Elena Prudnikova: interview for the book “The Last Battle of Lavrentiy Beria. Interview with Elena Prudnikova. So when

The interview is an afterword to the new book “ Last Stand Lavrentiy Beria.

Presented with abbreviations.

You know, Elena, it’s mine desire After reading your book, I immediately ask: what is true in it, and where is the fiction here?

Complex issue. Approaching the matter as a researcher, with all the necessary tediousness, I will say that, basically, everything is made up - well, how can I really know what Stalin and Beria talked about and how? And as an author fiction- that the book is overloaded with facts and there is too much of a history textbook in it. This, you know, is a question of criteria. If we talk about naked facts- here there is what actually happened, what did not happen, and also tells about what, most likely, actually happened, but there is no evidence about this and about what did not happen, but there is ample evidence about this and detailed memories.

Do you want to speak in riddles? Then let's classify. So first...

About what really happened

(Two rulers Soviet Union)

Commander of Industry...

- ...Firstly, there was definitely a coup d’etat on June 26, 1953. This is not a struggle for power between Stalin’s heirs, but the most ordinary, normal putsch.

Can you justify it?

Certainly. The version of the “sharing of power” is based on the completely ridiculous assumption that Stalin could afford to die without identifying and preparing a successor so that he could take the helm from his hands at any moment. The story about Stalin's pathological lust for power, that he was afraid of competitors - like many others of the same nature - was launched by Khrushchev. Neither one nor the other is absolutely impossible for the real Stalin.

Why do you think that Beria was the successor?

So this is written in poster letters throughout the post-war structure of the USSR. The fact is that Stalin’s successor is constantly being sought where, in principle, he could not be at that time - in the Central Committee. But this is an aberration of vision introduced by the later, Brezhnev era, when the party received absolute and unlimited power in the country. The same thing happened before 1939. However, from 1940 to 1953 this was absolutely not the case. Let us remember: back at the July plenum of 1953, Malenkov was named Stalin’s successor, and he was in the honorable first place in the country’s leadership starting in March, immediately after the leader’s death. But Malenkov was Chairman of the Council of Ministers and just an ordinary member of the Politburo after he refused the post of Secretary of the Central Committee in the spring of 1953. Shifting the center of gravity government controlled from the Politburo to the Council of People's Commissars began back in 1939, and Stalin's successor must be sought precisely in the Council of Ministers. And there it is surprisingly easy.

How exactly?

In 1942, the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee was formed, after the war it was transformed into the Operational Bureau of the Council of Ministers, and then simply called the Bureau of the Council of Ministers. It was a kind of “general headquarters” of the Soviet Union. They remained outside his jurisdiction - if they remained! - just a few ministries, of the significant ones: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of State Control and the command of the army. The man who headed the Bureau of the Council of Ministers was, by his position, the second person in the USSR. So: starting from 1944, this person was Beria. In addition, he also supervised three law enforcement agencies: the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Moscow State Committee (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the army were personally supervised by Stalin, who also dealt with general, strategic issues of the country’s development). In fact, power in the state was divided between Stalin and Beria, with Stalin’s overall supervision of the “Beria” half - isn’t it obvious who the leader was going to hand over the helm to? In addition, it follows that Beria was either a complete and absolute like-minded person of Stalin, or his views suited the leader - otherwise Lavrenty Pavlovich would never have seen such a volume of powers in his life. In fact, after the war, the country was ruled not by one leader, but by two: old and young, and the first gradually transferred the levers of control to the second. By the way, about this, God willing, I am going to write the next book, which will be called “The Double Star System.”

Do you want to say that already in 1944 Stalin identified his successor?

I think this was done much earlier, in 1944 his solution just came to the surface. And how can I say... Until now, I have taken 1944 as a reference point, when Beria became Stalin’s deputy for the State Defense Committee. Then, while studying the topic of June 22, I found out that even then Beria was part of the leading “troika” of the USSR - the narrowest of the narrow leadership that ever existed in the country. He was also entrusted with carrying out the most important of the Great Operations. Patriotic War— evacuation of industry from threatened areas. And the new conditional point was August 8, 1941, when Stalin became the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Even though he was a genius, in order to calmly lead the course of the war, focusing on managing the army, he had to rely on the “commander-in-chief” of the entire rear, that is, a single military camp called the USSR. Of the four remaining members of the State Defense Committee, and of the entire Politburo, only Beria was suitable for this post.

You forget about Molotov...

Molotov never worked independently; Stalin closely looked after him at all posts. And at the moment we are talking about, the leader simply did not have the time or energy for this. He needed a person who could act independently, without nannies. While still the First in Georgia, Beria showed that he could do it, and how he showed it! But August 8 is, again, a moment of action, and the decision, I think, was made much earlier.

So when?

There is one indirect indication. The fact is that a successor will not grow up on his own, he must be trained, and this process is not quick. At the 19th Congress, Stalin said: in order to educate a statesman, it takes ten years, then he corrected himself - fifteen. If we subtract fifteen years from 1952, we get 1937. But if it is true that since 1949 Stalin began to transfer power, then we will find ourselves already in 1934. This is a very interesting date. In thirty-four, Kirov was killed, and Stalin had to think about a new successor. And he is not the kind of person who thinks for a long time.

So, the first person Stalin prepared to be his successor was Kirov?!!

And there’s simply no one else! For Stalin, the economy was always a priority. This means that he could only be replaced as head of state by someone who had experience in successful integrated management of a country or region. There were few of these at that time. In the Politburo - Ordzhonikidze and Kirov. The first one didn't fit in the row personal qualities and because of nationality. And the fact that they say that Kirov was also not very suitable for a number of properties - but Stalin did not have the opportunity to look ideal leader, he had to choose from those who were nearby.

Ordzhonikidze's nationality bothered Stalin. But what about Beria’s nationality?

It's not just about nationality. Ordzhonikidze was incredibly hot-tempered and, at the slightest, used his hands. Well, what kind of head of state is this who can get angry and punch him in the face? As for Beria, he was a man of such caliber when little things like inappropriate nationality no longer matter. I think that if he had managed to live in his post until he was seventy years old, like Stalin, we would now be arguing which of them did more for the USSR.

Even so?

“In his “hundred days” alone, he showed himself to be a statesman of historical proportions. It would seem, what can be done in a hundred days? But such interesting political transformations were started... and we still don’t know what was planned in the economy!

So who thought of it? economic reform- Stalin or Beria?

It was probably Stalin who came up with the idea, but Beria’s role, I believe, was very important here.

So, in your opinion, Stalin was against the economics of socialism?

But they simply didn’t have time to create it. Starting from the first five-year plans, the USSR economy was always an emergency and for this reason a command economy. They began to think about economic mechanisms after the war, when there was no longer a need for such a frantic race and it was necessary to move on to a normal peacetime economy. Some kind of transformation was clearly being prepared. Let us remember Stalin’s “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR” - they appeared precisely during that period. And the impetus, I think, was given by the “Gosplan case”, when it came to light what an unscrupulous planner or simply a traitor could do to the economy. Voznesensky was shot, but the problem remained.

And do you think the economy was supposed to be a market economy?

Planned market, of course. Back in the 30s, when the whole country worked not for money, but according to orders, economic mechanisms were successfully used in “Beria’s” Georgia. There in an interesting way enterprises of union subordination, working according to a national plan, and local ones were combined, as well as command and economic methods. In general, it would be necessary to carefully study the Georgian experience of the 30s - precisely as a testing ground for the new socialist economy. By the way, I had to deal with the statements of major Western economists - truly major ones, and not those with whom our “boys in pink pants” consulted - and these specialists said that one of the main goals of “perestroika” was to destroy the Soviet planned economy, since this is the economy of the day after tomorrow, and nothing more effective has yet been invented. Recently I heard a very interesting comparison, with which I generally agree. The market economy is a magnificent, sophisticated last word technology and design of a racing car. The Soviet planned economy is a clumsy, ugly and unfinished spaceship. And even unreformed and cumbersome, this economy was still a dangerous competitor. And returning to the late 40s - early 50s..., only one thing should be said: whoever developed this reform, only Beria could carry it out.

Why not Stalin?

He no longer had the same strength for the day-to-day work of carrying out the reform. The head is the same, but the ability to work, alas... I’m just starting to work on that period, but today the more I learn, the more I understand what kind of future Khrushchev cut off for us.

Returning once again to the question of a successor - why did Malenkov become the head of state after Stalin’s death?

Perhaps this was a compromise condition in the negotiations between the party and the government, but, rather, it was Beria’s decision. It was he who was the first, not counting the purely formal chairmanship of Khrushchev, to take the floor on March 5 at the meeting when the question of power was being decided, and proposed Malenkov for this post. Thus, by the way, in the distribution of roles, he played in the new government the role that Stalin played in the 30s. Let us remember that the leader did not always occupy the main positions himself. Let us also remember that it was Beria who gave instructions to doctors to Stalin's dacha, he ordered to stop resuscitation measures- that is, he behaved like a real head of state. And until June 26, the government obeyed him unquestioningly, so then they all had to try very hard at the plenum, explaining the reason why they did this. Why didn’t Beria become the chairman of the Council of Ministers... There may be several versions here. In “Stalin’s Last Knight” I stated one thing - that it was a matter of nationality. This book contains another...

And quite unexpected...

Yes, but what is impossible about it? Beria was for statesman young - 54 years old, but looked much older. There is evidence that he worked lying down - according to at least, he received the father of one of my friends in this way, and that man, a rather large designer, was extremely amazed. Finally, just a month ago I learned about the neuropsychic manifestations of radiation sickness - these are euphoria and depression turning into each other. If we take into account Beria’s temperament, this exactly coincides with what they said about him at the plenum and what they remembered about what he was like in the spring of 1953. He was clearly very sick with something, and what is the most natural, one might say professional, illness for the chairman of the atomic committee? By the way, two of his deputies, Malyshev and Zavenyagin, died from it in the mid-50s. We must not forget that radiation sickness was practically unstudied at that time, so doctors could hardly give any definite prognosis. And it would be simply irresponsible to take over government when you don’t know how much time you have left. And then what - a new redistribution of power?

What else in your book is historical fact?

Major political events, removals and appointments of government officials, plenums and congresses, etc. The general historical outline is quite accurately verified by dates and events. Biographies of Beria and other people are based only on real facts- except for dialogues, of course. Although in this case, some of them relate to those that could take place - if not with the same words, then with the same meaning...

About what didn't happen

(Fiction as confirmation of truth)

- ...Firstly and most importantly, there was no arrest of Beria. Before working on this book, I was ninety percent sure of this, now I’m ninety-nine percent sure.

Why did you take this story?!

Because a ten percent probability cannot be dismissed either, especially if this version is generally accepted and supported by a certain amount of evidence. In addition, there is also a way to explore a version - present it in artistic form and see what happens. In this case, the work itself is quite interesting - creating intrigue, interaction between characters...

And how are the results?

You can see for yourself. As soon as the historical characters came to life, began to move, and began to behave not like characters, but like people, it immediately became clear that the mechanism of events, which is now considered generally accepted, is in fact cumbersome, ridiculous... and even unrealizable. To make ends meet, crude, artificial stretches and assumptions were required. Of course, this doesn’t happen in life - but to draw up such ridiculous plans for a coup, counting on chance... They are not Decembrists, after all!

What “extensions” are you talking about?

About the chronicle of the coup. Because it's not real life, and a detective, then I can afford the completely accidental absence of Beria from home at the moment when his mansion was stormed, and the adventurous withdrawal of his deputy Bogdan Kobulov from the game, and the fact that Molotov and Malenkov followed Khrushchev’s lead and began to dance to his tune, limiting himself to only an oral report of Beria’s death and not demanding to see his corpse. But in reality, both Kobulov, Malenkov and Molotov would have behaved the way they did, only in one case - if Beria was dead and they knew about it accurately and reliably.

So, do you completely rule out the possibility of Beria’s arrest at the Politburo?

I repeat: now - about ninety-nine percent. The fact is that I literally just received confirmation of that fundamental fact, which until now I knew about only from one source, and a source, unfortunately, endowed with a rich imagination. I mean the shelling of Beria's mansion, which took place on June 26, 1953 at about 12 noon. Until now, only Sergo Beria spoke about him. Now I have a recording of an interview and memoirs of Pyotr Nikolaevich Burgasov, the former chief sanitary doctor of the USSR, who at that time worked in Beria’s department. On the afternoon of June 26, he encountered Vannikov and Sergo on the stairs, who were running somewhere, and later went to Vannikov, and he told him how he went to Kachalov Street, what he saw there, and that Beria was most likely killed. I think in this case two pieces of evidence are enough. And this completely overturns the generally accepted official version.

What if Beria was still not at home?

If Beria was not at home, he was informed about the assault within five minutes, and do you really think that after that he would have gone to the Politburo? Never in my life! He would have other, much more important things to do.

What if everything happened at the same time? Arrest and shooting on Kachalov Street?

What's the point of storming an empty house? What to look for there and why is there such a hurry? If Beria has already been arrested, what prevents him from removing security in the usual manner, coming with a warrant, and so on... One can even guess how it all happened. Sergo recalled that he saw the broken windows of his father’s office and the trace of a machine-gun burst on the wall. If you break into the house, it will be long and noisy. Firstly, Beria is not much of a lamb, so he may not break through. Secondly, during this time the dashing guys from the Ministry of Internal Affairs will arrive. Now imagine: an armored personnel carrier bursts into the yard, security jumps out of the house and begins to sort things out. What does Beria do in this case? It’s as simple as that: he goes to the window to see what happened. And then - at the windows with a machine gun.

Isn't it too simple?

For our time - yes! But they were all front-line soldiers there, with combat experience and in this capacity - masters simple solutions. And why arrest Beria? Alive, he created too many problems. And the most important of them is that while he was alive, a real alternative continued to exist new government, that is, one could choose between Beria and Khrushchev. Therefore, in order to force the party and government to dance to their tune, the conspirators had to put everyone in a hopeless situation - to prove that Beria was dead and there was no choice. Otherwise, everything could have ended very badly for them.

Yes, at least the same Malenkov or Molotov could address the plenum. Their weight and authority were incomparable to Khrushchev’s; any of them could make Nikita Sergeevich walk out of the hall in handcuffs. And the mere fact that they were released onto the podium on the first day of the plenum says absolutely precisely: there was no alternative, there was nothing to fight for, Beria was dead, moreover, members of the Politburo saw him dead.

Would they have believed Khrushchev otherwise, of course! It’s only in the book that they are so gullible...

What if they were all at the same time, as Khrushchev claimed?

At the same time - why on earth and in the name of what? Firstly, not one of those who left memories of that day could invent at least some, the most wretched motivation for this arrest, even years later. “The struggle for power” is an argument of approximately the same nature as the machinations of the Jewish Freemasons. There is always a struggle for power, and coups are extremely rare. Partly for the simple reason that, in addition to interested political forces, this requires a group of specific people who are willing to risk their lives. What is the motivation for this risk among Khrushchev, Bulganin, Moskalenko, Zhukov? And the chances of ending up against the wall for them were, to put it mildly, very significant.

And what motive do you see?

Only one - life! Only to save your own life can you oppose such a strong ruler as Beria. Moreover, these are clearly some kind of secret games, because everything is about the real background of the events characters were silent to death. Even Khrushchev never said in his memoirs what exactly happened. There were no specifics at the plenum either. The so-called “Beria case” is such a wretched farce that it’s funny to read. To the question: “For what?” - there is still no answer. And for no reason, just change Beria for Khrushchev? Why the fright? Not to mention the fact that I feel sorry for the country. This is the first thing.

Secondly, Khrushchev’s detective story about how Beria was preparing a coup and they conspired for almost a week to arrest him - this, excuse me, is a series for housewives. Is it really possible to believe that no one from the Politburo, knowing what was being prepared, warned Beria? Yes, if Khrushchev had declassified his plan to his comrades, he would have already given testimony at the Lubyanka on the 26th. There is one small nuance here: the fact is that for the members of the then Politburo, Beria was much more one of their own than Khrushchev.

Khrushchev came to the Politburo earlier!

Yes, earlier, he became a member of the Politburo in 1940, and Beria only in 1946. So what? The Politburo is just one of the parties of the group of people who ruled the state. They had other parties too. Until the end of the 30s, everything was controlled by the Politburo, during the war - by the State Defense Committee. There is no need to get hung up on names here at all. The organs are different, but the people are the same! As, in my opinion, Mikoyan said: “GKO was Stalin’s office.” As well as the Presidium of the Council of People's Commissars, and the Politburo - and then the secretary formalized each of the decisions under his own stamp, that's all.

The importance of each of the statesmen was very well demonstrated by the war, when there was no time for political dances and the structure of government was built rigidly and unambiguously. And in this case we see a completely different situation. During the war, Beria was a member of the GKO, and Khrushchev was a member of the Military Council of the front. It is not simple different levels, these are incommensurable levels! After the war, Beria was the chairman of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, in fact, the second person in the country, and Khrushchev was the first secretary, first in Ukraine, then in Moscow, that is, the regional leader. The maximum he achieved by the end of his career was the position of Secretary of the Central Committee, which in the early 50s meant almost nothing. He's up to the very last days did not reach the level of those who gathered in the Politburo, not to mention his personal qualities and personal talents. And why would they be scared to exchange Beria for Khrushchev? Moreover, Nikita Sergeevich’s character was no better. Moreover: if Beria was scolding on the matter, then Khrushchev was arguing because the reins had fallen under his tail.

Finally, third. Do you really think that members of Stalin’s Politburo would have allowed, as Khrushchev said at the plenum, “to arrest first, and then sort it out”? Especially if we are talking about the second person in the country? Don't take them for idiots! Let's remember at least the case of Mikhail Kaganovich, just the brother of one of the Politburo members. August '41, there's a war going on. Nevertheless, these extremely busy people first look at the case materials, then interrogate Vannikov, who testified against Kaganovich, then conduct a confrontation - and all this time Kaganovich remains free. But he is just the director of the plant.

Therefore, the arrests were a decision of the Politburo...

Invented much later. Everything was much more complicated. Before giving the NKVD permission to arrest, the Politburo carefully studied all the materials...

Was this what the entire Politburo was doing?

No, as far as I know, the leading “two” - Stalin and Molotov - and those who were directly related to the issue. If we were talking about the military - Voroshilov, if about party members - perhaps Malenkov. In general, in order to obtain permission to arrest a high-ranking official, Yezhov had to work very, very hard.

But what about the resolutions on NKVD reports: “arrest so-and-so”? Are you saying this didn't happen?

It was, of course. The reason is that the “two” had much more information than the NKVD investigators and even the People’s Commissar. After all, data from all intelligence and counterintelligence services flowed to them, how many there were in the country, plus the information went through personal channels... Only Stalin and Molotov had the complete picture, and much of what they knew was not supposed to be known not only by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs affairs, but even to other members of the Politburo. By the way, this is the reason that some arrested conspirators, who were silent during interrogations, began to speak after a personal meeting with Stalin - the leader knew what to present to them.

Do you want to say that there was no arbitrariness during the repressions?

There was, and what another! But not in relation to persons from the nomenklatura. Now it’s hard to even imagine with what meticulousness the Politburo supervised the investigation into the cases of important people! Not at the level of indictments - at the level of individual interrogations! And I’m sure that in that famous Stalinist “execution” list for 129 people - by the way, the only published list - he knew every case... So, as you see, there are too many arguments for the fact that there was no arrest, and not a single real one evidence that Beria was alive after June 26... however, I wrote about this in detail in “Stalin’s Last Knight.” Well, and, accordingly, there was no bunker, no interrogations, no duel between Beria and Rudenko...

If there was no arrest, then all the interrogation reports are fiction?

No, not at all. The protocols are very real. This is a lie about which there is documentary evidence. And since they exist, why not use them in the novel? They’re just so stupid, these protocols...

In one version or another, it continues to torment me and, I think, many main question: How could Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, with his experience and undoubted intelligence, get caught like that? Did he really not foresee that reprisals were being prepared against him?

I don’t yet have a definite answer to this question. But even if he foresaw, he could hardly have imagined such brutal forceful actions, and most importantly, that the coup would be carried out by the hands of the military, with tanks, armored personnel carriers and machine guns. Secondly, it seems that he still trusted Khrushchev. And third, apparently, he believed that Stalin died an absolutely natural death. The absurd testimony of the guards, indicating that everything was very difficult with the death of the leader, was given many decades later, and then the version was simple and clear: the guards discovered the dying Stalin on the morning of March 2 and immediately reported where he was supposed to go. If Beria knew that Ignatiev was involved in the death of the leader, he might have been careful not to arrest him so directly. But... even the most experienced soldier can step on a mine. And Beria is no exception. (We consider it our duty to note that a number of serious historians adhere to a different, in our opinion, more plausible version. A day before his murder, June 25, 1941, L.P. Beria requested permission to arrest the former Minister of State Security Ignatiev in the case of poisoning I .V. Stalin, which he very quickly managed to investigate, and Khrushchev was supposed to be next. In addition, he had in his hands the materials of Stalin’s investigation about the real causes and culprits of the tragedy of June 22, 1941, which he received from Stalin shortly before his death For Nikita and Zhora (Zhukov), there was a strong smell of fried food... - Ed.)

Once again about Stalin, Beria and others

(The humanity of leaders)

What do you think the relationship was between Stalin and Beria?

Very close and warm. These were two people of the same culture, the same mentality, they had the same life values and goals in life. And the facts speak precisely about this. There is, for example, a very interesting recollection of Sergo Beria dating back to the beginning of 1934 - just when Beria was elected a member of the Central Committee at the congress. Sergo recalls how, after the congress, they went to Stalin’s dacha, and he was in the same car with Stalin and without his parents. At the dacha, Stalin himself put him to bed, then there was a holiday there. Where did mom and dad go? Most likely, they communicated with Kirov, and Stalin took care of the child, giving them the opportunity to be together. Agree, this indicates that the relationship was quite close. Or, for example, there are photographs of Beria together with Svetlana, and there are several of them. But Stalin did not have the habit of allowing everyone he met to film with his daughter. That is, it seems that already in the early 30s Beria was close to Stalin. By the way, what’s surprising here? He was an extraordinary person, very charming and a good person - why not?

Beria is a good person... It sounds strange...

Alas, such is the cold voice of analysis. When, sorting through the heap of evidence, I discarded everything that came from Khrushchev and his team, as well as outright lies, very few facts remained. But these scattered fragments of reality began to take shape into a completely different picture.

... Let's return once again to the relationship between Stalin and Beria. The leader actually controlled how Beria lived, in what conditions, whether everything was in order with him, and Beria actually kissed the hand of the dying Stalin. And more than once I heard about his speech at the leader’s funeral - its tragedy sank into people’s souls so much that this speech was remembered fifty years later, when everything else had simply been erased. To erase all this from people’s memories, it took a fairy tale about Beria’s monstrous hypocrisy.

But more than one person told how animated and cheerful Beria was literally the next day after Stalin’s death. What do you think, is this all a lie?

Not necessary! More than once I have had to deal with just such a reaction to the loss of a loved one from people who are not prone to public displays of feelings. It's protective psychological mechanism for those who for some reason do not allow themselves to cry in public. By the way, a similar incident occurred in 1923, when a seriously ill Lenin demanded that the Politburo give him poison. From the meeting at which this issue was discussed, Trotsky retained in his memory the terrible “half-smile” with which Stalin reported on the leader’s demand. But Stalin treated Lenin with great love as a human being. You know, the position obliges...

Yes, a mysterious person - Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria...

On the contrary, it is not mysterious. Apparently, he was just very a simple person, so simple that it would seem incredible to everyone today. A technician to the core, an industrial leader, with all the features of this personality type, very emotional and at the same time straightforward, pathologically incapable of intrigue...

Are you serious?

Do not forget that the generally accepted portrait of Beria is a portrait of the murdered man, painted by the murderers. What kind of objectivity do you want from them? Moreover, starting from the very moment of the murder, his behavior was analyzed from the standpoint of bureaucratic, apparatus logic and they are still surprised how such a monster could exist on earth, which turned out in the end. But in fact, the result was not a monster, but complete nonsense, because this man did not fit into the apparatus relationships in any way, he lived according to different laws. He didn’t understand hardware logic, didn’t accept it, and didn’t want to know it, that’s all. And when you understand this, everything falls into place.

After all, history is not so much dates, events, documents, but rather the people who create it. There would be no Stalin or Hitler - and world history would be different. Moreover, these people are large, with their own characters, relationships, and characteristics. Volumes have already been written about Stalin, but let’s take Molotov, for example. On the one hand, he is stubborn, ambitious, a communist scribbler, and on the other, an unyielding and tough diplomat who is guided in his work exclusively common sense, but not ideas. What is here from Molotov and what from the Stalinist leadership? Or, for example, another stroke that characterizes him very well. Chuev asks Molotov if Beria argued with Stalin. He answers: no, he didn’t argue. And then, in the next phrase, it becomes clear that he actually argued, and how, but exclusively on specific issues. But for Molotov, a dispute on specific issues is not a dispute at all, you can only argue on political issues, and any specifics are working issues.

Do you think he really argued?

Certainly! People who did not know how to defend their point of view did not stay near Stalin. And Molotov argued with Stalin and often knew how to insist on his own, since he was much more stubborn than the leader. By the way, speaking about the processes of the 30s, we must not forget that issues in the then Politburo were decided by voting. And Stalin often remained in the minority.

And Malenkov? What you have here is also not the same as it has always been “served”...

I think he was also lied to. You see, firstly, the Khrushchevites had no sense of proportion. They tried so hard to convince everyone that it was Malenkov who led the coup, that the thought involuntarily creeps in: he probably had nothing to do with it. And they treated him far more cruelly than the others. Let us remember: after an attempt to remove Khrushchev in 1957 - mind you, using completely statutory methods - Malenkov was sent into exile, from where he was allowed to return only ten years later. I think the condition for his return was silence - he did not leave any memoirs, and what is interesting is that none of the historians even refers to him. That is, the person simply remained silent the rest of his life. Meanwhile, about his true role in Stalin's USSR we know even less than about the role of Beria. The fact is that he was one of the five members of the State Defense Committee, which means that already in the forty-first year he was part of the narrowest of all narrow leaderships.

Were they on good terms with Beria?

It seems that not just good ones, but friendly ones. Sergo Beria indignantly makes a reservation about him: the man was a friend of the house and betrayed him! However, ten years in Ekibastuz can teach you to remain silent... Who else surprises you?

Abakumov!

Oh, this is a wonderful and also misunderstood hero of our story. A quite decent biography of him was recently published, which gives little known facts. What can you say about a person who was described in his job description as “impetuous”? About a man who, with such quality, rose from lieutenant to general in three years? Smart, hot-tempered, always going ahead, able to love and hate with full dedication... On the one hand, he had, like many others, just elementary education, on the other hand, the records of the search of his apartment indicate a library of one and a half thousand volumes, which is quite a lot for that time. Or, for example, in the “organs” they remember that Abakumov started an excellent orchestra at the MGB and often ordered classical music for himself...

What else do the “authorities” remember about him?

That he was a highly qualified counterintelligence officer, an attentive boss, ready to stand to the death for his subordinates. Ivashutin, the future head of the GRU, recalled how in 1942 he was summoned to Moscow to see Abakumov. As the conversation progressed, he casually inquired whether the interlocutor had a large family and, having learned that his relatives had disappeared during the evacuation, promised to make inquiries. The next day, he called Ivashutin again, dryly informed him that his family was in Tashkent, and gave him three days of leave and a plane to fly to his relatives. Here's the story...

They also say that he never used physical methods impact. By the way, historian Yuri Zhukov was also told about the same thing in the same Lubyanka region.

Nevertheless, even Yuri Mukhin did not dare to insist that Abakumov was innocent.

Mukhin is blinded by the Jewish question, otherwise he would have long ago and certainly noticed that the main document in the “Abakumov case”, the famous letter from the Central Committee, where he is accused of the story with Dr. Etinger (the story, by the way, is completely schizophrenic: there are two accusations - falsification of the investigation into the case of the innocent Etinger and the curtailment of the investigation into the case of the guilty Etinger. In general, the falsifiers of the Abakumov case got themselves confused...) - a fake. It just screams about it. And the absurdity of the accusations, and the clumsy style, uncharacteristic of documents of that time. In general, I have a suspicion that some saboteur prepared the false documents for Khrushchev, so they are easily identified. Who else surprises you?

Serov. Why do you think he was in the conspiracy?

The Khrushchevites could not do without a strong ally in the Ministry of Internal Affairs - it was necessary for someone to neutralize possible actions“authorities”, otherwise the guys from “Bureau No. 2” would have really come and tied everyone up. This was supposed to be the level of the first deputy minister. It’s easy to guess who exactly: whoever made a career under the new government went with them. Of Beria’s three first deputies: Kobulov was arrested and shot, Kruglov became Minister of Internal Affairs, that is, he received his previous position, which he held until 1953, and soon he was kicked out of the authorities altogether, and only Serov made a career, becoming chairman of the KGB, and then the head of the GRU.

(…)

End of the article here.

When we met, Elena Anatolyevna turned out to be a very active, lively and charming woman. It is interesting to communicate with her, she knows a lot.

Very hospitable and inviting. We spent several hours together and I'm sorry that they ended faster than we would have liked.
The entire conversation with Elena Anatolyevna is in these three videos. The most important thing is that we agreed that this meeting will not be the last.

There are still so many blank spots in our recent history, so many facts exist on their own. Everyone who is interested in the truth about our history, about the top officials of the USSR state and about those who were unjustly slandered should know about them, and there is no need to hide those who worked for destruction in the country, who falsified history and replaced the truth, who distorted the facts in their petty and alien global interests, no matter what words it is justified by, no matter what the motivation.

Lenin, Stalin, Beria

Beria system

Collectivization

Biography of Elena Prudnikova

Elena Anatolyevna Prudnikova was born in Leningrad.
Graduated from Leningrad Polytechnical Institute, Faculty of Physics and Mechanics, Department of Solid State Physics.

She began her journalistic work in the large-circulation newspaper of the Elektropribor plant, a source of personnel for Leningrad journalism. Then she worked in the large-circulation newspaper of the association “Soyuz”, worked as first deputy editor-in-chief in the newspaper “Good Day” in the Frunzensky district, and as a correspondent for the newspaper “Solidarity”.

She became known for her sensational biographies of Stalin and Beria. To the correspondent’s question “What happened?” the author replied: “It’s just that in my gut, in my liver, I always felt some kind of big lie in everything that was said about Stalin’s time, and I wanted to understand it at least a little, but I still couldn’t get around to it. And then our St. Petersburg historian, Alexander Kolpakidi, suddenly invites me to work with him on a book. Well, how could you miss such an opportunity? After all The best way study something - write about it.”

Collaborated with several central publishing houses. Her books “Stalin. Second murder", "Beria. Stalin's Last Knight", "Double Conspiracy. Secrets Stalin's repressions", "Khrushchev. Creators of Terror”, “Land of the Virgin Mary”, each of which became some kind of sensation. The author's historical specialization can be called “an attempt on myths.”
Since 2007, Elena Anatolyevna has been the editor-in-chief of the newspaper “Our Version on the Neva”.

As an expert, she starred in documentary film series on the NTV channel “Kremlin Children”, “Kremlin Funerals”, “Soviet Biographies” and several more films on the Mir TV channel.

Bibliography (books by Elena Prudnikova)
. Kolpakidi A.I., Prudnikova E.A. Double conspiracy. Stalin and Hitler: Failed coups. — M.: “Olma-Press”, 2000
. Prudnikova E.A. Stalin. Second murder. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House “Neva”, “Olma-Press”, 2003
. Prudnikova E.A. Beria. Crimes that never happened. St. Petersburg: Publishing House "Neva", "Olma-Press", 2005
. Prudnikova E.A. Richard Sorge - intelligence officer No. 1? - St. Petersburg: Publishing House "Neva", 2004
. Prudnikova E.A., Gorchakov O.A., Popov A.Yu., Tsvetkov A.I., Paporov Yu.N. Legends of the GRU - St. Petersburg: Publishing House "Neva", 2005
. Prudnikova E.A. Beria. Stalin's last knight. — M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2005
. Prudnikova E.A. Joseph Dzhugashvili. The most humane person. - M.: “Yauza”, “Eksmo”, 2005
. Prudnikova E.A. I deny you, Satan. - M.: “Yauza”, “Eksmo”, 2005
. Prudnikova E.A. Land of the Virgin. — M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2006
. Prudnikova E.A. Kolpakidi A.I. Double conspiracy. Secrets of Stalin's repressions. — M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2006
. Prudnikova E.A. Khrushchev. Creators of terror. — M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2007
. Prudnikova E.A. 1953. Fatal year Soviet history. - M.: “Yauza”, “Eksmo”, 2008
. Prudnikova E.A. Lavrentiy Beria's last fight. — M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2009
. Prudnikova E.A. Bridge over the fiery river. — M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2009
. Prudnikova E.A. Son of a Witch - M.: Olma Media Group, 2009
. Prudnikova E.A. Lenin-Stalin. Technology of the impossible. — M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2009
. Prudnikova E.A. Stalin. Battle for bread. — M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2010
. Prudnikova E.A. The second murder of Stalin (reissue). — M.: “Olma-Media Group”, 2010

I recently learned about this musical group and have already become their fan. I am very glad that more and more talented and creative young people with leftist views, and also theoretically savvy, are appearing. It cannot be otherwise, because Communism is the youth of the world!…

June 12th, 2017

In most memoirs of Soviet military leaders, the idea is tirelessly repeated that the beginning of the Great Patriotic War found the majority of the Red Army soldiers sleeping peacefully, which is why the troops of the border districts were defeated. Naturally, Stalin is to blame, who did not heed the warnings of the military and until the last resisted putting the army on combat readiness. Likewise, French and German generals swore in their memoirs that they tried their best to dissuade Napoleon and Hitler, respectively, from attacking Russia, but they did not listen. The goal in all three cases is the same - to shift the blame for defeats from oneself to the head of state, and each time studying the documents gives a completely opposite picture.

()

Nevertheless, the Poles were recognized by the Soviets, and then Russian authorities I am not satisfied with the USSR’s guilt in the Katyn execution. The Polish side in Strasbourg challenged the closure of the official investigation into the Katyn massacre, the decision of which was made by the Main Military Prosecutor's Office of Russia in 2004, citing the death of the criminals. The Poles demand continuation of the investigation and legal rehabilitation of the murdered officers.

Oddly enough, many Russian citizens also demand the same. Like the Poles, they are not satisfied with the state of this case and would like to continue the investigation and establish the truth. In short, in addition to the vague confessions of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, it would be desirable to obtain at least some more facts.

It was this desire to get facts that prompted Moscow researcher Ivan Chigirin and me to write a book about Katyn two years ago. This turned out to be surprisingly easy to do - almost all Soviet primary materials are in the “Burdenko Commission” fund at GARF, and there are also German sources there. We analyzed this entire array of information in detail in the book, but here I will report only the main facts and results.

When we met, Elena Anatolyevna turned out to be a very active, lively and charming woman. It is interesting to communicate with her, she knows a lot.

Lenin, Stalin, Beria

Beria system

Collectivization

Biography of Elena Prudnikova

Elena Anatolyevna Prudnikova was born in Leningrad.
Graduated from the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute, Faculty of Physics and Mechanics, Department of Solid State Physics.

Collaborated with several central publishing houses. Her books “Stalin. Second murder", "Beria. Stalin's Last Knight", "Double Conspiracy. Secrets of Stalin's repressions", "Khrushchev. Creators of Terror”, “Land of the Virgin Mary”, each of which became some kind of sensation. The author's historical specialization can be called “an attempt on myths.”
Since 2007, Elena Anatolyevna has been the editor-in-chief of the newspaper “Our Version on the Neva”.

As an expert, she starred in documentary film series on the NTV channel “Kremlin Children”, “Kremlin Funerals”, “Soviet Biographies” and several more films on the Mir TV channel.

Bibliography (books by Elena Prudnikova)
Kolpakidi A.I., Prudnikova E.A. Double conspiracy. Stalin and Hitler: Failed coups. - M.: “Olma-Press”, 2000
Prudnikova E.A. Stalin. Second murder. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House “Neva”, “Olma-Press”, 2003
Prudnikova E.A. Beria. Crimes that never happened. St. Petersburg: Publishing House "Neva", "Olma-Press", 2005
Prudnikova E.A. Richard Sorge - intelligence officer No. 1? - St. Petersburg: Publishing House "Neva", 2004
Prudnikova E.A., Gorchakov O.A., Popov A.Yu., Tsvetkov A.I., Paporov Yu.N. Legends of the GRU - St. Petersburg: Publishing House "Neva", 2005
Prudnikova E.A. Beria. Stalin's last knight. - M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2005
Prudnikova E.A. Joseph Dzhugashvili. The most humane person. - M.: “Yauza”, “Eksmo”, 2005
Prudnikova E.A. I deny you, Satan. - M.: “Yauza”, “Eksmo”, 2005
Prudnikova E.A. Land of the Virgin. - M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2006
Prudnikova E.A. Kolpakidi A.I. Double conspiracy. Secrets of Stalin's repressions. - M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2006
Prudnikova E.A. Khrushchev. Creators of terror. - M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2007
Prudnikova E.A. 1953. The fateful year of Soviet history. - M.: “Yauza”, “Eksmo”, 2008
Prudnikova E.A. Lavrentiy Beria's last fight. - M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2009
Prudnikova E.A. Bridge over the fiery river. - M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2009
Prudnikova E.A. Son of a Witch - M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2009
Prudnikova E.A. Lenin-Stalin. Technology of the impossible. - M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2009
Prudnikova E.A. Stalin. Battle for bread. - M.: “Olma Media Group”, 2010
Prudnikova E.A. The second murder of Stalin (reissue). - M.: “Olma-Media Group”, 2010

Extremely interesting material.
There is so much “low-quality art” heaped up around Lavrentiy Beria that you stop believing.
A calm look (like that of Stalin) is very helpful.

Original taken from vladimir_krm in Elena Prudnikova: interview for the book “The Last Battle of Lavrentiy Beria”

The interview is an afterword to the new book “The Last Battle of Lavrentiy Beria.”

Presented with abbreviations.

You know, Elena, my strongest desire after reading your book is to immediately ask: what is true in it, and where is the fiction here?

Complex issue. Approaching the matter as a researcher, with all the necessary tediousness, I will say that, basically, everything is made up - well, how can I really know what Stalin and Beria talked about and how? And as an author of fiction - that the book is overloaded with facts and there is too much of a history textbook in it. This, you know, is a question of criteria. If we talk about bare facts, there is something that actually happened, something that didn’t happen, and it also tells about what most likely actually happened, but there is no evidence of this and about what didn’t happen , however, there are abundant and detailed memories of this.

- Do you want to speak in riddles? Then let's classify. So first...

About what really happened

(Two rulers of the Soviet Union)

- ...Firstly, there was definitely a coup d’etat on June 26, 1953. This is not a struggle for power between Stalin’s heirs, but the most ordinary, normal putsch.

-Can you justify it?

- Why do you think that Beria was the successor?

So this is written in poster letters throughout the post-war structure of the USSR. The fact is that Stalin’s successor is constantly being sought where, in principle, he could not be at that time - in the Central Committee. But this is an aberration of vision introduced by the later, Brezhnev era, when the party received absolute and unlimited power in the country. The same thing happened before 1939. However, from 1940 to 1953 this was absolutely not the case. Let us remember: back at the July plenum of 1953, Malenkov was named Stalin’s successor, and he was in the honorable first place in the country’s leadership starting in March, immediately after the leader’s death. But Malenkov was Chairman of the Council of Ministers and just an ordinary member of the Politburo after he refused the post of Secretary of the Central Committee in the spring of 1953. The transfer of the center of gravity of public administration from the Politburo to the Council of People's Commissars began back in 1939, and Stalin's successor must be sought precisely in the Council of Ministers. And there it is surprisingly easy.

- How exactly?

- In 1942, the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee was formed, after the war it was transformed into the Operational Bureau of the Council of Ministers, and then simply called the Bureau of the Council of Ministers. It was a kind of “general headquarters” of the Soviet Union. They remained outside his jurisdiction - if they remained! - just a few ministries, of the significant ones: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of State Control and the command of the army. The man who headed the Bureau of the Council of Ministers was, by his position, the second person in the USSR. So: starting from 1944, this person was Beria. In addition, he also supervised three law enforcement agencies: the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Moscow State Committee (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the army were personally supervised by Stalin, who also dealt with general, strategic issues of the country’s development). In fact, power in the state was divided between Stalin and Beria, with Stalin’s overall supervision of the “Beria” half - Isn't it obvious who the leader was going to hand over the helm to? In addition, it follows that Beria was either a complete and absolute like-minded person of Stalin, or his views suited the leader - otherwise Lavrenty Pavlovich would never have seen such a volume of powers in his life. In fact, after the war, the country was ruled not by one leader, but by two: old and young, and the first gradually transferred the levers of control to the second. By the way, about this, God willing, I am going to write the next book, which will be called “The Double Star System.”

- Do you want to say that already in 1944 Stalin identified his successor?

I think this was done much earlier, in 1944 his solution just came to the surface. And how can I say... Until now, I have taken 1944 as a reference point, when Beria became Stalin’s deputy for the State Defense Committee. Then, while studying the topic of June 22, I found out that even then Beria was part of the leading “troika” of the USSR - the narrowest of the narrow leadership that ever existed in the country. He was also entrusted with carrying out the most important operation of the Great Patriotic War - the evacuation of industry from threatened areas. And the new conditional point was August 8, 1941, when Stalin became the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Even though he was a genius, in order to calmly lead the course of the war, focusing on managing the army, he had to rely on the “commander-in-chief” of the entire rear, that is, a single military camp called the USSR. Of the four remaining members of the State Defense Committee, and of the entire Politburo, only Beria was suitable for this post.

-You forget about Molotov...

- So when?

- So, the first person Stalin prepared to be his successor was Kirov?!!

And there’s simply no one else! For Stalin, the economy was always a priority. This means that he could only be replaced as head of state by someone who had experience in successful integrated management of a country or region. There were few of these at that time. In the Politburo - Ordzhonikidze and Kirov. The first one was not suitable due to a number of personal qualities and nationality. And the fact that they say that Kirov was also not very suitable for a number of properties - after all, Stalin did not have the opportunity to look for an ideal leader, he had to choose from those who were nearby.

- Ordzhonikidze’s nationality was a hindrance to Stalin. But what about Beria’s nationality?

- Even so?

- So who conceived the economic reform - Stalin or Beria?

It was probably Stalin who came up with the idea, but Beria’s role, I believe, was very important here.

- So, in your opinion, Stalin was against the economics of socialism?

But they simply didn’t have time to create it. Starting from the first five-year plans, the USSR economy was always an emergency and for this reason a command economy. They began to think about economic mechanisms after the war, when there was no longer a need for such a frantic race and it was necessary to move on to a normal peacetime economy. Some kind of transformation was clearly being prepared. Let us remember Stalin’s “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR” - they appeared precisely during that period. And I think the impetus was given by the “Gosplan case” when it came out - What What can happen to the economy is an unscrupulous planner or simply a traitor. Voznesensky was shot, but the problem remained.

- And do you think the economy was supposed to be a market economy?

Planned market, of course. Back in the 30s, when the whole country worked not for money, but according to orders, economic mechanisms were successfully used in “Beria’s” Georgia. There, in an interesting way, enterprises of union subordination, working according to a national plan, and local ones were combined, as well as command and economic methods. In general, it would be necessary to carefully study the Georgian experience of the 30s - precisely as a testing ground for the new socialist economy. By the way, I had to deal with the statements of major Western economists - truly major ones, and not those with whom our “boys in pink pants” consulted - and these specialists said that one of the main goals of “perestroika” was to destroy the Soviet planned economy, since this is the economy of the day after tomorrow, and nothing more effective has yet been invented. Recently I heard a very interesting comparison, with which I generally agree. The market economy is a magnificent racing car, equipped with the latest technology and design. The Soviet planned economy is a clumsy, ugly and unfinished spaceship. And even unreformed and cumbersome, this economy was still a dangerous competitor. And returning to the late 40s - early 50s..., only one thing should be said: whoever developed this reform, only Beria could carry it out.

- Why not Stalin?

Returning once again to the question of a successor - why did Malenkov become the head of state after Stalin’s death?

Perhaps this was a compromise condition in the negotiations between the party and the government, but, rather, it was Beria’s decision. It was he who was the first, not counting the purely formal chairmanship of Khrushchev, to take the floor on March 5 at the meeting when the question of power was being decided, and proposed Malenkov for this post. Thus, by the way, in the distribution of roles, he played in the new government the role that Stalin played in the 30s. Let us remember that the leader did not always occupy the main positions himself. Let us also remember that it was Beria who gave instructions to the doctors at Stalin’s dacha, and he also ordered the end of resuscitation measures - that is, he behaved like a real head of state. And until June 26, the government obeyed him unquestioningly, so then they all had to try very hard at the plenum, explaining the reason why they did this. Why didn’t Beria become the chairman of the Council of Ministers... There may be several versions here. In “Stalin’s Last Knight” I stated one thing - that it was a matter of nationality. This book contains another...

- And quite unexpected...

Yes, but what is impossible about it? Beria was young for a statesman - 54 years old, but he looked much older. There is evidence that he worked lying down - at least, he treated the father of one of my friends in this way, and that man, a rather large designer, was extremely amazed by this. Finally, just a month ago I learned about the neuropsychic manifestations of radiation sickness - these are euphoria and depression turning into each other. If we take into account Beria’s temperament, this exactly coincides with what they said about him at the plenum and what they remembered about what he was like in the spring of 1953. He was clearly very sick with something, and what is the most natural, one might say professional, illness for the chairman of the atomic committee? By the way, two of his deputies, Malyshev and Zavenyagin, died from it in the mid-50s. We must not forget that radiation sickness was practically unstudied at that time, so doctors could hardly give any definite prognosis. And it would be simply irresponsible to take over government when you don’t know how much time you have left. And then what - a new redistribution of power?

- What else in your book is a historical fact?

Major political events, removals and appointments of government officials, plenums and congresses, etc. The general historical outline is quite accurately verified by dates and events. Biographies of Beria and other people are based only on real facts - except for dialogues, of course. Although in this case, some of them relate to those that could take place - if not with the same words, then with the same meaning...

About what didn't happen

(Fiction as confirmation of truth)

- ...Firstly and most importantly, there was no arrest of Beria. Before working on this book, I was ninety percent sure of this, now I’m ninety-nine percent sure.