Why did the Japanese take Koreans to the Far East. The history of the deportation of Koreans to Central Asia is different. "To recognize the expedient resettlement of Koreans ..."

The deportation of an entire people is a sad page in the USSR in the 1930s-1950s, the crime of which practically all political forces are forced to admit. There were no analogues of such atrocities in the world. In ancient times and during the Middle Ages, peoples could destroy, drive them out of their homes in order to seize its territories, but in an organized way to resettle it to other, obviously worse conditions, they thought of it only during the period of Stalinism, and at the same time they introduced into the propaganda ideology of the USSR such concepts as "traitor people", "punished people". Before finding out which peoples of the USSR experienced the horrors of deportation, it is necessary to define the term "deportation".

Today the concept of "deportation" is given a one-sided interpretation: "[Lat. Deportatio] - expulsion, expulsion from the state as a measure of criminal and administrative punishment." In our opinion, the correct definition of the notion "deportation" for the forced, forced and total resettlements of many ethnic groups, carried out in the USSR on only one national basis, has not yet been formulated and requires special elaboration.

The first of the peoples of the Soviet Union to experience deportation were the Far Eastern Koreans, followed by dozens of others: Germans, Kurds, Crimean Tatars, Poles, Chechens, etc. The question: "Why were the Koreans deported?", Over the long years of the totalitarian regime, and then the administrative-command system, belonged to the category of taboo. G.V. Kahn singled out "a large-scale reason for the deportation, the essence of which is that Soviet Koreans have become hostages of the Far Eastern policy of the USSR as a whole." At the same time, he refers to the rapprochement of the main political forces of China: the Communist Party and the Kuomintang with the Soviet Union, which culminated in the signing of the Soviet-Chinese non-aggression pact on August 21, 1937. "The deportation of Koreans under the pretext of" stopping the penetration of Japanese espionage, "GV Kan believes," should be viewed as one of the moments of "big politics", as a demonstration by the Soviet Union of the firmness of its allied relations with China, its relations with Japan (Korea was in colonial dependence on Japan, and the Koreans were Japanese subjects), their positions in the Far Eastern policy.

The well-known researcher N.F.Bugai, on the basis of studying documents belonging to the departments that led the deportation processes, classified these reasons according to five groups of deportees and Koreans entered the second, along with Germans, Kurds, Meskhetian Turks, Khemshins and Greeks who were forced to relocate according to called a preventive feature.

The fundamental reason for the deportation of Koreans and subsequent special resettlements, in our opinion, should be sought in the very essence of the totalitarian regime that took shape in the USSR by the end of the 1920s, and which fully manifested itself in the 1930s and 1940s.

By the will of Stalin and under the leadership of the party, state apparatus, punitive organs and means of agitation and propaganda, socialism was built in a single country, according to the principle: the goal justifies everything. Among the real reasons for the deportation of Soviet Koreans from the Far East, researchers mention the following:

By 1937, the Korean population was largely integrated into the socio-political, economic and cultural life of the Far Eastern Territory. However, the nature of their spatial distribution - rather compact regions with a significant or predominant proportion of the Korean population - caused concern and did not correspond to the "divide et impera" principle.

The formation of the Jewish Autonomous Region in 1934 in their areas of residence, according to some foreign researchers, could entail the demands of the Korean population of the Far Eastern Territory to create their own national-state autonomy.

The forced resettlement of Koreans inland, a thousand kilometers away from the borders with Korea and Manchuria, also pursued certain political and economic goals.

Here we can assume the following: firstly, the resettlement to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, whose area was dozens of times larger than the territory of the Far Eastern Territory, automatically meant the dispersion and fragmentation of groups of the Korean population in the areas of settlement. Secondly, in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, as a result of the criminal methods of forced, complete collectivization without taking into account the specific mode of management, millions of people died, and hundreds of thousands migrated outside their republics and countries. Direct losses 1931-1933 from hunger, epidemics and other hardships in Kazakhstan alone amounted to 1 million 700 thousand people. 1 million 030 thousand migrated outside the republic, including 616 thousand who migrated irrevocably. Thus, an acute shortage of labor resources arose here, which was partially made up by immigrants, in this case Koreans.

Among those deported to Uzbekistan was the grandmother of a student of our university, Pak Vladimir (group VTiPO-41), Elena Liang. She was not yet a year old when her uncle brought her to Uzbekistan in his arms. The orphan girl was adopted by another Korean family. Vladimir's grandfather - Kim Vladimir does not remember his parents, because he was only 5 years old. Perhaps they were among the arrested Koreans in the Far Eastern Territory, and the child, like many Korean children, including Vladimir's grandmother from his father's side, was sent to the other end of the big Union.

Vladimir's grandmother always emphasizes the hospitality and kindness of the Kazakh and Uzbek peoples who sheltered Korean immigrants, who, contrary to strict instructions from above, shared bread and shelter with those who suffered from hunger and cold.

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PAGE 74: Period 1937-1938 in the history of our country it is characterized as a period of mass repressions, which became an integral part of the intensifying Stalinist policy of terror. Far Eastern Koreans were the first of the peoples of the Soviet Union to experience mass deportation, followed by dozens of others: Germans, Kurds, Crimean Tatars, Poles, Chechens, etc. From the moment of their appearance within Russia, Koreans have always aroused suspicion with a certain frequency. This happened both under Soviet rule and during the period of the Russian Empire. Back in 1911-16, attempts were made to evict Koreans from the Far Eastern regions of Russia into the interior of the country, which ended in vain. Thus, the stereotype of "unreliability" in the image of Koreans in an open or secretive form has always been preserved. At certain times, the economic benefits of the Koreans came to the fore, pushing back other issues for a while. But the pre-war situation in the second half of the 1930s once again exacerbated an old question about the reliability of Koreans. At a certain point, the escalating threat of an attack from Japan, combined with domestic political factors, actually determined the authorities' priorities in the pre-war strategy to eliminate threats in the Soviet Far East. On August 21, 1937, a decree was issued? 1428-326ss of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union (SNK) SSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "On the eviction of the Korean population from the border regions of the Far Eastern Territory" in order to "prevent the penetration of Japanese espionage into the Far Eastern Territory." The deportation was preceded by two articles in the Pravda newspaper, dated April 16 and 23, 1937, about Japanese espionage in the Soviet Far East. They emphasized that Japanese spies were operating in Korea, China, STR. 75: Manchuria and the Soviet Union and that Chinese and Koreans are used for espionage, masquerading as local residents. This raises the question of how justified were the assumptions of the Soviet authorities about the complicity of the Koreans of the DCK with the Japanese. Probably, such suspicions could have taken place in view of the ethnic similarity of Koreans and Japanese and their difficult identification by the Russian population. Even despite the fact that the Koreans themselves for the most part treated the Japanese negatively, this could hardly guarantee that among the Koreans in the DCK, Japanese spies did not really hide and did their work. Secondly, the Soviet authorities simply had no time to figure out and calculate the likelihood of espionage among Koreans, it was easier to accuse them of this in advance, and thereby protect themselves in advance from the manifestation of actual espionage. Looking ahead, it would be appropriate to recall the psychology of Stalinism, in which the constant "struggle with an invisible enemy" was inseparable from the policy of maximizing the protection of power from danger within the state. The deportation of Koreans took place mainly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but individual groups of immigrants also ended up in the European part of Russia, for example, in the Astrakhan region. Thus, the fact of transferring 520 Korean families in the amount of 2,871 people for placement to the Astrakhan enterprises of the State Fishery Trust, in the amount of 2,871 people, who were recorded as settled in Kazakhstan, was documented. On September 16, 1937, the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbek SSR adopted a resolution "On the resettlement of Korean farms." In total, by November 10, 1937, 16,307 Korean farms were settled in the Uzbek SSR. The resettlement brought about radical changes in all spheres of koryo saram life. Most of the Koreans, neither morally nor physically (especially the elderly and children) were not ready for resettlement. Judging by the secret special messages of the NKVD, some Koreans were disappointed in the Soviet regime, and also showed a negative attitude towards the STR. 76: representatives of the Russian population as a whole. But still they were much more worried about the fate of the property they left behind. In addition, they experienced a certain fear of the unknown what awaited them in Central Asia. In our opinion, the research of scientists concerning the deportation of Koreans in 1937-1938 clearly lacks a systematic approach. In our work, we will try to consider the reasons for deportation in its various contexts, be it the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet leadership, the phenomenon of Stalin's personality. This will allow us to comprehensively study this issue, assessing it from different positions and points of view. Then we will highlight the most significant approaches for us and give them our own assessment. When studying the reasons for deportation, it is necessary to reveal the concept itself. In a broad sense, deportation refers to the forced expulsion of a person or a whole category of persons to another state or other locality, usually under escort. Deportation is often applied to foreign citizens or stateless persons who illegally entered a particular state. In our case, we are talking about the mass deportation of a significant number of people on a national basis. In the USSR in the 1920s and 40s. deportation was used as an act of mass repression. As noted, Koreans were not the only peoples of the Soviet Union who were forcibly displaced during the period of repression. Deportation, as a political measure, was part of the general political course of the Soviet leadership in those years. Therefore, the reasons for the deportation cannot be considered in isolation from the very personality of Stalin. Khan S.M. and Khan V.S. consider the phenomenon of Stalinism in its various aspects, be it system, politics, psychology or ideology. Studying Stalin's personality reveals the essence of his tough methods. To justify the massive nature of the repressions, it was necessary to find more and more "enemies", "pests", "unreliable" (as in the case of the Koreans), "on suspicion", ie. further confirmation of the correctness of the Stalinist policy of total terror. And what was more irrational were the arrests, executions and deportations, the massive displacement of millions of people in all directions, STR. 77: the better the goal of the System was achieved - universal fear, suppression of the I, deformation of consciousness, unquestioning obedience. Ultimately, "enemies" and "unreliable" were found, including among nations and nationalities. The search mechanism for "enemies of the people" came from the paranoid psychology of the leader of all nations, who believed that enemies were lurking around and that "the wolves of imperialism were not asleep." The "preemptive" policy of suppressing the elements that threatened the entire system of power lay the origins of the subsequent repression, including deportation. In Soviet historical literature, in conditions when the documents on the deportation of Koreans were classified, the need to develop the uninhabited lands of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and the area of ​​rice cultivation in these territories was also named as the reason for the deportation. Among the modern views of the authors studying this problem, Kim G.N. also considers it possible that the placement of immigrants mainly in the southern regions of Kazakhstan and the republics of Central Asia provided for them to engage in traditional agricultural activities: rice growing and vegetable growing. As you know, before the deportation, the Koreans made a great contribution to the development of agriculture in the Russian Far East. From Korea, they brought traditional Korean crops and farming methods to their new homeland. Therefore, the resettlement of Koreans to Central Asia as specialists capable of raising certain branches of agriculture in the region can also be taken into account. Scientists N.F. Bugay, V.F. Lee point to the preventive nature of deportation. Continuing their thought, scientists Kim G.N. and Men D.V. there are the following reasons for deportation: STR. 78: - by 1937 the Korean population was largely integrated into the socio-political, economic and cultural life of the Far Eastern Territory. However, the nature of their spatial distribution - rather compact regions with a significant or predominant proportion of the Korean population - caused concern and did not correspond to the "divide and rule" principle. - the formation of the Jewish Autonomous Region in 1934 in the areas of their residence could entail the demands of the Korean population of the Far Eastern Territory to create their own national-state autonomy. - Forcible resettlement of Koreans inland for a thousand kilometers from the borders with Korea and Manchuria could also pursue certain political and economic goals. We can assume the following: firstly, the resettlement to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, whose area was dozens of times larger than the territory of the Far Eastern Territory, automatically meant the dispersion and fragmentation of groups of the Korean population in the areas of settlement. Secondly, in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, as a result of the criminal methods of forced, complete collectivization without taking into account the specific mode of management, millions of people died, and hundreds of thousands migrated outside their republics and countries. Thus, an acute shortage of labor resources arose here, which was partially made up by immigrants, in this case Koreans. As for foreign policy reasons, it is worth noting the opinion of G.V. Kahn on the reasons for the deportation, the essence of which is that Soviet Koreans became hostages of the Far Eastern policy of the USSR as a whole. At the same time, he refers to the rapprochement of the main political forces of China: the Communist Party and the Kuomintang with the Soviet Union, which culminated in the signing of the Soviet-Chinese non-aggression pact on August 21, 1937. In his opinion, "the deportation of Koreans under the pretext of" stopping the penetration of Japanese espionage "should be viewed as one of the moments of" big politics ", as a demonstration by the Soviet Union of the firmness of its allied relations with China, its relations with Japan, and its positions in the Far Eastern policy. Hitlerite Germany was gaining strength in Europe, and Japan's militaristic policy was increasingly manifest in the Far East. Stalin, realizing the approach of war and his unpreparedness for it, py- STR. 79: Thought to maneuver between the poles of the upcoming conflict. Perhaps he intended to postpone the time of the USSR's involvement in the war as far as possible and made certain concessions, both with Germany in the West and with Japan in the East. So, according to Professor M.N. Pak, a political concession could have been the complete expulsion of anti-Japanese Koreans from the DCK. Of the whole range of approaches to the issue of the reasons for deportation, we would like to single out two main reasons that most likely could influence the decision of the authorities to deport Koreans from the DCK: areas, which could not but cause concern for the Soviet authorities. 2. In the increasingly complicated situation, deportation could be an element of military or, rather, pre-war tactics. As for the compact settlement of Koreans near the border with Korea, which was occupied at that time by Japan, in this matter, concerns about the border territories become quite logical. As part of a predictive assessment of the development of events, the country's leadership probably as a possible option could have assumed that the Posyetsky region of Primorye, with a proportion of Koreans of 90%, could become a reliable springboard for the Japanese to seize the entire Soviet Far East. With regard to deportation as a pre-war tactical maneuver, the term "internment" is used to refer to such measures in wartime. In international law, internment is understood as the forced placement of certain categories of aliens in any locality with a prohibition to leave it. Internment was practiced, for example, in the United States. During World War II, about 120,000 Japanese were resettled from the west coast of the United States to special camps, of which 62% had American citizenship. About 10 thousand were able to move to other parts of the country, the remaining 110 thousand were imprisoned in camps officially called "military centers for relocation." In many publications, these camps are called concentration camps. If we consider the deportation of koryo saram precisely from the point of view of pre-war policy, then the realities of that time, deportation could represent a measure aimed at solving a specific political problem. How justified was this measure of the Soviet leadership, and was it generally correct to carry out this political action? Some scholars studying the issue of deportation, first of all, focus on the inhuman nature of the organization of resettlement, questioning the advisability of forced resettlement. We will highlight the main points to which the attention of scientists is drawn in this regard: - first, the conditions in which the Koreans were transported. In particular, the emphasis is on the fact that the resettlement was carried out in railway freight cars, designed for the transport of livestock and hastily converted for people. - secondly, the deportation was carried out in a relatively short time, which entailed a lot of mistakes and shortcomings, such as poor medical care, lack of housing; - thirdly, the general unpreparedness of the Central Asian republics to receive such a large number of immigrants, as well as the general unsatisfactory organization of resettlement work by the authorities. Indeed, in the course of work on settling the settlers in new places, significant shortcomings appeared. The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the UzSSR dated January 11, 1938 "On measures for the employment of Korean immigrants" obliged the people's commissariats and institutions involved in the placement and settlement of immigrants in the plan for 1938 to carry out measures for the earliest possible employment of Korean immigrants and providing them with all types of services. However, the sanitary provision of the resettlement was not properly organized, and the work to provide Koreans with everything necessary in the RTP was not performed or performed unsatisfactorily. 81: places of arrival. The authorities of the Uzbek and Kazakh SSR were not ready to receive such a number of immigrants. Therefore, the first years in a new place were accompanied by an excess mortality caused by extreme natural and climatic conditions, housing insecurity, inadequate nutrition, a weak level, and often a lack of medical care, medicines, etc. In many Korean resettlement collective farms, various epidemic diseases, massive gastrointestinal and colds with widespread fatalities were widespread. Thus, in a letter from the Head of the Department of Resettlement of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the Uzbek SSR to the Chairman of the People's Commissariat of Health Muminov, it is reported that "collective farms of 1,636 Korean migrant farms have been organized in the Nizhne-Chirchik region. Among these migrants there are mass diseases of measles, typhoid fever, and epidemic malaria." Koreans were the first to be forcibly deported en masse. It was on them that the mechanisms for implementing a political measure of this kind and of such a scale were worked out, which then affected other peoples who fell into the category of "unreliable". Research into the reasons for the deportation of Koreans requires further elaboration. And although the topic of deportation is the most studied among other topics related to the history of koryo saram, it is necessary to apply new approaches in assessing this issue. List of sources used: 1. See: A.A. Kirichenko. About the first eviction of Koreans // 1937 Russian Koreans. Materials of the scientific conference "60 years of deportation of the Koreans of Russia from the Far East to Kazakhstan and Central Asia". Moscow, 2004.S. 215-238. 2. White paper on the deportation of the Korean population of Russia in the 30-40s. M., 1992. S. 64 3. Kim G.N. Deportation and liquidation of national educational institutions..shtml 2008. 4. Eyewitness accounts, - Niva, 1997,? 4, p. 24, 27, 29 - Reference by: Kim G.N. Deportation of Koreans to Kazakhstan // http://wrldlib.ru/k/kim_o_i/tyk5rtf.shtml 2004. 5. CSA RUZ, f. 837, op. 32, d.587, l. 1-7. 6. Ibid. d.593, l.91. 7. Koryo Saram is an ethnonym that replaced the ethnonym "Soviet Koreans" and denotes Koreans from the CIS countries. 8. Special message? 16. On the resettlement of Koreans of the 3rd stage in the DCK as of 10/14/37 // White Book on the deportation of the Korean population of Russia in the 30-40s. M., 1992.S. 136-140. 9. Large legal dictionary // http://www.info-law.ru/dic/1/ 10. See: Khan S.M., Khan V.S. Stalinism: on the question of the reasons for the policy of deportation // News of Korean Studies in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Issue 4, Almaty, 1993, pp. 7-14. 11. Ibid. P.12. 12. Stalin I.V. Vol. 5, p. 224 // Reference: Khan S.M., Khan V.S. Decree op. C.9. 13. See: G. N. Kim. Socio-cultural development of Koreans in Kazakhstan. Scientific and analytical review. Alma-Ata, 1989.S. 10-11. 14. See: Bae Eun Giyong. The participation of Koreans in the development of the economy of the Far Eastern region (20-30s of the XX century) // 1937 Russian Koreans. M., 2004.S. 153-166. 15. See: Bugay N.F. Tragic events should not be repeated (On the question of the position of Koreans in the USSR in the 30s). - Actual problems of Russian oriental studies. M., 1994. 16. White paper on the deportation of the Korean population of Russia in the 30-40s. S. 65-66. 17. Kim G.N., Meng D.V. History and culture of Koreans in Kazakhstan. Almaty, 1995. P.8-9. 18. Kan G.V. History of Koreans in Kazakhstan. Almaty, 1995. S. 46-47 19. Pak M.N. On the reasons for the forced deportation of Soviet Koreans from the Far East to Central Asia // Road of Bitter Trials. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the deportation of Koreans from Russia. M., 1997.S. 31. 20. Encyclopedia of the Lawyer // http://eyu.sci-lib.com/article0000860.html 21. Hirabayashi v. United States, reproduced at findlaw.com; accessed 15 Sept. 2006; Confinement and Ethnicity: An Overview of World War II Japanese American Relocation Sites, Jeffery F. Burton, Mary M. Farrell, Florence B. Lord, and Richard W. Lord, Chapter 3, NPS, accessed 31 Aug 2006 .; Peter Irons. (1976, 1996). Justice At War: The Story of the Japanese American Internment Cases. University of Washington Press. ISBN 0-520-08312-1. 22. TsGAP RUz, f. R-837. op. 32, d.589, ll. 23-28 23. See: TsGA RK, f. 1208, op. 1, d.30, l.81; GAKO, f. 18, op. 1, d. 164, St. 13. // Reference by: Kim G.N. The history of the enlightenment of the Koreans of Russia and Kazakhstan. Second half of the 19th century - 2000. 24. TsGA RUz, f. R-837, op. 32, d.593, l. 257. Attention! When citing an article, a link to the author is required! link for citation: Ten M.D. On the issue of the reasons for the deportation of Koreans from the Russian Far East to Uzbekistan in 1937-1938. // Uzbekiston Tarihi. - Tashkent, 2010. - Issue. 3. - P.74-81.

Deportation of Koreans

Far Eastern Koreans were among the first to be deported by the totalitarian regime. Their massive forced resettlement from the Far East to Kazakhstan was first preceded by the administrative resettlement of the most active part of the diaspora here in 1935 and 1936. These were former partisans, active participants in the Korean liberation movement. Most of them held positions of responsibility in local, district, regional Soviet and party bodies of the Far Eastern Territory (DVK). Having failed to collect accusatory material against them, they were expelled without trial or investigation. In Kazakhstan, exiles were placed on the islands of the Aral Sea and in the north of the republic. Among them were activists of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, leaders of Korean partisan units, workers of the Primorsky and Khabarovsk regional committees and regional committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, executive committees, publishing houses, students of the Vladivostok Korean Pedagogical Institute, etc. In 1937-1938, almost all of them were physically destroyed.

The mass media and literature played an active role in the black deportation case. Not without Stalin's knowledge, the novel of the future four-time winner of the Stalin Prizes of the USSR, Pyotr Pavlenko, was born. "In the East", dedicated to a detailed description of the future Second World War, which, according to the author, was to begin in the Far East with Japan's attack on the Soviet Union "in March 193 ...". The book was replicated in huge numbers. In 1937 alone, it was published with a circulation of almost half a million copies. And what is already quite remarkable, the author very clearly stated the idea that "North Korea was liberated by units of the Red Army" and in it "people's power was proclaimed", while South Korea remained under the yoke of capitalism.

A new impetus in the expansion of mass political repressions was Stalin's report "On the shortcomings of party work and measures to eliminate Trotskyist and other double-dealers" on March 3, 1937 at the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and his closing speech on March 5. Already on March 3, 1937, during the days of work At the plenary session, the media revealed the "valuable confession" of the Japanese Minister of War about Japanese espionage in Russia. On March 16, 1937, Pravda published an article "The system of Japanese espionage", on April 21, Molotov appeared in the same newspaper with an article "Our tasks in the fight against Trotskyists and other saboteurs, saboteurs and spies." Foreign espionage in the Soviet Far East. "Similar materials were published regarding Kazakhstan:" Trotskyite-Bukharin national-fascist bandits, these vile agents of Japanese-German fascism set themselves the goal of overthrowing Soviet power, enslaving the Kazakh people, turning Kazakhstan into a colony of Japanese imperialism. "

What are the real reasons for the deportation of Koreans from the Far East? Officially, this was motivated by a preventive necessity in order to “prevent the penetration of Japanese espionage into the region.” However, in our opinion, in close unity with this reason, a deeper one should nevertheless be distinguished. Its essence is that the Soviet Koreans became hostages of the Far Eastern policy of the USSR government As you know, in July 1937, Japan began an armed invasion of Inner China, and Beijing was occupied by the end of the month. In support of the belligerent parties, the polarization of global political forces in that bipolar world was manifested. It was based on ideological confrontation. In this situation, the Kuomintang government, not without the influence of the Chinese Communist Party, went on to further rapprochement with the Soviet Union. On August 21, 1937, it was signed Soviet-Chinese th non-aggression pact. The conclusion of such a treaty meant, in fact, the strengthening and development of the already long-standing allied relations between the USSR and China in the war with Japan. The Soviet Union treasured these relations very much, especially since it felt its isolation in the face of the impending World War II. The USSR actively rendered large economic and military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek China. What is characteristic: the Soviet-Chinese non-aggression pact and the decree of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the eviction of the Korean population from the border regions of the Far Eastern Territory were signed on the same day. These were two sides of the same coin. The deportation of Koreans under the pretext of "stopping the penetration of Japanese espionage" should be viewed as a political measure of the USSR government in its Far Eastern policy and, in particular, as a demonstration by the Soviet Union of the firmness of its allied relations with China, its relations with Japan, while Korea was colonially dependent on Japan. Koreans were Japanese subjects.A striking confirmation of this approach is the fact that if in 1937 all Soviet Koreans were deported from the Far East as potential Japanese spies, then starting in 1946, that is, less than ten years after the mass forcible resettlement, their again, on a voluntary-compulsory basis, they were returned to the Primorsky and Khabarovsk Territories, to the island of Sakhalin, especially to its southern part.

On August 21, 1937, Decree No. 1428-326e of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) “On the eviction of the Korean population from the border regions of the Far Eastern Territory,” signed by Molotov and Stalin, was adopted. , who fought with all their might against the Japanese colonialists, were massively accused of Japanese espionage and forcibly deported.

In the places of eviction, “resettlement trios” were created. exceptions were put in wagons for the transport of goods and livestock, and sent thousands of kilometers to the other end of Asia's largest part of the world.

Upon learning of the resettlement, Koreans heatedly and desperately discussed their fate, tried to resist arbitrariness and lawlessness. NKVD workers through their agents regularly drew up “special reports about the political sentiments of the Korean population subject to eviction.” Many Koreans assessed the eviction as a violation of the Stalinist Constitution and the party's national policy, declared their refusal to resettle. Some Koreans expressed a desire to go abroad, but were forced to refuse this, realizing that "the Japanese will strangle them", especially since those who filed a request to leave were immediately arrested and after the inquiry they "confessed" that they were Japanese intelligence officers. Some tried to hide from resettlement, went into the taiga, but they were returned, so how the areas of eviction were cordoned off by screening detachments. There were also quite desperate, full of hopelessness statements: "It is better to die here than to go where they are being resettled, I have many children and have no money", "Let me be shot rather than resettled." Far Easterners will not tolerate the Kazakh climate and if they are resettled there, then “undoubtedly, all r fuckers "," the law on eviction is wrong, the deadline for eviction is short, there is no money, they will bring us in and leave us, let the military pick us up and shoot us, anyway we will die. "

This is what people of different ages, men and women, representatives of the Korean intelligentsia and illiterate collective farmers used to say. These statements of desperate Koreans, struck by the thunder of resettlement, have been collected by the NKVD and live in the memory of the older generations of Kazakhstani Koreans. Among the Koreans, there were also moods of hidden hope: “Probably, an autonomous region will be created for us there.” Such hopes were not destined to come true. Neither an appeal to the Stalinist Constitution, to the national policy of the party, nor to local officials, nor hopes for abroad, nor extremes: "it is better to die here than to move." The employees of the NKVD themselves posed questions to their leaders: “What about children and relatives who are studying or living in other cities? How to deal with the sick and women in the last term of pregnancy? "The answer was short:" Ensure the resettlement of all Koreans. "

Actions to evict the Korean population unfolded in the areas of the first priority on September 1, 1937. This involved thousands of vehicles and carts, ocean steamers and the local fishing fleet. There were reports from the localities that "the district troiks were disgraceful about the resettlement of Koreans", "the possibilities of transporting migrants were not taken into account", "the schedule for loading and dispatching trains is systematically disrupted", " transportation of people "," the wagons are equipped and washed outrageously, not a single train for loading was delivered without defects "," harmful carelessness is noticeable among the leaders of the evicted areas ... ".

Analysis of the documents shows that during the period of deportation, hundreds of Koreans were repressed and physically killed. They were arrested at the places of eviction, on the way in trains, files were sent to them in pursuit to the places of settlement. The massacre of the NKVD bodies over them continued in Kazakhstan. The places of settling of Koreans, thus, became not only Kazakhstan and Central Asia, but also the vast expanses of the GULAG: Norillag, Siblag, Kargopollag, Soroklag, Karlag, Kraslag, Sevzheldorlag, Vyatlag ... it is often written that he was convicted under the article of the Criminal Code "Japanese agent".

Many trains already on the way received readdressing from Moscow, Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Alma-Ata, Tashkent. Some echelons, having arrived at their destination, did not unload, but received a new unloading address. The entire system of the NKVD was involved in the route of the Koreans, the progress of each echelon was transmitted in hours and minutes along a chain from station to station. On the way, massive illnesses began, especially among children. So, for example, measles due to difficult conditions gave up to 60 percent of mortality.

In December 1937, the deportation was completed. On December 20, in Pravda, under the heading “The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks),” it was reported: “For the“ exemplary and accurate fulfillment of the important tasks of the Government on transportation, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) announce gratitude to the head of the NKVD DVK and the workers of the Far Eastern roads ", those who distinguished themselves were presented for awards.

The first echelons with Koreans began to arrive in Kazakhstan at the end of September 1937. This is how the history of the Koreans of Kazakhstan began. The Kazakhs with an open mind, with their inherent hospitality, mercy and cordiality, greeted the Koreans, provided them with help, despite the strict prohibitions of the official authorities and not paying attention to the fact that they themselves were in incredibly difficult conditions: they had just suffered the greatest tragedy of famine in their history. the beginning of the 30s, generated by "Small October".

Koreans arrived in Kazakhstan in a stressful state with no means of subsistence, labeled as “Japanese spies.” Here they found themselves in a different ethno-economic situation, a different socio-cultural, linguistic, natural and climatic environment. - we repeat once again - due to the fact that the Kazakhs treated the troubles of the Koreans with compassion, deep understanding and sympathy.At a critical moment in the life of the Korean community, the high qualities of the soul of the Kazakh people were clearly manifested.

An important role in the ethnic self-preservation of Koreans was also played by such qualities of their national character as hard work, perseverance, and modesty.

The main place of unloading and temporary resettlement of Koreans in Kazakhstan was the South Kazakhstan region, that part of it, which is now the Kzylorda region (according to the administrative-territorial division of that time, it was part of the South Kazakhstan region). It is known that to this day it is the most difficult region of the republic in terms of its natural and climatic (the problem of the Aral Sea) and socio-economic conditions. In the economic description, these areas of the initial arrival of Korean migrants and further places of their compact residence (as of 1937) were nomadic and semi-nomadic. It was directly indicated that these areas were economically and culturally backward. A significant part of the farms did not have a definitively fixed land for their use, they sowed exclusively in the order of a one-time land designation. There was also the issue of using land for hayfields, grazing, etc. The families living in these areas in most cases did not have permanently adapted buildings, hibernating in dugouts, hastily erected, and sometimes simply dug into the ground, or in wagons.

As already noted, Kazakhstan itself has just suffered the greatest tragedy of famine in the 1930s. There was an acute issue of organizing "returnees" - those who returned to their homeland from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, the Middle Volga region and other places, who were forced to migrate to escape hunger. These were hundreds of families, for their arrangement there was a catastrophic lack of transport, building materials, and other resources. In addition, at that time in Kazakhstan the violent campaign of settling of the nomadic and semi-nomadic Kazakh population had not yet ended.For example, in 1936, almost seven thousand families were transferred to settle, and there were not enough resources to settle them.

It was against such a background that trains with thousands of exhausted migrants appeared here, in dire need of literally everything.

At a time when echelons with thousands of Koreans stretched out in a gigantic tragic line from one end of Asia to the other, on September 21, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov delivered a speech at the League of Nations in Geneva, condemning the war in Spain and China. He was justly stigmatizing the instigators of these wars; he did not even say a word about the tragedy of the Soviet Koreans. “They (instigators) are preachers of rabid misanthropy, resurrectors of the wildest, outdated theory of paganism and the Middle Ages, incinerators of the best works of the human spirit, persecutors of the most brilliant works of science, art and literature, despised by the entire cultural world, make themselves funny when they talk about salvation of civilization and call in the name of this to crusades against other peoples. "

And what about the League of Nations? “After Comrade Litvinov's speech, there was a round of unanimous applause from all sides, and many delegates hastened to congratulate him on his wonderful speech. Even usually unfriendly circles admitted that the speech made a deep impression. "[Ibid.] In any case, history is silent about whether the question of deporting Koreans was raised in this and other forums of the predecessor of the UN.

It is known that only on December 9, 1948, the International Convention "On the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide" was adopted, ratified by all UN members. According to it, actions that directly or indirectly create conditions for a group of people that are calculated on its complete or partial destruction.And only on April 26, 1991 in the RSFSR appeared the Law "On the rehabilitation of repressed peoples." It says that during the years of Soviet power, peoples were repressed, against whom “on the basis of nationality, a policy of slander and genocide was carried out at the state level, accompanied by forced resettlement, the formation of a regime of terror and violence in places of special settlement. The policy of arbitrariness and lawlessness practiced at the state level in relation to these peoples, being illegal, insulted the dignity of not only the repressed, but also all other peoples of the country. "

In general, 1937 was rich in "epochal" events. By this time, the "Stalin Constitution - the result of the struggle and victories of the Great October Revolution, the constitution of victorious socialism and true democracy" had already been adopted. This was the year of the 20th anniversary of the October Revolution.

On November 2, 1937, when the deported Koreans, including the elderly, women and children, employees of the department of camps, labor settlements and places of detention of the NKVD were placed in dugouts, sheds, barns, pigsties, etc. newspapers and magazines published the calls of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) for the 20th anniversary of the revolution: “The great union of equal peoples is growing and gaining strength in the Soviet country. Long live the fraternal union and the great friendship of the peoples of the USSR! "Preparations for the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the basis of the new constitution were in full swing. In November 1937, the working people of the Karatal district of the Alma-Ata region nominated Lev Borisovich Zalin as their candidate for the Council of the Union - People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan, who "under the leadership of the party and the glorious People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Comrade Yezhov," as his biography published in newspapers said, "is doing a tremendous job of exposing and routing these vile agents of Japanese-German fascism, who set themselves the goal of transforming Kazakhstan to the colony of Japanese imperialism ".

According to the department of camps, labor settlements and places of detention of the NKVD of the Kazakh SSR, in 1937 more than 90 echelons of Koreans, 20 789 families, 98 454 people were resettled in Kazakhstan.

The Koreans deported to Kazakhstan went through two stages of resettlement. The first was from the fall of 1937 to the spring of 1938, when they were transported from the Far East and they were in places of unloading and temporary residence, which were dugouts, warehouses, stables, pigsties, former prisons, abandoned mosques and other similar premises. Koreans lived only on the funds brought with them. The first winter in the places of their settlement, they spent incredibly difficult winters in the cold, hunger, lack of rights, with massive diseases, high mortality, especially among children, women and the elderly.

In the spring of 1938, the second stage of the resettlement of Koreans began already inside Kazakhstan, to which almost 60 percent of Koreans underwent, and the distance of transportation ranged from 20 kilometers on unpaved roads to 4000 kilometers by rail. Since that time, they have been resettled in places of permanent residence. Most of them were settled on undeveloped lands, on the lands of ruined unprofitable, and therefore liquidated state farms. All this work took place under the vigilant control of the NKVD On March 7, 1938, in all areas where Koreans were stationed, postcards signed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Redens were sent to the heads of the regional departments of the NKVD, in which it was emphasized: measures for resettlement and arrangement of migrants ".

But there was also the third stage of resettlement, connected with the fact that Koreans were not passive contemplators of their fate.

Already in the winter of 1938, messages from almost everywhere began to arrive in Alma-Ata: "There is a massive administrative migration of Korean farms", "Inform where and the reasons for the flight of Korean migrants are fleeing", Soviet and economic organizations for the purpose of propaganda and explanatory work among the Korean population, these activities do not help, and the movement of people does not stop. " fields.

By the fall of 1939, the situation had escalated. In a collective letter from the Koreans of the Ekpendy collective farm of the Kum-Aryk village council of the Yana-Kurgan district of the Kyzyl-Orda region dated October 24, 1939 to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Kazakh SSR, it was said that in 1939 the Koreans of this collective farm “sowed 50 hectares of wheat, and harvested only 13 centners grain. Collective farmers and their children are starving. Many students have stopped even going to school; there is no food, no shoes, or clothes. They sit naked and hungry. There is no hope for the future. " exhausted, but still left without bread. "Do not leave us on this site, we wish and ask to relocate us. After reviewing our application, give us a decisive joyful answer," they wrote.

Crop failure due to lack of water and ill-conceived arrangement in a number of Korean collective farms led to the overflowing of patience, and after fruitless correspondence with the authorities, despite the bans and restrictions, they arbitrarily, en masse began to arrange their future fate in Kazakhstan. ... Some Koreans left for Uzbekistan, went to cities for industrial enterprises. Resettlement collective farms merged with each other, with Kazakh collective farms. In October 1939, three Korean resettlement collective farms in the Kyzyl-Orda region - named after Molotov, "Krasny Kolokol", "Krasny Vostok", which are in distress due to crop failure caused by the lack of water for irrigation, merged with local Kazakh collective farms without permission. Despite the plight of the Koreans, they were fully recovered in kind, as well as arrears of past years. The authorities took measures for the administrative return of Koreans to their former places of settlement.

Not only a number of Korean agricultural collective farms, but also fishing ones, found themselves in such a difficult situation. So, the Korean fishing collective farm named after Voroshilov was located in the Aral region of the Kyzyl-Orda region with the allocation of a business center in the village of Kuvan-Darya at a distance of 250 kilometers from the regional center of the city of Aralsk. It was located at a distance of almost 10 kilometers from the sea, moreover, because of the shallow water, the ships could not approach the parking lot at a distance of 15 kilometers and the fishermen walked through the water for almost 25 kilometers. Fishing was carried out at a distance of 60 to 200 kilometers from the village. The fishing brigade was fishing without returning to the collective farm for up to three months or more. It was bad with the provision of drinking water. A seven-kilometer canal was dug, but a sharp drop in the water level in the Syr-Darya did not ensure its flow into Kuvan-Darya. But even the water that came from the Kuvan-Darya flowed almost 150 kilometers through the swampy area and reached the collective farm unfit for drinking. On the collective farm, 85 people died from intestinal diseases alone.

In terms of epidemic diseases, unsanitary conditions among the immigrants, the situation was so critical that on December 24, 1937, a memorandum was received from the People's Commissariat of Health of the Kazakh SSR signed by Deputy People's Commissar Kuvarzin to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Isaev. On January 14, 1938, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a special resolution “On medical care for Korean migrants.” One can also cite the following fact: 372 Korean migrants died in the Dzhusalinsky area alone in the Karmakchi district of the Kyzyl-Orda region during the first seven months of their residence.

The massive forcible resettlement of Koreans from one end of the world to another violated the "root system" that nourished the soul of the ethnos. Transplantation from one soil to another, which differed like the shores of the Pacific Ocean and the Caspian Sea, brought irreparable losses to many Koreans. There is no need to expand on the striking difference of the soft, humid coastal monsoon climate of the Far East from sharply continental, with hot summers, severe winters, sharp transitions from warm to cold, little precipitation, dry climate with a predominance of northern and northeastern winds in Kazakhstan. even the horses could not stand it and oxen were needed.

The most tragic thing was that as a result of the deportation, the Far Eastern Koreans were completely torn off and isolated for many years from their historical homeland - Korea. In the Far East, speaking in the language of Russian sources, "Koreans were closer to their past, here the climate and soil were the same as in their homeland, they did not need to learn much from the Russian peasants, on the contrary, our peasants had to learn a lot from them."

At that time, repressions were taking place in Kazakhstan, as well as throughout the country. In the image and likeness of the center in the republic, the "Ili affair", "Chimkent", "Karkaralinskoe" and so on were promoted. A significant intensification of repressions in Kazakhstan falls on the fatal autumn of 1937. In September-October 1937, demonstration trials were held in all regions "over members of counter-revolutionary groups." "To additionally increase the number of repressed" - in the 1st category of anti-Soviet activity by 2,000 people, in the 2nd category - by 3,000 people.

In only one Kazaly district of the Kyzyl-Orda region, upon arrival here and placement for permanent residence, 20 Koreans were repressed by the NKVD, 14 of them for counter-revolutionary and espionage activities, 6 people for anti-Soviet agitation.

Koreans arrived in whole collective farms, but their charters were not registered in Kazakhstan, which is why they could not start business operations, open bank accounts. In addition, among the arriving Koreans, there were a large number of collective farmers who left the non-Korean collective farms of the Far Eastern Territory, as well as other agricultural workers, for example, from state farms, etc. However, few were engaged in them. Many workers and employees of different professions and qualifications were out of work and from the very beginning found themselves in a very difficult situation. The agricultural and fishing collective farms that arrived did not bring any implements with them, since they had been handed over to them in the Far East. The resettlement handicraft artels of garment workers, shoemakers, straw weavers, hairdresser workers brought with them tools, partly equipment, but they also could not find a use for themselves. Among the settlers there were also single handicraftsmen: woodworkers, bakers, brick-makers, metalworkers and others, but no one was involved in their employment either.

Rybtrest refused to use Korean fishermen and workers of fish enterprises, although they did not use deep fishing due to the lack of specialists, and the arrived Korean fishermen were specialists in both shallow and special deep fishing.

A difficult situation has developed with the food supply of the settlers. There were no vegetables, fish, and other essential products. Bread supplies were intermittent.

The accounting and sale of exchange receipts of grain, fodder, vegetables, other types of agricultural products, fish, livestock, machinery, etc., handed over to the DCK, were not carried out.

The issues of enrollment of school-age children, the use of the arrived Korean teachers, the brought teaching aids were let go. The study was not organized, the teachers were not paid their salaries, they were looking for a job outside their specialty, they applied for material assistance to the resettlement areas.

There were no local guidelines for servicing Korean pensioners. Every day they appealed to the district councils, district councils with a petition for help.

According to the calculations of the NKVD workers themselves, an average of 32 rubles 19 kopecks was spent on housing for one Korean family.

During the second stage of resettlement, no less acute questions arose about providing the displaced with housing, employment of workers, employees and artisans, providing Koreans with at least the simplest agricultural implements (shovels, catmen, hoes) for field work.

In view of the unsatisfactory situation of Koreans, on July 26, 1938, the SNK and the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Kazakhstan adopted a resolution “On the progress of the economic arrangement of the Koreans-immigrants.” breakdown.

The work on the selection and planning of economic centers was delayed; in a number of cases, even the sites for the construction of crops were not identified, the possibilities of irrigation of the allotted land, as well as the provision of drinking water, were not studied. The situation with the provision of building materials was completely unsatisfactory. On August 22, 1938, at the Bureau of the Central Committee of the CP (b) K, it was stated that the resolution of July 26, 1938 had not been fulfilled on all positions.

The construction of independent Korean resettlement collective farms was carried out by the special construction office Spetsstroy, but it did not have either fixed assets or working capital and carried out its work through advance payments and loans issued to Korean collective farms for housing construction and for the indivisible funds of collective farms. These loans were used to purchase construction equipment, transport and inventory, unnecessary for migrants and resettlement collective farms. In a word, the funds allocated for housing construction to Korean families were spent for other purposes. And when the time came to make settlements with the collective farms on the loans received, the Spetsstroy office was “turned to liquidation.” Moreover, from the first days, the squandering and direct theft of funds allocated for the arrangement of Korean migrants began, the theft of strictly funded building materials, spare parts for cars and tractors, embezzlement of state money, speculation in products, as well as gross violations of construction technology.

The situation with the employment of migrants was difficult. Many of them were unemployed, others were not employed in their specialty. For more than six months, 300 Korean migrants, workers of the fish processing plant, were not employed at the Burlyu-Tyubinsky resettlement site by the Balkhash State Trust Trust. “As a result of this situation, the settlers began to leave their places of settlement without permission.” 40 families of Koreans living in the village of Stepnoye, Aktobe region, were not provided with jobs, about which they wrote a letter to Stalin. accepted mass sizes.

The Koreans asked to be given the opportunity to engage in rice sowing, this issue became acute in the north of Kazakhstan. Three Korean rice collective farms "Rice October", "Collective Labor", "Eastern Dawn", located in the Kellerovsky district of the North Kazakhstan region, asked Kalinin in his telegram to settle them in the rice-growing areas: "We, immigrants, collective farmers-rice workers, We ask for your assistance in order to study in our specialty, that is, rice, we Koreans have always been engaged in rice. " Almost all Koreans (100 families) located in the North Kazakhstan region expressed their desire and desire to move to rice-growing areas; they constantly addressed with requests and complaints about this. The Korean collective farms "Lenin's Way" and the name of the Comintern (382 families), which ended up in the Karaganda region, petitioned for resettlement to rice-growing areas.

Migrant Koreans also strove for their traditional fishing. Fishermen who were out of work organized themselves in fishery farms and applied for permission to move to the fishery. In addition, the settlers also tried to preserve as much as possible not only the specialization of their collectives, but also the production collectives themselves.

After the Koreans were resettled for permanent residence, intensive personal and collective correspondence began to be conducted on the return of property left in the DCK, especially from the beginning of 1939 until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Letters and telegrams were sent in streams from Kazakhstan to the NKVD of Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, to the resettlement department of the NKVD of the USSR, Khabarovsk and Primorsky regional committees, regional executive committees, regional executive committees, prosecutors of these regions, etc. "We still have no answer to our inquiries", "Since the expulsion of Koreans, unacceptable red tape has been dragging on in payments for abandoned property. Especially outrageous is the fact that regional executive committees and district executive committees do not even respond to Kazakhstan's inquiries."

On July 17, 1939, the head of the resettlement department in the Kyzyl-Orda region reported in Alma-Ata: “The representative of the republican office Zagotkon in 1938 did not supply horses, and having taken certificates and receipts from the collective farmers, he issued certificates that they had not been given horses. The collective farms, which received information about the lack of horses, applied to the regional office of Zagotkon to issue them horses. There, these certificates were not recognized and they refused to issue the horses. ”The harassment around the return of the property to the Koreans in this way continued until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, then ceased forever.

As a result of repression and deportation, Koreans suffered huge losses in education, language and culture. According to party and government directives, from September 1, 1938, all Korean schools, a pedagogical school in Kazalinsk, and in 1939 the Korean Pedagogical Institute in Kyzyl-Orda were closed in Kazakhstan. In December 1939, the decisions "On Korean Literature" and "On the Removal of Korean Literature from Booksellers and Libraries" were adopted. Under the strict control of the State Committee for the Preservation of Secrets in the Press, tens of thousands of books brought by Koreans from the Far East were written off and destroyed. Over 120,000 copies of 134 textbooks in all subjects were destroyed, including more than 17,000 textbooks on the Korean language. Many Korean books were destroyed in the library of the Korean Pedagogical Institute, including rare editions. Learned from the bitter experience of deportation, many Koreans, having learned about the campaign to destroy Korean books, got rid of them themselves, because even their simple storage threatened with inevitable prison.

But life went on, and Koreans, steadfastly enduring the trials that fell to their lot, settled in their new homeland. The resettlement of Koreans to Kazakhstan made it possible to significantly increase, first of all, agricultural production in the republic. Indeed, in 1937, 104 Korean agricultural collective farms were transported to Kazakhstan - 6175 families, 1856 people; 13 fishing collective farms - 1109 families, 5350 people; agricultural workers of individual collective farmers, natives of non-Korean collective farms and individual peasants: 3362 families, 15 582 people; unskilled workers, including workers in the fishing industry - 3305 families, 5327 people; skilled workers - 2,470 families, 1,782 people; 4 handicraft artels - 229 families, 1167 people; prospectors - 371 families, 1492 people; employees - 3248 families, 15,047 people.

In Kazakhstan, 70 independent Korean collective farms were formed; they were located in 8 regions of the republic - Kyzyl-Orda, Alma-Ata, North Kazakhstan, Guryev, Karaganda, Kostanay, Aktobe, South Kazakhstan, in 21 districts. 8037 families, 35 724 people lived in them. 13 farms were fishing, the rest were agricultural.

According to the state plan, in the first spring of their stay on Kazakh land, only independent Korean collective farms were supposed to sow 26,860 hectares of arable land with grain, vegetable and melon and industrial crops. And in 1939, they already sowed 38,482 hectares, in addition, there were 104 livestock farms in Korean collective farms. In 1940, in the Kzyl-Orda region alone, Koreans sowed 25,026 hectares with spring crops.

Behind all these dry digital indicators of acres, hectares are the incredible efforts of the Koreans of the deported generation, who often created flourishing farms in the bare steppe with their own hands.

The 30s are over, the 40s have come. The Koreans began to settle in new conditions for them, but on June 22, 1941, the Great Patriotic War broke out. Despite the humiliation of deportation, the Koreans were full of patriotism, but just as during the First World War the Kazakhs were deprived of the right to fight without entrusting them with weapons (the tsarist government mobilized them into labor squads), the Koreans were also deprived of the right to defend their homes with arms in hand. , families. Trudarmia became their lot. In the certificate "On the political and moral state of immigrants", compiled on the instructions of the party bodies by the head of the Kazaly district department of the NKVD of the Kyzyl-Orda region, lieutenant of state security Shvetsov on September 22, 1941, it was reported that there were all "anti-Soviet" elements in the Kazaly district: former participants gangster uprisings 93 people and 936 Koreans. And yet the Koreans asked to go to the front. In the first hours, days of the war, hundreds of them voluntarily appeared at the military registration and enlistment offices with statements about sending volunteers to the front line. Some still managed to get to the front. The fact that the Koreans are able to show their military courage is evidenced by the feat of the Hero of the Soviet Union A. Ming. Submarine commander A. Khan, scout, junior sergeant V. Tsoi, rifle battalion commander, captain S. Teng, machine gunner M. Ten showed heroism and courage. Senior sergeant of the medical service V. Lim passed a difficult military road four years long from Moscow to Berlin.

During the war years, Kazakhstan sent hundreds of thousands of its sons and daughters to the front, turned into its arsenal, fed, clothed and shod the army. Labor heroism during the war years was shown by rural workers, who, at the cost of considerable efforts, sharply increased the sown area and increased the yield. The whole of Kazakhstan was aware of the labor feat of a team rice grower from the "Avangard" collective farm of the Chilean region of the Kyzyl-Ordn region Kim Man Sam. The conditions for growing rice allowed him to set a world harvest record of 150 centners per hectare in 1942. The Kimmansam method of high yields became widespread in Kazakhstan, songs were composed about Kim Man Sam. In 1945-1946 he was twice awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. In 1947 he was awarded the Stalin Prize, in 1949 he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, 11 Heroes of Socialist Labor of the "Avangard" collective farm consider him their teacher. His comrade-in-arms was the famous Kazakh rice grower, laureate of the Stalin Prize, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, leader of the Kyzyl Tu collective farm neighboring with "Vanguard" Ibrai Zhakhaev.

A worthy example of labor valor was shown by the farmers of the collective farms "Giant", "Bolshevik", "III International" of the Kyzyl-Orda region, "Leninsky way", "Far East" of the Alma-Ata region and many others. The Koreans made a great contribution to the victory over the enemy In a difficult time for the Motherland, the rice grower Kim Man Sam donated 105 thousand rubles from his personal savings for the construction of a tank column “Kzyl-Orda collective farmer”, and the chairman of the collective farm “Far East "Shin Hyun Moon contributed 120 thousand rubles to the Defense Fund. Such Korean collective farms as" Bolshevik "," Giant ", Avangard", "Canton Commune" contributed more than 350 thousand rubles to the Defense Fund in money, over 100 thousand bonds, handed over 6,000 poods of rice , 18 thousand different things for the soldiers of the Red Army.

As already noted, Koreans were drafted into the Trud Army. Workers' columns were formed from among the "unreliable" peoples to work in the coal, metallurgical and other strategically important industries of Kazakhstan and the entire Soviet Union. Koreans were mobilized to the mines of Karaganda, Russia, etc. Only in the mines of Karaganda more than 2000 Koreans mined coal. Often Koreans worked alongside the Germans of the Volga region, convicts, as well as with prisoners of war. The "combat mission" for them was the obligatory fulfillment of the production rate. Labor army continued after the war, and only today labor army members are recognized as participants of the labor front during the Great Patriotic War.

Thus, the Koreans-immigrants, despite the humiliation of deportation, the huge hardships of the first years of settling in Kazakhstan, in the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War for the Motherland, demonstrated genuine patriotism, made a worthy contribution to the cause of Victory.

Honest fulfillment of civic duty by the Koreans of Kazakhstan during the war years, labor heroism of workers in agriculture and other spheres, it would seem, should have finally brought peace to the Korean diaspora, but it has once again become an instrument of the USSR government in its post-war Far Eastern policy.

At the final stage of World War II, the Soviet Union was actively involved in the post-war order not only in Europe, but also in Asia, including the Far East. The Soviet leadership understood the significance of its influence on the Korean Peninsula. Korea has once again become an arena of struggle, and if earlier different races and civilizations clashed here, then this time irreconcilable hostile ideologies entered the conflict. The liberation of Korea from Japanese rule did not bring it independence. The country was divided by the 38th parallel.

The Koreans of Kazakhstan have experienced another shock. They began to be sent first on "special missions", and then to permanent residence in the Far East and "to work" in North Korea to impose pro-Soviet order there. This negatively affected the life of the diaspora. In addition to the fact that the Koreans of Kazakhstan were involved in the criminal split of Korea, they were bled to death, as the authorities returned to the Far East and sent to Korea the most educated part of Koreans who know the language. This is again an irreparable loss. Thus, a tragic trace was once again left in the life of the Koreans of Kazakhstan.

But nevertheless, with the patience, perseverance, and diligence characteristic of Koreans, enduring all the vicissitudes of fate, in the post-war years they again showed a high impulse of soul. He manifested himself in labor heroism.

On October 10, 1997, in Almaty, in the Palace of the Republic, a public meeting was held dedicated to the 60th anniversary of Koreans' residence in Kazakhstan, at which President N. Nazarbayev delivered a warm and heartfelt speech in honor of this date.

The words of N. Nazarbayev that today “we are witnessing a phenomenon that can be called the spiritual renaissance of Koreans” were greeted with deep enthusiasm.

At this meeting, on behalf of the Korean community of the republic, the president of the Association of Koreans of Kazakhstan, Yu. A. Tskhai, spoke. He emphasized that in our state, the legislative condemnation of the events of sixty years ago, a monstrous arbitrariness over entire nations, was accepted with approval. Yu. A. Tskhai expressed the general opinion of the Korean diaspora: “For the deported Koreans, Kazakhstan has become not just a place where they found refuge in a hard time of mass resettlement, here we have found a homeland for ourselves and our descendants. Koreans will never forget about this warm participation of the Kazakh people in their destiny. We fully support the democratic reforms, economic transformations carried out in the republic, we are determined to make a worthy contribution to the preservation and consolidation of peace, harmony and the desire to increase the spiritual and material wealth of multinational Kazakhstan. "

The other day in Arsenyev, the Department of Social Development of the Primorsky Territory Administration held a seminar on the concept of the demographic policy of the Primorsky Territory. One of the most acute topics discussed during the seminar was the problem of resettlement to the Russian

The other day in Arsenyev, the Department of Social Development of the Primorsky Territory Administration held a seminar on the concept of the demographic policy of the Primorsky Territory. It was attended not only by officials of the agro-industrial complex, municipalities, but also representatives of numerous public organizations and associations, leaders of religious confessions. One of the most acute topics discussed during the seminar was the problem of resettlement to the Russian Far East of compatriots and citizens of other states, especially the republics of the former Soviet Union. The assessments sounded different, sometimes directly opposite.

There was no consensus on the issue of the return of Koreans to Primorye, who were evicted from here in 1937.

In continuation of the discussion, we decided to publish three articles on this topic this week. Each of them raises questions, presents a different point of view. Starting this publication, we count on the reaction of our readers, specialists and the settlers themselves. Today - the first material in this series.

Seventy years ago, on August 21, 1937, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) issued a decree "On the eviction of the Korean population from the border regions of the Far Eastern Territory."

In 1993, the Supreme Soviet of Russia recognized the illegal deportation of Koreans by a special resolution, thereby placing them on a par with the "repressed peoples of the USSR" such as Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks and others. At the same time, there are significant differences in the history of the "repression" of these peoples.

The eviction of the Tatar population from the Crimea and the mountain peoples from the North Caucasus was presented as their "punishment" for real or imaginary cooperation with the German occupiers, that is, for anti-government actions. In the second half of the 50s. they, with the exception of the Crimean Tatars, were allowed to return, which they all did.

The result is one. The reasons are different

The reason for the deportation of Koreans is different, which causes controversy among modern historians, whether the decision of the Soviet government to resettle the Korean population of the Far East was just another act of inhumanity or was caused by a real threat to security for the state.

Initially, the Koreans moved to Russian territory (to the neighboring Ussuri region), fleeing hunger and land shortages, and after the annexation of Korea by Japan, from Japanese oppression. Thus, it would seem completely unfounded to suspect them of complicity with the Japanese. However, already in 1908, the Amur Governor-General Pavel Unterberger wrote to the Minister of Internal Affairs: “... One cannot also hope for the loyalty of this element in the event of a war with Japan or China; on the contrary, they will then represent an extremely fertile ground for widespread organization by the enemies of espionage. " It must be admitted that these claims were not so unfounded. During the Russo-Japanese War in Vladivostok, there was an extensive intelligence network of Japan, whose representatives successfully disguised themselves as Korean artisans, water carriers, servants and even prostitutes, and also recruited Koreans for the same purposes.

As a result, and also because the Koreans in Primorye accounted for up to a third of the total population, since the 1920s, measures began to be developed to resettle them from the borders of Korea, occupied by the Japanese. Initially, it was planned to resettle some of the Koreans in the Khabarovsk and Amur districts - about 1.5 thousand people were resettled there, but this did not solve the problem.

A little later, another option for resolving the issue appeared. At this time, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan planned to start rice growing, but local farmers did not have the slightest rice-growing skills. Therefore, the leaders of both republics asked Moscow to organize a visit to them by Korean volunteers - "natural experts" in this matter. In 1929, they managed to collect 220 Koreans who agreed to go to Kazakhstan. As a result, even before the mass resettlement of Koreans from the Far East, there were already thirty Korean collective farms in the Tashkent region.

Provoked by the Japanese threat

After the Japanese occupied Manchuria and created a bridgehead on its territory for an attack on the USSR, the problem became sharply aggravated.

... TYAN Yong Din, a pensioner who now lives in the Bektemir district of Tashkent, reports. “A troika came to us - a representative of the NKVD, a representative of the military commissariat and a representative of the district party committee. We are going to listen to them. The first to speak was a representative of the district committee. He said that imperialist Japan was preparing to attack the Soviet Union. The Japanese government claims that all Koreans, wherever they live, are subjects of the Japanese emperor, so other states have no right to mobilize them into their armies. The leadership of the USSR, in order not to aggravate relations with Japan, decided to no longer call Koreans to serve in the Red Army. But the enemies are sending their spies and saboteurs into Soviet territory. By their appearance, Koreans are difficult to distinguish from Japanese and Chinese, so spies and pests can hide among us, which threatens state security in the Far East. For our own good, the Soviet government decided to resettle us as far as possible from the borders of Japan. We were bitter to hear that. We hated Japan, because of which our parents lost their homeland. During the Civil War, many Koreans in Primorye participated in partisan detachments that fought the invaders. Before that, we were told, and we read in the newspapers, that there were already cases when groups of Japanese saboteurs hiding among Koreans were arrested in the Far East, and the NKVD uncovered Korean organizations that collaborated with Japan.

Nobody began to protest. The "Troika" were asked questions only about the organizational procedure for resettlement - how quickly you need to get ready, what and how much you can take with you.

The chairman of our collective farm was my son-in-law - the husband of my older sister. Prior to that, he was a career soldier, served in the Red Army for eight years and was a party member. Then he specially went to the district committee and made sure that the harvest harvested this year was counted and adopted according to the act, on the basis of which we expected to get something in a new place. The cattle were also handed over to the state. I had to leave home. We were given two weeks to get ready. And it seemed a lot, since whole villages were taken out of the border areas in two or three days. "

According to reports from the field, there were no special problems with the eviction. One of the officers of the NKVD reported: “The bulk of the Koreans met this event with approval. Along with this, there were isolated cases of expressing discontent, in particular, some said: "Not all Koreans are spies, saboteurs, there are people loyal to the Soviet regime, and therefore an individual approach to people was needed in the resettlement." A total of 172,000 Koreans were deported. Families were loaded into freight wagons and sent to Central Asia and Kazakhstan, where they hoped for the promised assistance and compensation, but these settlers were not expected in the field, and their arrangement took many years ...

The special status of the repressed people

Until 1945, the position of Koreans was better than that of other repressed peoples. They did not have to appear in person at the "special commandant's office" for registration on a weekly basis, they could move around the territory of Central Asia, and upon receipt of a special permit - and beyond its borders. True, they were denied the right to be drafted into the Red Army, replacing service with work in the "labor army". Finally, the Koreans, unlike the Germans or Tatars, and in Stalin's times could study in higher educational institutions and occupy positions of responsibility.

Only on July 2, 1945, shortly before the USSR declared war on Japan, Lavrenty Beria issued an order according to which all Koreans were registered as special settlers, having received the actual status of exiles. In the places of their settlements, departments of special commandant's offices were created under the local directorates of the NKVD. But after Stalin's death, the main restrictions were lifted. In the fifties, having received passports, Soviet Koreans were able to travel outside Central Asia, study in Russia, and even got the opportunity to return to the Far East. But few people wanted to film again.

In Primorye, Koreans began to return in small numbers since the 60s, but not as peasants, but as engineers, teachers, doctors, scientists, etc. - after Korean youth rushed to cities for higher education, including Moscow and Leningrad. Part of the "new coastal Koreans" moved to the Primorsky Territory from southern Sakhalin, where the Korean population appeared as a result of Japanese "mobilization" to work in mines and fisheries.

The situation changed in the second half of the 90s. First, in 1990, the USSR established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Then, in 1993, the well-known resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Russia on the illegal deportation of Koreans was issued. Soon after that, representatives of South Korean state structures reached out to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and at the same time to the Primorsky Territory. In the former Soviet republics, the southerners persuaded Koreans to return "to their homeland" - but not to the countries of the Korean Peninsula, but to the Russian Primorye, where they were actively negotiating with the regional administration on the reception and resettlement of future settlers from the CIS in the territory of the region.

As a result, in 1998, the regional administration allocated two thousand hectares in the Mikhailovsky district for the construction of the “seaside Korean village“ Druzhba ”, where it was planned to build 100 houses for the settlement of about a thousand displaced persons. The project was implemented and financed by the Builders Association of the Republic of Korea. By September 2001, 30 houses were ready and inhabited. It didn't go further. Why - among the local Koreans, various speculations have arisen. There was a version about the theft of local officials, there were excuses about the financial crisis in Korea. A little later, a scandal erupted in Seoul over the "illegal distribution" of funds allocated for the project by the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan between senior officials of South Korean ministries and representatives of public funds of the Republic of Kazakhstan, who directly assimilated government money in the coastal territory.

Now the Koreans continue to rebuild "Friendship" on their own - and very slowly. According to the displaced person Anastasia KAN, her family got used to the seaside life for a year and a half.

Meanwhile, the activities of South Korean representatives to organize the resettlement of Koreans from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Primorye continues. In Kazakhstan, she does not receive much support - the standard of living there is on average comparable to that in Russia, and not many agree to seek the good from the good. Life in Uzbekistan is worse - and there are volunteers to go to the Primorsky Territory. The local population treats "their" Koreans traditionally friendly and with great respect. It would be another matter if the ground had been prepared in advance for migrants from the CIS - a housing infrastructure was created, the issues of registration and obtaining Russian citizenship, as well as decent employment, etc. were resolved at the intergovernmental level. It is difficult to do all of the above, but if for some reason Seoul really wants to see as many ethnic Koreans as possible in Primorye, then it is probably still possible.

Meanwhile, against the background of the absence in recent years of any significant financial injections from South Korea to improve the lives of Koreans in the Republic of Korea, public funds periodically carry out fundraising campaigns among the population for the “needy compatriots in Russia”. Businessmen and ordinary people are shown videos filmed in Primorye about the terrible living conditions of the migrants and are offered to "make contributions" for a good cause. Considerable funds are being collected. But, like government money, this money does not reach the addressee. So, perhaps, the idea of ​​resettlement of Koreans from the CIS has somewhat different goals?

Moscow - Tashkent - Vladivostok.

Continuation of the theme - in tomorrow's issue "B".

Rakhmankulova Adolat Khushvaktovna is a candidate of historical sciences, a doctoral student at the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

In the history of the former Soviet state, a significant place is occupied by the problem of forced resettlement (deportation) of peoples. In the 1930-1950s, peoples migrated mainly to Siberia, Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In these regions of the country, including Uzbekistan, an area of ​​ethnic minorities was forcibly created. In 1937, Koreans from the Far East were resettled to Uzbekistan. In subsequent years, other peoples were deported - Poles, Chechens, Ingush, Karachais, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Pontic Greeks, Meskhetian Turks, Hemshils, Kurds, Iranians, other citizens living in the USSR.

The problem of deportation of peoples in Uzbekistan is poorly understood. The first scientific articles and publications on this topic began to appear only since 1989. Here, first of all, the works of Russian historians N.F. Bugai and V.N. Zemskov, who systematically studied the problems of deportation of the peoples of the USSR and the tragic fate of the special settlers.

The declassification of archival documents in the Russian Federation during the 1930s-1950s made it possible to study the causes of political repressions and forced displacements of the peoples of the USSR.

In Uzbekistan, all the basic information on this problem is contained mainly in the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic, partly in the archives of the Office of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The inaccessibility of materials from these archives is the reason for insufficient coverage of the history of the deportation of peoples to Uzbekistan. These circumstances hinder the comprehension of the historical reasons for the repressive policy and individual negative processes that were part of the history of the Soviet state in the 1930-50s.

In this regard, the adoption by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan of the Resolution of July 27, 1998 "On improving the activities of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan", as well as the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of July 22, 1999 "On the perpetuation of the memory of patriots who gave their lives for the freedom of the Motherland and the people ", which made it possible to get acquainted with some materials from the archives of the National Security Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Office of the President and secret documents of the Central State Archives of Uzbekistan.

The Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan is the main repository of documents on the history of Uzbekistan, as well as its history during the Soviet period. The funds stored in the archive include documents of the SNK-CM of the Uzbek SSR; People's Commissar of Agriculture and Resettlement Department under the SNK UzSSR. These funds contain a complex of sources on the history of the peoples of the Soviet Union, who were forcibly resettled in the 30s and 40s to Uzbekistan.

The subject of our attention is the study of the documentary base of not all deported peoples to Uzbekistan, but only Koreans. Koreans evicted from the Far East in 1937 were classified as administratively deported (until 1945).

The Fund of the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbek SSR has a number of documents (we are talking about documents of an open nature) - resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbek SSR, memoranda and information messages on the implementation of resolutions and decisions regarding resettled Koreans, information, information on the placement and deployment of Koreans in the regions and regions of the republic etc. The SNK UzSSR adopted resolutions and orders in the development of the resolutions of the SNK of the USSR and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the deportation of peoples, as well as on issues related to the labor, economic and household arrangements of those evicted in the places of resettlement. To implement the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated August 21, 1937 "On the eviction of the Korean population from the border regions of the Far Eastern Territory", the Council of People's Commissars of the UzSSR adopted on September 16, 1937 a resolution "On the resettlement of Korean farms." TsGA RUZ, f. 837, op. 32, d.587, l. 1-7.

According to this decree, the resettlement of 6,000 Korean farms was planned to be carried out in Nizhnechirchik, Srednechirchik, Gurlensky (Khorezm district), Ikramovsky districts with the direction of rice, grain and vegetable growing. The decree also indicated to place the resettled Koreans in the existing district premises, and in case of a shortage of them, to immediately start equipping dwellings from reeds, with the mobilization of housing stock and temporary adaptation of other buildings.

The People's Commissars of Health, Education, Agriculture, Finance, the Uzbekbrlash organizations, the Chirchikstroy plant were instructed to take measures to serve the migrants. For example, the People's Commissariat of Health undertook to organize in a short time in the above-mentioned areas first-aid posts, to provide medical personnel and the necessary amount of medicines for medical care of displaced persons, to submit a draft estimate of a hospital for 70 beds within two weeks. In the same place. The Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the UzSSR on the issues of servicing the Korean migrants, if necessary, was supposed to involve all institutions, organizations and individual workers in the work on resettlement and had the right to demand from the people's commissariats, organizations, departments and trusts to fulfill the orders of the Extraordinary Commission of the SNK of the Uzbek SSR. In the same place. l.

SNK UzSSR And the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Uzbekistan on November 25, 1937, for 1810/273 s, adopted a resolution "On measures to serve Korean migrants through education." Ibid, d, 593, ll. 16-17, 33-34. It approved a plan for the education of children of Korean immigrants at the rate of 21,986 students. According to this decree, for the IV quarter of 1937, an estimate of expenses in the amount of 2,053.2 thousand rubles was allocated for the education of Koreans and for the equipment of schools, including 150 thousand rubles for major repairs and adaptation of premises for schools, as unlimited costs for capital construction ... Ibid, l. 16.In order to better serve Koreans, an additional inspector, a methodologist from among Korean teachers in the following districts was introduced to the district staff in the following districts: Begovatsky, Past-Dargomsky, Kamashinsky, Mirzachulsky, Nizhnechirchiksky, Srednechirchiksky, Chinaz, Gurlensky and Karakalpakstan - Khodjeyli and Kungradsky districts also in the central office of the People's Commissariat for Education of the UzSSR: in the management of secondary schools - 1 person, in the management of primary schools - 1 person, in the main inspection - 1 person. It was decided to ask the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the allocation for 1938 of the limits and the necessary funds for building materials for the construction of new schools for Koreans in the amount of 6856 thousand rubles. In the same place. l. 17.

The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the UzSSR dated January 11, 1938 "On measures for the employment of Korean immigrants" obliged the people's commissariats and institutions involved in the placement and settlement of immigrants in the plan for 1938 to carry out measures for the earliest possible employment of Korean immigrants and providing them with all types of services. TsGAP RUz, f. 837. op. 32, d.589, ll. 23-28. In particular, according to this decree, collective farms newly organized from migrants, as well as collective farms accepting migrants (according to the number of additional farms) were exempted from the obligatory supply of grain crops, rice, sunflower, meat, potatoes, wool, milk and butter to the state, and also from the obligatory state contracting of soybeans, vegetables and flax for a period of 2 years. It should be emphasized that the implementation of all points of the adopted resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars of the UzSSR, which determined in detail all the necessary work for the reception, accommodation and service of Korean immigrants, would save them from the difficulties and problems that they had to endure. But for objective reasons, the fulfillment of all the points of these resolutions was not realistic.

The most valuable are verbatim reports of meetings on the issue of the arrangement of Korean migrants, memoranda, information messages, certificates and information on the resettlement and maintenance of Korean farms, which are contained in the fund of the SNK UzSSR. So, according to archival information about the resettlement of the arrived Koreans-immigrants in the UzSSR on November 4, 1937, 10698 Korean farms were resettled in the republic, Ibid, f. 837, op. 32, d.590, l. 9. On November 8, 1937, 5392 Korean farms were settled in the people's commissariats, enterprises and institutions of the UzSSR. In the same place. ll. 7-8. By November 13, 1937, 16307 Korean farms were settled in the regions and cities of the Uzbek SSR. In the same place. d.593, l. 91. There are data as of March 2, 1938 about the deployment of Korean immigrants in the newly created independent collective farms and about the addition of Koreans to the existing collective farms of the Uzbek SSR. In the same place. d. 1226, ll. 5-7. Thus, the task set by the Council of People's Commissars of the Union in 15,000 farms (post. Љ 1697/377 of 28. IX-37, item 2 - 9,000 farms and an additional task - 6,000 farms) was fulfilled with an excess of 1307 farms. In the same place. d.593, l. 139.

In a memorandum to the SNK of the UzSSR from the People's Commissar of Agriculture, it is reported that the newly organized Korean collective farms were allocated separate land plots from the liquidated state farms, subsidiary farms and partly state land funds. Farms that were relocated to the old multi-land collective farms were provided with surplus lands assigned forever by state acts to those collective farms to which they were adopted by resolutions of general meetings. In the same place. d. 1228, ll. 46-47. According to the information available in the Rybakkolkhoz Center, by April 24, 1938, there were 11 Korean fishing collective farms on the territory of the Uzbek SSR, in which 723 Korean farms settled. Ibid., 1230, l. 107.

The allied leadership planned to allocate money for the resettlement of farms. According to Uzselkhozbank, the limit on resettlement of Koreans was set at 48 million rubles, i.e. for 16 thousand farms for 3 thousand rubles. Ibid., 593, l. 131.

The information and memoranda sent to the chairman of the SNK of the UzSSR and the union leadership informs about the state of affairs in servicing Koreans through the NKzdrav of the UzSSR. So, in accordance with the instructions on the deployment of an additional treatment and prophylactic network for servicing the migrants of the NK Healthcare of the Uzbek SSR, during October-November 1937, 65 additional hospital beds, 3 medical posts, and paramedic posts - 9 were organized. Ibid., No. 593 , l. 11. As of August 13, 1938, the prevention of epidemic diseases was carried out during 1937-1938. general smallpox vaccination of the entire arriving population, 2-3 times its sanitization, preventive chemicalization in areas unfavorable for malaria Ibid, d. 1224, p. 22.etc. The main shortcomings in the medical and sanitary services for the displaced persons were expressed in the low level of their sanitary and household services, inadequate material equipment (poor supply of medical equipment, bed equipment, medicines), poor staffing with qualified medical personnel of the newly deployed medical network (substitution of paramedics for medical positions) poor development of the nursery network, unsatisfactory progress in the construction of medical institutions, primarily in the KKASSR, lack of attention on the part of the district executive committees to the issues of household arrangement and medical and sanitary services for migrants. Ibid., 1224, l. 23.

According to archival data, the education service for Koreans by March 26, 1938 is as follows: 6 million rubles were allocated for school construction for Koreans in 1938 by the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union. By this time, there were 16 land plots for new schools, for which projects and estimates were tied. The People's Commissariat of Education developed a plan for financing school construction Ibid., 1226, l. 20.for Koreans for the 2nd quarter of 1938 in the amount of 3600 thousand rubles. Korean schools were organized: primary - 90, incomplete secondary - 30, secondary - 9, which covered 11,707 Korean children. In addition, 1576 people studied in Russian schools.

All Korean schools had 559 teachers. There were 485 children out of school, including 173 in Karakalpakstan and 189 in Past-Dargom district. Korean students were accommodated in educational institutions of the People's Commissariat for Education: in the Namangan Pedagogical School 8 - 40 people; in the Samarkand pedagogical school 12 - 46 people, in the Central Asian State University - 12 people, in the Tashkent State Pedagogical Institute - 4 people, in the Tashkent Industrial Institute - 1 person. A total of 103 people. Ibid., 1224, l. 21. To provide Korean schools with inventory and equipment, the People's Commissariat of Education of the UzSSR shipped 4,557 desks, 200 blackboards, 93 office cabinets, 157 teachers' desks to the areas where Koreans settled, totaling 370,200 rubles. Ibid., 1224, l. 22. In general, the services provided to the children of Korean immigrants were satisfactory. In the memoranda and information, data on the places are given, Ibid., D. 1224, l. 11. on the progress of the state Ibid., No. 1224, ll. 26-28. construction and costs Ibid., 593, ll. 14-15. on the organization of schools, as well as additional lists of cultural and household construction according to the People's Commissariat of Education of the UzSSR. Ibid., 593, l. 46.

In the SNK fund of the UzSSR, along with the above information on the household and labor structure, you can also get acquainted with information on the provision of housing stock through the repair and refurbishment of finished housing and the implementation of new construction on Korean resettlement collective farms, Ibid., No. 1225, p. 84. on the issuance of foodstuffs to these collective farms, Ibid., D. 592, l. 104. on financing of works on irrigation land development for migrant Koreans Ibid., D. 592, l. 125. and other information. Ibid., 592, ll. 251, 253-254, 275.

From the above, it can be seen that from the side of government and republican bodies an opportunity was created for the arrangement of Korean immigrants in Uzbekistan. But at the same time, shortcomings were revealed in relation to the implementation of decisions and decisions on the arrangement and service of Korean immigrants, they were not fulfilled on time or were partially implemented, since they did not fully take into account the real situation on the ground. This provision is emphasized in the verbatim report of the meeting with the chairman of the SNK of the UzSSR on the issue of the arrangement of Koreans-immigrants (August 17, 1938). TsGA RUz, f. 837, op. 32, d. 1223. ll. 1-56.

Documents on the history of the resettlement of Koreans are kept both in the fund of the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbek SSR and also in the fund of the Resettlement Department. The resettlement department under the Council of People's Commissars of the UzSSR was established by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the UzSSR on November 7, 1939 to carry out measures for the economic organization of Korean immigrants.

The fund of the Resettlement Department under the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbek SSR contains reports, information, certificates and memoranda on the status of settlements with Korean migrants for property handed over in the Far Eastern Territory, on the implementation of measures for the economic arrangement of migrants, on the construction of dwellings in Korean collective farms, on the allocation and receipt of building materials for housing, school and medical-sanitary construction to complete the economic arrangement of the Koreans-immigrants in the 1937-1940s, Ibid, f. 314, op. 1, d.2. Ll. 168, 170-171, 176, 241, 267, 268, 270, 282, 284. informational messages, draft resolutions on the state of affairs with respect to settlements with Korean migrants and information on them with indicators of need for benefits for repayment of food loans. Ibid., D. 4, d. 5, d. 6.

So, according to archival information, a total of 19137.6 thousand rubles were issued for the economic arrangement of Korean immigrants from September 1937 to January 1940. Of these, for housing construction on collective farms - 14034.8 thousand rubles, housing construction for workers and employees - 387.9 thousand rubles, building a fleet, purchasing fishing gear and coastal construction for fishing collective farms - 304.7 thousand rubles, for watering collective farms - 1696 , 1 thousand rubles at the rate of 200 rubles per farm, for working cattle for collective farms -1577.8 thousand rubles, etc. The mistakes made in 1938 in financing and lending to resettlement activities by the end of 1939 were corrected.

Among the materials, one should especially dwell on the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 35 of January 8, 1945 "On the legal status of special settlers", TsGA RUz, f. 314, op. 7, d. 18, which established a forced labor arrangement and restrictions on the free movement of special settlers. Although the resettled Koreans were considered administratively expelled, this decree was extended to them too.

On July 2, 1945, L. Beria issued an order according to which the Koreans were officially registered as special settlers. In the places of settlement of Koreans, Departments of special commandant's offices were created at local directorates of the NKVD and at the Department of Special Settlements of the NKVD, a department for servicing Koreans.

The fund of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the Uzbek SSR contains materials on Korean collective farms: a memo "On the progress of the economic organization of Korean immigrants in the Tashkent region", Ibid, f. 90, op. 8, d. 4469, ll. 62-78. notes to the annual report of the Department of Resettlement of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the UzSSR for 1937-1938, Ibid., 4472, ll. 5-7. distribution instructions for tractors Ibid., 4471, l. 198. and the distribution of 1000 tons of food loans Ibid, p. 213. Korean immigrants in Korean collective farms, materials on the resettlement of the collective farm named after Dimitrov from the Dam-Ashi site to the rice zone of the Nizhnechirchik district of the Tashkent region. Ibid., 5138, ll. 2-7, 26. As indicated in the draft resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the UzSSR of March 1938 "On measures for the economic and organizational strengthening of Korean resettlement collective farms in the Uzbek SSR", by this time 34 independent Korean collective farms were organized in the UzSSR - 4790 farms with a real sowing plan for 1938 of 12366 hectares, and there are 9373 Korean farms in collective farms. Ibid., 4466, ll. 1-5.

An analysis of the documents of the Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan allows us to conclude that the adaptation of resettled Koreans to Uzbekistan was accompanied by difficulties that they had to endure. Although much has been done on the part of the government and local authorities to alleviate their problems in the household structure. Therefore, the history of the deportations of peoples to Uzbekistan requires further, more thorough research, without which it is impossible to fully objectively assess the socio-political processes of the 1930-50s.