With the onset of the Khrushchev Thaw in the Soviet Union, a number of serious socio-political changes were outlined, which were supposed to turn the long-standing opinion about the USSR as a country with a totalitarian regime. Despite the fact that many of the innovations and reforms introduced into the social and political life of the country outwardly looked reformatory and democratic, the essence of the Soviet system of government did not change. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union remained unchanged, aimed at expanding spheres of influence and maintaining the conquered positions. The methods of foreign policy influence on the policy of the satellite countries and political regimes in the third world countries have also been preserved. All means were used, from political blackmail to threats to use military force.

All the charm of the love of the Soviet Union and the care of brothers in the socialist camp at the end of the 60s of the XX century was fully felt by Czechoslovakia. This country, despite the socialist path of development, made an attempt to follow its own path of development. The result of such courage was an acute political crisis that broke out in the country, the end of which was put by an armed invasion - the introduction of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia.

The beginning of Operation Danube - the end of fraternal friendship

The month of August is one of the most significant months for history, especially in the turbulent 20th century. In this month, with chronological accuracy, significant events take place that affect the subsequent course of history, changing the fate of peoples. In 1968, August was no exception. On the late night of August 21, 1968, one of the largest military operations began in Europe since 1945, codenamed "Danube".

The scene of action was the central European state of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which until that moment was one of the main pillars of the socialist camp. As a result of the invasion of the troops of the countries of the Warsaw Pact, Czechoslovakia was in the occupation. The Prague Spring, a revolutionary period in the country's history, was stifled through the use of brute military force. All reforms carried out in the country and were of a revolutionary nature were curtailed. The military intervention in Czechoslovakia became a serious rift that split the unity of the socialist camp.

It cannot be said that the socialist front was united in this impulse. Protest and disagreement with the ongoing methods were expressed by those countries that tried to conduct a balanced foreign policy, distancing themselves from the excessive tutelage of the USSR. Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania opposed the introduction of the troops of the Internal Affairs Directorate into Czechoslovakia. In general, after these events, the Albanian leadership set a course for secession from the members of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

From a technical point of view, Operation Danube can be considered a model of tactical and strategic planning. The country's territory was occupied by large military contingents in just three days. Even taking into account the fact that the invasion troops did not meet organized resistance from the Czechoslovak People's Army, the losses during such a large-scale operation were extremely small. Soviet units participating in Operation Danube lost 36 people killed and wounded, excluding non-combat losses. The occupation of Czechoslovakia for the civilian population was not so peaceful. 108 people became victims of direct armed clashes with the occupation forces, more than half a thousand were injured.

Not without provocation in this case. In addition to the fact that troops ready to invade were concentrated on the borders of Czechoslovakia, the beginning of the operation had to be carried out in secret and covertly. At the airport of the Czechoslovak capital, a Soviet passenger plane made an emergency landing at night, from the cabin of which, to the surprise of the airfield service personnel, armed paratroopers began to disembark. After the capture group captured all the main nodes and control points of the airport, Soviet transport planes began to land on the runway one after another. Soviet transport planes, loaded with military equipment and military personnel, arrived every 30 seconds. From that moment on, the fate of the Prague Spring was sealed.

At the same time, after receiving a signal about the successful start of the operation, Soviet troops, army units of the National People's Army of Germany, units and mechanized units of the Polish Army, the People's Army of Bulgaria and Hungary invaded the territory of Czechoslovakia. The invasion was carried out from three directions. Columns of the NPA and the Polish Army were coming from the North. Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia from the East through Transcarpathia. Troops of the Hungarian People's Army and parts of the Bulgarian army advanced from the southern flank. Thus, the "rebellious republic" was engulfed in dense steel tongs.

It is important to note that at the very last moment the army units of the German Democratic Republic were barred from participating in the invasion. The Soviet leadership did not want to have an analogy with the Wehrmacht's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938. German troops were ordered to stop at the border, being in constant combat readiness. Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian units performed an auxiliary function, controlling the peripheral regions of the country and a section of the border between Czechoslovakia and Austria. The main tasks during the operation "Danube" were solved by the Soviet troops, which were brought together into two fronts - the Carpathian and the Central. The total number of Soviet troops involved in the invasion was about 200 thousand soldiers and officers.

Tactically, the Soviet Union allocated large forces to participate in Operation Danube. In total, 18 Soviet divisions took part in the operation, including tank, airborne and motorized rifle divisions. From the air, the troops had serious air support. Only the helicopter and aviation units of the front-line aviation, there were 22 regiments. The number of Soviet tanks was unprecedented, approximately 5,000 vehicles used for the operation! The total number of army units and subdivisions of the armed forces of the countries that took part in Operation Danube was about half a million people.

An interesting motive was used by the leaders of the countries that took part in the invasion. The Prague Spring was declared an attempt by the counter-revolutionary forces to take revenge, the aim of which was to eliminate the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people. In this regard, the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp are forced to come to the aid of the people of fraternal Czechoslovakia in defending their conquests.

The true causes of the conflict

Since the end of the Second World War, Czechoslovakia has been the sphere of interests of the Soviet Union. To ensure the strength of the socialist camp, the Warsaw Pact Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) were created. All this was supposed to keep the countries and states of socialist orientation in the orbit of the political influence of the USSR. Proceeding from this, any changes in the political structure of government, changes in the foreign policy of the allied countries caused a sharp reaction in the Kremlin. The events in Hungary in 1956 are a vivid confirmation of this. Even then, the Soviet Union had to use force to suppress the outbreak of popular unrest.

By 1968, Czechoslovakia found itself in a similar situation. By this time, a difficult internal political situation had ripened in the country, which seriously undermined the hegemony of the ruling Czechoslovak Communist Party. The correct Soviet course of development was replaced by Alexander Dubchek, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia A. Novotny. His main political position was based on a radical renewal of party policy in relation to the leadership of the country's social and political life and the economy.

The first steps in this direction looked optimistic. Censorship was weakened, the policy of doing business in the country was simplified. The country was on the verge of dramatic economic reforms. At first glance, the declared position looked progressive and modern, however, according to the curators from Moscow, such steps could cause a gradual departure of Czechoslovakia from the socialist path of development. In the intentions of the Czechoslovak communists, the Soviet leaders saw a desire to pursue rapprochement with the West. They were not going to silently contemplate what was happening in the Soviet Union, so a long diplomatic game began. The leaders of the GDR and Poland supported the unrest and worries of the Soviet leadership regarding the events in Czechoslovakia. The leaders of Yugoslavia, Albania and the Socialist Republic of Romania, Joseph Broz Tito, Enver Hoxha and Nicolae Ceausescu, spoke out against interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, as well as in the future against the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia.

By the way: The last two leaders later became dictators and managed to stay in power for a significant period. Enver Hoxha died a natural death in 1985. Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu was convicted by a military tribunal and shot in the 1989 revolution.

The events that took place in Czechoslovakia in those days could have an extremely negative impact on the social and political life of neighboring countries. The situation in Poland was unsettled. The events of 12 years ago have not yet been forgotten in Hungary. The slogan declared by the Czechoslovak communists - "Let's build socialism with a human face" undermined the basic foundations of the socialist system. The liberal policy pursued in the party leadership of Czechoslovakia, in its goals and objectives, was at odds with the line of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Czechoslovak experiment could become a detonator that could provoke a subsequent chain reaction in the socialist camp. This could not be allowed either in the Kremlin or in other capitals of the Eastern European socialist states.

Aims and methods of pressure on Czechoslovakia

The Soviet leadership, having fresh memories of the events in Hungary in 1956, made every effort to resolve the Czechoslovak crisis in a peaceful manner. Was originally a giveaway game. The Soviets were ready to make significant political concessions to the new Czechoslovak leadership in exchange for adherence to the ideals of socialist internationalism and a restrained policy towards the West. The military aspect was not considered at first. Czechoslovakia was an important element of the united ATS strategy, an active participant in the CMEA, and a major economic partner of the USSR. In the opinion of the party leadership of the USSR, using military force against its main ally was unacceptable. This option was considered as the most extreme case, when all the mechanisms and means of a peaceful political settlement will be exhausted.

Despite the fact that most members of the Politburo spoke out against the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia, the military received clear instructions on the development of a strategic operation for the invasion of the armed forces of the ATS countries into the territory of Czechoslovakia. The information that followed that Czechoslovakia was not going to make concessions in its position only convinced the Soviet leadership of the timeliness of the preparatory operations. An extraordinary congress of the CPC is scheduled for September 9; on August 16, the Politburo, by a majority vote, decided to use the armed forces to suppress the counter-revolutionary rebellion in the fraternal republic.

In order to whitewash itself in the eyes of the socialist community and distribute responsibility to other political players, the Soviet leadership specially held a meeting of the ATS member countries on August 18 in Moscow. The leaders of the Eastern European countries attending the meeting supported the initiative of the Soviet leadership.

The official version for the provision of military assistance was the appeal of a group of public and party leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the CPSU to other fraternal parties with a request for military-political international assistance. The appeal hinted at the counter-revolutionary activities of the current party leadership of Czechoslovakia and the need to urgently change the country's leadership by any means. For the Czechoslovak side, preparations for the introduction of troops did not come as a surprise. The Ministry of Defense of Czechoslovakia, other party leaders of the country were informed that a large-scale military-police action was planned.

Finally

Naturally, 50 years after the well-known events, it is safe to say that there was no counter-revolutionary rebellion in Czechoslovakia. The communists were in power in the country, civil society was loyal to the leading role of the party in the development of the state. The only thing you can focus on is the different approaches to achieving the goal. The course of reforms announced by the Czechoslovak leadership is very similar in content to the events that took place in the Soviet Union 20 years later, during the Perestroika era.

Reasons for the invasion

Afghanistan - a country located on the borders of the Central Asian republics of the USSR - became a troubled point in the late 70s. In 1978, a coup d'etat took place in the country, in which the government of the USSR played an important role. This resulted in the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. However, soon the new government in the country began to lose the threads of control. Amin, who tried to instill communist ideals in Islamic Afghanistan, was rapidly losing his authority in society, an internal conflict was brewing in the country, and the Kremlin itself was not happy with Amin, who increasingly began to look towards the United States. Under these conditions, the government of the USSR began to search for a person who would suit him at the head of Afghanistan. The choice fell on the oppositional Amina Babrak Karmal, who was at that time in Czechoslovakia. The reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, therefore, are largely associated with a possible change in the country's foreign policy vector. Having determined the new leader of the neighboring country, the USSR, after a series of consultations between Brezhnev, Marshal Ustinov and Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko, he began to intervene in the country. war propaganda afghanistan

In less than a year, the position of the Soviet leadership on this issue has changed from restraint to consent to open military intervention in the intra-Afghan conflict. With all the reservations, it boiled down to the desire “not to lose Afghanistan under any circumstances” (literal expression of the KGB chairman YV Andropov).

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko initially opposed the provision of military assistance to the Taraki regime, but failed to defend his position. Supporters of the introduction of troops into the neighboring country, first of all, the Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov, had no less influence. L.I. Brezhnev began to lean towards a forceful solution of the issue. The reluctance of other members of the top leadership to challenge the opinion of the first person, together with a lack of understanding of the specifics of Islamic society, ultimately predetermined the adoption of an ill-considered decision to send troops.

The documents show that the Soviet military leadership (except for the Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov) thought reasonably enough. Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov recommended refraining from attempts to resolve political issues in the neighboring country by military force. But the top officials ignored the opinion of experts not only from the Ministry of Defense, but also from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The political decision on the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 in a narrow circle - at a meeting of L.I. Brezhnev with Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and A.A. Gromyko, as well as the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee K.U. Chernenko, i.e. five members of the Politburo out of 12. The goals of bringing troops into the neighboring country and the methods of their actions were not determined.

The first Soviet units crossed the border on December 25, 1979 at 18.00 local time. Paratroopers were airlifted to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. On the evening of December 27, special groups of the KGB and a detachment of the Main Intelligence Directorate carried out a special operation "Storm-333". As a result, the Taj Bek palace was captured, where the residence of the new head of Afghanistan H. Amin was located, and he himself was killed. By this time, Amin had lost Moscow's confidence in connection with the overthrow and assassination of Taraki organized by him and information about cooperation with the CIA. Was hastily formalized the election of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA B. Karmal, who had illegally arrived from the USSR the day before.

The population of the Soviet Union was confronted with the fact of the introduction of troops into a neighboring country in order, as it was said, to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people in defending the April Revolution. The Kremlin's official position was set forth in the responses of L.I. Brezhnev to questions from a Pravda correspondent on January 13, 1980. Brezhnev pointed to the armed intervention unleashed against Afghanistan from outside, the threat of turning the country into an "imperialist military foothold on the southern border of our country." He also mentioned the repeated appeals of the Afghan leadership to bring in Soviet troops, which, according to him, will be withdrawn "as soon as the reasons that prompted the Afghan leadership to apply for their input disappear."

At that time, the USSR really feared interference in the Afghan affairs of the United States, as well as China and Pakistan, a real threat to its borders from the south. For reasons of politics, morality, and the preservation of international prestige, the Soviet Union could no longer indifferently watch the development of civil confrontation in Afghanistan, during which innocent people were killed. Another thing is that it was decided to suppress the escalation of violence by another force, ignoring the specifics of the intra-Afghan events. The loss of control over the situation in Kabul could be regarded in the world as a defeat for the socialist camp. Personal as well as departmental assessments of the situation in Afghanistan played an important role in the events of December 1979. The fact is that the United States was extremely interested in drawing the Soviet Union into the Afghan events, believing that Afghanistan would become for the USSR what Vietnam would for the United States. Through third countries, Washington supported the Afghan opposition forces that fought against the Karmal regime and Soviet troops. The direct participation of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Afghan war is usually divided into four stages:

1) December 1979 - February 1980 - the entry of the main composition of the 40th Army, deployment in garrisons; 2) March 1980 - April 1985 - participation in hostilities against the armed opposition, assistance in the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA; 3) May 1985 - December 1986 - a gradual transition from active participation in hostilities to support operations conducted by Afghan forces; 4) January 1987 - February 1989 - participation in the implementation of the policy of national reconciliation, support for the DRA forces, the withdrawal of a contingent of troops to the territory of the USSR.

The initial number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was 50 thousand people. Then the number of OCSV exceeded 100 thousand people. The Soviet soldiers entered the first battle on January 9, 1980 when the rebel artillery regiment of the DRA was disarmed. Subsequently, the Soviet troops, against their will, were drawn into active hostilities, the command proceeded to organize planned operations against the most powerful groups of the Mujahideen.

Soviet soldiers and officers showed the highest fighting qualities, courage and heroism in Afghanistan, although they had to act in the most difficult conditions, at an altitude of 2.5-4.5 km, at a temperature of + 45-50 ° C and an acute shortage of water. With the acquisition of the necessary experience, the training of Soviet soldiers made it possible to successfully resist the professional cadres of the Mujahideen, trained with the help of the Americans in numerous training camps in Pakistan and other countries.

However, the involvement of the OKSV in hostilities did not increase the chances of a military solution to the intra-Afghan conflict. The fact that it was necessary to withdraw the troops was understood by many military leaders. But such decisions were beyond their competence. The political leadership of the USSR believed that the condition for the withdrawal should be the peace process in Afghanistan, guaranteed by the UN. However, Washington, in every possible way, obstructed the UN mediation mission. On the contrary, American aid to the Afghan opposition after Brezhnev's death and Yu.V. Andropova has grown dramatically. Only since 1985 there have been significant changes in relation to the participation of the USSR in the civil war in the neighboring country. The need to return the OCSV to their homeland became completely obvious. The economic difficulties of the Soviet Union itself became more and more acute, for which large-scale aid to its southern neighbor was becoming ruinous. By that time, several thousand Soviet servicemen had died in Afghanistan. Latent dissatisfaction with the ongoing war was ripening in society, about which the press spoke only in general official phrases.

Year after year, the situation in Afghanistan did not improve, a number of brilliant operations of the Soviet army, such as, for example, the galaxy of Panjshir operations, could not bring the main thing - a change of mood in Afghan society. The inhabitants of the country were categorically opposed to the ideology of the Soviets, and the mujahideen were gaining more and more popularity. The losses of Soviet troops grew, the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan provoked a noticeable increase in military spending, an increase in discontent in society, by the way, the intervention also became the reason for many countries to boycott the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. The unspoken defeat of the superpower was becoming evident. As a result, in February 1989, the inglorious campaign of the Soviet army ended: the last soldier left the country on February 15. Despite the fact that this war can be called a failure, the Soviet soldier confirmed his skills, fortitude, heroism and courage. During the war, the USSR lost more than 13,000 people killed. The country's economic losses were also significant. Annually, about 800 million dollars were allocated to support the puppet government, and the provision of the army cost 3 billion.Thus, this confirms the thesis that the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan worsened the state of affairs in the country's economy, and as a result, became one of the reasons for it. systemic crisis.

The situation in Afghanistan became more complicated in May 1979. Hafizullah Amin became the prime minister and began to brutally suppress the uprising. The prisons were overcrowded, but the uprising expanded. One could expect the imminent fall of the communist regime in Afghanistan. While no one in the West reacted to this, the Soviet government was worried about this prospect. The fall of Kabul and the rise to power of Islamic fundamentalists could lead to unrest among the Muslim population and the Soviet Central Asian republics. (Uzbeks, Turkmen and Tajiks are geographically and religiously close to Afghans.) In addition, the situation in the region became seriously complicated due to the Iranian revolution and the coming to power of Khomeini, which severed all relations with the United States - Soviet politicians were seriously afraid of an increase in US influence in Afghanistan, incl. and direct intervention by the Americans to at least partially make up for the loss of Iran. And the prospect of getting another unfriendly state oriented to the West at its very borders seriously worried the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The first reaction of the Soviet leadership was to send several thousand military advisers to Afghanistan. At the same time, Taraki was asked to remove Amin, whom the Soviet leadership, not without reason, suspected of having links with the CIA. But Amin reacted faster. September 14, 1979 he stormed the presidential palace. Taraki was badly injured and died on 17 September. Preparations began for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The divisions located in the Central Asian republics were reinforced and reinforced, mainly by Uzbeks and Turkmens. At the same time, the Soviet leadership tried to persuade Amin to surrender power to Babrak Karmal by the day the Soviet troops entered, but Amin categorically opposed this. The Soviet invasion was modeled on the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. On December 25, 1979, on the basis of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978, Soviet troops entered the DRA in three directions: Kushka-Shindand-Kandahar, Termez-Kunduz-Kabul, Khorog-Faizabad. The landing force landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar. The official goal of the entry was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention, but very soon a limited contingent (OKSV) was drawn into the flaring civil war, and became an active participant in it.

On December 27, 1979, Soviet special forces stormed the residence of President Amin, the Topayi-Tajbek Palace. Amin himself was killed. The "Parcham" / "Banner" faction, headed by Babrak Karmal, came to the leadership of the PDPA and the DRA.

One of the reasons for the introduction of troops was the desire to support the supporters of the concept of socialism in Afghanistan, who came to power as a result of the April Revolution, who faced powerful opposition to their social, economic and political strategy. American military-economic activity in the region created a threat of Afghanistan's withdrawal from the Soviet sphere of influence. Also, the introduction of Soviet troops pursued the goal of preventing a possible strengthening of Islamic fundamentalism in the region caused by the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. The fall of the pro-Soviet government itself would mean a strong blow to the foreign policy positions of the USSR, because, if this happened, it would be the first case of deposition in post-war history pro-Soviet government. In theory, in addition to direct consequences, the spread of fundamentalism through the Afghan Tajiks could significantly destabilize Soviet Central Asia. At the international level, it was declared that the USSR was guided by the principles of "proletarian internationalism." As a formal basis, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU used the repeated requests of the leadership of Afghanistan and personally Hafizullah Amin to provide the country with military assistance to fight anti-government forces. The final decision to send troops to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret decree of the CPSU Central Committee No. 176/125 "To the position in" A ". The statements of the USSR government that the troops were brought in at the request of the Afghan leadership to help in the fight against the insurgent bandits and in the name of fulfilling their international duty were assessed as falsifying the events.

After all, the former ruler of Afghanistan, Amin, was killed during the storming of his palace by Soviet special forces, and his successor in this post had not yet appeared on the political arena by the time of the so-called "invitation". The repeated statements by Soviet leaders about some "external forces" assisting the Afghan insurgents (they meant mainly Pakistan and the CIA) were actively criticized. The political maneuvers of the Soviet leadership did not convince the public of the capitalist world of its sincerity, and although the West assessed differently the goals of the Soviet Union in this war, everyone understood its aggressive nature. Some saw in it the desire of the superpower to change the balance of power in the region, the desire to conduct a dialogue with neighboring states, mainly with Pakistan, from a position of strength and to demonstrate to the whole world the power and will of the USSR. Others shifted the center of gravity to the fact that the Soviet Union simply could not leave the communist regime without help in a country where chaos and defeat inevitably awaited it. Some were even inclined to believe that the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan was nothing less than a "long-term strategy aimed at obtaining geostrategic advantages associated with gaining access to the warm seas and oil resources of the Persian Gulf." We can say with confidence that the Soviet action in Afghanistan was regarded in the West and was viewed in the circle of the Soviet leadership unequivocally - not as assistance to the truly people's government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in its struggle against the imperialists and dushmans, and not to protect the gains of the revolution accepted by the Afghans, but to prevent the inevitable counter-revolutionary coup in the conditions of the bankruptcy of the pro-Soviet regime.

By the spring of 1980, Soviet troops, against their will, were drawn into hostilities in Afghanistan. With the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the leadership of the former Soviet Union initially did not intend to conduct hostilities against the rebels, it apparently hoped that the very presence of our troops would allow the Afghan leaders to stabilize the situation. However, the course of events, especially the anti-government demonstrations directly in Kabul in the twenties of February 1980, forced the Soviet leadership to agree to jointly with the Armed Forces of the DRA to begin active hostilities to defeat the opposition units. By this time, the rebels had a constant fire effect on the Soviet units and subunits, which were in the garrisons agreed with the DRA government. In such a critical situation, further evasion of military assistance to the DRA government did not make sense.



Option 1

1. What changes have occurred in the political system of the USSR?
a) line ministries were restored
b) the constitution was adopted
c) the foundations of the rule of law were fixed

2. When did the eighth five-year plan take place?
a) 1965-1970
b) 1971-1975
c) 1976-1980

3. Why did the curtailment of economic transformations take place?
a) the reform failed to ensure military parity between the USSR and the USA
b) the reform required the replacement of the economic model
c) there was a continuous rise in prices for consumer goods
d) there was a sharp decline in industrial production

4. What role did the party play in the life of society according to the Constitution?
a) guiding and guiding force
b) the democratizing element of life
c) the guarantor of the Constitution

5. Which writer was the representative of the village prose?
a) A. Solzhenitsyn
b) F. Abramov
c) I. Brodsky

6. What was the first step in the fight against dissidence in the USSR?
a) reference A.D. Sakharova
b) the arrest of Y. Galanskov and A. Ginzburg
c) the arrest of A. Sinyavsky and Y. Daniel

7. What are the reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia?
a) a sharp increase in the number of anti-government protests in the country
b) the reforms carried out in Czechoslovakia could undermine the influence of the USSR in the country
c) there was a threat of the country's disintegration into the Czech Republic and Slovakia

8. In what year was the Helsinki security meeting held?
a) 1972
b) 1973
c) 1975

9. Which countries received military aid from the USSR?
a) Pakistan
b) India
c) Israel

10. When did Soviet troops enter Afghanistan?
a) 1975
b) 1979
c) 1980

Option 2

1. What did Brezhnev's idea of ​​"cadre stability" lead to?
a) to improve the management structure
b) aging staff
c) to strengthen the power of the CPSU

2. What is the date of the adoption of the new Constitution?
a) October 7, 1977
b) December 12, 1979
c) February 24, 1980

3. The main idea of ​​the economic reform was:
a) strengthening the role of party organizations in enterprises
b) strengthening economic incentives
c) expanding aid to friendly countries

4. In what way did the USSR lag behind Western countries manifested itself?
a) in the field of computerization of production
b) in the creation of the latest weapons
c) in the production of iron and steel
d) in the living standard of the people

5. What problems were faced in the social policy of the USSR?
a) low level of education
b) acute housing problem
c) shortage of consumer goods

6. Which of the listed cultural figures was forced to leave the USSR?
a) M. Rostropovich
b) A. Tarkovsky
c) V. Shukshin

7. What international events took place in the period from 1964-1985?
a) the first visit of the Soviet leader to the United States
b) Vietnam War
c) boycott of the Moscow Olympiad

8. What policy was called the "Brezhnev Doctrine"?
a) negotiations on disarmament
b) cooperation with the United States in the field of space exploration
c) strengthening the influence of the USSR in Eastern Europe

9. Which of the leaders of the human rights movement received the Nobel Peace Prize?
a) A. Sakharov
b) V. Sablin
c) Y. Orlov

10. What steps of the Soviet leadership led to the strengthening of the role of the KGB in life
society?
a) the beginning of the fight against corruption
b) the creation of the Fifth Directorate of the KGB
c) the fight against foreign intelligence

Keys (answers) to the test:

Option 1: 1-a, b; 2-a; Z-b; 4-a; 5-6; 6-c; 7-6; 8-in; 9-6; 10-6.

Option 2: 1-6; 2-a; Z-b; 4-a, d; 5-6, c; 6-a, b; 7-6, c; 8-in; 9-a; 10-6.

Goals:

• find out the reasons, course and results of the war in Afghanistan, showing the role of Soviet soldiers-internationalists in this military event;
• pay attention to the consequences of the war for the USSR, emphasizing the heroism of our soldiers-internationalists;
• to instill in students a sense of love for the Fatherland, loyalty to duty, patriotism;
• promote the development of students' skills to extract information from various sources, analyze a historical source, systematize information, draw conclusions.

Preparation for the lesson:

1. The student is given the anticipatory task "The April Revolution in Afghanistan."
2. If possible, you can use fragments of the feature film "Ninth Company", director F.S. Bondarchuk, 2005.
3. Handout material.
4. If possible, it is advisable to invite a participant in the war.
5. Map.

DURING THE CLASSES

Motivational conversation:

On March 2, 2011, the President of the Russian Federation D.A. Medvedev signed a decree on awarding M.S. Gorbachev with the highest award of the Russian Federation with the Order of the Holy Apostle Andrew the First-Called. Historians have different assessments of the activities of the first president of the USSR, but it cannot be denied that under him our country emerged from the exhausting Afghan war. Today in the lesson we will learn more about this event and will try to answer the problematic question: "What are the consequences of the USSR's participation in the Afghan war?"

Information block:

1. Student message: The April 1978 Revolution in Afghanistan On April 27, in Afghanistan, under the leadership of a group of officers, a summit military coup was carried out, supported by the army and part of the petty bourgeoisie. President M. Daud was killed. Power passed into the hands of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (created in 1965). It was announced to the whole world that a socialist revolution had taken place. in terms of economic development, Afghanistan ranked 108th among 129 developing countries of the world, at the stage of feudalism with deep vestiges of tribal foundations and community-patriarchal way of life. The leaders of the revolution were N. Taraki and H. Amin.

2. Reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

Teacher: On September 15, the leader of the PDPA N.M. Taraki was removed from power. On October 8, on the orders of Amin, he was killed. Opposition demonstrations began in Afghanistan. December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (Brezhnev L.I., Suslov M.A., V.V. Grishin, A.P. Kirilenko, A.Ya. Pelshe, D.F. Ustinov, K.U. Chernenko , Yu.V. Andropov, A.A. Gromyko, N.A. Tikhonov, B.N. Ponomarenko) a decision was made individually: to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. A.N. Kosygin was not present at the meeting, whose position was negative.

On December 25, at 15 o'clock, the entry of Soviet troops began. The first victims appeared two hours later. On December 27, the storming of Amin's palace by special forces from the “Muslim battalion”, the KGB groups “Thunder”, “Zenith” began, and his physical elimination.

Further, the teacher invites students to get acquainted with an excerpt from the work of the famous orientalist Snesarev A.E. Afghanistan and try to answer the question: What are the reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan?

“Afghanistan itself is of no value. It is a mountainous country devoid of roads, lack of technical facilities, with a fragmented unreliable population; and this population, moreover, is also freedom-loving, distinguished by pride, values ​​its independence. The latter circumstance leads to the fact that if this country can be conquered, then it is very difficult to keep it in our hands. The establishment of administration and the establishment of order will require so many resources that the country will never return these expenses; she has nothing to return.

Therefore, we must say with all frankness. that in the history of the century-long struggle between England and Russia, Afghanistan itself did not play any role, and its value has always been indirect and conditional. If you think about the essence of its political value, then it mainly boils down to the fact that Afghanistan includes operational routes to India, and there is no other. This is borne out by the thousand-year history and the conquerors of India who have always traveled through Afghanistan. "

“Taking into account the military-political situation in the Middle East, the last appeal of the Afghan government was considered positively. A decision was made to introduce some contingents of Soviet troops stationed in the southern regions of the country into the territory. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as create favorable conditions for prohibiting possible anti-Afghan actions by neighboring states ”

After the discussion, a note is made in a notebook.

The reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

1) Instability in Afghanistan, which was considered a zone of Soviet influence.
2) The threat of loss of stability in the Central Asian regions of the USSR due to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.
3) The desire to maintain the course taken by the Afghan regime to build socialism.
4) Prevent American influence in Afghanistan.
5) The leaders of the USSR wanted to test the effectiveness of military equipment and the degree of training of troops in a real, but local war.

3. The course of hostilities

Students get acquainted with the stages of the stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (the printed text is on the students' tables)

First: December 1979-February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their deployment in garrisons, the organization of the protection of the deployment points.

Second: March 1980-April 1985. Conducting active hostilities, including large-scale ones, as, for example, in the province of Kunar in March 1983. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Third: April 1985-January 1987. The transition from active operations mainly to the support of the Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. The use of motorized rifle, airborne and tank subunits mainly as reserves and to increase the moral and combat stability of the Afghan troops. Special forces continued to fight to prevent the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. Partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Fourth: January 1987 - February 1989. The participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Active work to strengthen the positions of the Afghan leadership, assist in the formation of the armed forces of the DRA. Preparation of Soviet troops for withdrawal and their complete withdrawal.

Conversation with students

- What stages stand out in the Afghan war?
- What methods did the Soviet troops use?

Students briefly write down the stages of the war.

Teacher: All who have fulfilled their international military duty with dignity and honor have earned national respect.

Students watch an excerpt from the movie "The Ninth Company" or listen to a recollection of a participant in those events.

A student reads K. Savelyev's poem "And the world is not very fair ..."

And the world is not very fair:
people come home
one from the war brings checks.
other jaundice or typhoid.
And the third in the stuffy silence
squeaks with prosthetic belts
and anger rolls with nodules. when he hears about the war ...
Taking train stations into circulation.
breathing army overhead,
the people are not old enough to leave the war.
not very affectionate people.
... I remember the frenzy of shame,
when the sleek storekeeper,
on a suitcase seated next to,
he whispered to me: "I would go there ..."
And motorized rifles were walking by
in panamas burnt by the sun -
fried veterans
went into a world shattered into pieces.
We went into a world tired of tirades.
not believing someone else's cry,
no longer remembering what they mean
patches on the chest of a soldier ...
Accustomed to hard work,
people come home
some only bring checks,
others - conscience and trouble.
In a twenty year spring
a co-worker came - a kid and a Skoda,
slightly grown in two years ...
yes, aged for the war.

4. Results of the war

Teacher:"What are the results of the Afghan war?"
During the conversation and reading the text of the textbook on pages 392-393 (Zagladin N.V., Kozlenko S.I.

History of Russia XX - early XXI century) students make notes in a notebook.

- political defeat of the USSR
- withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan
- OKSV did not defeat the armed opposition of the Mujahideen
- the civil war in Afghanistan has resumed.

5. Mistakes of Soviet troops in Afghanistan(discussion with students)

- inconsistency of the existing organizational structure of combined arms formations with the conditions of the theater of military operations. The military units were too cumbersome.
- an attempt to resolve the conflict with "small forces", insufficient number of troops.
- Soviet troops were unable to cut off supplies to the rebels from abroad.
- underestimation of the opposing side (at the initial stage)
- insufficient effective use of the latest weapons, especially high-precision

6. Consequences of the Afghan war

Students review the loss data and draw conclusions.

The losses of the limited contingent of Soviet troops were:
total - 138333 people, of which officers - 1979,
combat losses - 11381 people,
Sanitary losses amounted to 53,753 people,
38614 of them were returned to the station. 6669 people became disabled.
417 people disappeared without a trace, were taken prisoner, of which 130 people returned as of January 1, 1999.
Losses of equipment and weapons:
tanks - 147
BTR, BMP, BRDM - 1314
guns and mortars - 233, mammoths - 114, helicopters - 322.

Students record the conclusion:

The consequences of the Afghan war for the USSR:

- great loss of life
- large material losses
- decline in the prestige of the Soviet armed forces
- the fall of the USSR's authority in the Muslim world
- the fall of the international authority of the USSR
- strengthening the position of the United States

Final control

1. The Afghan war has begun

2. One of the reasons for the Afghan war was:

1) maintain a foothold advantageous for the USSR and prevent the United States from influencing Afghanistan
2) raise the international authority of the USSR
3) fulfill the allied duty to the countries of the Warsaw Pact Organization

3. The leaders of the Afghan revolution were:

1) M. Gaddafi
2) A. Sadat
3) N. Taraki

4. The Afghan war led to:

1) a new exacerbation of international tension
2) allied relations with Muslim countries
3) reduction of strategic arms

Reflection

1. How I learned the teaching material

a) very good, I remembered and understood everything
b) good, but it must be repeated
c) I poorly understood the main questions of the topic

2. How I worked in the lesson

a) very active
b) actively
c) preferred not to raise his hand

Homework.§41 pp. 392-393. Write an answer to the question. Do you agree with the opinion of some historians that the Afghan war has become "Soviet Vietnam" for our country?

Literature.

1. N.V. Zagladin, S.I. Kozlenko. S.T.Minakov, Yu.A. Petrov History of Russia XX-XXI century. “Russian word”, M., 2011.
2. V.Andreev. An unexpected war. Voronezh, 2004.
3. You are in my memory and in my heart, Afghanistan. Materials of the military-practical conference dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the withdrawal of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Voronezh, 2004.
4. Encyclopedia for children of Avanta. History of Russia, volume 3. Publishing house Astrel 2007.