko (military unit 7430) for possible operations A military reserve of 100 people was allocated in the area of the dacha. However, this time it happened: communication between the Tbilisians and Zhu De took place, and tension in Krtsanisi began to gradually subside.

By evening the crowd dispersed, but many of them returned to the monument to Stalin. Dzhandzhgava ordered additional patrols from the 19th detachment to be put on the streets, and for this, six unarmed groups (platoons) from the very companies that had dealt with the troublemakers the day before were sent to different police departments. In addition, the next morning, 40 people from the 24th detachment blocked the Marneuli highway to prevent the influx of additional demonstrators from outside into Tbilisi.

Passions over Stalin were heating up, and shortly before the end of the day a fatal call was made to move to where the means of communication and mass media were located in order to notify the country and the world about what was happening in Tbilisi.

According to operational data, up to 30 or even 40 thousand people took part in the protests throughout the city, and some of these people rushed to the buildings of the House of Communications and the editorial offices of the newspapers Komunisti and Zarya Vostoka. All threatened objects were located on Rustaveli Avenue.

Unlike March 8, this time law enforcement officers began to prepare for more decisive actions, even before the main warning signs appeared. Already at 20.00, on the orders of Dzhandzhgava, the patrols of the 19th detachment were withdrawn and went to the unit to get weapons. An hour later, a group from the 2nd team, which did not participate in the events of the previous days, was sent to each editorial office. At 23.00, a military reserve from the 24th detachment - 100 people - was allocated to the duty officer in the city.

The distribution of responsibilities between the internal security and the Soviet army for the protection of important facilities, which was apparently arbitrary, led to the fact that the personnel of military unit 3219 did not get to the site that turned out to be the most tense that night - the Communications House. The soldiers of the 1st Mechanized Division (military unit 06770), led by the commander himself, Major General Gladkov, fell into this trap (both tactical and subsequently ideological). As the crowd attempted to enter the building, gunfire began from the street and at least two soldiers were wounded. Warning shots into the air did not convince the people to stop the assault, and as a result, targeted fire was opened, stopping the onslaught.

It was more difficult in the area adjacent to Rustaveli Avenue on Georgiashvili Street (now Chanturia Street), where a crowd of three thousand people was besieged by the city police officer of the Tbilisi police department. The chief of staff of the 19th detachment, Lieutenant Colonel Novozhenov, was sent with the 1st team and a group from the 2nd team to rescue the policemen and prevent the seizure of the weapons available in the building. Having inquired about the use of weapons against the attackers, he was instructed by Janjgava, who ordered that if a dangerous situation arose, first fire a volley upward, and, if this does not stop the violence, fire to kill.

This was the end of active police actions for the detachment. Subsequently, he was again involved in patrolling, as well as guarding hospitals, where the bodies of those killed during the riots were taken. According to official data, a total of 21 people were killed, and another 54 were injured of varying degrees of severity (the vast majority of all losses occurred in the area of the House of Communications).

Detachment 24 entered the case again, now working together with the police and state security to seize possible instigators and guard them in an internal KGB prison. In total, about 300 people were indiscriminately arrested on the night of March 9 and the morning of March 10, most of whom later had to be released for lack of evidence of a crime.

But nothing happened either on March 24 or later. It is extremely doubtful that after the events of the night of March 10 and numerous arrests, the people of Tbilisi would have the courage to take the risk again.

From the facts considered, the following conclusions can be drawn.

Contrary to stereotypes, military unit 3219 was not a merciless instrument of the “final solution” to the Tbilisi problem, thrown in for reprisals at the last moment, but a “fire brigade” activated long before things took a completely nasty turn. Even in the most difficult moments, the fighters of the 19th detachment did not use lethal weapons, limiting themselves to a terrifying effect.

As illustrations for the material, frames from the film “A Dangerous Criminal Wanted” by Georgy Gakhokia (Saban, Gorky Film Studio, 1992. Cameraman - Alexander Machilsky) were used.

Military unit 3219 Labinsk

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