German WWII poster "Fortresses of the Eastern Front".
Germany did not need these fortresses in that war: n and our troops could not besiege one of them.
The entry of Samsonov's army into East Prussia deprived Prittwitz of his self-control. At first, fearing that the troops of the 2nd Russian Army would cut off East Prussia from the rest of Germany, he decided to abandon East Prussia and retreat beyond the Vistula. At the same time, he expressed fears that it would also be impossible to contain Russian troops on the Vistula, since in the north it is not deep enough (as if the main obstacle should have been not the resistance of the German units, but the depth of the river).
Original taken from mayorgb in the East Prussian tragedy of 1914 and the Franco-Belgian front. Part 2.
The German high command regarded Prittwitz's sentiments as alarmist and decided to change the leadership of the 8th Army. Instead of Prittwitz, 66-year-old Colonel General Paul von Hindenburg, who had returned from retirement, was appointed commander; Major General Erich Ludendorff, who distinguished himself during the storming of Liege, was elected as the new chief of staff of the 8th Army. Hindenburg was not distinguished by any special talents, but was endowed with qualities that Prittwitz lacked - a steely will and composure.
Colonel General Paul von HindenburgMajor General Erich Ludendorff.
Hindenburg and Ludendorff, having assessed the situation, decided to transfer the main forces of the 8th Army by rail through Königsberg to the southern borders of East Prussia, protected only by the 20th Army Corps of artillery general Friedrich von Scholz. Having assembled a striking fist west of the Masurian Lakes, the new leaders of the 8th Army planned to defeat the Russian 2nd Army. First of all, the 1st Army Corps of General Francois, which had proven itself well under Stalluponen and Gumbinnen, was redeployed against Samsonov.
While Hindenburg and Ludendorff were planning the actions that would save the German 8th Army,
The Commander-in-Chief of the Northwestern Front, General Zhilinsky, made a decision that predetermined the disaster. Due to insufficient intelligence, he became ingrained in the belief that the Eighth Army was retreating in disarray toward Königsberg, and ordered Rennenkampf to pursue them. So the 1st Army, instead of connecting with Samsonov’s troops, was sent to Königsberg, where it could not do anything, if only due to the fact that heavy artillery was at the disposal of the 2nd Army. The already poorly planned operation of the Russian troops was simply crossed out. Instead of a joint offensive with joint forces, the 1st and 2nd armies acted separately, each in their own sector, while the tasks of Samsonov and Rennenkampf were detached and unrelated to each other. However, this decision of Zhilinsky in itself did not yet have a fatal significance, acquiring such only as a result of the subsequent actions of Zhilinsky and Samsonov.
Before the war, General Samsonov held responsible staff and administrative positions, but he never even commanded an infantry division for a day, and this left its mark on his leadership of the troops. In the complex swampy-wooded terrain of East Prussia, dotted with many rivers and canals, with mostly poor sandy roads, the troops needed a capable, experienced and strong-willed military leader - otherwise the single fist of the advancing army would disintegrate among the East Prussian forests, swamps and lakes into separate groups. This is exactly what happened to the corps of the 2nd Army, and the underestimation of aviation and modern means of communication led to the fact that Samsonov’s troops began to lose communication with each other.
Russian soldiers cross a stream
On August 23-24, the first clashes of the 2nd Army took place with units of the 20th German Corps, which offered fierce resistance. Russian troops lost almost 4.1 thousand people killed and wounded, 1 banner in these battles, and the Germans lost about 1.6 thousand people, 2 guns and 2 machine guns .
The course of the first skirmishes with the Germans aroused the concerns of Samsonov and some corps commanders of the 2nd Army. At the pre-war headquarters games, the Germans planned to defeat the Russian Narevo army by attacking the flank and rear from the west, from the Soldau region, and General Samsonov knew about this, and some of the information he had indicated that the Germans were particularly active in the west.
But General Zhilinsky considered Samsonov’s concerns to be a manifestation of cowardice. According to the Commander-in-Chief of the front, the main German forces fled in panic to Königsberg, and Samsonov is opposed by a small group, which must be crushed and move further north in order to block East Prussia and not allow the Germans to either retreat from it or send to the aid of the “defeated” 8- th army reinforcements. Suspicions of cowardice deeply affected Samsonov, and he gave the order to move north without delay. This led to the fact that the corps of the 2nd Army fanned out across the forests and swamps of East Prussia, losing almost all contact with each other, and the flanks of the army were not covered.
Russian soldiers on the march
And Samsonov’s suspicions were more than justified. While the corps of the 2nd Army went deeper into the thicket, to the right of the German 20th Corps, the corps of General Francois was deployed for a crushing blow on the left flank of Samson’s troops, and the 1st Reserve and 17th Army Corps were pulled up to the left flank of the 2nd Army. Based on the directives of the North-Western Front captured from the killed Russian officer and intercepted unencrypted dispatches transmitted by Zhilinsky's headquarters via radiotelegraph, Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided, hiding from Rennenkampf's troops with cavalry and landwehr formations, using the main forces of the 8th Army to defeat Samsonov's corps.
German artillerymen roll a gun
Meanwhile, the corps of the 2nd Army, scattered in a fan-based attack, continued to move blindly north, having no information about the enemy. There is absolutely no operational intent in Samsonov’s offensive. The German offensive, which began on August 26, came as a complete surprise to the Russians.
The flanking corps of the 2nd Army were quickly crushed and thrown back. At the same time, the commander of the right-flank 6th Army Corps, Infantry General Alexander Aleksandrovich Blagoveshchensky, abandoned his units and fled, later justifying his action by saying that “he was not used to being with the troops”; the corps soon followed the example of its commander. A different picture emerged near Soldau in the left-flank 1st Army Corps of Infantry General Leonid Konstantinovich Artamonov. The latter, instead of controlling the battle, rushed into the whirlpool of the battle with a rifle, inspiring the soldiers with speeches and personal example; As a result, the management of the corps turned out to be completely disorganized, and therefore, although at first Artamonov reported to Samsonov that the 1st Corps stood like a rock, an hour later he was forced to give the order to retreat. Soon Samsonov replaced Artamonov with Lieutenant General Alexander Alexandrovich Dushkevich.
Russian machine gunners in the trenches
General Samsonov himself, for better leadership of the battle, was at the headquarters of the 15th Army Corps of Infantry General Nikolai Nikolaevich Martos, which led to the loss of contact with the front headquarters and disruption in the general leadership of the army. Now Hindenburg could only finish off a group of scattered Russian corps and divisions.
Zhilinsky gave the 2nd Army the order to retreat, but given the collapse of control, this order did not reach the troops. On the morning of August 28, General Martos suggested that Samsonov withdraw the three central corps from the emerging pocket, but the commander of the 2nd Army, not knowing the whole situation, hesitated to make a decision.
At the same time, Zhilinsky, trying to rectify the situation, ordered Rennenkampf to move part of his forces to the rescue of the 2nd Army. The commander of the 1st Army moved 2 army corps to the battle area, but already on August 29, a message was received from the headquarters of the North-Western Front that Samsonov’s army had allegedly retreated from the bag, as a result of which Rennenkampf canceled his order and recalled the corps back. This decision, made on the basis of an erroneous report, nevertheless turned out to be correct - Rennenkampf could no longer save the 2nd Army, and the 4 divisions he sent, battered by previous battles, would have found themselves face to face with the entire power of the 8th Army's strike force .
On August 29, General Francois's 1st Corps defeated the rear of the 2nd Army, and General Mackensen's 17th Army Corps closed a ring around Samsonov's main forces. 5 Russian divisions, squeezed in the steel pincers of German troops, tried to escape from the cauldron, but to no avail. On the night of August 30, General Samsonov, considering the situation hopeless, committed suicide, and by the end of August 31, the Battle of Tannenberg was over. Most of the 2nd Army was defeated. The number of prisoners ranged from 70 to 95 thousand (the last number is the German request), more than 30 thousand Russian soldiers were killed and injured (not counting the wounded who were captured). 350 guns, 2 entire banners, 7 banner poles and elements of banners became German trophies. The Germans announced losses of 6.5 thousand dead and missing and almost 6.6 thousand wounded (however, knowing the “accuracy” of the German accounting of losses, it can be argued that in reality they were most likely higher).
Russian soldiers captured at the Battle of Tannenberg
With the defeat of Samsonov's army, the outcome of the East Prussian campaign was decided. Under the circumstances, Rennenkampf's troops had no choice but to retreat to the state border to reduce communication lines. But General Zhilinsky did not want to understand this. Headquarters, led by Nikolai Nikolaevich, and Rennenkampf himself did not want to leave East Prussia.
Zhilinsky, as if forgetting about the beating of the 2nd Army that had just taken place and in general about the presence of German troops in East Prussia, ordered the 1st Army to continue preparations for the siege of Königsberg. Rennenkampf by that time, as a result of the attack on Königsberg, had concentrated the main forces of his army on the left flank, while the weakened left flank had also been significantly stretched. According to the plan of the command of the Northwestern Front, the recently formed 10th Army was supposed to cover the left flank of the 1st Army, but it was just beginning to deploy. Rennenkampf, in addition to the infantry division sent to him on August 27, received an additional army corps in early September, and another 1 division was on the way to him. But the Germans also received reinforcements - 2 corps and 1 cavalry division arrived in East Prussia from the Franco-Belgian front.
Immediately after the completion of the defeat of Samsonov's army, the German General Staff ordered the 8th Army to move north of the Masurian Lakes and defeat the Russian 1st Army. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, having covered themselves from the remnants of the 2nd Army with forces generally equal to 1.5 infantry divisions, moved the bulk of their troops east, against Rennenkampf. Against 13 infantry divisions (of which only 10 were present on the front line), a rifle brigade, 2 Guards and 3 line cavalry divisions and 1 cavalry brigade of the 1st Army, the Germans fielded 16 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions. From the 10th Army, only 1 corps managed to move into the combat area.
Russian soldiers in a trench
The Germans planned to act using a method that had already brought them victory - to outflank the Russian troops and cut off their communications. On September 7, the 8th Army launched an offensive. Having struck the junction between the 1st and 10th armies, the Germans quickly broke through the Russian defenses, and already on September 9, a strike force of 5 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions rushed into the breakthrough with the intention of going to the rear of Rennenkampf’s troops. But he remembered the tragic death of the 2nd Army, and quickly castled General Smirnov’s 20th Army Corps into the threatened area, and also put his last reserves into action. Despite huge losses, the left flank of the 1st Army was able to hold back the enemy onslaught, and the threat of a repeat of Tannenberg was downplayed. On September 13, Zhilinsky ordered the withdrawal of the 1st Army for the Neman, and the 2nd for the Narev. Under the cover of rearguards, Rennenkampf's troops retreated abroad by September 15. In the battle north of the Masurian Lakes, Russian troops lost at least 75 thousand people, as well as 150 guns. German losses amounted to 14 thousand people, estimates of captured Russian soldiers vary between 29-45 thousand people.
Thus ended the East Prussian campaign of the Russian Imperial Army in August-September 1914. The losses of the Russian Imperial Army amounted to at least 250 thousand people, among whom, according to various estimates, from 110 to 160 thousand were taken prisoner, the artillery was missing half a thousand guns. German losses, according to German documents, amounted to almost 11 thousand irrevocably (including about 3 thousand prisoners), almost 22 thousand wounded and more than 23.1 thousand sick. However, there is almost no doubt that in reality the German battle losses were greater. Thus, the number of sick people shown in German documents suggests that a significant part of the wounded were classified in this category of losses. As for irretrievable losses, it should be noted that the calculation and clarification of German losses in the First World War was carried out until the 30s, and the final figures differed significantly from the initial reports. Therefore, we can assume that the actual German combat losses amounted to 45 thousand people, of which 15 thousand were irrevocably (including 3 thousand prisoners) and 30 thousand wounded.
It took the Germans less than a month to drive the superior Russian troops out of East Prussia, inflicting terrible damage on them. The defeat of Samsonov's 2nd Army and, in general, the defeat of the North-Western Front was a severe blow for the Russian Empire and its Armed Forces. Russian society was shocked without exaggeration; the most incredible rumors circulated in all layers of it, from the betrayal of General Rennenkampf (objectively speaking, the most adequate commander, unlike Samsonov and Zhilinsky, who showed, if not talent, then at least military professionalism) to the death of half a million Russian soldiers at Masurian lakes.
The disaster in East Prussia marked the beginning of the formation in the Russian Army of a kind of “inferiority complex” in front of Reichsheer. The feeling of German superiority permeated the entire Armed Forces from generals to lower ranks, and the defeats of 1915 strengthened this feeling with the idea that German troops had literally endless ammunition and an incalculable number of guns. “Herman” began to be perceived not as a person of flesh, blood and mind, but as some kind of unbridled and merciless element, similar in destructiveness and inevitability to a tsunami. Throughout the rest of the war, the fact of the appearance of German troops was seen by many as an omen of an inevitable, quick and brutal defeat. This conviction of certain defeat played a disastrous and downright fatal role for the Russian Army in the First World War.
In an effort to somehow obscure the failure of the East Prussian campaign, the propaganda organs of the Russian Empire launched a version according to which the offensive of Russian troops in East Prussia saved France from supposedly inevitable defeat.
But maybe this version has a right to exist? After all, the transfer of 2 corps and 1 cavalry division of Reichsheer from the Franco-Belgian front to the Russian actually took place, and these formations were transferred precisely to East Prussia.
However, the decision to transfer troops was made by the German command only on August 26, when the encirclement of the 2nd Army had already begun. At the same time, in a conversation with the head of the operational department of the Supreme High Command, Colonel Gerhard Tappen, General Ludendorff said that the 8th Army could do without these reinforcements. On August 27, Ludendorff said that the transferred formations would arrive too late, and “against Rennenkampf We will manage alone in the extreme." Note, reader, that Ludendorff no longer spoke about Samsonov, believing the problem with his army had already been solved. Ludendorff also reminded of the inadmissibility of weakening the main strike force of Reichsheer in France. But Tappen reassured him, saying that in the West in these troops no need.
It really seemed to the German High Command in those days that it was entirely possible to weaken the Western Front. Franco-British troops in the third decade of August quickly retreated deep into France, and the German armies confidently pursued them. Already this, as well as information about the facts of panic in the ranks of the French and British, was enough for German military leaders and staff officers, filled with German military-aristocratic pride, to become convinced that the French army and the British expeditionary forces were close to collapse, and victory over the Entente in the West close. Because of this belief, the Germans did not attach serious importance to the fact that the French and British armies were retreating in an organized manner, continuously waging rearguard battles, and generally did not notice that there was no significant decline in discipline in the enemy ranks. Concern for the fate of the Western Front had only been shown for almost a week since Ludendorff had left for East Prussia, and the people responsible for the German troops in France and Belgium were already anticipating their imminent victory in the silence of their offices hung with maps and saw themselves receiving the city keys from the hands of the inhabitants of conquered Paris. .
British infantry on the march
It is worth noting that from the German armies advancing on France, units were withdrawn not only for East Prussia. The resistance of Belgian troops in besieged Antwerp and Maubeuge, and indeed throughout the entire length of the front occupied by the Belgians, forced the Germans to withdraw significant forces to Belgium, especially since British troops sent to help Belgium landed in Ostend. As a result, at the height of the decisive battle on the Marne in Belgium, a German group of 3 corps operated. And if we talk about the role of the East Prussian operation in the defeat of the Germans on the Marne, then we must not forget about the role of the Belgian army.
Fighting on the Franco-Belgian Front in 1914
But in reality, the Battle of the Marne was lost by the Germans not because part of their forces were diverted to other areas, but because of a strategic miscalculation generated by self-confidence and arrogance towards the enemy. While extolling the iron German spirit to the skies, German generals did not take into account either the French elan vital ("Elan vital" - life impulse) or the cold-blooded fortitude of British volunteer soldiers, many of whom went through the Anglo-Boer Wars.
By the evening of September 4, the German 1st and 2nd armies had advanced significantly into French territory south of the Marne River and were already preparing to begin the main part of the German plan for the western campaign - the outreach and encirclement of the Franco-British forces. To do this, the Germans planned a maneuver to bypass the British and 5th French armies east of Paris. At the same time, the 1st German Army left its right flank, facing Paris, completely uncovered. The military governor of Paris, General Joseph Simon Gallieni, learned about this on September 3 from air reconnaissance aircraft - this is how the work and funds invested by the French before the war in aviation, which amazed their minds and captured their imagination, more than paid off. With such information, Gallieni was able to convince the French commander-in-chief, General Joseph Jacques Césaire Joffre, who intended to retreat further south, to give the Germans battle and strike at the flank and rear of their 1st Army. The strike was entrusted to the newly formed French 6th Army under General Michel Joseph Maunoury.
General Joseph Simon Gallieni General Joseph Jacques Cesaire Joffre
But the first French strike on September 5 brought only limited success - the commander of the 1st German Army, Colonel General Alexander von Kluck, was forced to stop his advance to the east, but by removing 2 corps, he parried Maunoury’s attack. On September 6, the battle flared up along the entire front from Paris to Verdun, taking on particular intensity on the right flank of the German troops. Here, units of the 6th French Army rushed against the 1st German Army, the British and 5th French armies rushed into the junction between the 1st and 2nd German armies, and the 2nd and 3rd German armies were attacked by the 9th I'm French.
French infantry
The better tactical training of the Germans compared to the French and their overwhelming superiority in heavy field artillery led to heavy losses of French units. The colorful red and blue uniform of the French did not contribute to survival either. But still they went to certain death, determined not to allow the shame of Mars-la-Tour and Sedan to be repeated. But the determination to die was not enough. On September 7, Kluck transferred 2 more divisions against the 6th Army, and Maunuri was on the verge of defeat. Gallieni, rescuing the 6th Army, used an innovation that was unexpected at that time. Having requisitioned 600 Renault taxis in Paris, he transported one of the brigades of the Moroccan Division to the front line in two flights, thereby carrying out the first large-scale transfer of troops using cars in history. Gallieni moved the other brigade, as well as the Algerian units that arrived from Africa (not counting the French troops themselves), by rail. Reinforcements that arrived from Paris in a timely manner strengthened the 6th French Army and improved its position.
German infantry
Trying to develop a blow against Maunoury’s troops, on September 8 Kluck sent 2 more corps from the southern bank of the Marne to his right flank. This transfer did not bring success to the Germans, but it created a gap of more than 30 kilometers between the 1st and 2nd German armies, covered by a weak curtain of small cavalry units. And it was into this gap on September 9 that the British and 5th French armies launched their attacks. The troops sent by Kluck to cover the gap were defeated by the French, and the British corps wedged into the location of the German troops had the opportunity to operate in the rear of the 1st and 2nd German armies. Kluck unleashed a new blow on the 6th Army of Maunoury, and again began to achieve success, but the commander of the 2nd German Army, Colonel General Karl von Bülow, having received information that the British were coming to his rear, decided to retreat, thereby putting the 1st and 3rd German armies on the southern bank of the Marne were in mortal danger. As a result, a general retreat of the German troops began, and the French and British, inspired by the victory, gave chase. By September 12, the Germans took up defense along the lines of the Aisne and Vel rivers. Thus ended the Battle of the Marne, which turned the tide of the 1916 campaign.
It is worth noting that even if all the formations left by the German command in Belgium and transferred to East Prussia were present on the Marne, even then the victory of the Germans was not guaranteed.
However, even if the French and British had lost the battle of the Marne and Paris had fallen, this did not mean the defeat of France. Suffice it to recall the experience of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. In 1870, the troops of Prussia and other German states defeated the personnel army of the French Empire in less than two months, capturing most of its personnel led by Emperor Napoleon III. After this, North German troops besieged Paris, cutting it off from the country. But the government of the Third Republic proclaimed in Paris did not give up. Relying on a powerful economy and open sea routes, which made it possible to use colonial resources, the new French leaders were able to assemble a new army in just four months (with an average of 6 thousand infantrymen and 2 batteries being formed daily) and continue the war until September 1871.
Yes, then France was still defeated, but it had been preparing for the First World War for more than forty years, and it had powerful allies. Moreover, unlike in 1870, France did not lose its regular army. Consequently, there is simply no need to talk about the inevitable defeat of France.
But in any case, the East Prussian tragedy of the Russian Army should be remembered.
The East Prussian operation was the first offensive operation undertaken by Russian troops during the First World War. The operation began on August 14 (hereinafter - dates according to the new style) 1914 with the transfer of armies intended for the offensive to the border of the empire and ended exactly a month later, on September 14. The strategic goal of the Russian troops was the capture of East Prussia, one of the indigenous territories of the state that united Germany. Thus, the threat of a potential flank attack on the troops concentrated in the Kingdom of Poland was supposed to be eliminated, and in addition, the war was immediately transferred to the enemy’s territory, which was supposed to have a stunning psychological effect on him. Forced to defend himself, he would have to slow down the pace of the offensive against France, whose strategic position by mid-August was unenviable: it was not possible to break into Alsace and Lorraine, and meanwhile, the German army was confidently advancing through Belgium and threatened to fall with all its might on the weak left flank French troops.
The operation was carried out by troops of the 1st (commander - Pavel Karlovich Rennenkampf) and 2nd (commander - Alexander Vasilyevich Samsonov) armies of the North-Western Front. They were opposed by the German 8th Army of Maximilian von Prittwitz. Russian troops totaled 19 infantry and 8.5 cavalry divisions, German troops - 14.5 infantry and 1 cavalry division. The numerical superiority was on the side of the Russian army and in artillery - 1140 guns against 800 field guns for the Germans.
Both Russian armies began moving towards the border at the same time. The 1st had the task of cutting off German troops from Koenigsberg, enveloping their left flank and blocking the city. The 2nd was supposed to bypass the Masurian Lakes and threaten the enemy’s right flank. However, the 1st Army, which delivered the main blow, moved faster. Already on August 17, when Samsonov’s forces had not yet approached the border, Rennenkampf’s troops were already crossing it and entering into the first battles with the German army (at Stallupenen and, soon, at Kaushen). Von Prittwitz decided to fend off the first onslaught of the Russians with his own blow. On August 20, he attacked Rennenkampf’s troops, who had stopped to rest near Gumbinnen. However, despite fatigue, the 1st Army drove the enemy back. The ratio of losses was in favor of the Germans, but they were still very heavy - the 17th Corps under the command of August von Mackensen was simply defeated. This had a most depressing effect on von Prittwitz, and he decided to retreat across the Vistula before he found himself sandwiched between two Russian armies. But this decision was not approved by the German high command. On August 21, it ordered the redeployment of six corps from the Western Front to the aid of the retreating 8th Army; in addition, the next day, the highly experienced Paul von Hindenburg, recalled from retirement, was put at its head, and Erich Ludendorff, who had already become famous, was appointed chief of staff capture of the Belgian fortress of Liege.
While all these changes were taking place in the German army, Rennenkampf gave his troops a long-awaited rest, after which he continued his offensive towards the Königsberg area. The victory at Gumbinnen ensured the fulfillment of the most pressing task of the operation - to weaken the enemy’s pressure on France at the moment when it was most difficult for her (on August 21, the French lost the battle of Charleroi). However, continuing to consistently follow the instructions of the command, Rennenkampf lost contact with the enemy, gave him time to regroup and moved far away from Samsonov’s army, which made first contact with the enemy only on August 23 (the battles of Orlau and Frankenau). Having made its way through this sector, the 2nd Army, at the insistence of Headquarters, continued its offensive to the north to intercept the Germans retreating to the Vistula (as the Russian command believed). However, Hindenburg was not going to retreat. Having at his disposal fresh forces and accurate information about the enemy’s plans (messages between Russian armies were transmitted without encryption), he attacked Samsonov with all his might, pitting only cavalry and Landwehr (reservists) against Rennenkampf. On August 26, the I and VI corps of the 2nd Army were attacked, moving away and covering the advance of the main forces from the flanks. Both of them were repulsed: the VIth - on the same day, the Ist held out until the 27th. The remaining troops continued to advance, but their path was already blocked by German units. On August 28, it became obvious that the enemy ring was closing around the 2nd Army, but General Samsonov no longer had time to take effective measures. The next day, a German attack fell from the rear on the center of the 2nd Army and practically destroyed it. The Russian troops were defeated and surrendered, General Samsonov shot himself. Rennenkampf received instructions from front headquarters to assist the 2nd Army only on August 27 and sent help the very next day. However, the opportunity to save the 2nd Army had already been missed, and the soldiers had to be returned halfway.
Fighting broke out again on September 7, when Hindenburg's troops, seeking to finally clear East Prussia of the Russians, attacked Rennenkampf's 1st Army. She confidently fought back until the 9th, but the difficult situation on the left flank forced the commander to order a retreat while it was still possible. This timely decision saved the 1st Army from the fate of the 2nd, and on September 14 its last units retreated beyond the Neman. The left flank, which covered the entire maneuver, suffered heavy losses, but the remaining troops were saved.
Thus ended the first Russian offensive of the Great War, which successfully accomplished its primary objectives, but resulted in disproportionately large losses due to a number of both accidents and strategic miscalculations.
The East Prussian operation of 1914 is usually called the offensive of the Russian army in Germany during the First World War. Despite early success, it was not possible to advance deeper into enemy territory. Having won the first few battles, the Russian army was defeated in the Battle of Tannenberg and was forced to retreat to its original positions on the Narev. From a tactical point of view, The East Prussian operation of 1914 ended in failure. However, its strategic results were favorable for the Russian Empire and its allies.
Comparison of the sides' strengths
In August 1914, two armies under the command of generals and Pavel Rennenkampf. In total, Russian troops numbered 250 thousand people and 1200 artillery pieces. Both armies were subordinate to the front commander General Yakov Grigorievich Zhilinsky. It is worth noting that during the East Prussian operation of 1914, there were obvious contradictions between his orders and the orders of the headquarters.
The total number of opponents was 173 thousand people. The German side had about a thousand artillery pieces. commanded by General Max von Prittwitz. A week after the start of the East Prussian operation, he was replaced by the famous military leader and politician Paul von Hindenburg.
Planning
The general task assigned to the armies of Samsonov and Rennenkampf was to defeat the German troops and develop an offensive deep into enemy territory. The Germans had to be cut off from Konigsberg and the Vistula. The location of the East Prussian operation of 1914 at the initial stage was the Masurian Lakes region, bypassing which Russian troops were supposed to strike the enemy’s flank. Implementation of this task General base entrusted to the army under the command of Samsonov. It was planned that she would cross the state border on August 19. Two days earlier, Rennenkampf’s army was supposed to invade enemy territory and divert German troops, striking in the area of the cities of Insterburg and Angerburg.
Hasty actions
International politics and relations with the allies had a negative impact on the quality of planning and organization of the East Prussian operation of 1914. The government of the Russian Empire promised France to hurry up with the start of the offensive. Hasty actions led to serious problems with obtaining detailed intelligence data on the enemy’s deployment and establishing communications between Russian corps. The invasion of German territory took place almost blindly. Due to lack of time, the supply of troops was not properly organized. The reasons for supply disruptions included not only rush, but also absent in Poland the required number of railways.
Command miscalculations
The likelihood of failure of the East Prussian operation in August 1914 increased significantly due to a dramatic mistake, admitted by Russiangeneral staff. Having learned that the Berlin direction was defended only by German territorial troops (Landwehr), characterized by low combat effectiveness, the high command decided to create an additional strike group to develop an attack on the enemy capital. The reserves, which were supposed to strengthen the armies of Samsonov and Rennenkampf, joined the new formation. As a result of this error, the strike potential of the participants in the East Prussian operation of 1914 was significantly reduced. The outcome of the battle was, to a certain extent, decided before it even began.
German army plans
Kaiserovsky General base assigned his troops in East Prussia only the task of holding territory. The High Command did not give the army a specific plan and allowed some freedom of decision-making depending on the development of the situation. General Prittwitz's troops were waiting for reinforcements, which were supposed to arrive 40 days after the start of mobilization in Germany.
It should be noted that the German side, like the Russian side, was poorly prepared for combat operations in terms of intelligence collection. The German headquarters had very vague information about the number and location of enemy forces. The German command was forced to make decisions blindly.
The features of the landscape contributed to the conduct of defensive actions. The territory of the powerful fortified area contained a large number of lakes, swamps and forested hills. Such terrain impeded the enemy's advance. Narrow passages between reservoirs made it possible to create effective defensive lines.
Start of operation
In accordance with the plan, Rennenkampf's army crossed the state border on August 17 and immediately got involved in battle with the enemy near the city of Stallupönen. This became the first battle of the East Prussian operation in 1914. Briefly, the result of this battle can be described as follows: Russian troops forced the Germans to retreat, but suffered serious losses. Considering the five-fold superiority of Rennenkampf's soldiers, this episode can hardly be called a great success. The Russian army took Stallupönen, and the Germans retreated to the city of Gumbinnen. The next day the offensive continued. The Russian cavalry tried to bypass Gumbinnen from the north, but collided with a brigade of German territorial troops and suffered losses. Samsonov's army entered on August 20. Having received information about this, the German headquarters decided to immediately engage in battle.
Battle of Gumbinnen
German divisions suddenly attacked the right flank of the Russian troops. This section of the front was opened due to the fact that the cavalry, after suffering losses, retreated and was inactive. The Germans managed to push back the Russian right-flank divisions. However, further development of the attack was stalled due to dense artillery fire. The German army retreated, but the Russian troops were too tired to pursue them. Both sides suffered heavy losses. As a result of this battle, the threat of encirclement loomed over the German corps.
Battle of Tannenberg
After Prittwitz reported General Staff announcing his intention to continue the retreat inland, he was removed from office and replaced by Paul Hindenburg. The new commander decided to concentrate his forces to defeat Samsonov's army. The Russian headquarters mistakenly mistook the transfer of enemy divisions for a retreat. The command came to the conclusion that the main part of the operation was completed. Based on these considerations, the two Russian armies began to pursue the enemy and move away from each other. Hindenburg took advantage of this situation to encircle Samsonov's divisions.
The flanks of the Russian troops, having advanced deep into enemy territory, found themselves unprotected. Concentrated attacks by German Landwehr corps and brigades led to the flight of individual units of Samsonov's army to the rear. Communication with headquarters was lost, and troop control was disorganized. During a chaotic retreat, five divisions led by Samsonov were surrounded. The general shot himself, and his subordinates surrendered. Western European historians call the defeat of Samsonov's army the Battle of Tannenberg.
Having eliminated one threat, the German command turned its attention to another. Superior enemy forces launched an attack on the southern flank of Rennenkampf's troops, intending to encircle and destroy them. The attack was repelled with the help of the remnants of Samsonov’s army, but the losses grew, and the situation became hopeless. Russian troops returned to their original positions. The Germans were unable to encircle and destroy Rennenkampf's army, but the offensive operation aimed at capturing Prussia ended in failure.
Results
The attempted invasion of German territory did not bring any results and resulted in heavy losses. The results of the East Prussian operation of 1914 were certainly negative for the Russian army, but in the long term, the tactical defeat turned into a strategic gain. For Germany, this theater of military operations was secondary. The Kaiser's government concentrated forces on the Western Front in order to first of all defeat France with one quick and powerful blow. The Russian invasion disrupted Germany's strategic plans. To eliminate the new threat to German General Staff it was necessary to transfer more than a hundred thousand people from the Western Front. Russia diverted forces intended to participate in the battle for France and saved its ally from defeat.
Briefly, the results of the East Prussian operation of 1914 can be formulated as follows: the invasion forced Germany to conduct military operations on two fronts, which predetermined the outcome of the world confrontation. The German side did not have enough resources for a protracted fight. The intervention of the Russian Empire not only saved France, but also doomed Germany to defeat in the world war.
One of the most famous episodes of the First World War was the defeat of units of the 2nd Russian Army during the East Prussian operation. This battle became known as the Battle of Tannenberg (August 26 - 30, 1914).
On August 20, the 8th German Army under the command of Colonel General Prittwitz was defeated in the battle of Gumbinen by the 1st Russian Army. On August 21, the main units of the 2nd Russian Army under the command of General Alexander Vasilyevich Samsonov crossed the German border. It should be noted that the army headquarters was assembled “from scratch,” since the headquarters of the Warsaw district became the headquarters of the North-Western Front, and the headquarters of the Vilna district became the headquarters of the 1st Army. A.V. Samsonov (1859 - August 30, 1914) was appointed commander. Samsonov was a participant in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878, and showed himself well in the Japanese campaign, commanding the Ussuri Cavalry Brigade and the Siberian Cossack Division. But most of his career was associated with staff and administrative positions, so, from 1896 he was the head of the Elisavetgrad Cavalry Junker School, from 1906 - the chief of staff of the Warsaw Military District, from 1907 he was the appointed ataman of the Don Army, from 1909 - the Turkestan Governor-General and Commander of the Turkestan Military District. In addition, from March 1909 he was also the appointed ataman of the Semirechensk Cossack army. Samsonov was sick with asthma and was treated in Pyatigorsk in 1914. In the process of mobilization activities, they remembered that Samsonov was the head of headquarters of the Warsaw district, and he was entrusted with command of the army. Although his “ceiling” was command of a cavalry division. The front commander, Yakov Grigorievich Zhilinsky, who before the war held staff and administrative positions, was engaged in military research activities, and was a military diplomat, could not help him or adjust his activities.
The Second Army had 5 corps (1st Army Corps, 6th AK, 13th AK, 15th AK, 23rd AK), they had 12.5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions. Army units deployed from left to right along the Mlawa - Myshinets line: 1st Corps, 15th Corps and part of the 23rd Corps, 13th, 6th Corps. It must be said that initially the army was stronger - it had 7 corps (14.5 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions), but a number of units were recalled to form the 9th Army, and the 2nd AK was transferred to the 1st Army. This weakened the striking power of the 2nd Army. In addition, it was difficult to transfer units to this section of the front - the railway approached only the left flank of the army, units had to make long marches even before the start of the war.
According to the plans of the command, the 2nd Army was supposed to cut off the troops of the 8th German Army from the Vistula; they wanted to take the Germans into the “cauldron”. Rennenkampf's 1st Army was doing well, so to prevent the defeated German army from running away completely, he was ordered to stop. And the 2nd Army was being urged on. The units walked for 12 hours, getting further and further away from the rear. By August 23, the 1st AK of General Leonid Konstantinovich Artamonov occupied the border city of Soldau. As already mentioned, there was a railway on the left flank, and other units accumulated here - an infantry division from the 23rd Corps, two cavalry divisions, artillery. Samsonov reassigned them to Artamonov, as a result the left flank was strengthened and other directions weakened. To the right of 1 AK, I. Mingin’s 2nd Infantry Division from 23 AK was advancing; it fell behind the main forces, but overtook 1 AK. The 15th Army Corps of Nikolai Nikolaevich Martos penetrated into the center, deep into enemy territory. The 15th Corps defeated the 37th German Division in a border battle and occupied the city of Neidenburg. Next moved 13 AK under the command of Nikolai Nikolaevich Klyuev, he advanced in the direction of Allenstein. Alexander Alexandrovich Blagoveshchensky’s 6th Corps was advancing on the right flank. The army headquarters lagged behind the advancing formations by 120 km, being in Ostroleka, where there was a telephone line connecting the headquarters with Bialystok (front headquarters).
Not all corps commanders were “combat officers.” Artamonov was more of a military diplomat, an intelligence officer, a “general for assignments”; during the Russian-Japanese War, Kuropatkin tried to remove him from his post for panic and retreat during the onslaught of the enemy. Klyuev was the “general for assignments”; Blagoveshchensky was also considered a “civilian”. The real combat commander was Martos. The 15th and 13th corps attacking in the center were considered well-prepared combat formations. The 6th Corps (right flank) was “prefabricated”, created from reserve units.
The big mistake of the Russian command was the fact that reconnaissance was not organized at all. They used the data that was transmitted from the headquarters of the North-Western Front (and Zhilinsky’s headquarters itself did not know much). Samsonov aggravated the situation by deciding to turn his troops to the northwest, fearing that the Germans would leave. And the front headquarters ordered an attack to the northeast, towards Rennenkampf’s army. There was no telephone connection with the buildings; the Germans destroyed the lines. Communication was carried out by radio (the Germans intercepted these messages), and more often by horse relays, which led to a large delay in information. As a result, the corps were left to their own devices, having lost their unified command.
It should be noted that the Germans were doing well with intelligence; local residents often reported about Russian troops, sometimes simply by telephone. As a result, the German command had a good picture of the movement of the Russian army. In addition, the Germans prepared the territories well for the invasion - supplies were taken out, hay was burned, and warehouses in Neidenburg were set on fire.
First clashes
On August 23, reconnaissance from the 15th AK Martos discovered German positions north of Neidenburg, near the villages of Orlau and Frankenau. The 20th Corps of General Scholz, reinforced by landwehr units, occupied the defense there. In terms of strength, it corresponded to two Russian corps: two infantry divisions, 1 reserve division, 1 landwehr division, 1 cavalry division, 2 landwehr brigades.
At Orlau and Frankenau two divisions with 16 artillery batteries held the defense. Martos deployed his units and, after artillery preparation, attacked. Russian units broke into Orlau, but the Germans counterattacked and brought a reserve into the battle. The battle was fierce, one regiment was surrounded, but was able to break through to its own. In the morning, Martos regrouped his forces and resumed the offensive, and an artillery strike was carried out on the identified German positions. The infantry, still in the dark, approached the German positions and attacked in unison. The Germans could not stand it and fled. The 37th Infantry Division was completely destroyed. The fierceness of the battle is evidenced by the losses of 15 AK: 2.5 thousand people killed and wounded, including 2 brigade commanders and 3 regiment commanders.
Reports of defeats at Gumbinnen and Orlau caused panic in Germany. It was the result of an information campaign that was carried out before the war, talking about “Russian barbarians.” Newspapers and other propaganda materials talked about widespread rape, murder of babies, etc. In Berlin, they decided to transfer two and a half corps to the Eastern Front (Moltke initially even thought about 6 corps), replacing the command of the 8th Army with Hindenburg and Ludendorff.
At this time, the Russian command makes fatal mistakes. The command of the Northwestern Front, having learned about the rapid retreat of German troops in front of the front of the 1st Army, decided that the German command was withdrawing troops beyond the Vistula, and considered the operation completed. The main tasks for the 1st Army were changed: the main forces of Rennenkampf’s army were directed not towards the 2nd Army, but to cut off Koenigsberg, where, according to Zhilinsky, part of the 8th German Army had taken refuge, and to pursue those “retreating to the Vistula” Germans. The commander of the 2nd Army also decided to intercept the Germans “retreating to the Vistula” and insisted on transferring the main attack from the northeast to the northwest. As a result, the 1st and 2nd armies began to advance in diverging directions, and a large gap of 125 km opened between them. The headquarters also considered the operation in East Prussia essentially completed and began to work out a plan for an offensive deep into Germany, so Zhilinsky was refused to reinforce the 2nd Army with the Guards Corps.
German command plan, regrouping of forces
After the initial plan failed (to defeat first the 1st Army and then the 2nd), the command of the 8th Army, even before the arrival of Ludendorff and Hindenburg, began to implement a new plan: to break away from the 1st Army and defeat the 2nd. In principle, this plan was worked out even before the war.
There were also infrastructural prerequisites for this. Three parallel railways passed through Prussia: along the sea through Marienburg and Königsberg, to the south the road went through Osterode and Allenstein, and the third was near the border - it passed through Soldau and Neidenburg. The roads were connected by transverse branches.
1.5 divisions of the Koenigsberg garrison, 1 cavalry division and a Landwehr brigade were left against the 1st Army. All other troops - 11.5 divisions - were concentrated against Samsonov's 2nd Army. Francois's 1st AK was sent to Königsberg, put in trains and transferred in a roundabout way to Marienburg, and from there to Soldau, to the left flank of the 2nd Army. Belov's 1st reserve AK and Mackensen's 17th AK were withdrawn to the right flank of the Russian 2nd Army.
The question was what was worth doing: launch a flank attack and simply push back the Russian troops, or should we decide to organize “Cannes” - destroy the flanks and encircle the Russian army. The command of the 8th Army doubted that the encirclement operation was too risky. If the 1st Army continued to move west, the German 8th Army faced the threat of complete defeat. The head of the operational department of the headquarters, Max Hoffman, argued that there was no need to be afraid, it was necessary to act more decisively. There was 125 km between the 1st and 2nd armies, and Rennenkampf’s army would not have been able to intervene with a quick attack. He even started a story that Rennenkampf would not help Samsonov, because he insulted him during the Japanese campaign - he hit him in the face. So this myth began to circulate in literature. But the decisive argument was the intercepted radiograms (they were not encrypted then). In them, the commander of the 1st Army informed Samsonov about his location, and spoke about the order of the commander of the 2nd Army to continue the offensive.
The Germans decided to push back the flank corps of the 2nd Army and encircle the units located in the center. In the center, so that Martos’ corps would not break through further, they decided to strengthen Scholz’s 20 AKs. 1 reserve and 1.5 landwehr divisions were allocated to help him.
Max Hoffman.
On the way to destruction
Samsonov received news of the battle of Orlau only on August 24. At the same time, information was received from 1st AK that the enemy was accumulating on the left flank (echelons with units of Francois’s 1st Corps began to approach). The army commander suggested that the front headquarters stop, pull up the rear, and conduct additional reconnaissance. The front commander not only refused to do this, but also accused Samsonov of cowardice: “Seeing the enemy where he is not is cowardice, and I will not allow General Samsonov to be a coward. The commander of the 2nd Army did not insist and threw away all caution. He confirmed the order to the troops - “forward” and decided to move the headquarters to Neidenburg. On the left flank, Lyubomirov's 15th Cavalry Division, attached to the 1st AK, captured the city of Uzdau. The 15th Corps, pursuing the Germans, turned to the west, the 13th AK, without meeting resistance, went to Allenstein. On the left flank, 6th AK occupied Bischofsburg and turned to the northeast. The corps continued to fan out along the 200 km front.
The 2nd Infantry Division of Mingin from 23 AK came to the position of Scholz's corps, fortified with reserve and landwehr formations. The division commander decided to attack the Germans on the move. The right wing of the division advanced successfully and penetrated the enemy positions, but the left flank was defeated. The commander of 15 AK Martos learned about the battle and the appearance of the enemy and at the same time received an order to move to the northeast, to Hochstein. Thus, the corps exposed the rear to the enemy. Based on the situation, he ordered the main forces to turn to the west and sent two regiments to Hochstein. Martos asked the commander of the 13th AK Klyuev to help, and Samsonov suggested sending the entire 13th Corps to him in order to defeat the enemy. If this plan were carried out, the enemy’s plan would collapse - the defeat of Scholz’s corps could lead to a very difficult situation for the two German corps. Klyuev allocated one brigade to Martos.
Defeat of the 6th Corps. At this time, the front command came to its senses and decided to assemble the corps. We focused on 13 AKs that had taken the lead. They ordered 15 AK units advancing on the left and 6 AK units on the right to move toward him. Then they came to their senses, realizing that the eastern flank would remain uncovered and 6 AK abandoned their previous task, to be at Bischofsburg. But the order was late; on August 26, the 6th AK had already advanced to Allenstein. They marched in two columns - the divisions of Komarov and Richter. Intelligence from the 4th Infantry Division Komarov reported that enemy troops were moving in the rear. The division commander decided that these were Germans who were fleeing after the defeat from the 1st Army and decided to strike. And this was Mackensen’s 17th AK, which was preparing for a flank attack. A counter battle took place near the village of Gross-Bessau. Komarov, fighting off attacks from the enemy corps, called Richter's 16th Infantry Division for help, who had already gone 14 km. Richter turned and on the way to Komarov collided with Belov's 1st reserve AK. At this time, Komarov’s division lost 4 thousand killed and wounded and began to retreat, Richter’s units also began to retreat.
The Germans were unable to pursue them, because they met resistance from the rearguard under the command of Nechvolodov (2 regiments, 7 hundred Cossacks, a mortar division). They felt that the entire corps was against them. Komkor Blagoveshchensky was unable to regroup his forces in Bischofsburg and the upset mass continued to retreat to the border.
The headquarters showed concern. On August 26, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich visited the headquarters of the North-Western Front, and ordered the 1st Army to be aimed at establishing contacts with the 2nd Army. At this time, Rennenkampf's army captured Insterburg and cut the railway to Memel (Klaipeda) and reached the Baltic Sea at Labiau, 50 km from Königsberg. But Zhilinsky stood by his mistake and ordered the siege of Koenigsberg to begin. The headquarters of the 2nd Army, having reached Neidenburg and not understanding the general situation, refused to support Martos from 13 AK.
Retreat of 1st Corps. On August 27, the situation became even more complicated. German aerial reconnaissance discovered that 6 AK had retreated far to the south, leaving a large hole in the Russian front. Mackensen's corps continued its advance to the south, and Belov's corps to the west, towards Allenstein.
Francois's 1st AK attacked Uzdau. The attack was well prepared: after an hour of artillery shelling, the German divisions went on the attack. To encircle the Russian troops, they prepared a flying detachment (cavalrymen, motorcyclists, cyclists, infantry on vehicles), which they planned to throw at Neidenburg. But the attack failed, brigade commander Savitsky and Colonel of the General Staff Krymov organized a defense. The German dense chains were simply mowed down by the fire of artillery, machine guns and rifles. The Petrovsky and Neyshlotsky regiments struck with bayonets. The enemy was defeated, there was even panic; one of the German units managed to retreat 45 km.
But the human factor ruined the brilliant opportunity to complete the defeat of Francois’s corps. Komkor Artamonov chickened out and ordered a retreat to Soldau. He also lied to Samsonov: “All attacks have been repulsed, I’m holding on like a rock. I will complete the task to the end." Francois occupied the abandoned Uzdau, but did not believe in the Russian retreat and dug in, preparing for defense.
At the same time, Martos’s corps, inferior to the Germans in strength by 1.5 times, fought with Scholz’s forces. Moreover, the entire day the battle went in favor of the Russians. The German defense was broken through, the Germans were driven back; in order to restore the situation, the German command had to transfer a new division. It was not possible to encircle Martos's corps from the flanks; the Russians repulsed all enemy attacks.
The commander's fatal mistake. Alarming messages poured into headquarters from all sides. The threat of “ticks” has become apparent. But Samsonov again ordered an attack. Only after learning about the defeat of the regiments of Mingin’s division, the army commander gave the order to the 13th AK to go to the aid of Martos’s 15th Corps. Random cavalrymen reported that the Artamonovs had surrendered to Uzdau. An angry Samsonov removed Artamonov from his post and appointed Dushkevich in his place.
In principle, the situation was not yet critical. It could even be turned in your favor. If it had been possible to regroup the forces on the left flank (there were up to a third of the army’s total forces), which were inactive, it would have been possible to defeat Francois’s corps. After this, support the center corps (15 and 13) with the forces of the left flank. It was possible not to risk it at all and withdraw the 15th and 13th corps back.
But Samsonov could not manage his strength correctly. He made the most wrong decision - he went to the front line (to the headquarters of the 15th AK) to deal with the situation, as a result, control of the army was completely lost. This was his last message to front headquarters.
By the evening of the 27th, front headquarters realized that the Germans were not retreating across the Vistula, but were attacking the 2nd Army. The 1st Army receives orders to send cavalry units and establish contact with the 2nd Army. On August 28, units of the 1st Army set out, but time was lost - they did not have time to overcome the gap of 100 km.
Nikolai Nikoloevich Martos.
13 building. Klyuev's corps entered Allenstein. Corps headquarters did not know about the retreat of 6 AK. When aerial reconnaissance reported that troops were coming from the east, they believed that these were units of Blagoveshchensk. Therefore, the corps calmly went to 15 AK, leaving only two battalions in the city. The Russian units were crushed almost instantly, and the townspeople attacked from the rear. Belov's corps continued the pursuit.
Klyuev, finding the Germans in the rear, decided that these were small auxiliary detachments and placed one regiment in the rearguard - the Dorogobuzh 143rd Infantry Regiment (weakened, one of its battalions was left in Allenstein). Moreover, without artillery and with a limited supply of ammunition. Regimental commander Vladimir Kabanov took a position between the lakes and repelled attacks from the enemy division. It helped that the Germans could not bypass the regiment. The cartridges soon ran out, the Germans were driven back by bayonet attacks. Kabanov died, the battalions were bleeding, but they held out until nightfall. At night, the remnants of the regiment withdrew, taking the commander's body.
15 and 13 buildings. On August 28, the Russian corps repelled German attacks. A particularly fierce battle took place near the positions of the 13th AK brigade - near Hochstein, which Klyuev sent first to help. The Narva 3rd Infantry Regiment and the Koporye 4th Infantry Regiment were semi-surrounded, but stood strong, pushing back the Germans over and over again. The corps' ammunition had come to an end, and it was no longer possible to continue the battle.
Klyuev’s corps reached Hochstein that day, but the commander did not dare to attack without the order of the army commander and missed the opportunity to inflict a strong blow on the Germans. Only one regiment (the Nevsky 1st Infantry Regiment) was sent forward, and its sudden attack put an entire German division to flight. But the success was not developed; Klyuev ordered a retreat.
Samsonov arrived in the evening. After discussing the situation, we realized that we had to leave. A “sliding shield” plan was developed: first the convoys departed, then the formations of 13 AK, then 15 AK, and last came units of 23 AK. They planned to retreat to Neidenburg. Martos was entrusted with equipping the positions at Neidenburg, removing the most combative commander from the front line - he was captured by the German cavalry that went to the rear. Samsonov also went to the rear; his illness worsened. As a result, the retreating troops were virtually beheaded. Klyuev, who was assigned to lead the retreat, was unable to organize it. The parts came off on their own.
True, the Germans in the center were unable to organize pursuit. So, advancing behind Martos’ corps, at night they ran into an ambush organized by the Aleksopol 31st Infantry Regiment and the Kremenchug 32nd Infantry Regiment. The enemy column was shot. Hindenburg, having learned about the movement of the 1st Army, gave the order to the corps of Belov and Mackensen to turn around. But Mackensen did not comply, angry with conflicting instructions, and led the corps towards Francois, who, seeing that he was not in danger, resumed the offensive. The center of the 2nd Russian Army was surrounded.
Destruction
On August 29, Zhilinsky was informed about the withdrawal of part of the headquarters of the 2nd Army and he decided that the army was retreating, so there was no need for the movement of units of the 1st Army. Rennenkampf is ordered to stop the movement. But he refuses, giving his troops the order to go to the aid of the 2nd Army.
The Russian rearguard - the Kashira 144th Infantry Regiment of Kakhovsky and units of the Narva 3rd Infantry Regiment of the 13th AK - took the battle at Hochstein. Against 16 Russian guns there were 86 German ones, the regiment fought for up to 14 hours in complete encirclement. Regimental commander Kakhovsky fell in hand-to-hand combat near the regiment's banner. The remnants of the regiment fought until the evening. The Sofia 2nd Infantry Regiment, which covered the retreat of 13 AK, fought until 15:00, then retreated.
Although in general there was no dense environment - outposts, patrols, armored vehicles on the roads. With good organization, it was possible to break through with a concentrated strike. But at night the retreating mingled, the people were tired - several days of fighting, constant marches, food ran out, ammunition was running out. There was no high command. Klyuev decided to surrender - part of the corps followed him, the majority refused and broke through to their own. Martos ran into the Germans and was captured. Samsonov tried to command the retreating, then fell into prostration, he was tormented by asthma and conscience. With a small group, he almost escaped the encirclement, but his conscience finished him off: “The king trusted me. How will I meet him after such a defeat? He shot himself. And a few hours later his companions came out to their own.
Main causes of defeat
Major miscalculations and command errors. First of all, the commander of the North-Western Front, Zhilinsky, his headquarters, Samsonov and the headquarters of the 2nd Army. Mistakes and incompetence of the majority of corps commanders of the 2nd Army.
Operational actions of the German command, well-organized reconnaissance, speed of movement of troops (developed road infrastructure of the country).
Results
The Germans inflated the scale of the victory. They talked about 70-90 thousand prisoners, 20 thousand killed, 300-600 captured guns. In reality, 5 incomplete divisions were surrounded - at the start of the offensive they numbered up to 80 thousand people and 200 guns. Up to 6 thousand people died in the battles, about 20 thousand more were wounded, more than 20 thousand were able to break through or escape the encirclement. Therefore, up to 50 thousand people were captured, along with the wounded. And less than 200 guns were captured - some were damaged in battle, some were destroyed by artillerymen.
The German 8th Army also suffered serious losses: up to 30 thousand killed and wounded. 4 infantry, 1 landwehr divisions, 2 landwehr brigades were defeated or severely bled out.
The Germans managed to prevent the fall of East Prussia and defeat 2.5 corps. But this success was achieved at the expense of strategic defeat on the Western Front.
Contrary to German propaganda, the Russian 2nd Army was not completely defeated and destroyed. Most of it simply retreated. The army was led by an energetic and experienced military officer - S. M. Sheideman. He quickly brought the army into order, and already at the beginning of September it was actively fighting.
As a result of the investigation, Zhilinsky’s attempt to shift the blame onto Rennenkampf failed. Zhilinsky and Artamonov were removed from their posts. Kondratovich, Blagoveshchensky. The actions of the commanders and soldiers of the 15th Corps Martos and Divisional Commander Mingin (2nd Infantry), who “fought like heroes, valiantly and steadfastly withstood the fire and onslaught of superior enemy forces”, retreated only after their reserves were completely depleted.
Rennenkampf and his generals were shocked by the Battle of Gumbinnen. They felt what seemed like the death grip of a terrible enemy squeezing them. Suddenly, for no apparent reason, the grip loosened. The Germans retreated; they completely disappeared; they left the battlefield, leaving behind the dead and wounded. Where did they go? This could become clear later. Why did they leave? It was a mystery. But there is one explanation, an explanation that panders to the feelings of the Russians and feeds their deepest hopes. The resistance and heavy losses of Mackensen's corps threw the German army into panic. They knew they were broken. They accepted the fact that they were absolutely outnumbered by mighty Russia. They retreated in haste, conserving their strength to fight deep within their own country.
EAST PRUSSIAN OPERATION, 1914
The 1914 campaign on the Russian front opened with the East Prussian operation. The need for it was motivated by the desire “to support the French in view of the main German attack being prepared against them.” The troops were tasked with defeating the enemy and capturing East Prussia in order to create an advantageous position for the development of further operations to invade Germany. The 1st Army was supposed to advance bypassing the Masurian Lakes from the north, cutting off the Germans from Konigsberg (now Kaliningrad). The 2nd Army had to conduct an offensive bypassing the lakes from the west, preventing the withdrawal of German divisions beyond the Vistula. The general idea of the operation was to cover the German group from both flanks.
The Russians had some superiority over the enemy. The Northwestern Front consisted of 17.5 infantry and 8.5 cavalry divisions, 1,104 guns, and 54 aircraft. The German 8th Army consisted of 15 infantry and one cavalry division, 1044 guns, 56 aircraft, 2 airships. True, the Germans had more powerful artillery. They had 156 heavy guns, while the Russians had only 24. However, in general, the balance of forces ensured the fulfillment of the General Headquarters' plan. It made it possible to defeat the German 8th Army. The form of operational maneuver chosen by the Russian command was fraught with a great threat to the enemy. She put him under double attack. The execution of the maneuver was complicated by the fact that the Russian armies had to operate along external operational directions, separated from one another by the Masurian Lakes region. Under these conditions, the reliability of troop leadership and, above all, the organization of interaction between both armies acquired particular importance.
The operation began on August 4 (17) with the offensive of the 1st (Neman) Army. Having crossed the state border, its formations entered the territory of East Prussia. The first clash with the enemy took place at Stallupepen (now Nesterov). Russian troops defeated the 1st Army Corps of General G. Francois and forced him to retreat to the river. Angerap.
The German command decided, taking cover from the 2nd Army of General A.V. Samsonov, move the main forces against the 1st Army of General P.K. Rennenkampf. General M. Prittwitz intended to defeat the Russians with a double blow: from the north with the 1st Corps of Francois and from the south with the 17th Corps of A. Mackensen. In the direction of Goldap, auxiliary actions were envisaged by G. Belov’s 1st Reserve Corps.
On August 7 (20), one of the largest battles of the world war began in the area of Gumbinnen (now Gusev). At first the Germans were successful. Then Russian counterattacks put parts of the 1st Army Corps to flight. Mackensen's 17th Corps, having come under severe artillery and machine-gun fire from the Russians and having suffered enormous damage, retreated in panic. Here is what German authors write about this: “The combination of unfortunate circumstances led to the fact that superbly trained troops, who later showed themselves worthy everywhere, lost their self-control at the first clash with the enemy. The hull was seriously damaged. In the infantry alone, losses reached 8,000 people in round figures - a third of all available forces, with 200 officers killed and wounded." The Russians took about 1,000 prisoners and captured 12 guns.
The situation allowed the Russian command to inflict a major defeat on the 8th German Army. But the favorable moment was missed. Instead of organizing the pursuit of the German troops defeated in the Battle of Gumbinnen-Goldap, General Rennenkampf was inactive. By his order, the troops were on rest for two days, putting themselves in order. Only on August 10 (23) did they begin to slowly advance west of the river. Angerap, meeting almost no resistance. The army command and headquarters did not have reliable information about the enemy. The considerations of the Russian command did not at all correspond to the true state of affairs. All calculations were based on an incorrect assessment of the situation. It was believed that the enemy had been defeated and was retreating partly to Koenigsberg, and partly to the line of the river. Vistula. The operation was considered essentially completed. They hoped to soon transfer troops from East Prussia to another direction. Headquarters worked energetically on a plan for an offensive from Warsaw to Poznan.
In turn, the initial decision of the command of the 8th German Army to abandon East Prussia did not meet with approval at headquarters. The fate of General Prittwitz and his chief of staff, General Waldersee, was sealed. On August 8 (21), they were removed from their posts. Instead of them, the following were appointed: army commander - General P. Hindenburg, chief of staff - General E. Ludendorff, who took up their duties on August 11 (24).
On August 13 (26), the German command, having completed the regrouping of its troops, began to implement the plan. On this day, the 6th Russian Corps was forced to retreat from Bischofsburg. The enemy's attempt to push back the troops of the left wing of the 2nd Army was unsuccessful. The next day, the Germans transmitted a false order to withdraw on behalf of the commander of the 1st Army Corps. This led to the retreat of the corps. As a result of the fighting on August 13 (26) and August 14 (27), the position of Samsonov’s 2nd Army worsened. The flanks of the group of central buildings were open.
The command of the Northwestern Front did not take all measures to prevent the defeat of the 2nd Army. It didn't know the situation well. The real intentions of the enemy became known only on the evening of August 14 (27). On the night of August 15 (28), Oranovsky telegraphed Samsonov that the commander-in-chief ordered “to withdraw the corps of the 2nd Army to the Ortelsburg-Mlawa line, where they will start organizing the army.” However, the order did not reach the troops. On the morning of August 16 (29), the 1st and 20th Army and 1st Reserve German Corps launched an offensive, enveloping the central corps of the 2nd Army on three sides. The 17th German Corps did not receive an order to concentrate at Allenstein and continued to operate in a southwestern direction towards Passenheim. In his movement, he entered the Russian retreat route. An encirclement ring was closed around the 13th and 15th corps. In total, about 30 thousand people and 200 guns were surrounded in the Komusinsky forest area. On the night of August 17 (30), Samsonov committed suicide at the Carolinghof farm (near Wielenberg). Having assumed command of the army, General N.A. Klyuev did not use all the opportunities to break through the encircled corps. The order to surrender was given. Some unit commanders rejected this decision and fought their troops out of the encirclement.
GENERAL SAMSONOV
The army headquarters, led by Samsonov, breaking out of the encirclement, moved in the direction of Yanov. Alexander Vasilyevich was in a difficult moral state. According to the testimony of the chief of staff, General Postovsky, Samsonov said more than once on the 15th and 16th that his life as a military leader was over. After a short night halt in the forest on August 17, when the headquarters officers moved on on foot, Alexander Vasilyevich quietly went deep into the forest, and his shot was heard there...
Despite the search, his body was never found, and besides, it was necessary to escape persecution. However, there is another version of Samsonov’s death. According to one of the officers leaving the encirclement, he last saw his commander at the edge of the forest, bending over a map. “Suddenly a huge column of smoke enveloped our headquarters. One of the shells hit a tree trunk, exploded and killed the general on the spot...” The fate of Samsonov’s army was tragic, few units and groups managed to escape from the encirclement, losses amounted to tens of thousands killed, wounded and prisoners. One of the culprits of the incident, front commander Zhilinsky, reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief: “If the behavior and orders of General Samsonov, as a commander, deserve severe condemnation, then his behavior as a warrior was worthy; He personally led the battle under fire and, not wanting to survive the defeat, committed suicide.” Two weeks later, the high command that planned the East Prussian operation removed Zhilinsky from his post. However, a strategic result was achieved: the Germans transferred part of their forces to East Prussia, weakening their onslaught on France. The sacrificial fate of General Samsonov and the salvation of France turned out to be closely linked.
The widow of the deceased general, left with a 15-year-old son and 12-year-old daughter, was allocated by the tsar a pension in the amount of 10,645 rubles per year. In the fall of 1915, Ekaterina Aleksandrovna Samsonova, as a sister of mercy, participated in the inspection of camps for Russian prisoners of war in East Germany, and she managed to find the burial place of her husband. She identified him by the locket in which he kept tiny photographs of herself and her children. She transported his remains to Russia, to her native village of Akimovka, where she first met Alexander Vasilyevich, and buried him in the graveyard of the Akimov Church.
An unfortunate fate awaited the second main participant in the East Prussian operation - General Rannenkampf. After October 1917, the already old general lived in Taganrog under a different name. Representatives of the Soviet government identified him and, recalling his participation in the massacre of Siberian peasants in 1905, shot him.
Chronos: Samsonov Alexander Vasilievich
SOLVED IN THE EAST
The consequences of the Battle of Gumbinen for the Russian Northwestern Front generally resulted in Samsonov’s army being left to its own fate. But this battle had a very important influence on the entire course of the campaign. Firstly, it brought significant assistance to the French by forcing the Germans to withdraw 2 corps and 1 cavalry from the French front at the most decisive moment. division and urgently send them to the Russian Front. These hulls were also removed from the strike group. Secondly, it pointed out to the Germans the possibility for the Russians, while conducting an offensive operation against the Austrians, to conduct the same operations on a larger scale against East Prussia, which aroused in the Germans a natural desire to better secure their Eastern Front, which is why some of the new formations were sent there . Finally, thirdly, a new command was appointed to the Eastern Front (Hindenburg and Ludendorff), which subsequently, both by its nature and the importance acquired after the victories, put great pressure on the German Headquarters in the sense of shifting the center of gravity of the war from the Western to the Eastern Front.
ACT OF INVESTIGATION
about the murder of cavalry general Pavel Karlovich Rennenkampf by the Bolsheviks
The former commander of the 1st Army in the first period of the Russian-German War, the leader of the campaigns in East Prussia, cavalry general Rennenkampf, lived in Taganrog at the beginning of 1918 in retirement, far from military and political activities. On January 20, 1918, after the Bolsheviks seized power, he immediately had to go illegal, and using his passport, under the name of the Greek citizen Mansoudaki, he moved into the apartment of one worker, the Greek Langusen, at Kommercheskiy Lane, building No. 1, and hid there.
However, the Bolsheviks put him under surveillance, and on the night of March 3, General Rennenkampf was arrested and placed under arrest at the headquarters of the Taganrog military commissar Rodionov.
While General Rennekampf was in custody, the Bolsheviks offered him three times to take command of their army, but he always categorically refused this offer and once told them: “I am old, I have little time left to live, in order to save my life I will not become a traitor against my own people.” will not go. Give me a well-armed army, and I will go against the Germans, but you don’t have an army; leading this army would mean leading people to slaughter; I will not take this responsibility upon myself.”
Still, the Bolsheviks did not lose hope and tried to attract the general to their side, but soon they had to finally become convinced of the futility of their attempts.
In the last days of March, during one of the visits to the city of Taganrog by the Bolshevik “chief-in-chief” of the Southern Front, Antonov-Ovseenko, the latter, when asked by Rodionov what he should do with General Rennenkampf, expressed surprise that he was still alive and ordered him to be shot...
CITY OF GUSEV
The 564th Infantry Regiment of the 130th Infantry Division, commanded by Guard Colonel Penov, was advancing on the Gross Beitchen stronghold. The Nazis fought desperately here. Enemy machine gunners launched a counterattack several times. They climbed out of the ruins of houses, jumped out of courtyards and basements. From the labyrinth of narrow alleys and streets, the long trunks of Ferdinands and Tigers suddenly protruded.
Soon the commander of the 6th company of this regiment was seriously wounded. Then the deputy commander of the 2nd battalion for political affairs of the guard, Captain S.I. Gusev took command of the company.
When repelling another enemy counterattack, Gusev raised his company to attack. Other units of the regiment also rose behind the 6th company.
The strong point was taken, and the regiment began fighting directly on the approaches to Gumbinnen.
Here, in one of the bayonet attacks, Gusev died.
On the bank of a quiet river, in the very center of the city of Gusev, a marble obelisk now stands with a laconic inscription: “Hero of the Soviet Union Sergei Ivanovich Gusev.” The Motherland named the city of Gumbinnen after this man.
The Kaliningrad region, formerly East Prussia, is unique in that it is the only region in Russia on whose territory battles of the First World War took place (
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