Reasons for standing on the eel river. Great Stand on the Eel River

For many years, Rus' was oppressed by Tatar-Mongol rule. But gradually the situation changed. Russian rulers behaved more and more independently. In 1476, Grand Duke Ivan III stopped paying tribute to the Great Horde. The Great Khan Akhmat did not immediately move his army to pacify the rebellious ruler - he was busy fighting. In 1480, the Russian state refused to completely submit to the Horde.

Akhmat Khan

Having gathered an army, Akhmat went to Moscow. The Russians understood that if Khan reached Moscow, then victory would be his. And therefore they decided to meet the horde in advance. But these events were preceded by heated debates among the Russian nobility. Part of the elite advised the Grand Duke to flee, but the Grand Duke, perhaps under the influence of the Muscovites, decided to give battle to the Khan.

Ivan III began to gather an army near the Oka River, while he himself remained in Kolomna. The Vladimir Icon of the Mother of God was brought to Moscow, with whose intercession the deliverance from Tamerlane’s invasion was associated.

Khan Akhmat walked through the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, accompanied by Lithuanians loyal to him, to Vorotynsk. It was here that he waited for help from King Casimir IV of Poland. But the king had his own worries. The allies of Ivan the Third, the Crimeans, raided Podolia. Therefore, Khan was forced to act alone. Having learned about the troops gathered on the Oka, he moved towards the Ugra. The Grand Duke also sent his troops there.

It is unlikely that Akhmat’s plans included the suddenness of his military maneuver. Rather, he resorted to the traditional Mongol tactic of intimidation by numbers.

In the fall, Ivan the Third arrived from Kolomna to Moscow for a council with the boyars and clergy, at which they decided to give battle to the khan. Russian squads stood along the Ugra for about 60 versts; attempts by the Tatars to cross the river were stopped by them.

Khan Akhmat withdrew his troops inland from the river, the Russians stood on the other bank. Thus began the great stand on the Ugra. The opponents still did not dare to fight. Akhmat demanded the obedience of the Moscow prince, expecting his son or brother as envoys with the tribute that the Russians owed him for the previous seven years. But the boyar’s son was sent to him for negotiations, which simply delayed time.

The situation was in favor of the Moscow prince. There were allies on the approaches, the Crimean Khan was ravaging the Lithuanian lands with might and main, preventing the Polish king from coming to the rescue of Akhmat.

Failed battle

There was another one important point. The Horde used sheep as food, since the army was mounted, the horses destroyed all the supplies around the site. The Russians received provisions from the Grand Duke's warehouses. And the main army was on foot. And most importantly, the Horde began to be decimated by a disease, which was later identified presumably as dysentery. The Russian army was not affected by the disease.

And the main strategic point is that Ivan the Third benefited from the absence of a clash, while for Akhmat the battle was vital.

The clergy also supported Ivan - Archbishop Vassian sent the prince a message of parting words. Akhmat, having gathered a huge army, left almost no reserve in the horde itself. Therefore, he sent the governor Vasily Nozdrevaty on a raid through enemy territory. The Crimean prince Nur-Devlet and his horsemen accompanied Vasily on this raid.

The coming winter changed the prince's strategy. He decided to retreat deeper into the territory, to more advantageous positions. Khan Akhmat, having learned about the raid of Prince Vasily with the Crimeans, as well as about their intentions to take the capital of the Khanate, decided not to accept battle with the squads and began to withdraw the army. Lack of food also played a significant role in this decision.

On the way back, he began to plunder Lithuanian settlements in revenge for Casimir's betrayal. In just two days, both troops left in different directions from the clash. If this was a victory on the part of the prince, then the khan definitely lost this failed battle.

Many contemporaries attributed the Khan's retreat to the intercession of the Mother of God, hence the second name of the Ugra River - the belt of the Mother of God.

Moscow greeted the prince with jubilation and celebrated the return of its troops as a victory. The Khan was greeted quite differently in Sarai, the capital of the horde. In early January, Akhmat, who left Sarai due to fear of assassination attempts, was killed by the Tyumen prince Ibak in a poorly protected headquarters, most likely at the instigation of Ivan the Third.
The Greater Horde began to be torn apart by hostility and struggle for power between the khans.

The stand on the Ugra revealed new diplomatic techniques used by the rulers of the principality. These are successful alliance treaties, which largely freed up his hands to act behind enemy lines, and the raid of Prince Vasily himself, which forced Akhmat to retreat. And, in fact, the very avoidance of a collision, which the Russians no longer needed - the days of the Horde were numbered.

It is the “standing” that is considered the final point in the Tatar-Mongol yoke, where Rus', having received not formal, but actual sovereignty, began its path as a great power.

The last invasion of Horde troops into Russian lands

The stand on the Ugra also had far-reaching consequences - part of the Lithuanian lands went to the Moscow principality. The Grand Duke was an extraordinary diplomat - he avoided conflict with the Horde until the last. Even in 1502, he calls himself a “slave” of the Horde, although in the same year it was defeated by the Crimean Khan Menli I Giray.

The concept of “Tatar yoke” was introduced by the historian Karamzin. A number of historians, mostly foreign, deny the significance of the “standing on the Ugra” event, considering it an ordinary diplomatic event. As evidence for this version, it is said that the payment of tribute, although it decreased significantly, did not stop. Arguments were also given in favor of this that in the records of contemporaries there is no evidence of liberation from the Tatars.

Other historians believed that the council of boyars and the fierce confrontation between the two parties was clear evidence that the events were more significant than a simple diplomatic clash.

The Grand Duke modestly writes about this event: “Akhmat Khan attacked me, but the all-merciful God wanted to save us from him and did so.”

The stand on the Ugra was of great importance because it was the last invasion of the Horde troops into Russian lands. In honor of the quincentenary, in 1980, a monument was unveiled at the site of these long-standing events.

After the resounding victory on the Kulikovo Field, the Russian principalities remained under Horde dependence for another century, and only the events of the autumn of 1480 decisively changed the situation. Two armies converged on the Ugra River. When the battle was over, Russia (precisely Russia, no longer Rus' - the new name of our state is found in sources from the 15th century) was finally freed from what we used to call the Mongol-Tatar yoke.

The fateful events of 1480 were assessed by both contemporaries and learned descendants. Ancient chroniclers called them a bright, bloodless victory, emphasizing the good way of achieving it - the defeat of Akhmat was therefore “bright” because it was achieved without blood, and most importantly, it led to the end of the “dark” and protracted dependence on the Horde rulers. And already in modern times, historians who were impressed by the story of a long confrontation between two armies, separated by a narrow frozen river, came up with the formula “Standing on the Ugra”.

Gone into the twilight of centuries were the knots of dangerous contradictions hidden behind this catchy phrase, the tension associated with mobilization, and the military operations themselves, the participants in the months-long drama, their characters and positions. Two dates, 1380 and 1480, symbolizing the beginning and end last stage in the struggle for Russian freedom from alien power, found themselves tightly bound in historical memory. And even in this “pair”, the 1380th always comes to the forefront: the “loud-boiling” battle on Nepryadva overshadows the less noisy campaign of 1480. Behind the Battle of Kulikovo, in addition to chronicle texts, there is a whole trail of works (mostly mythologized): the lives of saints, and in particular Sergius of Radonezh, “Zadonshchina”, and above all “The Tale of the Battle of Mamayev”, which lived a long and complex life in the handwritten literature of the XVI-XVIII centuries. But about standing on the Ugra there is not a single special non-chronicle text. Only a small chapter of “Kazan History” drew the attention of readers of the late 16th and subsequent centuries to the invasion of Akhmat. So the events of 1480 clearly require a detailed story.

Secret agreement

The official chronicler at the Moscow court later likened Akhmat's campaign to Rus' to Batu's invasion. In his opinion, the goals coincided: the khan was going to “destroy the churches and capture all Orthodoxy and the Grand Duke himself, as was the case under Batu.” This comparison, of course, is exaggerated. The Horde rulers had long been accustomed to the regular collection of tribute, and the one-time devastation of Rus' simply could not become a serious goal for them. And yet, in the deep sense of the scale of the threat, the chronicler is right. The campaign being prepared was part of a series of long campaigns of conquest that were detrimental to the country, and not the semi-robber short-lived raids that were common in the 15th century. And it seemed even more dangerous because confrontation between two allied states was expected at once. It is unlikely that in the early spring of 1480 in Moscow they knew about the details of the secret treaty concluded between the Great Horde and Lithuania, but they did not doubt the fact of its existence. Advisors to Ivan III knew about the unusually long stay of the Polish-Lithuanian king Casimir in the Lithuanian part of the domain - from the autumn of 1479 to the summer of 1480 (his functions in governing the principality did not seem to require such a long delay there). News was also received about the sending of Casimir's ambassador to the Great Horde and, most likely, about the royal intention to hire several thousand horsemen in Poland. Finally, in Moscow they knew for sure about the king’s relationship with the rebellious appanage princes - Ivan’s brothers, who were offended by his oppression and “injustice” in the distribution of the conquered Novgorod lands.

The military potential of Akhmat himself was no secret. There are no exact statistical data about him in the sources, but a simple listing of the princes of Genghis Khan’s blood who went on a campaign with the khan is impressive - about a dozen. According to eastern chronicles, the forces of the Great Horde reached 100 thousand soldiers, and in the mid-1470s, the Khan's ambassadors in Venice promised to oppose Ottoman Empire and an army of 200 thousand.

The essence and seriousness of the great-power claims of the Horde is clearly perceptible in his message to the Turkish Sultan (1476). In two words, he equates himself with the “most illustrious padishah,” calling him “his brother.” Three - defines his status: “the only” of Genghis Khan’s children, that is, the holder of the exclusive right to lands and peoples once conquered by the great conqueror. Of course, Akhmat's real request was more modest - he actually claimed only the heritage of the Golden Horde. But isn’t this also a very difficult task? And he began to implement it. In July 1476, his ambassador in Moscow demanded the arrival of Ivan III “to the Tsar in the Horde,” which meant Akhmat’s intention to return to the most rigid forms of political subordination of Rus': the ulusnik must personally beat the khan’s favor with his forehead, and he is free to favor (or not to favor) his label for a great reign. And of course, a return to paying a large tribute was implied. The Moscow prince ignored the requirement to go personally, sending an ambassador to the Horde, and the intentions of the Tatar ruler from now on became completely clear to him.

Later, in the same 1476, Akhmat captured Crimea and placed his nephew Janibek on the throne, and replaced the traditional dynasty, the Gireevs. In general, these two branches of the Chingizids mortally competed for hegemony over the countries into which the Golden Horde broke up. And then - such a decisive blow. In addition, Akhmat indirectly encroached on the authority of the Sultan, who had just conquered the Genoese colonies in the Crimea and accepted Gireyev under his official protection.

True, a year later the unlucky Janibek himself was expelled from Crimea, and the brothers Nur-Daulet and Mengli-Girey clashed in the struggle for the throne. But the defeat of Akhmatova’s protege became possible only because the khan was busy with other matters and in another place. In the late 1470s he led a coalition that decisively defeated the Uzbek Sheikh Haider. One of the consequences of this victory was the subordination of his other nephew, Kasym, to Akhmat, who at one time independently ruled in Astrakhan (Hadzhi-Tarkhan). So by 1480 the lower and middle reaches of the Volga were again united under one hand. His army grew noticeably in numbers and was favored by constant military success. In those days, such a bouquet of “assets” was worth a lot.


In addition, fate, as already mentioned, sent the khan a powerful ally: in 1479, his ambassador returned from Lithuania with Casimir’s personal representative and with a proposal for joint military action. They were supposed to open at the turn of spring and summer of 1480. And soon another joy happened, which he hastened to convey to Akhmat new friend somewhere in March-April: the brothers of Ivan III “emerged from the earth with all their might”, separated from the eldest in the family. In this situation, could Akhmat have doubts about an easy triumph? In addition, the “unfaithful ulusnik” Ivan finally became insolent: he stopped paying the tribute on time and in full.

The sources do not tell us anything about how “procedurally” and when exactly the Russian prince formalized the elimination of economic and state dependence on the Horde. It is possible that there were no special ceremonies. Akhmat's last ambassador visited Moscow in the summer of 1476 and in September went back with the Moscow ambassador. Most likely, Ivan III stopped paying the “exit” in 1478. And the plot itself, associated with the severance of vassal relations, gave rise to at least two famous historical myths. The first comes from the pen of Baron Sigismund Herberstein, the Holy Roman Empire's ambassador to Russia in the 1520s. He wrote - almost certainly from the words of Yuri Trakhaniot, treasurer of Vasily III and the son of a noble Greek, who came to Rus' with Sophia Paleologus, whom, in fact, this plot glorifies. Allegedly, the imperial niece almost daily reproached her husband for participating in humiliating ceremonies of meetings of Horde ambassadors and persuaded him to call in sick (meanwhile, it is impossible to imagine the imperious Ivan patiently listening to his wife’s reproaches, no matter how fair they may seem to him). Sophia’s second “feat” was the destruction of the house for the Horde ambassadors in the Kremlin. Here she allegedly showed cunning: in a letter “to the queen of the Tatars” she referred to a vision according to which she was supposed to build a church on this site, and asked to give her the courtyard, supporting her request with gifts. The princess, naturally, promised to provide the ambassadors with other premises. She received a place for a temple, erected a church, but did not keep her promise... All this, of course, is evidence of Herberstein’s ignorance of the routine of life in the grand ducal family, and even simple facts! Which queen did Sophia write to? How could all this happen without Ivan's knowledge? And with all this, is it worth forgetting that the representative of the Palaiologan dynasty was primarily occupied with her main task - almost annually giving birth to children for her husband?..


N. S. Shustova “John III overthrows the Tatar yoke, tearing up the image of the khan
and ordering the death of the ambassadors" (1862)
The second myth is younger (last quarter of the 16th century), more colorful and even more fantastic. Sophia is forgotten, Ivan III is on the proscenium. The author of "Kazan History" in two small chapters depicts the exploits of the sovereign prince in the conquest of Novgorod, and then gives him credit for the Horde issue. Here are the Khan's ambassadors, who arrived with the mysterious “parsun bazma”, asking for tribute and quitrents “for last summer.” Ivan, “not a little afraid of the Tsarev’s fear,” takes “the bazma parsunu of his face” (who would know exactly what it is!), spits on it, then “breaks it,” throws it to the ground and tramples it with his feet. He orders the visitors to be executed - all but one. The pardoned person must tell his khan about what happened, and in the meantime the Grand Duke will begin to prepare for a decisive battle.

However, let us return to the objective situation in the country in 1479-1480. Let's try to understand whether Russian politicians consciously tried to oppose something to the growing threat. They not only tried, but also managed to do something. The choice was small and predictable: the hostile course of the Horde and Lithuania towards Moscow could not change radically. It is another matter that specific circumstances greatly modified it. The likelihood of Lithuanian aggression was moderated by the complex intertwining of interests of the king and his family, the “party” of the crown nobility hostile to Lithuania, and various groups of Lithuanian magnates. However, these difficulties favorable to Russia did not eliminate the need to remain vigilant. Ivan's government remained: a small victorious raid on Kazan in 1478 strengthened the ruling circles of the Kazan Khanate in their decision to remain loyal to Moscow. There was also an active search for their own potential allies. At the end of the 1470s, contacts were established with the Moldavian ruler Stephen the Great. A rapprochement on anti-Lithuanian grounds suggested itself, moreover, it was reinforced by the prospect of the marriage of the prince-heir Ivan Ivanovich the Young with Stefan’s daughter, Elena. However, by 1480 all these prospects remained only prospects. Things turned out more successfully with the Crimean Khanate. The first negotiations with Mengli-Girey took place back in 1474, and even then there was talk of a full-fledged union treaty, but the khan was still not ready to openly call Casimir his enemy (the inertia of almost forty years of close ties with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania affected). Then, as we already know, the Gireyevs were overthrown, but they managed to regain power, and in the fall of 1479 in Moscow, after a long diplomatic game, the brothers of the Crimean Khan, Nur-Daulet and Aidar, found themselves in Russia either in the status of honored guests, or in a position kind of hostages. Thus, a powerful lever of pressure on Bakhchisarai appeared in the hands of Ivan III’s diplomats. In April 1480, the Russian ambassador was already bringing to Crimea a clear text of the agreement with the named “enemies” - Akhmat and Casimir. That summer, Giray swore to honor the treaty, beginning a strategic coalition that would last 30 years and ultimately produce generous results for both sides. However, the Horde were already advancing on Rus', and it was not possible to use good relations with the Crimeans in confrontation with them. Moscow had to repel the military threat on its own.

Akhmatovo kingdom

There is no exact date of birth of the Great Horde or “Takht Eli” (“Throne Power”), the largest state formation formed during the collapse of the Golden Horde. In the chronicles of the 15th century, this name is mentioned when describing the events of 1460, when the Khan of the Great Horde, Mahmud, stood “aimlessly” under the walls of Pereyaslavl-Ryazan, and in the Nikon Chronicle, the Great Horde is mentioned even earlier: in 1440, when describing another strife in the tribe of the clan Jochi. With a slight degree of convention, we can say that the “three daughters of the mother of the Golden Horde”: the Great Horde, the Crimean and Kazan Khanates - were born in the second half of the 1430s - the mid-1440s. In 1437, Khan Kichi (Kuchuk) - Muhammad wins and ousts Khan Ulug-Muhammad from Desht-i-Kipchak. The latter, after a fleeting raid on Moscow in 1439, went east and by 1445 became the first Kazan Khan. Soon after 1437, Kichi-Muhammad removes Tokhtamysh's grandson, Khan Seyid-Akhmed, from Crimea, who went into nomadic territory southwest of the Lower Dnieper. But Kichi-Muhammad also failed to gain a foothold in Crimea - in 1443, with the help of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Hadji-Girey, who had previously tried to separate from the Horde, became the head of the Crimean Khanate. The Great Horde, whose khans exercised jurisdiction over the principalities of North-Eastern Rus', lasted just over 50 years. Only one of its rulers made campaigns in Central Asia, Crimea, against the Principality of Moscow, and sent diplomats to Istanbul, Venice, Krakow, Vilna, and Moscow. We are talking about Akhmet (Akhmat of Russian chronicles). In 1465, he succeeded his elder brother Mahmud on the throne. In the 1470s, he managed to concentrate under his rule most of the tribes of the Great Steppe up to the Volga region (including some of the Nogais). Under him, the Great Horde occupied the maximum territory, and the borders briefly became stable. In the north, the Horde bordered on the Kazan Khanate; in the south, it owned the flat expanses of the North Caucasus, the steppe expanses from the Volga to the Don and from the Don to the Dnieper (at times, its lower right bank). The failure of the 1480 invasion turned out to be fatal for Akhmet: in the winter of 1481 he was killed during a surprise attack on his headquarters by the Siberian Khan Ibak and the Nogai Murzas, and his property and booty went to the winners. After this, the Great Horde could no longer revive its former power. In 1502, the Crimean Khan Mengli-Girey inflicted a severe defeat on Shikh-Ahmed, its last ruler.

The official chronicler attributed the beginning of Akhmatova’s campaign to the spring of 1480, and according to indirect indications, April is calculated. However, for those distant times, the movement of individual military detachments along different routes is difficult to determine. The migration from the Volga region, for example, could have been complicated by the late opening of the Volga. Be that as it may, the Russian guards in the Wild Field worked well; they learned about the beginning of hostilities in Moscow on time, which was important in two respects: for the rapid mobilization of all resources and the correct movement of their troops. The movement of Horde troops to the lower reaches of the Don meant that the first blows would fall on the fortresses in the middle reaches of the Oka - from Tarusa to Kolomna.

In general, the campaign of 1480 is usually reduced to the October events on the Ugra. But this is incorrect - what then to do with the strange listing of points of movement of the Horde army in most chronicles? Why did Lyubutsk, which does not fit into the route in any way, end up on the same level as Mtsensk, Odoev and Vorotynsk (these cities record movement from the southeast to the northwest)? Whose troops captured and devastated the Besputu volost on the Tula river of the same name? Finally, why did the Grand Duke order to “burn” the “town of Koshra” (Kashira, much east of the Ugra)? One has only to recognize some obvious facts, and the bewilderment disappears. Obviously, while waiting for an ally with troops, Akhmat did not stand idle: his advanced detachments probed Russian forces along the banks of the Oka, simultaneously engaging in robbery and capturing live prey. One of these raids was the capture of Besputa. The signal was received correctly in Moscow. The first governors immediately went to the Bereg (that is, to the fortified cities on the left bank of the Oka), a little later Prince Andrei Menshoi, the younger brother loyal to Ivan, came to Tarusa (his appanage city), and led the largest detachments led “with many governors” to Serpukhov Ivan Ivanovich Young. This happened on June 8th. Khan was in no hurry.

The slow progress of the Horde in those days is understandable. The first and initially main reason is the need after harsh winter feed the horses on fresh grass. The next thing is the need to “probe” the strengths and dislocation of the Muscovites, to find their weak points. And finally, the already impatient expectation of Casimir with the army, gradually coming to the fore. The Russian commanders, of course, also needed fresh information about the enemy’s maneuvers - this forced Ivan to make a decision: to go with the main forces to Kolomna in July, “diagonally” from the Horde movement, so that for the time being a stable distant confrontation would be established between the main armies, punctuated only by skirmishes between forward detachments.

There was another new circumstance that required considerable organizational efforts: for the first time in history, the Russians went to war with field artillery. Therefore, special groups of people responsible for transporting heavy cannons and arquebuses took part in the campaign. This means that the criteria for choosing a battle site when defending a water line also changed - now it was necessary to take into account the capabilities of artillery.

Over time, tension in the opponents' stakes increased, and, apparently, in mid-September the khan decided to move to the left bank of the upper Oka. By this he wanted to achieve two goals: by getting close to what was then Lithuanian territory, to quickly and finally clarify the issue of allied assistance and, most importantly, to find, with the help of local residents, a way to covertly bypass the Moscow troops. It was then that the Horde appeared near Lyubutsk, once again testing the defenses of the Russian army. Probably, by that time Akhmat had already guessed the answer to one of his questions: the Lithuanians would not show up.

The Russian command quickly learned about the movement of the Horde to the north and assessed the risk of their breakthrough through the Ugra. Somewhere in the mid-twenties of September, Ivan ordered the transfer of almost all available forces led by Ivan the Young, Prince Dmitry Kholmsky (an outstanding commander of that time) and Andrei the Lesser to the left bank of the small river, and on September 30 he himself appeared in Moscow.

Council in Moscow, battle on the Ugra

According to chronicles, Ivan III arrived in Moscow for a council with his mother, hierarchs and boyars remaining in the capital on September 30. Ambassadors from the brothers were also waiting for him. Yesterday's rebels, who were unable to come to an agreement with the Pskovites on the defense of Pskov from the Livonian Order, in a situation of a formidable invasion, considered it a good idea to join the eldest in the family in exchange for land additions. The end of the conflict was quickly resolved, and the closest relatives of the sovereign hurried to the Ugra with their troops.

Things were much more difficult with ordinary townspeople. These perceived the sudden arrival of Ivan III as a manifestation of fear of the Horde, and measures to prepare the city for the siege as a sign of Akhmat’s imminent approach. Reproaches and accusations flew at the Grand Duke from the assembled crowd of Muscovites, and Archbishop Vassian, having publicly accused his spiritual son of cowardly flight, offered to save the situation by leading the army himself. Passions became so intense that Ivan chose to leave for Krasnoe Selo.

Such a reaction was provoked by the position of a number of people close to Ivan III, who believed that military happiness was changeable and proposed “not to fight with the sovereign” (Akhmat), but to find forms of dependence that were not too burdensome for Rus' in negotiations. But this approach ran counter to the patriotic upsurge in Moscow, clearly expressed in the words of Vassian. Eventually general advice Of all the authoritative clergy and secular persons present in the city, he recommended that the prince continue the confrontation by strengthening the army on the Ugra with reinforcements and, most importantly, with his personal presence. And now the Grand Duke with new troops is heading towards Kremensk. The final phase of the confrontation was approaching. On October 3, the main Russian forces completed their redeployment and took up positions along 50-60 kilometers along the left bank of the Ugra. They had another 3-4 days to prepare for the battle. The Ugra is noticeably narrower than the Oka, its current is fast, and in a number of places the channel is squeezed by steep slopes. It was more difficult for the Horde to deploy numerous cavalry here, but if several detachments went to the water’s edge at the same time, the crossing of the water line itself should not have delayed the troops for long. However, theoretical calculations ceased to be relevant on October 8, when the Horde launched a general offensive in order to force a decisive battle on the Russians by crossing the river. The descriptions of this maneuver in the chronicles are unusually sparse, which is understandable: in the October days of 1480 there were no historiographers on the Ugra, so the records were kept from the words of the participants in that battle - many years later.

However, it is noted, firstly, the accuracy of firing from cannons and bows by the Russians and... the complete failure of the vaunted Horde archers. Most likely, the artillery also had a great psychological effect. The second sign of the battle is its extraordinary duration: only its first phase lasted four days, and in several areas at the same time. The third feature is, as it turned out, a successful disposition of the Russians, who had time to think it over. Akhmat failed to push the Muscovites away from the river, break through their front, and put them to flight, and after October 11 he was forced to stop the offensive. After some time, however, a final attempt was made to break through to the left bank of the river near Opakov, but this skirmish also ended unsuccessfully for the Horde. On these same days, Ivan III came to Kremensk, sending reinforcements to the Ugra. From now on, the feeling of an imminent victory steadily grew stronger among one of the warring sides (in the mid-twenties, Ivan’s brothers also arrived in Kremensk with troops). The other side lost heart and suffered from an unusually long period of military operations on foreign soil in the conditions of the coming winter.


Tsar John III tears up the Khan's letter. A. Kivshenko. Second half of the 19th century
Against this background, negotiations began. It is still not entirely clear who took the initiative - most likely, it was the Prince of Moscow, which immediately caused a new attack of suspicion and new controversy in Moscow itself. Here, on the border of the Moscow principality and Lithuania (the Ugra served as the border line between them for a long time), the situation looked different. At first, the khan, as usual, demanded the maximum: the personal visit of the Grand Duke and, of course, a large tribute. There was a refusal. Then Akhmat wished that at least the son and co-ruler of Ivan III, Ivan the Young, would come, but this “wish” was not fulfilled. Akhmat, in turn, tried to “threaten” with the coming winter, when “the rivers will all stop, and there will be many roads to Rus'.” And it’s true: on October 26, the river began to become covered with ice, and Russian troops, by order of the Grand Duke, retreated to Borovsk in an organized manner. This seemed more expedient: in the opinion of the sovereign prince and governor, it was on those fields that it would be more profitable to fight a general battle in cold conditions. In the capital, rumors of flight again began to spread. Apparently, it was then that a popular idea arose, which was later reflected in the chronicles, of two armies fleeing from each other and not being persecuted by anyone. It is unlikely that Akhmat’s troops also “fled”: they left the Ugra on November 11 “for the queen’s power, they fought his land for treason, and his cities and graveyards were fought, and they led countless people into captivity, and cut others to pieces.” Without waiting for Casimir's help, Akhmat plundered the territories in the upper reaches of the Oka (Odoev, Belev, Mtsensk). They didn’t get to Ivan - at least they took revenge on the treacherous ally... This is how the “stand on the Ugra” ended, which for the most part did not take place on the Ugra at all, and most importantly, hardly belonged to the category of “stands”.

Rus' from Nepryadva to Ugra

The victory of Dmitry Donskoy over the ruler of the right wing of the Golden Horde, Mamai, on the Kulikovo Field in 1380 did not draw a line under the century and a half of dependence of North-Eastern Rus' on the Horde. It is unlikely that the prince himself set such a goal - he fought, “not sparing his belly,” with the “illegal ruler” who threatened his country with “ultimate ruin.” The historical meaning of the victory was reflected in something else: after Nepryadva, it became clear that the center of the struggle for independence from the Horde after 1380 could only be Moscow. In the meantime, after the devastating campaign of the “legitimate king,” Khan Tokhtamysh, in 1382, when many cities of the Moscow principality, including the capital, were destroyed, payments to the Horde increased and half-forgotten forms of dependence were revived. At the same time, Tokhtamysh himself transferred the territory of the Vladimir Great Reign (non-inheritable table) to the “patrimonial estate” of the Grand Duke of Moscow, which meant the refusal of the Sarai rulers from the traditional practice of the 13th-14th centuries of pitting the Rurikids against each other in the fight for the table in Vladimir. Crushing blows Tokhtamysh was attacked by Timur in 1391 and 1395, when the latter’s troops “ironed” the most developed areas of the Horde for several months. It seemed that thanks to them, Rus' would quickly free itself from the power of the “Golden Horde kings.” It seemed that the Horde would no longer economically recover from the pogrom committed; the strife of the descendants of Khan Jochi would complete the work begun by Timur... But the nomadic states surprisingly quickly regenerated their military potential (and it was great), while at the same time the presence of rival Horde groups only increased the danger of new campaigns to Rus'. In the 1430-1450s, tribute was sometimes paid to two khans, and sometimes for objective reasons (lack of “legalized” subordination to one or another khan) it was not paid. Thus, the understanding of its optionality gradually developed. For more than a quarter of a century, two lines of the Moscow Rurik dynasty were engaged in a mortal struggle for the main table (1425-1453), all the Moscow princes, almost all the principalities and states of North-Eastern Rus', and the Horde rulers joined it. The victory of Grand Duke Vasily II Vasilyevich the Dark, who emerged from the strife blinded, led to consolidation throughout the country. It is also important that the princes learned to see in the khans not only the source of their power and the personification of dependence, but also rival rulers in the international sphere and on the battlefield. The rich experience of military confrontation with the Horde raised two generations of Russian soldiers, who became “customary” to resist the Horde troops. Fighting with them in the border zones (1437, winter 1444-1445), repelling attacks on the left bank of the middle Oka (1450, 1455, 1459) or “besieging” in Moscow (1439, 1451). There were defeats, and painful ones at that: in July 1445, Vasily II was captured. But they already believed in the possibility of military victory over the Horde. Ivan III Vasilyevich was the last Grand Duke to receive permission to reign in the Horde, and the first to overthrow the power of the khan. And society turned out to be ready for a decisive battle; it was no longer the temporary rulers who were “illegal”, they were the Genghisid khans themselves. Their power over the Orthodox sovereign henceforth became illegal and intolerable. Thus stretched the thread of one destiny, one great task - from Nepryadva to Ugra.

Having dismissed the main forces in Borovsk to their homes, at the end of November 1480 the Grand Duke with his son, brothers, governors and court returned to the capital. Prayer services and ceremonies followed, however, not particularly pompous - the Nativity Fast began. Many were aware of the significance of what had happened: even warnings were heard to the “kind and courageous” against the “foolish madness”, after all, they “boasted” that it was they who “with their weapons delivered the Russian land” - a humble Christian was not supposed to think so. This means that the sense of self-esteem and pride in participating in the great victory rose so high. The feasts died down, and the brothers of the sovereign prince, Andrei Bolshoi and Boris, received the promised additions. Ivan III had special joys: in the spring the news came that Akhmat had been killed, and in October 1481 his wife gave him a third son, Dmitry. But there were also consequences that reverberated several years later, and sometimes decades later.

What remained behind the victors of 1480? Almost 250 years of addiction - sometimes severe, sometimes more moderate. In any case, the Horde invasions and huge dues influenced the development of the medieval city in North-Eastern Rus', changing the vector of socio-political evolution of society, because the country of the 14th-16th centuries clearly lacked citizens as an economic and political force. Agriculture also suffered, having been shifted for a long time to lands with infertile soils protected by forests and rivers, and the formation of fiefdoms and seigneuries was slowed down. Only from the middle - second half of the 14th century did the service boyars revive: in the 13th - early 14th centuries, this elite stratum declined many times due to deaths on the battlefield or extremely harsh living conditions. The dominance of the Horde not only slowed down, but set back the progressive development of the country. After 1480 the situation changed dramatically. Of course, relations with Rome, Venice, and the Teutonic Order began back in the 1460s and 1470s, but now Russia is entering into a close diplomatic dialogue with almost two dozen states - old and new partners, and among them many were ready to “be friends against” the Jagiellons (primarily Casimir) and, moreover, recognize the “legitimacy” of Moscow’s claims to Kiev and the lands of “Orthodox Russians” in Lithuania, and also accept the titles of the Moscow sovereign. And these titles, used by Moscow diplomats, recorded the equality of Ivan III in status with the leading monarchs of Europe, including the emperor, which meant recognition of Russian sovereignty in the international forms that were then customary.

There were also practical consequences: two Russian-Lithuanian wars at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th centuries reduced the territory of Lithuania by more than a quarter and expanded the borders of Russia. Eastern policy brought no less significant results - from 1487, for almost 20 years, the Moscow sovereign “placed khans from his own hand” on the throne in Kazan. Vyatka finally submitted, and at the end of the century the first “Moscow” campaign beyond the Urals took place. As if by chance, in 1485 the Grand Duchy of Tver became part of the state (its prince fled to Lithuania). Pskov and the Ryazan principality were under complete political and military control of Moscow. The last third of the 15th century was the time of economic growth of the country, the era of the formation of a sovereign Russian state: in February 1498, by the decision of Ivan III, the “great reigns” (Moscow, Vladimir and Novgorod) were crowned as his co-ruler and heir, Dmitry the grandson, the son of the deceased in 1490 by Grand Duke Ivan the Young. Since then, supreme power has been inherited and the only source of its legitimacy has been the ruling monarch. The origins of Russia as a state moving from the Middle Ages into the early modern era lie in a country that found itself after the events of 1480.

You can also rejoice in the direct fruits of victory. In 1382, after the Battle of Kulikovo, Moscow was ravaged and burned, hundreds of books were burned in the Kremlin churches, and the dead Muscovites were buried in common “skudelitsa”. In 1485, a fundamental restructuring of the entire Kremlin began. In just over twenty years, the former white-stone medieval castle turned into the residence of the monarch of a powerful state with powerful fortifications, a full range of palace stone buildings, central institutions, cathedrals and court cathedrals. This grandiose construction project, which required large expenses, was carried out largely thanks to the victory on the Ugra, after which Russia was finally freed from paying tribute. And if we add the powerful rise of the arts and culture in general, which occurred at the end of the 15th century, the conclusion is clear: the historical consequences of the victory on the Ugra are broader, more diverse and more fundamental than the victory on Nepryadva.

Vladislav Nazarov. "Around the world"