In September 1942, troops of the Neva operational group of the Leningrad Front again captured a bridgehead on the left bank of the Neva. The Nevsky “patch”, held by the Red Army from the autumn of 1941 to the spring of 1942, was revived. True, in conditions when the operation to break the blockade failed, it was already pointless to attack from it. But the Soviet command had no intention of leaving the bridgehead. And for the Germans, he became a source of constant anxiety, which could not be tolerated.
Nevsky patch
The newly formed bridgehead, for the capture of which the Red Army soldiers paid a very high price with their own blood, was held for a long time by relatively small Soviet units. At first it was a combined company of the 70th Infantry Division of Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General A.A. Krasnov (the division soon received the Guards rank and became the 45th Guards). Later, the guardsmen were replaced by a company from the 46th Infantry Division of E.V. Kozik. This formation, previously known as the 1st Rifle Division of the NKVD, was a veteran of the battles on the right bank of the Neva. Initially, its core consisted of border troops.
Scheme from the history of the 83rd Jaeger Regiment of the 28th Jaeger Division. The situation on the bridgehead at the time of the withdrawal of the main part of the troops of the Neva operational group from the left bank
The enemy initially considered the new bridgehead to be practically eliminated. It turned out that on October 8, the Soviet command was unable to secretly withdraw troops from the bridgehead, and the Germans quickly occupied most of the coast. On “their” bank they found only a small group of Red Army soldiers, which they were supposed to finally deal with on October 10, when the left bank of the Neva was occupied by units of the 170th Infantry Division. This was not possible, and the fighting continued on the 11th. On this day, according to German reports, a grenade battle took place with Red Army soldiers holed up on a steep bank. The next day, there were no further attempts by the Germans to dislodge the Soviet fighters from the left bank. It was at this time that the combined company of the 70th division received a shift: fighters of the 340th rifle regiment of the 46th rifle division came to the left bank of the Neva.
The regiment was commanded by I. N. Fadeev. It was one of his companies that had to defend the patch remaining in the hands of Soviet soldiers and act against the German 170th Infantry Division.
Commander of the 340th Infantry Regiment I. N. Fadeev
In the meantime, some organizational changes were taking place: the Neva Operational Group turned into the 67th Army. The Germans, for their part, also made a small regrouping, and now the bank of the Neva was in the zone of responsibility of the XXX Army Corps. However, not for long: after some time, the headquarters of another “Crimean” corps became responsible for the defense of the left bank of the river. This was the LIV Corps, also formerly part of the 11th Army.
It was then, in November 1942, that the Germans attempted to destroy the remaining bridgehead. They were not at all happy with this “purulent abscess” on the banks of the Neva. By the way, the expression “abscess” as a designation of the Soviet bridgehead is periodically found even in German documents.
Report card from the headquarters of the German XXX Army Corps. Soviet bridgehead marked in red
On November 6, the commander of the 18th Army, Georg von Lindemann, undertook a trip to the headquarters of the LIV Corps. Shortly before this, the company of the 340th Infantry Regiment somewhat expanded the area it occupied on the left bank. Lindemann demanded that the Soviet bridgehead on the left bank of the Neva be eliminated. The operation was to be carried out by the 170th Infantry Division. The commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division was entrusted with advising its leadership on the issue of conducting battles on the banks of the Neva.
Interestingly, at the army-corps level this operation was called "Doennerschlag" ("Roll of Thunder"), and at the division level the operation was called "Wespenest" ("Hornet's Nest"). After it was carried out, the Soviet bridgehead on the Neva was supposed to cease to exist.
Commander of the 46th Infantry Division E.V. Kozik
It cannot be said that this episode of the defense of the bridgehead on the Neva was completely forgotten in Soviet times - it, in particular, is reflected in the memoirs of the commander of the 46th Infantry Division E.V. Kozik. However, in his presentation he made several inaccuracies. One of them was that Kozik mixed up the events of several days in November 1942. The second inaccuracy concerns who actually attacked the bridgehead. Kozik claims that they were SS men from the Polizei division. However, such a mistake is a very common occurrence in Soviet post-war historical literature. Of course, in reality there were no SS men here.
Who exactly attacked the bridgehead and what ultimately came of it?
Strengths of the parties
Apparently, the decision to liquidate the Soviet bridgehead was finally made on November 9, 1942. This was ordered to be done, as mentioned above, by the units of the 170th Infantry Division of Major General Erwin Sander. The division suffered heavy losses and had the status of “fully capable of defense.” The division remained with 8 infantry battalions consisting of three grenadier regiments.
Commander of the 170th Infantry Division Erwin Sander
On November 12, an order was issued to the division, according to which the start of Operation Hornet's Nest was scheduled for the evening of November 19. The following forces were involved to carry out the plan. The main blow was to be delivered by two grenadier regiments: the 391st and 399th. Both regiments had three battalions. The stronger of them was the 391st Grenadier, which as of November 16 numbered up to 800 combat personnel. The 399th regiment was weaker; one of its battalions did not even reach 200 people in combat strength. It was assumed that the assault groups of units of these regiments shouted “Hurra!” attack already at dusk.
The 170th Division's artillery was to be reinforced with two additional battalions of 15 cm howitzers and a battery of rocket launchers. The 301st tank battalion with radio-controlled vehicles was also supposed to support the units of the 170th division. Even during the preparation of the operation, they tried to use them to undermine Soviet fortifications on the bridgehead, but due to technical malfunctions, this attempt, made on November 16, failed. The explosion killed two and wounded four more soldiers of the German tank battalion. Most likely this was due to a short circuit in the wire.
Sd.Kfz. 301 from the composition 301st Tank Battalion
It should be honestly mentioned that the situation for the Soviet fighters on the bridgehead was sharply complicated due to the presence of defectors. The last of them fell to the Germans on November 16. These people told quite a lot, and the records of their interrogations were preserved in the documents of the 170th Infantry Division.
As for the exact data on the size of the reinforced company of the 340th Infantry Regiment, they are, unfortunately, not available. It is known that the 340th Infantry Regiment itself was reinforced with one machine-gun and artillery battalion. For artillery support of the infantry, he was assigned one artillery and one howitzer regiment, a mortar regiment and an artillery battalion of the 11th Infantry Brigade.
Found a scythe on a stone
As planned, the German operation began on November 19th. From the report of the 170th division to the corps, the course of the battle is not entirely clear. But the surviving regimental reports make it clear that the Soviet company offered quite strong resistance to the Germans. However, the forces turned out to be too unequal: the Germans pushed back the defenders of the bridgehead, and their connection with the left bank was interrupted for some time.
On the morning of November 20, Sander's division reported to the corps that the operation was progressing according to plan. By 5 o'clock in the morning, a significant part of the coast was cleared of Red Army soldiers, most of them were destroyed. Some fighters tried to swim across the Neva. In the middle of the day, the division reported to corps headquarters that it had captured almost the entire bridgehead, and the Russians were holding only a section of the steep bank. According to the report, some of the dugouts were blown up, but individual Russian soldiers still resisted in the bridgehead.
The battle continued on the bridgehead until the end of the day. The Germans reported that they tried to clear the remaining part of it, but due to strong Soviet fire from the right bank, the process was delayed. According to Soviet data, during the day they even managed to transfer small reinforcements to the left bank (according to German documents, only one boat, containing 10 people, was able to get from the right bank of the Neva to the left).
And the very next morning, November 21, an unpleasant surprise awaited the Germans. During the night, the Soviet detachment received significant reinforcements. As it turned out, the remnants of the company managed to hold a narrow section of the shore; only about 100 meters separated them from the water’s edge, and the width of this patch was up to 500 meters. The Soviet artillery fired barrage quite accurately and aimed well at the bridgehead itself.
Scheme of the expected movement of part of the assault groups during the attack on the bridgehead. The line of barbed wire at the leading edge of the bridgehead is shown in red.
Thanks to the strengthening of the detachment on the left bank, its commander was even able to launch counterattacks. German documents mention that the northern flank of the 399th was attacked. The size of the counterattacking group was estimated at 50 people, and the battle with them was fought at the closest range. The German report again mentions a grenade battle, during which the counterattack was repulsed. All that remained was to admit that the “cleansing” of the bridgehead was not successful.
By the evening of November 21, Soviet artillery fire forced the German units on the northern flank of the 399th Grenadier Regiment to retreat. This happened after the machine guns failed, and the number of two companies located there was reduced to several dozen people. All their commanders were incapacitated. Following the retreating Germans, Soviet soldiers rushed, and the remnants of two companies retreated to their original positions from which the German operation began.
The Germans noted that the Soviet artillery fired very intensely. In just three morning hours on November 21, she fired at least 4,000–5,000 shots. Indeed, the commander of the 46th Infantry Division, Kozik, later recalled that the bridgehead was supported by up to 150 artillery barrels. If the German assessment is correct, then in this battle the Soviet artillery was able to compete with the German artillery not only in ammunition consumption, but also in fire efficiency. Over two days, November 20 and 21, the Germans lost 51 people killed, 274 wounded and another 27 missing. At the same time, the enemy took 39 prisoners.
Remote controlled car Sd.Kfz. 301
To clarify the current situation on the ground and obtain first-hand information, the commander of the 18th Army arrived at the headquarters of the 170th Infantry Division on November 22. Sander directly told Lindemann that both regiments of the division had retreated to their original positions due to heavy enemy fire. However, he immediately stated that the operation could be repeated at any time. True, in the end the German command refused to continue the offensive on the small Soviet bridgehead. The operation failed.
By the way, it was quite reminiscent of the operation of the 1st Infantry Division carried out in April 1942. However, then, in April, the Germans quickly enough, although with heavy losses, nevertheless liquidated the Soviet bridgehead. Moreover, it was then occupied not by one reinforced company, but by most of the 330th Infantry Regiment of the 86th Infantry Division. The Soviet side has drawn conclusions over the past time. The surviving soldiers of the garrison on the left bank of the Neva, occupying an area of approximately 1000 meters along the front and 350 meters in depth, were promptly replaced.
Operation Hornet's Nest also showed that the German troops near Leningrad were gradually losing personnel. Their actions were increasingly affected by the heavy losses they had previously suffered.
As for the remote-controlled vehicles of the 301st Tank Battalion, the effect of their actions turned out to be insignificant. The battalion lost some of its vehicles because they simply got stuck while moving towards the target.
Excerpt from the combat log of the 340th Infantry Regiment. The situation on the banks of the Neva on January 1, 1943
A small Soviet bridgehead on the left bank of the Neva continued to exist until January 1943. Unfortunately, it was not possible to use it as a springboard to rush towards the troops of the Volkhov Front during Operation Iskra. After the failure in the attempt to liquidate the bridgehead, the German command paid close attention to the defense of the Neva bank in this area. However, it was precisely because of this that the bridgehead played its role, creating a false impression among the enemy about the main attack of the Leningrad Front troops being prepared here.
The direct organizer of the defense of the Soviet bridgehead also deserves mention. The battalion commander of the 340th Infantry Regiment, Grigory Egorovich Fefelov, judging by the data from the “Feat of the People” database, was awarded twice during the Great Patriotic War. And the second time - with the Order of the Red Banner, in accordance with the order for the troops of the Leningrad Front of January 30, 1943. And he received this award precisely for organizing the defense of the left bank bridgehead.
Sources and literature:
- Documents of the 170th Infantry Division, LIV Army Corps, and 18th Army from the NARA collection.
- Kozik E.V. The enemy did not pass // Nevsky Piglet. Memoirs of participants in the battles near Nevskaya Dubrovka in 1941–1943. L., 1977. pp. 290–300.
Nevsky Piglet is the conventional name of a bridgehead on the left (eastern) bank of the Neva opposite Nevskaya Dubrovka, captured and held by Soviet troops of the Leningrad Front from 09/19/1941 to 04/29/1942 and from 09/26/1942 to 02/17/1943 during the defense of Leningrad.
From this bridgehead, Soviet troops repeatedly tried to launch an offensive on Mgu and Sinyavino to meet the troops striking from the east and thereby break the blockade of Leningrad. All attempts to expand the bridgehead and develop the offensive inevitably ended in failure.
The obvious military-tactical futility of holding the Nevsky patch and the huge losses in manpower did not force the Soviet military leadership to abandon such a bloody defense, since for the command this bridgehead had symbolic significance as the fact of the presence of Soviet troops on the eastern bank occupied by German troops. The losses of their soldiers in the Red Army were traditionally taken into account little and such a mind-boggling figure - 250,000 dead Soviet troops on an area of about 2 sq. km in 11 and a half months, apparently did not greatly impress the front command and the Supreme High Command Headquarters.
The Nevsky “piglet” bridgehead was located on the left bank of the Neva near the village of Dubrovka, approximately 12 kilometers downstream of the river from Lake Ladoga. At this point, the Neva forms a bend and is only 270-350 m wide and has fairly flat banks. Directly opposite the Nevsky “patch” there was a difficult terrain with numerous quarries, covered with bushes and forest.
The terrain features in the bridgehead area most directly influenced the course of hostilities. On the one hand, the presence of the Petrokrepost-Nevskaya Dubrovka railway line on the right bank of the Neva and the relatively small width of the river in the Dubrovka area allowed the Soviet command to quickly deliver reinforcements to this area and transport them to the left bank. On the other hand, because of the Neva bend, the enemy could fire from strongholds at the territory of the Nevsky “patch” and the crossings across the Neva from all sides. Every day, up to 50,000 shells, mines and aerial bombs fell on the defenders of the “patch”. Losses of rifle units reached 95% of the original strength. Moreover, most of the total losses were irrevocable losses, since the evacuation of the wounded to the right bank was difficult.
The crossing from one bank to the other until mid-November was carried out mainly at night, and after the formation of a strong ice cover on the Neva - at dusk or even during the day, since at night there was a very high risk of falling into an ice hole and drowning.
The dead, with very rare exceptions, were buried right on the bridgehead in craters and trenches. Some found themselves buried twice or three times - explosions of shells and mines raised the remains from the graves, and then the corpses were covered with earth again.
Yu. R. Poresh, veteran of the 115th Infantry Division, participant in the battles on the Nevsky Patch in November 1941: “By the time our company landed, all the trenches and communication passages were filled with frozen corpses. They lay across the entire area of the “patch”, where they were overtaken by a bullet or shrapnel. It’s hard to remember this, but it was like this: the shelter in which I and my two comrades happened to be accommodated was instead covered with frozen corpses, the walls were partially lined with corpses, firing loops were equipped between the corpses laid along the trenches instead of parapets. The entire area of the patch was a cemetery of unburied soldiers and officers. Not a single tree or bush, not a single brick on a brick - everything was demolished by fire... All this against the backdrop of the constant roar of our and German cannonade, the specific smell of mine powder, the disgusting sound of German attack aircraft, the groan of the wounded, the swearing of the living, covering the Germans, the war and this perishing patch, and sometimes our artillerymen, who were hitting their positions.”
At the end of April 1942, ice drift began on the Neva, which significantly complicated the connection of the “patch” garrison with the main forces of the Neva operational group on the right bank. The German command decided to take advantage of this and liquidate the bridgehead. In total, on the left bank of the Neva in the Shlisselburg-Ivanovskoye sector, the Germans had forces of 9-10 battalions numbering about 5,200 people.
At that time, the defense on the “patch” was held by the 330th Regiment of about 1000 people. The regiment occupied a defensive position on a front of 4 kilometers - from the ravine north of Arbuzov to the outskirts of the 1st Gorodok. The depth of the bridgehead was 500-800 meters on the right flank and in the center, and on the left flank - only 50-70 meters.
On the evening of April 24, after artillery barrage, German troops launched a surprise attack on the left flank of the Soviet defense on the bridgehead. Units of the 43rd and 1st regiments of the 1st German Infantry Division, after a fierce battle, reached the Neva and cut off the 2nd battalion from the main forces of the 330th regiment. In the morning, new attacks followed, as a result of which the enemy managed to push the 3rd battalion back 100-150 meters. All attempts by the bridgehead garrison to restore the situation on their own were unsuccessful.
On April 25-26, 250 reinforcements were transported to the bridgehead. On the afternoon of April 27, the Germans, striking from the north and south in converging directions, went on the offensive. Despite the desperate resistance of the defenders, after two hours of fierce battle, most of the bridgehead was in the hands of the Germans. At the end of April 27, the last radiogram was transmitted from the bridgehead - communication with the 330th regiment was interrupted. The chief of staff of the regiment, Major A.M. Sokolov, was sent to the right bank with a report, who, being wounded three times, still managed to swim to the opposite bank and talk about the critical situation of the defenders of the bridgehead. Further resistance was of a focal nature. Attempts by units of the 284th Regiment to cross the Neva and counterattack the enemy were unsuccessful.
At the beginning of September, it was decided to force the Neva Operational Group to cross the Neva in the Annenskoye - 1st Gorodok section, and then advance towards Sinyavino. On September 10, all attempts to cross the Neva failed, and on September 11, several more groups managed to cross the river, but were unable to gain a foothold and were knocked out from the left bank by enemy counterattacks. 12-th of September The Supreme Command headquarters ordered the operation to be stopped, “since the Leningrad Front was unable to intelligently organize the crossing of the Neva and, through its actions, stupidly killed a large number of commanders and soldiers” .
On September 26, Soviet troops began a new crossing of the Neva and managed to gain a foothold on the left bank in several places, but German troops managed to eliminate two bridgeheads. Only the “patch” in the Moscow Dubrovka area remained under the control of Soviet units.
On October 5, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered the withdrawal of the main forces of the Neva operational group to the right bank of the Neva due to the operational inexpediency of further holding the bridgehead on the eastern bank.
On January 12, 1943, Operation Iskra began. The 67th Army had to cross the Neva on a wider (13 kilometers) section of the front than in previous operations - from Shlisselburg to the Nevsky “patch” and advance east to connect with the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front.
On the first day of the offensive, the 131st Regiment of the 45th Guards Division, striking directly from the bridgehead, managed to advance only 500-600 meters. All enemy attempts to counterattack were repulsed, but the Soviet units again failed to advance.
On February 13, units of the Soviet army went on the offensive in large forces. The attack was carried out directly from the bridgehead by the 138th Infantry Brigade, which replaced the 46th Division. Pursuing the retreating enemy, by the morning of February 17, the main forces of the 67th Army reached the Nevsky Patch and linked up with the 138th Brigade. Success was achieved thanks to effective artillery support.
The number of dead and wounded Soviet soldiers in the battles for the Nevsky “patch” varies significantly in different sources, but, according to absolutely all estimates, the losses in the battles for the bridgehead were enormous.
In the 1960s, the Pravda newspaper first published the figure of 200,000 soldiers who died on the Nevsky “patch,” which was established for a long time in Russian military-historical literature. In recent years, other estimates have emerged. According to the calculations of the historian G. A. Shigin, Soviet troops in the battles for the bridgehead (only in 1941) lost 64,000-68,000 people killed and wounded, and V. V. Beshanov gives the figures - 140,000 wounded and 250,000 killed.
The dimensions of the Nevsky “patch” were constantly changing: from 4 to 1 kilometer in width and from 800 to 350 meters in depth, sometimes literally within a day.
The losses of German troops in battles in the Nevsky Piglet area are not known for certain. According to rough estimates, they ranged from 10,000 to 40,000 soldiers and officers killed.
As of 2005, there were 16 mass military graves on the territory of the memorial with the remains of 17,607 soldiers and commanders of the Red Army; The names of only 1114 of them have been identified.
Tomorrow, Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit the Nevsky Piglet near the village of Nevskaya Dubrovka in the Leningrad Region and lay flowers at the Rubezhny Stone monument. Here in 1941, his father, Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin, fought and was wounded.
There is an episode in the history of the defense of Leningrad that remained little known for a long time. This is the defense of the Nevsky Piglet. The bridgehead, tiny by military standards, is so abundantly watered with the blood of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, so stuffed with iron that to this day little grows there. And this is not surprising: almost all the time, thousands of shells and bombs rained down on its defenders.
On January 12, 1943, the last offensive began from the Nevsky Piglet with the goal of breaking the blockade of Leningrad. And although all the attacks of the Soviet troops from this bridgehead did not lead to success, they played their role. “From there, Soviet troops repeatedly tried to launch an attack on Moscow State University and Sinyavino to meet the troops striking from the east, and thereby break the blockade of the city,” she told a MIR 24 correspondent. Researcher at the Museum-Reserve “Breaking the Siege of Leningrad” Svetlana Ivanova. – These attempts failed. But the Nevsky patch attracted significant enemy forces, ensuring a successful breakthrough in other sectors of the front.”
“Maybe they won’t kill everyone”
The Nevsky Piglet owes its appearance to the first attempt to break the blockade undertaken by Soviet troops at the end of September 1941. The situation of the besieged city was desperate. To change it, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on September 12 appointed Marshal Georgy Zhukov as commander of the Leningrad Front. Six days later, he gave the order to cross the Neva and strike in the direction of the city of Mga, where the defenders of Leningrad and the “Mainland” were separated by only 12-13 kilometers.
The 115th Infantry Division and the 4th Marine Brigade were given only two days to prepare for the offensive. The haste was justified: the Germans had not yet managed to gain a foothold on the newly occupied lines, and the Soviet troops had a chance to knock them out of there. The very first day of the offensive gave us hope that this would be the case. On the night of September 20, Soviet troops in silence, without any artillery preparation, crossed the Neva opposite the village of Nevskaya Dubrovka, in a place where the river is quite narrow, and managed to knock out German troops with a surprise attack. A bridgehead emerged measuring two kilometers wide and one and a half kilometers deep. It was called the “Nevsky Piglet”.
In the memoirs of many military leaders of that time, one can find the following explanation for this name: they say, on large-scale headquarters maps this bridgehead fit under a five-kopeck coin. But most likely, this is a literary exaggeration: small areas of fierce defense in the Red Army were called “piglets” both before and after that. The word “piglet” itself has long meant a small piece of land – “the size of a penny.”
The German defense turned out to be stronger than the Soviet headquarters believed. It was not possible to develop the offensive launched on September 20. Moreover, by counterattacking, the Germans forced our troops to retreat, and the size of the Nevsky patch was reduced: two kilometers along the front and no more than 800 meters in depth. So everything froze: the German troops did not have enough strength to throw the enemy into the Neva, and ours did not have enough strength to accumulate forces and attack.
Exactly a month later, on October 20, the second offensive began with the goal of breaking the blockade of Leningrad - and again the Nevsky Patch was assigned the role of the main bridgehead. But even here, success was not achieved: over the past days, the Germans managed to strengthen their defenses. Now the patch was surrounded by rows of barbed wire, minefields and a large amount of artillery, which shot not only every meter of Soviet positions, but also all eight crossings organized across the Neva opposite the bridgehead.
This is how General Semyon Borshchev recalled this in his memoirs “From the Neva to the Elbe”: “Food was delivered to the “patch” from the right bank in thermoses, while many service platoon soldiers and petty officers died. It also happened that they came to us wounded, with thermoses shot through. Often people in the “patch” were left without food for days. And it happened that a fighter had just received the long-awaited blockade ration in his bowler and barely had time to bring the spoon to his mouth before the enemy opened fire. And now the pot is lying to the side - its owner no longer needs it... Following the order of the army commander, we transported 18 camp kitchens to the “patch”. Within two days they were all destroyed by enemy shells and mines. Service platoon soldiers crossed to the left bank and back many times a day under heavy fire. Perhaps, not everyone will be killed and not all thermoses will be punctured by shrapnel... And it’s strange, over the years I am more and more amazed at how it was possible to deliver ammunition, food, newspapers, letters to the Nevsky Piglet and find time to read the newspaper ourselves, write a response to news from home. No one was surprised at this then. And on the Nevsky Patch, the most scorched of all the small coastal bridgeheads of the last war, everyday life took shape.”
According to modern researchers and employees of the “Breakthrough the Siege of Leningrad” museum-reserve, it happened that people even fell in love there!
"Driven Hunt"
After waiting a week, the Soviet command concentrated its forces and managed to transport even heavy KV tanks to the Nevsky Patch. A new offensive began, but it also ended in failure. Nevertheless, the Headquarters demanded a breakthrough. The attacks on the Nevsky patch continued until December 27, but they failed to expand it, much less break through the defenses of the German troops.
After this, there was a calm on the patch. It was even possible to evacuate tanks that needed to be restored from there across the ice. A significant part of the troops were also pulled away from the patch. The next offensive began near Volkhov, and all the most combat-ready units were gathered there. Very quickly, German intelligence found out that only one 330th regiment, which was also badly battered in battle, was left to defend the Nevsky Patch. The German command began preparing an operation to destroy the bridgehead. The operation was called “Drueckjagd” (“Driven Hunt”). Having created a five-fold superiority in strength, German troops went on the offensive on April 24, 1942.
The success of the offensive was determined not only by the difference in the number of troops, but also by the fact that the ice drift that began on the Neva made it almost impossible to transfer reserves to the defenders of the Nevsky patch. And only a few managed to cross the ice drift back. In total, only 123 soldiers reached the right bank. Among them was the three-time wounded chief of staff of the 330th regiment, Alexander Sokolov, who swam across the icy river. He was a master of sports in swimming and champion of the Volga Military District. (By the way, it was he who, in the spring of 1990, showed the search engines where the last command post of the regiment was located, thanks to which the remains of its defenders were found).
By April 29, 1942, the bridgehead as such ceased to exist, although some of its defenders continued to resist for several more days. Even the enemies appreciated this desperate but courageous resistance. The fate of the commander of the 330th regiment, Major Sergei Blokhin, is surprising. On April 29, 1942, seriously wounded in the neck and both legs, he was shell-shocked. For four days he lay on the battlefield. In an unconscious state, he was captured and sent to a camp in Gatchina. Perhaps as a sign of respect for his courage, he was not “disused.” After eight days in the camp, Russian prisoners of war doctors amputated both of his legs. A month later, Blokhin ended up in Lithuania, then Poland, East Prussia. On January 22, 1945, liberation came. Until March 1945, Blokhin was in the hospital and at the same time was undergoing a SMERSH inspection. Then he spent five months in rear hospitals. Later he lived in Leningrad until the end of the 1970s.
Breaking the blockade
Headquarters did not give up hope of breaking through the ring of the blockade of Leningrad in the Nevsky Patch area, and were preparing for a new offensive. It began on September 9, and all available forces in this sector of the front were involved in the attacks, including even cadets of the naval school. This is how one of the cadets, Ivan Shirokogorov, recalled this offensive: “On September 7, 1942, our cadet company was alerted. They were sent first to Melnichny Ruchey, and from there to Nevskaya Dubrovka. On September 9, at the 8th crossing, we began to cross the Neva, to recapture that very Neva patch that is now so famous. The Nevsky patch was not occupied at that time. Of the 180 cadets, only 70 returned. The rest were killed or wounded, but most died. The next time we crossed on September 25th and occupied this patch. We, the cadets, did everything together with the troops. Then came the command “Return the cadets to school.” Only 11 of us returned."
The second attempt to recapture the patch was made on September 26. It turned out to be more successful: Soviet troops managed to gain a foothold on the Nevsky patch, but only on it, since ours were knocked out from the other captured bridgeheads. The defense held out until October 5, after which an order was received to leave the patch. And here’s what’s surprising: for some reason the German troops did not occupy the vacated bridgehead! On the night of October 8-9, a combined company of 114 volunteers under the command of Captain Nikolai Britikov crossed over to it.
When the Germans came to their senses and began to attack, it was this company that managed to repel all the attacks, for which all its soldiers and commanders were awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Battle (18 people) and the Red Star (30 people), as well as medals “For Courage” (the remaining 66 Human).
After this, Soviet troops no longer retreated from the Nevsky Piglet, although in November 1942 they almost lost it under the pressure of German troops. The situation was saved by artillery, which by that time had learned to place “screens of fire” in the path of enemy troops. And two months later the famous Operation Iskra began, which ended with the breaking of the siege of Leningrad. At this moment, Nevsky Piglet played to the end the very role that fell to him from the very first days. He pinned down large German forces, paralyzing their actions in other areas. As a result, the launched offensive of the Soviet troops ended in success. 
Why were such sacrifices necessary?
In the post-Soviet period, the history of the defense of the Nevsky patch was overgrown with a catastrophic amount of rumors, speculation and “research”, the main purpose of which was the desire to prove that it was a meaningless meat grinder, that all strategic and tactical decisions of the Soviet command led only to unjustified casualties. The number of alleged victims has also increased by an order of magnitude. The most reliable result appears to be the result of the investigation conducted by the commission of retired Colonel General Grigory Krivosheev: about 50 thousand dead. But you can find other numbers. According to General Mikhail Dukhanov, at least 100 thousand people died on the patch, according to the calculations of researcher Grigory Shigin - 64-68 thousand. The data “walking” on the Internet about two hundred and even three hundred thousand dead is not confirmed by any documents.
The assumptions that all operations related to the Nevsky Piglet were unjustified either tactically or strategically also appear unfounded. The Germans themselves called the Nevsky patch a “hornet’s nest.” Because he attracted considerable enemy forces to himself, easing the position of the defenders of Leningrad in other areas.
There are also statements that all Soviet losses were useless, since the Germans themselves had no point in winning back this “piece of land.” It is not clear why, then, elite German units attacked the exhausted Soviet soldiers - like the paratroopers from the 7th “Cretan” air brigade, who said that it was better to jump to Crete three times than to fight once on the Nevsky patch...
Here's what he told a MIR 24 correspondent about it senior researcher at the museum-reserve “Breaking the Siege of Leningrad” Oleg Sukhodymtsev: “With their active actions, the Leningraders forced the German command to transfer the most combat-ready, elite units of the Wehrmacht to the Nevsky Front: the 7th Airborne and 1st Infantry Divisions, intended for the Tikhvin-Volkhov direction. Thus, our troops on the Neva contributed to the defeat of the German formations that were trying to completely blockade Leningrad.”
Later, during Operation Iskra, “...with their active actions, the defenders of this bridgehead pulled back part of the enemy forces from the main direction of attack and took up to 70% of the artillery and mortar fire,” says the scientist. – Thus, they ensured the success of the attack group of the Leningrad Front advancing to the north. On January 18, it united with the troops of the Volkhov Front. The siege of Leningrad has been broken!”
Today, the Nevsky Patch has become a huge memorial, reminiscent of the colossal sacrifices that paid for the victory in the Great Patriotic War. Search operations are still underway on the former bridgehead, and search engines are still raising the remains of Soviet soldiers from under the ground, thickly mixed with rusty iron. If the statement is true that the war is not over until its last soldier is buried, then the fighting on the Nevsky Patch will not end for a very long time. However, like the information war, implicated in the memory of heroes.
The Nevsky Piglet bridgehead is one of the most heroic and tragic pages of Soviet military history. This is the site of one of the bloodiest battles in modern history: on this section of the Neva coast in 1941-1943, troops of the Leningrad Front tried to break the blockade of Leningrad for about 400 days.
Right flank of Nevsky Piglet
Author of the photo: Local historian.
The bridgehead on the left bank of the Neva River, which was held by Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War, was called the “Nevsky Piglet” because of its relatively small size: 2 km along the Neva and 800 m from the coastline. According to historians, 52 thousand bombs and shells fell on this land per day.
Soviet soldiers in a trench during the defense of Leningrad
On the night of September 19-20, 1941, Soviet troops were able to cross the Neva and gain a foothold in the Nevskaya Dubrovka area. The fiercest battles were fought on the Nevsky patch: the battles did not stop for a single hour. According to various sources, the Red Army's losses in killed and wounded during the entire operation to break through the enemy's defenses in the Nevsky Piglet area amounted to tens of thousands of people. Attempts to further advance to connect with the troops of the Volkhov Front were unsuccessful.
Soviet soldiers cross the Neva River in boats
T-60 tank towing a 45-mm cannon on Nevskaya Dubrovka
The fighting on the Nevsky patch continued until April 29, 1942, until all Soviet soldiers were destroyed and reinforcements were unable to arrive due to the ice drift on the Neva. On September 26, 1942, the troops of the Neva Operational Group again captured the bridgehead.
Soldiers of the Soviet 115th Rifle Division in a trench on Nevskaya Dubrovka
The debate about whether the tiny Nevsky Piglet was needed continues to this day. The answer can be sought by assessing events through the eyes of the older generation. Vladimir Putin, whose father fought in Piglet, answered reporters: “I think that in war there are always many mistakes. But if you fight and think that everyone around you is making mistakes, you will never win. They were thinking about victory then.” Putin's father, a soldier of the 330th Infantry Regiment of the 86th Infantry Division, was seriously wounded on the Nevsky bridgehead in November 1941 and was forever crippled by the war.
Vladimir Putin. After visiting the memorial. 01/27/04
boundary stone
Author of the photo: Local historian.
Photo information source: War Album.
The source of information about the Nevsky Piglet bridgehead is the Pavlovsk website.
Literature: A.P. Stein, D.A. Shcheglov, B.V. Bychevsky. "Nevsky Patch" Ed. Lenizdat. 1977 (Memoirs of participants in the battles near Nevskaya Dubrovka in 1941-1943)
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A bridgehead on the left bank of the Neva, near the village of Moskovskaya Dubrovka, controlled by Soviet troops from September 1941 to April 1942, and also from September 1942 to February 1943. Advancing from here, units of the 8th and 67th armies planned to connect with units of the Volkhov Front, thereby breaking through the Siege of Leningrad.
On September 8, 1941, German troops, having taken Shlisselburg, closed the blockade ring around Leningrad. Immediately after this, the Soviet command assigned the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts the task of breaking the blockade. During the 1st Sinyavino operation, units of the 54th Army were supposed to break through enemy defenses in the Mga and Sinyavino area and reach the Neva. At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad Front were supposed to cross the Neva and move towards the 54th Army.
On the night of September 20, soldiers of the 115th Infantry Division crossed the Neva in fishing boats and homemade rafts and captured a small bridgehead about two kilometers wide and one and a half kilometers deep. Fierce fighting began on the left bank of the Neva; the Soviet troops were unable to build on their success; however, the German units, exhausted in the battle, were unable to liquidate the bridgehead. The offensive of the Volkhov Front units was also unsuccessful. Units of the 54th Army advanced only 5-10 kilometers, after which they got stuck in the German defense. For several months, a kind of status quo was established in this area of hostilities.
In October 1941, Soviet troops made many attempts to develop an offensive from a bridgehead, but by this time the Germans had managed to prepare powerful defensive positions. After some time, maintaining the bridgehead itself became difficult; due to constant shelling, they could only cross the river at night, supply and evacuation of the wounded was difficult, and the bodies of the dead were often buried on the “patch.”
“By the time our company landed, all the trenches and communication passages were filled with frozen corpses. They lay across the entire area of the “patch”, where they were overtaken by a bullet or shrapnel. It’s hard to remember this, but it was like this: the shelter in which I and my two comrades happened to be accommodated was instead covered with frozen corpses, the walls were partially lined with corpses, firing loops were equipped between the corpses laid along the trenches instead of parapets. The entire area of the patch was a cemetery of unburied soldiers and officers” (from the memoirs of Yuri Poresh, a participant in the battles at the Nevsky Patch).
The ice drift that began in April 1942 almost completely interrupted the communication of the units on the patch with the “mainland”. At the end of the month, fewer than a thousand Soviet soldiers remained on the bridgehead. On the evening of April 24, the Germans began an attack on the bridgehead. Despite fierce resistance from Soviet soldiers, the bridgehead was liquidated by the end of April.
In August 1942, the 3rd Sinyavinsk offensive operation began. Units of the Volkhov Front struck from the east, intending to break through to the Neva, thereby releasing Leningrad. From the west they were to be supported by troops of the Neva Operational Group. The attempt to cross the Neva on September 9 completely failed. On September 26, a new offensive was launched, as a result of which Soviet troops managed to capture three bridgeheads on the left bank of the Neva, in the area of Moscow Dubrovka, Arbuzovo and Annensky. A few days later, the bridgeheads at Arbuzovo and Annensky were liquidated, but the Soviet troops were able to hold the “patch.”
By this time, the troops of the Volkhov Front were already surrounded by the enemy and could not further develop the offensive. In this regard, on October 5, a decision was made to withdraw the troops occupying the bridgehead to the right bank of the Neva. However, soon after the withdrawal it was discovered that the Germans were not occupying the compiled Soviet positions. As a result, on October 8, a company of 114 volunteers landed on the patch, which again occupied the abandoned bridgehead. By this time, the Germans “came to their senses” and tried to eliminate the “patch”, but the volunteers were able to repel all attacks. On October 20, reinforcements arrived at the “patch”, after which relative calm established itself here for several months.
In January 1943, the Soviet command made another attempt to break the blockade. During Operation Iskra, troops of the Volkhov Front were supposed to advance from the east, towards units of the Leningrad Front attacking the Germans from the west. However, this time it was planned to cross the Neva on a wide section of the front, from Shlisselburg to Moscow Dubrovka. The German command, believing that the main blow would be delivered precisely in the Nevsky Piglet area, concentrated a reinforced group here, so the Soviet offensive here did not unfold very successfully. However, Soviet troops advancing in the Maryino area managed to break through the enemy’s defenses and on January 18 united with the advancing units of the Volkhov Front. The fighting in the Nevsky Piglet area continued, however, until February 1943, when the enemy was pushed back to Arbuzovo and Annensky.
Results
Despite the fact that the Soviet offensives carried out from the Nevsky Piglet, as well as all attempts by Soviet troops to relieve Leningrad before January 1943, ended in failure, they played an important role in the strategic plan. The German command was forced to transfer additional forces here both from Leningrad and from other sectors of the front. As a result of this, the German group leading the attack on Stalingrad was significantly weakened, and in addition, the German command was forced to abandon the attack on Leningrad in the summer of 1942. The offensive of the Soviet troops in January 1943 also ended in success, largely because the enemy strengthened the defense in the Nevsky Piglet area at the expense of other sectors of the front, in which, as a result, the German defense was broken through.
Losses
The exact losses of Soviet troops are still unknown; according to various estimates, they range from 50 to 200 thousand people. German losses are estimated in the range from 10 to 40 thousand people killed.
Currently, there is a memorial on the territory of “Pyatachok”; several monuments have been erected here; in the village of Dubrovka, on the other side of the river, the Church of the Icon of the Mother of God “Recovery of the Dead” has been opened, as well as the Nevsky Pyatachok Museum.
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