Olga Viktorovna Kryshtanovskaya(born November 24, 1954, Moscow) is a well-known Russian sociologist who specializes in the study of elites.

was born Olga Kryshtanovskaya November 24, 1954 in Moscow in a family of philologists. Olga Kryshtanovskaya Graduated in 1979 from the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University. Since 1989 he has directed the Center for the Study of Elites at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 2002 she defended her doctoral dissertation in sociology.

Honorary Professor at the University of Glasgow, Academician of the Academy of Political Science. Since 2009 Olga Kryshtanovskaya- Member of United Russia. In 2010, she headed the women's public "Excellent" movement.
February 6, 2012 Olga Kryshtanovskaya was officially registered as a trustee of a candidate for the President of the Russian Federation and the current Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation. However, June 11 Olga Kryshtanovskaya suspended membership in the United Russia, declaring that it was switching from studying power circles to opposition ones.

Literature by Olga Kryshtanovskaya
“The position of the Chekists today is fantastically stable” // Power. - 2007. - No. 10.
Kryshtanovskaya O. V. Anatomy of the Russian elite. Moscow: Zakharov, 2005. - 384 p. ISBN 5815904570.
Kryshtanovskaya O.V. Political stratification of Russian society // World of Russia. 2004. No. 4.
Kryshtanovskaya O. V. Modern concepts of the political elite and Russian practice // World of Russia. 2004. Vol. XIII. No. 4. S. 3-39.
Modern Russian elite. What's this? // Finam FM, Realnoe Vremya, 06/10/2011.
Political scientist Olga Kryshtanovskaya - about Putin's victory // Radio Liberty, 05.03.2012.

Putin can make Serdyukov wait, and his servants - "former compatriots" at the five-star pool

Rise and rule
Putin can make Serdyukov wait, and his servants - "former compatriots" at the five-star pool
Prominent Putin-era sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya memorialized her stay in a five-star Cypriot hotel with a Facebook post that read:
“Here I was lying by the blue pool of the best 5-star hotel. in Cyprus and thought: “Bliiiiin! Well, could I, a simple Russian woman, imagine that I would be resting in such beauty as a mistress and mistress? And that our emigrants will serve me - maids, drivers, waiters? We, who remained in Russia, now come to different countries as wealthy tourists. And they - who emigrated for a better life - clean up after us, carry us, serve us ... "

After the famous tweet of Marie Antoinette #if there is no bread, let them eat cakes - this, of course, is a masterpiece. A small sociological masterpiece that brilliantly characterizes the attitude of Putin's elite.
If this tweet was written by Sveta from Ivanov, we would shrug our shoulders. But it was written by a sociologist, and that's wonderful.
First, pay attention to this beautiful "lying by the pool." Ms. Kryshtanovskaya went to an island of marvelous beauty, where you can relax as you like - walk in the mountains, swim in the sea. But the ideal of rest for Putin's elite is not like this: I lie by the pool, and they wait on me.

Secondly, I must inform the sociologist Kryshtanovskaya that her idea that all our former compatriots who have abandoned Putin's blessed Russia are forced to sweep hotels is sociologically incorrect. Some of them - for example, Sergey Brin - you know, got their own companies. In countries where they were not imprisoned or stripped for this. And do you know what is the most amazing thing? Here are those who have made a career, they can boast of many things. That they created a company that is worth a billion. Some are proud of their yachts, wives and sports hobbies. But I don't think any of them can take pride in being "lying by the pool."

If only because lying by the pool in the West is no achievement. I will tell the sociologist Kryshtanovskaya a little secret: the whole of Cyprus is covered with small villas, rather houses, in which the most ordinary British pensioners live: not millionaires, but ordinary people who have worked all their lives. And in the courtyard of each villa there is a swimming pool where you can lie down.

But the most interesting thing in this whole story is this: indeed, in Cyprus - as in Israel or America - there are a lot of our "former compatriots" - both Pontic Greeks and Russians, and yes, many of them simply work in the most ordinary jobs in poor western country: they build, sabbat, work as gardeners and goldsmiths. What, however, is not visible is that one of these "former compatriots" would like to return to Putin's blessed Russia.

I would venture to suggest that this happens for two reasons.

Firstly, none of them wants to change the work of a gardener in Cyprus for a drunken animal existence in their native Muhosransk. Because - unlike in Cyprus - there are no jobs for ordinary Russian citizens in Russia. There is a job for a guest worker. But if you are a citizen of Russia and are trying to get a job in the housing office to screw up pipes, you are objectionable.

Secondly ... how would you explain this to a sociologist? If the sociologist Kryshtanovskaya had deigned to talk to these "maids", she would have discovered that in Cyprus these people feel like people.
Cyprus is generally such a very free place. You are walking along a mountain road, and next to you is a Cypriot harvesting his avocados. When he sees you, he pours you a full hem. You go along a different road - and a Cypriot who notices you rushes to his car, pulls out honeycombs from there and tries to treat you. And the regal old Greek woman who invited you into the house for a cup of coffee for the good reason that she was busy in the garden, and you walked by, can tell you that she has already undergone three operations for cancer - and that's all alive.

And “who emigrated for a better life,” just one of those same maids who so aroused the lordly arrogance of Kryshtanovskaya, can also tell why she left: because they tried to rape her daughter in a small town. The rapist cut her forehead on the step of the stairs, the mother jumped out, he ran away. And since the police, of course, did not look for the rapist, the family itself found him, fortunately he was known to everyone: he was the son of a local cop. And after that, a nightmare began in the life of the family.

So, this is me to the fact that in Cyprus (as in Israel, the USA, Norway, etc.), small ordinary people who serve as waiters and wipers and arouse such contempt for Lady Kryshtanovskaya feel like people. They don't die of cancer at forty, because doctors just send them to hell, and the sons of local policemen don't bang their daughters' heads on concrete steps.

And these little people know that if they work - not to protect a business, not to found companies - but just to work (not everyone can be Sergey Brin), then they will earn a house, a swimming pool, medical care and a normal school and country for their children. . What a hard worker cannot get in Putin's Russia: as evidenced by the example of the mother of many children, Diana Nochivnaya, who earned 13,000 rubles in Rostov. a month, working day and night, making tiles, and committed suicide by throwing herself on high-voltage wires.

Oh yes. And one more little moment. It just so happened that at the same time that Kryshtanovskaya was describing her buzz, NTV, on the occasion of Putin's 60th birthday, showed an amazing 50-minute program by Vadim Takmenev, dedicated to the personal life of our everything.

Takmenev showed everything. He showed Putin, who spends hours in the morning swimming in the pool and doing fitness; , and shows where the legs grow from and why the Putin elite has such a feeling that the main thing in life is a buzz.

With the difference that Putin can make Serdyukov wait, and his servants - only "former compatriots" at the five-star pool.

Olga Viktorovna Kryshtanovskaya(born November 24, 1954, Moscow) is a Russian sociologist who specializes in the study of elites.

Biography

In 1979 she graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University. Since 1989 he has directed the Center for the Study of Elites at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 2002 she defended her doctoral dissertation in sociology.

Honorary Professor at the University of Glasgow, Academician of the Academy of Political Science. Since 2009 he has been a member of United Russia.

In 2010, she headed the women's pro-Kremlin public movement "Excellent students".

On February 6, 2012, she was officially registered as a trustee of the candidate for the President of the Russian Federation and the current Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin.

On June 11, 2012, she “suspended” her membership in the United Russia, declaring that she was switching from studying power circles to opposition ones.

Personal life

In her first marriage, she was the wife of the mathematician and sociologist Alexander Kryshtanovsky, whose last name she left for herself.

sayings

“Here I was lying by the blue pool of the best 5-star hotel in Cyprus and thought: “bliiiiin! Well, could I, a simple Russian woman, imagine that I would be resting in such beauty as a mistress and lady? And that our emigrants would serve me "maids, chauffeurs, waiters? We, who remained in Russia, now come to different countries as wealthy tourists. And they - who emigrated for a better share - clean up after us, drive us, serve us ... "

Olga Kryshtanovskaya // Facebook October 8, 2012. Kryshtanovskaya, Olga V. Retrieved October 10, 2012. Archived from the original on October 10, 2012.

This statement evoked a significant response. According to Andrey Illarionov, Kryshtanovskaya in this statement synthesized the formula of the Russian national idea, formulated by Pushkin: “I don’t want to be a black peasant woman, // I want to be a pillar noblewoman ... // She has zealous servants in front of her ...” and Y. Latynina called it “a small sociological masterpiece which brilliantly characterizes the attitude of Putin's elite.

Major Publications

1. Kryshtanovskaya O.V. Engineers: Formation and development of a professional group / Ed. ed. F. R. Filippov. - M.: Nauka, 1989. - 144 p. - ISBN 5-02-013328-0.
2. Kryshtanovskaya O. V., Radzikhovsky L. A. Framework of power: experience of political science research // Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences. - 1993. - T. 63, No. 2. - S. 94-101.
3. Kryshtanovskaya O. V. Illegal structures in Russia // Sociological research. - 1995. - No. 8. - S. 94-106. - ISSN 0132-1625.
4. Kryshtanovskaya O. V. Financial oligarchy in Russia // Izvestia. - 1996. January 10.
5. Kryshtanovskaya O. V. Business elite and oligarchs: results of the decade // World of Russia. - 2002. - T. 11, No. 4. - S. 3-60. - ISSN 1811-038X.
6. Kryshtanovskaya O. V., Khutoyarsky Yu. V. Elite and age: the way up // Sociological research. - 2002. - No. 4. - S. 49-60.
7. Kryshtanovskaya O. V. Transformation of the Russian business elite: 1998-2002 // Sociological research. - 2002. - No. 8. - S. 17-49.
8. Kryshtanovskaya O. V. Putin's Regime: Liberal Militocracy? // Pro et Contra. - 2002. - V. 7, No. 4. - S. 158-180.
9. Kryshtanovskaya O. V. Former. Trends in downward mobility of the Russian elite // Social sciences and modernity. - 2003. - No. 5. - S. 33-39. - ISSN 0869-0499.
10. Kryshtanovskaya O. V. Formation of the regional elite: principles and mechanisms. Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya [Sociological Studies]. - 2003. - No. 11. - S. 3-13.
11. Kryshtanovskaya O. V. Modern concepts of the political elite and Russian practice // World of Russia. - 2004. - T. 13, No. 4. - S. 3-39.
12. Kryshtanovskaya O.V. Anatomy of the Russian elite. - M.: Zakharov, 2005. - 384 p. - 10,000 copies. - ISBN 5-8159-0457-0.

Who came up with modernization?

Interview with Olga Kryshtanovskaya

Olga Viktorovna Kryshtanovskaya, a well-known sociologist, a specialist in the study of the Russian elite, in an interview with Lenta.Ru explains the principles of personnel policy under "tandemocracy", and also tells why the debate about the "dashing 90s" has become so aggravated, who invented modernization and who will be next the president of Russia.

Who will remember the old ...

Lenta.Ru: Let's start with an article about Yegor Gaidar written by Gavriil Popov and Yuri Luzhkov. Why such a surge of elite interest in the 90s? And interest, to put it mildly, unfriendly.

Olga Kryshtanovskaya: There have been numerous comments about Gaidar's activities after his death. Basically, they were in the nature of panegyrics, they were clearly laudatory. Apparently, this pissed off people who think otherwise. So much so that they did not even wait for forty days and came up with a sharply critical article.

Lenta.Ru: So it was just an emotional reaction?

OK.: I suppose that here the initiative came mostly from Gavriil Kharitonovich. Lately he has been writing a lot, publishing books, pamphlets, articles. To be honest, these works somehow did not find a response. Apparently, his fighting spirit has grown stronger lately so much that he could not be silent.

Lenta.Ru: Well, well, Popov has a polemical enthusiasm. But we are used to the fact that current politicians, especially of such a magnitude as Luzhkov, do nothing out of some kind of polemical enthusiasm. Is there any politics in this?

OK.: Why Luzhkov joined is the question. I think that fans of the 90s dispersed such an information wave that a desire arose to stop it. In particular, in order to support the current government. It's no secret that the confrontation between the politicians of the 90s and the politicians of the 2000s has survived, it has not gone anywhere. Just moved a little into the shadows.

I would say that this is the age-old confrontation between Slavophiles and Westerners, only in a modern interpretation. After all, no matter how many parties you create in our country, anyway, the nerve of political confrontation runs on this topic - you are for the West, or for your own, special path of development. That is, ideologically, we always have two parties (whatever they are called).

Westerners believe that there is no other way but democracy and the market. On the contrary, the Slavophiles and the Podviniks are sure that we ourselves have a mustache, and following other people's examples humiliates our national pride. In fairness, it must be said that in all non-Western countries there is such a division.

Lenta.Ru: Another participant in this discussion is Tatyana Borisovna Yumasheva, formerly known as Dyachenko, who suddenly appeared. In a recent interview with Profil magazine, you said that Yumasheva started a blog that has become very popular for a reason, that she is preparing for some kind of political career. In the same blog, she answered without naming names, but it is clear to you that she is not going into any politics, she will not create any parties. If not for your own active political career, then for what? How does Popov have polemical enthusiasm?

OK.: Here, I think, the matter is more serious. Perhaps Tatyana Yumasheva personally is not going to become the leader of the party. But it is in the political field, it is the carrier of the most important information. And she is currently using her knowledge to clean the 90s of adhering dirt.

Why do I think this is important? See. Dmitry Medvedev is moving towards liberalism with his modernization strategy. He is trying to somehow democratize our political system and economy, albeit in small steps (as his critics believe), but still quite clearly. Our political system is now arranged in such a way that it is difficult to become a political heavyweight without a party. The time will come when he will have to leave the presidency. I think it would be logical to prepare a game for him in advance. On the right flank, where he could turn his eyes, there is no such party now. There are only pitiful fragments of the Democrats of the 90s, mired in squabbles and mutual accusations. It would be strange if the liberal Medvedev suddenly headed a left-wing party (say, A Just Russia). There is a party, and perhaps it would be glad to welcome Medvedev. But ideologically, this is nonsense.

It turns out that Medvedev needs a party for his development as a politician. And the party for him is only on the left flank. Contradiction! That is, an objectively right-wing party is now very much needed by the authorities.

On the other hand, Tatyana Yumasheva in her blog is clearly and skillfully making efforts to improve the image of the 90s. Perhaps her influential friends support her in this. Let me remind you that today about 15 percent of Boris Nikolayevich's appointees work in the Russian elite.

And so it came together: the social order of the authorities, and the need of part of the establishment and business to reanimate the Democratic Party. Here is my logic.

In addition, Tatyana Yumasheva herself wrote in her blog that nothing is done just like that in politics. If someone or something appears in politics, then it is not just that. I applied her own quote to her actions. If materials have begun to be published that can destroy the negative mythology around the name of Yeltsin and the period of the democratic revolution in our country, then someone needs it.

Lenta.Ru: But this blog is, in fact, a memoir. Maybe this is not an actual policy, but a summing up?

OK.: I would absolutely agree with you if Tatyana were 80-90 years old. Then everything is clear: life has passed, it is necessary to sum up. But when a young, full of strength woman who heads the Boris Yeltsin Foundation, who has influence, has strong friends, begins to do this ... Moreover, her "memoirs" did not appear in the zero years, not under Vladimir Putin, no! Namely, now, when liberal modernization began to be carried out in the country. It seems to me that this cannot but have political overtones. I could be wrong, but that's how it seems to me.

Modernization always has two sides. On the one hand - economic modernization, on the other - it requires political democratization. Medvedev demonstrates that he is interested in both sides of the coin.

As soon as a thaw begins in our country, it is accompanied by an increase in chaotic processes: the opposition comes out more sharply, new forces of protest appear, and the elite is fragmented. This is an inevitable process and very difficult to manage. If these waves gain strength, they can blow everything around like a tsunami. Therefore, periods of liberalization have always ended with tough measures in order to put things in order and calmly move on.

Medvedev started this liberalization and these forces were awakened. For now, this is just the beginning. Someone still did not fully believe in the sincerity of the presidential program. Gradually, the further the president moves towards modernization, these forces will gain strength.

So far, the process is contradictory: somewhere they are allowed to sharply criticize the government (oddly enough - at the State Council), and somewhere they still disperse rallies of dissenters with batons. But still, the process went on. Medvedev summoned voices from the darkness of the underground. Now it will be very difficult to stop them. The president will not be able to do with economic modernization alone. He will either collapse in the economy, or will be forced to modernize the political sphere as well.

Unstable tandem

Lenta.Ru: So it's still warm?

OK.: Now it has become possible, and many Democrats began to raise their heads. The mass of people who vegetated somewhere throughout the 2000s are now moving. They had a hope that a real right-wing party, new strong leaders, would nevertheless appear. Do not forget, these are millions of people who shared the ideals of democracy, but then cooled down, drooped, and sit on the sidelines. This is an electorate that has lost its party. The social order is so obvious...

Lenta.Ru: And do you think that Medvedev is counting on this social order? Given that he has a tandem with Putin, United Russia, is it a pocket-sized systemic opposition? What for? Moreover, the liberals were in the minority even in the 90s.

OK.: It is inconvenient for the authorities to work in a one and a half party system, which is irresistibly striving to become a one-party system. If you think that "United Russia" is delighted that somewhere 90 percent of the people vote for them, and then everyone accuses them of the fact that the elections are dishonest - then no, it's not! They would like to have legitimacy, and for this they need real elections, competition, opposition. Their position would be more stable if they had serious opponents. A real victory is worth a lot!

Imagine now a different situation, when the government itself manages to form a two-party system. In this case, the ruling elite would be one, and it would have two parties. Like our two-headed eagle with one body, you know? To then be in the elections? If the left-wing party or the right-wing party had won, this would not have significantly changed the political system. Well, the course would change a little, well, the leaders would change ... This is necessary. People get tired of one leader. But what is important - the system as a whole would remain stable!

In my opinion, this would be an ideal model for Russia if Putin and Medvedev led different parties and fought in elections not with political dwarfs, but with each other. Russia would finally break out of the vicious circle of revolutions: each change of power - again "who was nothing, that became everything." This is our problem - a political hourglass that turns the country upside down every time.

It would be better than a tandem. Tandem is unstable. It depends on personal relationships. What if Ivan Ivanovich and Ivan Nikiforovich quarrel? And what should the country do?

Lenta.Ru: How are powers distributed in tandem now? Putin goes to Pikalevo, Medvedev is at war with Georgia?

OK.: Powers between the President and the Prime Minister are actually redistributed. If earlier the President was directly in charge of law enforcement agencies, now it is not even the Prime Minister. Deputy Prime Minister - Sergei Ivanov. We never had this.

When Putin was president, he once a week on Mondays gathered the main members of the government in his Kremlin. Directly led the chief economic ministers. Medvedev now very rarely gathers economic meetings. Even during a crisis - once, rarely twice a month. And Putin - four or five times a month. From the changed frequency, from the changed format, one can understand that powers have been seriously redistributed and Medvedev's intervention in the economy is minimal.

Medvedev is more involved in the judicial system, corruption. Previously, the president did not deal with this in such detail. But its resources in the regions have decreased. All personnel issues have been transferred to the ruling party, that is, it is under Putin's jurisdiction. He leads the government, partly the security forces, through United Russia - the State Duma and the Federation Council (where United Russia members make up more than 70 percent), regional parliaments and even municipalities. EP has achieved a majority everywhere. We have never had such an all-powerful prime minister!

But so far, this distribution of power resources in tandem has not been institutionalized. So far, this is all based on the personal friendship of two friends. And for our political system it would be important that this be enshrined in laws. To have a strong prime minister in Russia, no matter what his last name is: Putin, Ivanov or, for example, Khloponin. It would be necessary to change the law on the government (cancel the "asterisks" on the power ministers, remove dualism in the government). It would be necessary to amend the Constitution regarding the procedure for the appointment and dismissal of the prime minister. A strong prime minister cannot be an ordinary official dismissed with a stroke of the pen. It would be logical to approve the provision according to which the cabinet is automatically headed by the leader of the winning party. How his legitimacy would rise!

But none of this is being done. From which I conclude that Putin is likely to return to the Kremlin, and he does not want to lose presidential powers.

Lenta.Ru: When will he return?

OK.: In 2012.

Lenta.Ru: Not in 2018?

OK.: In 2012 he will be 60 years old. If he misses these elections, then next time he will be 66, and this is already problematic. Putin can get in the way. Not only because of age. It is impossible to maintain such a high trust rating indefinitely while remaining on the political sidelines.

Turbulence

Lenta.Ru: We talked a while ago and they are both on the President's Human Rights Council. And they unanimously said that a certain turbulence is taking place at the top with the arrival of Medvedev. On the one hand, some people change, and on the other hand, even those who do not change begin to behave somehow differently. Now the equator of Medvedev's presidency is approaching - with a thaw, judicial reform, reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and so on. And the change of the elite, despite the turbulence, is imperceptible. Is a separate "Medvedev" elite being formed?

OK.: It is being formed. True, not like Putin.

But first, about turbulence: it is due to the very existence of the tandem. People do not know whom to focus on, and cannot fully believe that after all, it is not Putin, but Medvedev. I am now traveling around the regions with the Strategy 2020 forum. I have already traveled half the country and everywhere I watch how portraits hang. In one region, they found a simply brilliant solution: a coat of arms, and portraits of Putin and Medvedev on the right and left, but Putin is a little higher.

Imagine officials who are invited to a meeting with the president and the prime minister at the same time. Or meetings that start half an hour apart. After all, there are events that you cannot refuse, you must definitely come here and there. What to do with these endless overlays? Officials grumble. And this has been going on for almost two years. That's turbulence for you!

Or another story. Medvedev's line on the personnel reserve and rejuvenation causes, if not a commotion, then tension in the elite. Imagine, in the region your name is published as a reservist, everyone knows you, the media interview you. Here's something going to happen. You are filled with anticipation of takeoff. But - nothing happens. The reservists are tense - well, when will they be taught something, gathered somewhere, appointed by someone? They appeal to the authorities: when, when? And they are not collected anywhere. They are not assigned anywhere. And maybe they never will. How do you think these young people feel?

On the other hand, people who now occupy high positions are in the civil service. Everywhere they say: "Reserve! Reserve!" Do they make it better for them? Do they feel that the chair under them is heating up? The elite are people from 50 to 60 years old, experienced people who have reached the top of their careers. They, the backbone of state power, suddenly began to feel uncomfortable, feeling breath in the back of their heads. This youthful enthusiasm, with which personnel changes are being made today, is causing fragmentation of the elite, generational fragmentation. This is especially felt in law enforcement agencies, in the regions.

Look at the changes in the governor's corps. The average age of new governors appointed by Medvedev is 48 years. Unprecedented! Indeed, before that, governors were the oldest group in the elite, their average age was 63 years. Putin led a very cautious personnel policy, and here is such a drastic renewal. With Mintimer Shaimiev still nothing: a man who subtly feels the spirit of the times - he left. But more often it causes dissatisfaction.

Lenta.Ru: But there is also Yuri Luzhkov, who has been predicted to resign for more than a month, but he is still in place. This is his speech about Gaidar, which we have already discussed, is it not also an attempt to deflect the blow from himself, to prevent his resignation?

OK.: Luzhkov is one of the leaders of United Russia, don't forget that. Yes, his article in "MK" pours water on the "pochvennikov" mill, it is directed against the democrats, against the 90s. There is no news here - this is his long-standing position. I don't think it has anything to do with the possibility of his resignation. Some kind of article to protect yourself from leaving? That's funny. He has been in power for a long time, and there are reasons for this. But someday he will leave. We all leave someday. And the longer he is in power, the closer his departure.

Putin has kept many old bison in the regions. That was his policy. He stopped the personnel meat grinder, which was under both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Putin has always acted very cautiously. Even when people made obvious mistakes, he did not fire them, he tried to cooperate. And thus won great respect in the political class. He is not just the leader of the people, he is, above all, the leader of the bureaucracy. He did a lot for the Russian bureaucracy, and therefore the officials of the whole country are ready to swear allegiance to him again and again. He understands their interests, protects their interests, he never threw people out into the street, as his predecessors ruthlessly did. A whole system of reservations and ex-elite zones was created so that an official could adequately leave a high post. Putin understood that without their support he would not be able to govern the country.

Lenta.Ru: And Medvedev again arranges personnel meat grinder?

OK.: For now, you can't say that. Among the governors - renewal by 18 percent, for other groups of the elite - up to 30 percent. But not only the pace of elite traffic is important. The main thing is that he almost did not bring his people to key positions. Of the 75 keywords - only two are obvious "Medvedev". He brings technocrats and managers, not just his loyalists. This is a different personnel policy.

So far, I see no reason to say that Medvedev's team has been formed. For me, it's still a president without a team. A small group in the presidential administration is not enough. His people occupy posts somewhere on the second, and somewhere on the third or even fourth bureaucratic level. They rise, but slowly. To put their own, it is necessary to drive out Putin's people. But it's still a conflict. Personnel is the most important thing in our policy. Medvedev does not dare or does not consider it necessary to expel Putin's cadres and continues to work with them. But the changes that he makes are aimed at rejuvenating the elite. Medvedev's people were born in the 60s and even 70s, while Putin's people were born in the 50s.

Lenta.Ru: It's clear with Shaimiev, it's clear with Luzhkov. But here a high-profile story happened to another governor - with Georgy Boos. In his entrusted territory, in Kaliningrad, an unprecedented thing happened: 15 thousand people go to the square of the regional capital and begin to demand Putin's resignation. This hasn't happened for a long time. With the way things are set up for us, this is a reason for resignation, no?

OK.: Now still no. Notice when such things happen, resignation never follows immediately. A person works, and then he is smoothly moved, maybe even with a promotion. Putin has started such a tradition that there will never be a clear causal relationship. If Boos is fired, it means that in another place it is also possible to topple the governor by gathering a 15,000-strong rally. This is a dangerous precedent. But there is a logic here: if the leadership does not listen to its people, then protest actions are obtained. It's bad when protesters are put in monkey houses and beaten. And the bosses should be punished if they do not respond to the demands of their population.

Lenta.Ru: Is the situation the same with Minister of Internal Affairs Rashid Nurgaliyev? It turns out that his diocese is a mess, and that is why he will not be fired?

OK.: Here, I think, the point is not in the person who will come to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but in how to change the entire system, how to get rid of the vertical corruption that permeates the entire system. If it has come to the point that they are talking about the complete dispersal of the police. These Augean stables need a real Hercules.

Lenta.Ru: Maybe a civilian minister of the interior?

OK.: Maybe! Our defense minister is a civilian. It is quite possible that a completely clean person will be imprisoned at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In Russia, there was no such precedent for a civilian to head the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Although it can be assumed that the internal protest of the system will be colossal.

Everything goes according to plan

Lenta.Ru: We have a little more than two years before the presidential elections. Won't this very thaw lead to conflict within the tandem? There, after all, it turns out that the Westerner Medvedev is against the soil-minded Putin?

OK.: The Kremlin understands this threat. Everything is being done to ensure that institutional conflict does not occur. It's really dangerous, no one wants a split. All power works for the fact that this is one team, one force. Therefore, Medvedev is limited in personnel changes. In ideology, too: modernization is modernization, but he continues to do some things in the spirit of Putin.

I am sure that there will be no split between Putin personally and Medvedev personally. But this does not mean that it will not be in other places of the political field. Cracks are already visible - at the regional level, in the bureaucracy of the third and fourth levels, the fragmentation of the elite along age and ideological principles. As long as it's small cracks. And it is absolutely impossible to avoid them. Otherwise, Medvedev will have to do nothing and say nothing at all.

Lenta.Ru: Well, yes, and in 2012 Putin returns, until he is 70 years old, modernization and thaw are curtailed, everything returns to normal ...

OK.: No I do not think so. Putin will no longer be able to enter the same river. If he comes back, it will be a different president. with another program. Modernization is hardly invented by Medvedev. It was invented by Putin when he was in the Kremlin. He understood the need for this. But the conditions were such that the primary task was to strengthen the state. The idea was to first take power into their own hands, and only then begin modernization. Therefore, Medvedev became his successor - he was most suitable for this role. Therefore, I believe that Putin in 2012 will appear before us as a different, more liberal politician.

Lenta.Ru: So everything is going according to plan?

OK.: In the rarefied air of the mountain peaks - yes, everything is planned there. But below there are always unforeseen streams, cracks, collapses. As in Kaliningrad, for example. It is never possible to predict absolutely all the consequences of decisions made. This is a natural process, it is impossible to control everything. The best thing to do is to come up with a system that will automatically promote the necessary splits and the necessary streams.

Perhaps a plan has been thought out to return Putin to the presidency in 2012. But this cannot be the only scenario. Perhaps the most likely. Otherwise, the strengthening of the powers of the head of government, which took place under Putin, would have been fixed institutionally and in laws. Since this did not happen, it means that autocracy will soon return. The king will return to his throne.

Lenta.Ru: And Medvedev did nothing to gain a foothold?

OK.: For this he needs a party. If he leaves the Kremlin, without his party, he will willy-nilly become just an official, as prime ministers have been until now. He needs, just needs his own party!

The sociologist, director of the Kryshtanovskaya Laboratory, who left United Russia in the summer to study not the establishment, but those processes that can demolish it, believes that the young part of the elite, raised to the top by Medvedev, is capable of becoming an ally of the coming revolution, the main the subject of which are the intelligentsia and students.

Photo by Anna Artemyeva

The sociologist, director of the Kryshtanovskaya Laboratory*, who left United Russia in the summer to study not the establishment, but those processes that can demolish it, believes that the young part of the elite, raised to the top by Medvedev, is capable of becoming an ally of the coming revolution, the main subject of which remain the intelligentsia and students.

- Olga Viktorovna, at the very beginning of the summer you publicly announced that you were suspending your membership in United Russia and your participation in politics in general in order to return to science - to study the revolution. Have you changed your mind?

- Yes, I still believe that a revolutionary situation is brewing in Russia, that everything is very serious, and if you close your eyes and pretend that it will “dissolve itself”, then this can end badly for the country. Our history is full of revolutionary drama. And now we are at that stage of the cycle when the idea of ​​breaking the inert state machine can prevail. Many believe that this is the only way to make a new leap in the development of the country. But I really hope that this time it will not be necessary to break it. We must not abandon attempts, by putting pressure on the state, to achieve movement in the direction that most people need.

“However, in reality, we see something completely different: increased repressions against dissidents, ignoring and perverting all the demands of the opposition, the triumphant return of a “strong hand” in the person of Putin.

— There is logic in these “repressions” (in other words, in attempts to strengthen state power). Our political system is such that the Russian "tsar" can rule only when he is able to protect his "boyars". He is the guarantor not only of the Constitution, but also of the inviolability of the political class. In this regard, little has changed in the country from the first Ruriks to the times of Navalny and Udaltsov. The antagonism between the ruling class and the people has existed for centuries. And now it exists. As soon as the class of proprietors becomes stronger in Russia, and the central government weakens, the people begin the struggle for freedom. Power is protected. Defending herself, she hides the true extent of her power and wealth. The people expose the government, accusing it of the illegitimacy of wealth, of illegitimacy. This is war. A real war for power, for property, for morality. This system was not invented by Putin. This is the old system. And Putin, having come to the Kremlin in 2000, was forced to comply with the current rules. And now he is obliged to fulfill the "social contract" between the ruler and the elite. He is between two fires: if he protects the elite, the people rebel. If he takes the side of the people, the elite will rebel. What's better? In chess, this position is called "zugzwang", when any move only worsens the position.

If everything in the country continues as it is now, then people at the highest levels of power will face a dilemma: 1) keep the system, but surrender their leader, or 2) change the system (in this case, the leader may be the same or different).

Replacing a leader is relatively easy. But this by and large will not change anything in the country. Although it can calm the protesters. Changing the system is extremely difficult and time consuming. I doubt that the revolutionaries understand this. Even if Putin starts doing this (and he starts!), people don't believe it, they don't see it.

Which exit? Putin is forced to constantly demonstrate his strength in order not to lose his leadership positions in the political class and to prevent the destabilization of society. Therefore, he acts consistently harshly, sometimes using the violent instruments of the state, but more often only by threatening force. Where it leads? Some part of the protesters (the majority, I think) will come to their senses and go home, not wanting trouble. The other (smaller) part will radicalize, become more desperate and daring. It will better prepare for further war, arm itself, organize itself and continue.

risk zone

- Now in the expert community two points of view prevail. First, the government has enough resources to stay within the framework of the scenario it has set (the next election of Vladimir Putin as president in a few years, while maintaining imitation democracy and full control over political and social processes). Second: the possibility of the collapse of the system at any time with unpredictable consequences. Which scenario seems most realistic to you?

“I think we are at high risk. Everything can start to crumble quickly and suddenly enough. I rate the readiness of the revolutionary situation as high. Let still insufficient for inevitability, but already very close to it. The collapse of the structure of power can occur at any moment. Anything can be the reason for the explosion: someone's death at a protest rally, the arrest of Navalny, a religious provocation, a brawl on an ethnic basis, a man-made disaster or a natural disaster, a collapse in oil prices, and the like.

For example, in South Korea, because of the lifting of the embargo on American meat, protests arose that did not subside for several months, and the government eventually made concessions. The phenomenon was named "Cheonggyecheon" after the gathering place of the protesters. We also know other long-term actions in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, the USA and, finally, in the countries of the Maghreb. The extraordinary tenacity of the protesters is directly related to online communities that allow you to keep in touch with people and maintain morale and the desire to win at all costs. This is a new form of direct democracy, the manifestation of which we see today in Russia.

These actions have not only a political context. It is also a new form of interesting pastime. The lack of communication, physical activity, risk is being filled. People at protests get acquainted with like-minded people. There is an unprecedented feeling of solidarity, delight, even euphoria. If danger is added to this, then it tickles the nerves. The risk is especially attractive to young people. The adrenaline rush from participating in protests is becoming a necessity. This is accompanied by colossal creative work - inventing new forms, methods, slogans, posters, political moves. The network crowd is no longer the crowd that is usually referred to as the “herd”. It's a smart, creative crowd. What can replace this feeling? What can compete in fullness of life, in emotions with #OkupaiAbay, with wandering rallies, with single (but massive) pickets? Fighting such phenomena with the old police methods is ineffective. Instead, you need to offer something else, no less exciting.

hereditary aristocracy

— In sociology, you are known for numerous and detailed studies of the modern elite. What is happening now in this part of society: consolidation or is it processes close to a split? Is the formation of a counter-elite possible at all, and who can enter it? Finally, which group dominates the elite today: the security forces, the liberal technocrats, or, conditionally, the offshore aristocracy?

- The counter-elite always exists. These are those who have not received something, who are offended, but are part of the elite. As for the security forces and liberals: in my opinion, the crack is not going through here now. During the four years of Medvedev's presidency, the number of security officials in our establishment has halved (from 45% at the beginning of 2008 to 20% now). And it is not the security forces that are in the lead, but the conservative bureaucracy. Of course, she wants to maintain her dominant position in society. She wants to maintain the status quo, but by restoring order and restoring stability. Destabilization threatens her privileged position. She used to be the most powerful and wealthy layer of our society, but only now she has the opportunity to transform into a hereditary aristocracy. The former system guaranteed all the benefits only when holding public office. Back in the early 1990s, I called this process “privatization by the state of the state.” Now things have gone pretty far. We already have the first generation of a new aristocracy. Without any quotes.

A dangerous process of elite fragmentation began during Medvedev's presidency. This was partly due to the very design of the tandem (that is, the sharing of absolute power). Partly - with the fight against corruption, which began Medvedev. Partly - with a sharp rejuvenation of the ruling stratum, which Medvedev contributed to (in the regions, rejuvenation occurred immediately by 14 years on average across the country). All sorts of "personnel reserves" also played their role. The young people, who were given hope, demanded the promised positions, and the representatives of the older generation who occupied them, feeling hot breath in the back, experienced irritation towards the young president.

The street protests did not come out of nowhere. This was preceded by serious unrest at the top even under Medvedev. Those who staked on him did their best to prevent Putin from returning to the Kremlin. The young part of the elite, raised to the top by Medvedev, can become an ally of the revolution, the main subject of which is still the intelligentsia and students. There may be an expansion of protest throughout the vertical of society. If the poorest segments of the population, on the one hand, and part of the elite, on the other, join the protesters, a revolution cannot be avoided.

moral factor

- And yet another revolution in Russia is real?

“It takes a few things to bring about a revolution. First: a single control center for a clear organization of actions. Now it is just being created. Second, we need fighters. These are not necessarily people with machine guns. These are people who are ready to fight. As far as I know, the training of such detachments is also underway. Third, we need finance. I think this is also being solved, the opposition is being secretly helped both by its own businessmen and by exiles who are eager to take revenge on Putin.

Of course, the state always has more power and financial resources. But the state lacks something else: sincere support from the population. Bought loyalty is not as motivating for activity as beliefs. And the majority of Putin, alas, is passive, which is quite natural. Why fight for what is now?

The revolution has in its arsenal another resource: it is an atmosphere of destructive protest, which, like an epidemic, covers entire countries and regions. Look: revolutionary events almost never happen in one place. They spread like a virus. Russia is now in such a state of mind. After a long national depression, attempts to emigrate, hopes for quick changes, other moods came: to take control of the situation, to change the course of the political process. It's hard to stop.

- Is it possible to do without shocks?

- Hardly. Flywheel started. A forest fire is stopped by oncoming fire. Such a counter-fire can be a counter-force. Or maybe something else: the solution is so extraordinary, creative, large-scale that people will stop in amazement. And then they will join this process. But here you need a colossal will and innovative thinking. Is Putin capable of this? I think yes. Theoretically capable. He is a smart person. And it's really hard for him right now. The authorities are under enormous pressure. There, too, there is confusion, different opinions, there are poles of hardness and softness. The feeling of a historical impasse, of great danger to the entire system, can stimulate completely unexpected steps. Up to the dissolution of the State Duma, the early appearance of a new successor, a grandiose plan for the development of Siberia, and so on. Now there is a tense struggle on the barricades. The opposition is coming. Power is on the defensive. But it won't be like this forever. The authorities can find an asymmetric answer. Or die.

All this is very dramatic. Because Russia needs a lot of creative work, not a revolution. The backward economy, the archaic structure of everyday life will not benefit from the revolution. Vice versa. Anyone who comes to the Kremlin will be forced to act taking into account the peculiarities of our Russian mentality, our political structure, our legal culture. This is not going to change on the spur of the moment.

What can and should be changed? It is necessary to return the moral factor to politics. This is what the fight is for now. We cannot live by the principle "loot decides everything." We tried. We've reached a dead end. We need high goals. And the one who takes moral heights in this confrontation, who is more honest, fairer, will win. We are such a country.

* Former director of the Center for the Study of Elites at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences