Berlin offensive operation commanders. Battle for Berlin. Summary of the last operation of the Great Patriotic War

Strengths of the parties Soviet troops:
1.9 million people
6,250 tanks
more than 7,500 aircraft
Polish troops: 155,900 people
1 million people
1,500 tanks
more than 3,300 aircraft Losses Soviet troops:
78,291 killed
274,184 injured
215.9 thousand units. small arms
1,997 tanks and self-propelled guns
2,108 guns and mortars
917 aircraft
Polish troops:
2,825 killed
6,067 injured Soviet data:
OK. 400 thousand killed
OK. 380 thousand captured
The Great Patriotic War
Invasion of the USSR Karelia Arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkiv Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikie Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomir Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians Baltics Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague

Berlin strategic offensive operation- one of the last strategic operations Soviet troops in the European Theater of Operations, during which the Red Army occupied the capital of Germany and victoriously ended the Great Patriotic War and World War II in Europe. The operation lasted 23 days - from April 16 to May 8, 1945, during which Soviet troops advanced westward to a distance of 100 to 220 km. The width of the combat front is 300 km. As part of the operation, the following frontal offensive operations were carried out: Stettin-Rostok, Seelow-Berlin, Cottbus-Potsdam, Stremberg-Torgau and Brandenburg-Ratenow.

The military-political situation in Europe in the spring of 1945

In January-March 1945, troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, during the Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian, Upper Silesian and Lower Silesian operations, reached the line of the Oder and Neisse rivers. The shortest distance from the Küstrin bridgehead to Berlin was 60 km. Anglo-American troops completed the liquidation of the Ruhr group of German troops and by mid-April advanced units reached the Elbe. The loss of the most important raw material areas caused a decline in industrial production in Germany. Difficulties in making up for the casualties suffered in the winter of 1944/45 have increased. Nevertheless armed forces Germany still represented an impressive force. According to the intelligence department of the General Staff of the Red Army, by mid-April they included 223 divisions and brigades.

According to the agreements reached by the heads of the USSR, USA and Great Britain in the fall of 1944, the border of the Soviet occupation zone was supposed to pass 150 km west of Berlin. Despite this, Churchill put forward the idea of ​​getting ahead of the Red Army and capturing Berlin, and then commissioned the development of a plan for a full-scale war against the USSR.

Goals of the parties

Germany

The Nazi leadership tried to prolong the war in order to achieve a separate peace with England and the United States and split the anti-Hitler coalition. At the same time, holding the front against Soviet Union.

USSR

The military-political situation that had developed by April 1945 required the Soviet command to prepare and carry out an operation in the shortest possible time to defeat a group of German troops in the Berlin direction, capture Berlin and reach the Elbe River to join the Allied forces. The successful completion of this strategic task made it possible to thwart the plans of the Nazi leadership to prolong the war.

  • Capture the capital of Germany, Berlin
  • After 12-15 days of the operation, reach the Elbe River
  • Deliver a cutting blow south of Berlin, isolate the main forces of Army Group Center from the Berlin group and thereby ensure the main attack of the 1st Belorussian Front from the south
  • Defeat the enemy group south of Berlin and operational reserves in the Cottbus area
  • In 10-12 days, no later, reach the Belitz - Wittenberg line and further along the Elbe River to Dresden
  • Deliver a cutting blow north of Berlin, protecting the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front from possible enemy counterattacks from the north
  • Press to the sea and destroy German troops north of Berlin
  • Two brigades of river ships will assist the troops of the 5th Shock and 8th Guards Armies in crossing the Oder and breaking through enemy defenses on the Küstrin bridgehead
  • The third brigade will assist the troops of the 33rd Army in the Furstenberg area
  • Ensure mine defense of water transport routes.
  • Support the coastal flank of the 2nd Belorussian Front, continuing the blockade of Army Group Courland pressed to the sea in Latvia (Courland Pocket)

Operation plan

The operation plan provided for the simultaneous transition of troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts to the offensive on the morning of April 16, 1945. The 2nd Belorussian Front, in connection with the upcoming major regrouping of its forces, was supposed to launch an offensive on April 20, that is, 4 days later.

When preparing the operation, special attention was paid to the issues of camouflage and achieving operational and tactical surprise. The front headquarters developed detailed action plans for disinformation and misleading the enemy, according to which preparations for an offensive by the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts were simulated in the area of ​​​​the cities of Stettin and Guben. At the same time, intensified defensive work continued in the central sector of the 1st Belorussian Front, where the main attack was actually planned. They were carried out especially intensively in areas clearly visible to the enemy. It was explained to all army personnel that the main task was stubborn defense. In addition, documents were planted at the enemy’s location characterizing the activities of troops in various areas front.

The arrival of reserves and reinforcement units was carefully disguised. Military echelons with artillery, mortar, and tank units on Polish territory were disguised as trains transporting timber and hay on platforms.

When conducting reconnaissance, tank commanders from the battalion commander to the army commander dressed in infantry uniforms and, under the guise of signalmen, examined crossings and areas where their units would be concentrated.

The circle of knowledgeable persons was extremely limited. In addition to army commanders, only the chiefs of army staffs, heads of operational departments of army headquarters and artillery commanders were allowed to familiarize themselves with the Headquarters directive. Regimental commanders received tasks verbally three days before the offensive. Junior commanders and Red Army soldiers were allowed to announce the offensive mission two hours before the attack.

Regrouping of troops

In preparation for Berlin operation The 2nd Belorussian Front, which had just completed the East Pomeranian operation, in the period from April 4 to 15, 1945, had to transfer 4 combined arms armies at a distance of up to 350 km from the area of ​​​​the cities of Danzig and Gdynia to the line of the Oder River and replace the armies of the 1st Belorussian Front. Bad condition railways and an acute shortage of rolling stock did not allow full use of the opportunities railway transport Therefore, the main burden of transportation fell on motor transport. The front was allocated 1,900 vehicles. The troops had to cover part of the route on foot.

Germany

The German command foresaw the offensive of the Soviet troops and carefully prepared to repel it. From the Oder to Berlin, a deeply layered defense was built, and the city itself was turned into a powerful defensive citadel. First-line divisions were replenished with personnel and equipment, and strong reserves were created in the operational depths. A huge number of Volkssturm battalions were formed in Berlin and near it.

Nature of defense

The basis of the defense was the Oder-Neissen defensive line and the Berlin defensive region. The Oder-Neisen line consisted of three defensive lines, and its total depth reached 20-40 km. The main defensive line had up to five continuous lines of trenches, and its front edge ran along the left bank of the Oder and Neisse rivers. A second defense line was created 10-20 km from it. It was the most equipped in engineering terms at the Seelow Heights - in front of the Kyustrin bridgehead. The third stripe was located 20-40 km from the front edge. When organizing and equipping the defense, the German command skillfully used natural obstacles: lakes, rivers, canals, ravines. All settlements were turned into strong strongholds and were adapted to all-round defense. During the construction of the Oder-Neissen line, special attention was paid to the organization of anti-tank defense.

The saturation of defensive positions with enemy troops was uneven. The greatest density of troops was observed in front of the 1st Belorussian Front in a 175 km wide zone, where the defense was occupied by 23 divisions, a significant number of individual brigades, regiments and battalions, with 14 divisions defending against the Kyustrin bridgehead. In the 120 km wide offensive zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front, 7 infantry divisions and 13 separate regiments defended. There were 25 enemy divisions in the 390 km wide zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

In an effort to increase the resilience of their troops in defense, the Nazi leadership tightened repressive measures. So, on April 15, in his address to the soldiers eastern front A. Hitler demanded the execution on the spot of everyone who gave the order to withdraw or would withdraw without an order.

Composition and strengths of the parties

USSR

Total: Soviet troops - 1.9 million people, Polish troops - 155,900 people, 6,250 tanks, 41,600 guns and mortars, more than 7,500 aircraft

Germany

Following the orders of the commander, on April 18 and 19 the tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front marched uncontrollably towards Berlin. The rate of their advance reached 35-50 km per day. At the same time, the combined arms armies were preparing to eliminate large enemy groups in the area of ​​Cottbus and Spremberg.

By the end of the day on April 20, the main strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front was deeply wedged into the enemy’s position and completely cut off the German Army Group Vistula from Army Group Center. Sensing the threat caused by the rapid actions of the tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the German command took a number of measures to strengthen the approaches to Berlin. To strengthen the defense, infantry and tank units were urgently sent to the area of ​​​​the cities of Zossen, Luckenwalde, and Jutterbog. Overcoming their stubborn resistance, Rybalko’s tankers reached the outer Berlin defensive perimeter on the night of April 21. By the morning of April 22, Sukhov's 9th Mechanized Corps and Mitrofanov's 6th Guards Tank Corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army crossed the Notte Canal, broke through the outer defensive perimeter of Berlin, and by the end of the day reached the southern bank of the Teltow Canal. There, encountering strong and well-organized enemy resistance, they were stopped.

At 12 noon on April 25, west of Berlin, the advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army met with units of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front. On the same day, another significant event occurred. An hour and a half later, General Baklanov's 34th Guards Corps of the 5th Guards Army met with American troops on the Elbe.

From April 25 to May 2, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front fought fierce battles in three directions: units of the 28th Army, 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies took part in the assault on Berlin; part of the forces of the 4th Guards Tank Army, together with the 13th Army, repelled the counterattack of the 12th German Army; The 3rd Guards Army and part of the forces of the 28th Army blocked and destroyed the encircled 9th Army.

All the time from the beginning of the operation, the command of Army Group Center sought to disrupt the offensive of the Soviet troops. On April 20, German troops launched the first counterattack on the left flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front and pushed back the troops of the 52nd Army and the 2nd Army of the Polish Army. On April 23, a new powerful counterattack followed, as a result of which the defense at the junction of the 52nd Army and the 2nd Army of the Polish Army was broken through and German troops advanced 20 km into general direction on Spremberg, threatening to reach the rear of the front.

2nd Belorussian Front (April 20-May 8)

From April 17 to 19, troops of the 65th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front, under the command of Colonel General P.I. Batov, conducted reconnaissance in force and advanced detachments captured the Oder interfluve, thereby facilitating subsequent crossings of the river. On the morning of April 20, the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive: the 65th, 70th and 49th armies. The crossing of the Oder took place under the cover of artillery fire and smoke screens. The offensive developed most successfully in the sector of the 65th Army, which was largely due to the engineering troops of the army. Having established two 16-ton pontoon crossings by 1 p.m., the troops of this army captured a bridgehead 6 kilometers wide and 1.5 kilometers deep by the evening of April 20.

We had a chance to observe the work of sappers. Working up to their necks in icy water amid exploding shells and mines, they made a crossing. Every second they were threatened with death, but people understood their soldier’s duty and thought about one thing - to help their comrades on west bank and thereby bring victory closer.

More modest success was achieved on the central sector of the front in the 70th Army zone. The left-flank 49th Army met stubborn resistance and was unsuccessful. All day and all night on April 21, front troops, repelling numerous attacks by German troops, persistently expanded bridgeheads on the western bank of the Oder. In the current situation, front commander K.K. Rokossovsky decided to send the 49th Army along the crossings of the right neighbor of the 70th Army, and then return it to its offensive zone. By April 25, as a result of fierce battles, front troops expanded the captured bridgehead to 35 km along the front and up to 15 km in depth. To build up striking power, the 2nd Shock Army, as well as the 1st and 3rd Guards Tank Corps, were transported to the western bank of the Oder. At the first stage of the operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front, through its actions, shackled the main forces of the 3rd German Tank Army, depriving it of the opportunity to help those fighting near Berlin. On April 26, formations of the 65th Army took Stettin by storm. Subsequently, the armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front, breaking enemy resistance and destroying suitable reserves, stubbornly advanced to the west. On May 3, Panfilov's 3rd Guards Tank Corps southwest of Wismar established contact with the advanced units of the 2nd British Army.

Liquidation of the Frankfurt-Guben group

By the end of April 24, formations of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front came into contact with units of the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, thereby encircling the 9th Army of General Busse southeast of Berlin and cutting it off from the city. The surrounded group of German troops began to be called the Frankfurt-Gubensky group. Now the Soviet command was faced with the task of eliminating the 200,000-strong enemy group and preventing its breakthrough to Berlin or to the West. To accomplish the last task, the 3rd Guards Army and part of the forces of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front took up active defense in the path of a possible breakthrough of German troops. On April 26, the 3rd, 69th, and 33rd armies of the 1st Belorussian Front began the final liquidation of the encircled units. However, the enemy not only put up stubborn resistance, but also repeatedly made attempts to break out of the encirclement. By skillfully maneuvering and skillfully creating superiority in forces on narrow sections of the front, German troops twice managed to break through the encirclement. However, each time the Soviet command took decisive measures to eliminate the breakthrough. Until May 2, the encircled units of the 9th German Army made desperate attempts to break through the battle formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the west, to join the 12th Army of General Wenck. Only a few small groups managed to penetrate through the forests and go west.

Assault on Berlin (April 25 - May 2)

A salvo of Soviet Katyusha rocket launchers hits Berlin

At 12 noon on April 25, the ring closed around Berlin when the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps of the 4th Guards Tank Army crossed the Havel River and linked up with units of the 328th Division of the 47th Army of General Perkhorovich. By that time, according to the Soviet command, the Berlin garrison numbered at least 200 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and 250 tanks. The city's defense was carefully thought out and well prepared. It was based on a system of strong fire, strongholds and resistance units. The closer to the city center, the denser the defense became. Massive stone buildings with thick walls gave it particular strength. The windows and doors of many buildings were sealed and turned into embrasures for firing. The streets were blocked by powerful barricades up to four meters thick. The defenders had a large number of faustpatrons, which in the context of street battles turned out to be a formidable anti-tank weapon. Of no small importance in the enemy’s defense system were underground structures, which were widely used by the enemy to maneuver troops, as well as to shelter them from artillery and bomb attacks.

By April 26, six armies of the 1st Belorussian Front (47th, 3rd and 5th shock, 8th Guards, 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies) and three armies of the 1st Belorussian Front took part in the assault on Berlin. th Ukrainian Front (28th, 3rd and 4th Guards Tank). Taking into account the experience of capturing large cities, assault detachments were created for battles in the city, consisting of rifle battalions or companies, reinforced with tanks, artillery and sappers. The actions of assault troops, as a rule, were preceded by a short but powerful artillery preparation.

By April 27, as a result of the actions of the armies of two fronts that had deeply advanced to the center of Berlin, the enemy grouping in Berlin stretched out in a narrow strip from east to west - sixteen kilometers long and two or three, in some places five kilometers wide. The fighting in the city did not stop day or night. Block after block, Soviet troops advanced deeper into enemy defenses. So, by the evening of April 28, units of the 3rd Shock Army reached the Reichstag area. On the night of April 29, the actions of the forward battalions under the command of Captain S. A. Neustroev and Senior Lieutenant K. Ya. Samsonov captured the Moltke Bridge. At dawn on April 30, the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, adjacent to the parliament building, was stormed at the cost of considerable losses. The path to the Reichstag was open.

On April 30, 1945 at 14:25, units of the 150th Infantry Division under the command of Major General V.M. Shatilov and the 171st Infantry Division under the command of Colonel A.I. Negoda stormed the main part of the Reichstag building. The remaining Nazi units offered stubborn resistance. We had to fight for literally every room. In the early morning of May 1, the assault flag of the 150th Infantry Division was raised over the Reichstag, but the battle for the Reichstag continued all day and only on the night of May 2 did the Reichstag garrison capitulate.

Helmut Weidling (left) and his staff officers surrender Soviet troops. Berlin. May 2, 1945

  • Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the period from April 15 to 29

killed 114,349 people, captured 55,080 people

  • Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the period from April 5 to May 8:

killed 49,770 people, captured 84,234 people

Thus, according to reports from the Soviet command, the losses of German troops were about 400 thousand people killed and about 380 thousand people captured. Part of the German troops was pushed back to the Elbe and capitulated to the Allied forces.

Also, according to the assessment of the Soviet command, the total number of troops that emerged from the encirclement in the Berlin area does not exceed 17,000 people with 80-90 armored vehicles.

Overestimation of German losses

According to combat reports from the fronts:

  • Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front in the period from April 16 to May 13: destroyed - 1,184, captured - 629 tanks and self-propelled guns.
  • Between April 15 and April 29, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front destroyed 1,067 tanks and captured 432 tanks and self-propelled guns;
  • Between April 5 and May 8, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front destroyed 195 and captured 85 tanks and self-propelled guns.

In total, according to the fronts, 3,592 tanks and self-propelled guns were destroyed and captured, which is more than 2 times the number of tanks available on the Soviet-German front before the start of the operation.

Berlin, Germany

The Red Army defeated the Berlin group of German troops and occupied the capital of Germany, Berlin. Victory of the anti-Hitler coalition in Europe.

Opponents

Germany

Commanders

I. V. Stalin

A. Hitler †

G. K. Zhukov

G. Heinrici

I. S. Konev

K. K. Rokossovsky

G. Weidling

Strengths of the parties

Soviet troops: 1.9 million people, 6,250 tanks, more than 7,500 aircraft. Polish troops: 155,900 people

1 million people, 1500 tanks, more than 3300 aircraft

Soviet troops: 78,291 killed, 274,184 wounded, 215.9 thousand units. small arms, 1997 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2108 guns and mortars, 917 aircraft.
Polish troops: 2825 killed, 6067 wounded

The whole group. Soviet data: OK. 400 thousand killed, approx. 380 thousand were captured. The losses of the Volksturm, police, Todt organization, Hitler Youth, Imperial Railway Service, Labor Service (500-1,000 people in total) are unknown.

One of the last strategic operations of Soviet troops on European theater military operations, during which the Red Army occupied the capital of Germany and victoriously ended the Great Patriotic War and the Second world war in Europe. The operation lasted 23 days - from April 16 to May 8, 1945, during which Soviet troops advanced westward to a distance of 100 to 220 km. The width of the combat front is 300 km. As part of the operation, the following frontal offensive operations were carried out: Stettin-Rostok, Seelow-Berlin, Cottbus-Potsdam, Stremberg-Torgau and Brandenburg-Ratenow.

The military-political situation in Europe in the spring of 1945

In January-March 1945, troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, during the Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian, Upper Silesian and Lower Silesian operations, reached the border of the Oder and Neisse rivers. The shortest distance from the Küstrin bridgehead to Berlin was 60 km. Anglo-American troops completed the liquidation of the Ruhr group of German troops and by mid-April advanced units reached the Elbe. The loss of the most important raw material areas caused a decline in industrial production in Germany. Difficulties in replacing the casualties suffered in the winter of 1944/45 increased. Nevertheless, the German armed forces still represented an impressive force. According to the intelligence department of the General Staff of the Red Army, by mid-April they included 223 divisions and brigades.

According to the agreements reached by the heads of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in the fall of 1944, the border of the Soviet occupation zone was to pass 150 km west of Berlin. Despite this, Churchill put forward the idea of ​​getting ahead of the Red Army and capturing Berlin.

Goals of the parties

Germany

The Nazi leadership tried to prolong the war in order to achieve a separate peace with England and the United States and split the anti-Hitler coalition. At the same time, holding the front against the Soviet Union became crucial.

USSR

The military-political situation that had developed by April 1945 required the Soviet command to prepare and carry out an operation in the shortest possible time to defeat a group of German troops in the Berlin direction, capture Berlin and reach the Elbe River to join the Allied forces. The successful completion of this strategic task made it possible to thwart the plans of the Nazi leadership to prolong the war.

To carry out the operation, the forces of three fronts were involved: the 1st Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian, as well as the 18th Air Army of Long-Range Aviation, the Dnieper Military Flotilla and part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet.

1st Belorussian Front

  • Capture the capital of Germany, Berlin
  • After 12-15 days of the operation, reach the Elbe River

1st Ukrainian Front

  • Deliver a cutting blow south of Berlin, isolate the main forces of Army Group Center from the Berlin group and thereby ensure the main attack of the 1st Belorussian Front from the south
  • Defeat the enemy group south of Berlin and operational reserves in the Cottbus area
  • In 10-12 days, no later, reach the Belitz - Wittenberg line and further along the Elbe River to Dresden

2nd Belorussian Front

  • Deliver a cutting blow north of Berlin, protecting the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front from possible enemy counterattacks from the north
  • Press to the sea and destroy German troops north of Berlin

Dnieper military flotilla

  • Two brigades of river ships will assist the troops of the 5th Shock and 8th Guards Armies in crossing the Oder and breaking through the enemy defenses of the Nakustrin bridgehead
  • The third brigade will assist the troops of the 33rd Army in the Furstenberg area
  • Ensure mine defense of water transport routes.

Red Banner Baltic Fleet

  • Support the coastal flank of the 2nd Belorussian Front, continuing the blockade of Army Group Courland pressed to the sea in Latvia (Courland Pocket)

Operation plan

The operation plan provided for the simultaneous transition of troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts to the offensive on the morning of April 16, 1945. The 2nd Belorussian Front, in connection with the upcoming major regrouping of its forces, was supposed to launch an offensive on April 20, that is, 4 days later.

The 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to deliver the main blow with the forces of five combined arms (47th, 3rd Shock, 5th Shock, 8th Guards and 3rd Army) and two tank armies from the Küstrin bridgehead in the direction of Berlin. The tank armies were planned to be brought into battle after the combined arms armies had broken through the second line of defense on the Seelow Heights. In the main attack area, an artillery density of up to 270 guns (with a caliber of 76 mm and above) was created per kilometer of the breakthrough front. In addition, front commander G.K. Zhukov decided to launch two auxiliary strikes: on the right - with the forces of the 61st Soviet and 1st Army of the Polish Army, bypassing Berlin from the north in the direction of Eberswalde, Sandau; and on the left - by the forces of the 69th and 33rd armies to Bonsdorf with the main task of preventing the retreat of the enemy 9th Army to Berlin.

The 1st Ukrainian Front was supposed to deliver the main blow with the forces of five armies: three combined arms (13th, 5th Guards and 3rd Guards) and two tank armies from the area of ​​the city of Trimbel in the direction of Spremberg. An auxiliary strike was to be delivered in the general direction of Dresden by the forces of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army and part of the forces of the 52nd Army.

The dividing line between the 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian fronts ended 50 km southeast of Berlin in the area of ​​the city of Lübben, which allowed, if necessary, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front to strike Berlin from the south.

The commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, K.K. Rokossovsky, decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 65th, 70th and 49th armies in the direction of Neustrelitz. Separate tank, mechanized and cavalry corps of front-line subordination were to develop the success after the breakthrough of the German defense.

Preparing for surgery

USSR

Intelligence support

Reconnaissance aircraft took aerial photographs of Berlin, all approaches to it and defensive zones 6 times. In total, about 15 thousand aerial photographs were obtained. Based on the results of filming, captured documents and interviews with prisoners, detailed diagrams, plans, maps, which were supplied to all command and staff levels. The military topographical service of the 1st Belorussian Front produced an accurate model of the city with its suburbs, which was used in studying issues related to the organization of the offensive, the general assault on Berlin and battles in the city center.

Two days before the start of the operation, reconnaissance in force was carried out throughout the entire zone of the 1st Belorussian Front. Over the course of two days on April 14 and 15, 32 reconnaissance detachments, each with a force of up to a reinforced rifle battalion, clarified the placement of enemy fire weapons, the deployment of his groups, and determined the strong and most vulnerable places of the defensive line.

Engineering support

During the preparation for the offensive, the engineering troops of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Lieutenant General Antipenko carried out a large amount of sapper and engineering work. By the beginning of the operation, often under enemy fire, 25 road bridges with a total length of 15,017 linear meters had been built across the Oder and 40 ferry crossings had been prepared. In order to organize a continuous and complete supply of the advancing units with ammunition and fuel, the railway track in the occupied territory was changed to a Russian track almost all the way to the Oder. In addition, military engineers of the front made heroic efforts to strengthen the railway bridges across the Vistula, which were in danger of being demolished by the spring ice drift.

On the 1st Ukrainian Front, 2,440 sapper wooden boats, 750 linear meters of assault bridges and over 1,000 linear meters of wooden bridges for loads of 16 and 60 tons were prepared to cross the Neisse River.

At the beginning of the offensive, the 2nd Belorussian Front had to cross the Oder, the width of which in some places reached six kilometers, so special attention was also paid to the engineering preparation of the operation. Front engineering troops under the leadership of Lieutenant General Blagoslavov the shortest possible time They pulled up and securely covered dozens of pontoons and hundreds of boats in the coastal zone, brought in timber for the construction of piers and bridges, made rafts, and laid roads through the marshy areas of the coast.

Disguise and disinformation

When preparing the operation, special attention was paid to the issues of camouflage and achieving operational and tactical surprise. The front headquarters developed detailed action plans for disinformation and misleading the enemy, according to which preparations for an offensive by the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts were simulated in the area of ​​​​the cities of Stettin and Guben. At the same time, intensified defensive work continued in the central sector of the 1st Belorussian Front, where the main attack was actually planned. They were carried out especially intensively in areas clearly visible to the enemy. It was explained to all army personnel that the main task was stubborn defense. In addition, documents characterizing the activities of troops in various sectors of the front were planted at the enemy’s location.

The arrival of reserves and reinforcement units was carefully disguised. Military trains with artillery, mortar, and tank units on Polish territory were disguised as trains transporting timber and hay on platforms.

When conducting reconnaissance, tank commanders from the battalion commander to the army commander dressed in infantry uniforms and, under the guise of signalmen, examined crossings and areas where their units would be concentrated.

The circle of knowledgeable persons was extremely limited. In addition to army commanders, only the chiefs of army staffs, heads of operational departments of army headquarters and artillery commanders were allowed to familiarize themselves with the Headquarters directive. Regimental commanders received tasks verbally three days before the offensive. Junior commanders and Red Army soldiers were allowed to announce the offensive mission two hours before the attack.

Regrouping of troops

In preparation for the Berlin operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front, which had just completed the East Pomeranian operation, in the period from April 4 to April 15, 1945, had to transfer 4 combined arms armies over a distance of up to 350 km from the area of ​​​​the cities of Danzig and Gdynia to the line of the Oder River and replace the armies of the 1st Belorussian Front there. The poor condition of the railways and the acute shortage of rolling stock did not allow full use of the capabilities of railway transport, so the main burden of transportation fell on road transport. The front was allocated 1,900 vehicles. The troops had to cover part of the route on foot.

Germany

The German command foresaw the offensive of the Soviet troops and carefully prepared to repel it. From the Oder to Berlin, a deeply layered defense was built, and the city itself was turned into a powerful defensive citadel. First-line divisions were replenished with personnel and equipment, and strong reserves were created in the operational depths. A huge number of Volkssturm battalions were formed in Berlin and near it.

Nature of defense

The basis of the defense was the Oder-Neissen defensive line and the Berlin defensive region. The Oder-Neisen line consisted of three defensive lines, and its total depth reached 20-40 km. The main defensive line had up to five continuous lines of trenches, and its front edge ran along the left bank of the Oder and Neisse rivers. A second defense line was created 10-20 km from it. It was the most equipped in engineering terms at the Seelow Heights - in front of the Küstrin bridgehead. The third stripe was located 20-40 km from the front edge. When organizing and equipping the defense, the German command skillfully used natural obstacles: lakes, rivers, canals, ravines. All settlements were turned into strong strongholds and were adapted for all-round defense. During the construction of the Oder-Neissen line, special attention was paid to the organization of anti-tank defense.

The saturation of defensive positions with enemy troops was uneven. The greatest density of troops was observed in front of the 1st Belorussian Front in a 175 km wide zone, where the defense was occupied by 23 divisions, a significant number of individual brigades, regiments and battalions, with 14 divisions defending against the Kyustrin bridgehead. In the 120 km wide offensive zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front, 7 infantry divisions and 13 separate regiments defended. There were 25 enemy divisions in the 390 km wide zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

In an effort to increase the resilience of their troops in defense, the Nazi leadership tightened repressive measures. So, on April 15, in his address to the soldiers of the eastern front, A. Hitler demanded that everyone who gave the order to withdraw or would withdraw without an order be shot on the spot.

Composition and strengths of the parties

USSR

1st Belorussian Front (commander Marshal G.K. Zhukov, chief of staff Colonel General M.S. Malinin) consisting of:

1st Ukrainian Front (commander Marshal I. S. Konev, chief of staff General of the Army I. E. Petrov) consisting of:

  • 3rd Guards Army (Colonel General V. N. Gordov)
  • 5th Guards Army (Colonel General Zhadov A.S.)
  • 13th Army (Colonel General N.P. Pukhov)
  • 28th Army (Lieutenant General A. A. Luchinsky)
  • 52nd Army (Colonel General Koroteev K. A.)
  • 3rd Guards Tank Army (Colonel General P. S. Rybalko)
  • 4th Guards Tank Army (Colonel General D. D. Lelyushenko)
  • 2nd Air Army (Colonel General of Aviation Krasovsky S.A.)
  • 2nd Army of the Polish Army (Lieutenant General Sverchevsky K.K.)
  • 25th Tank Corps (Major General of Tank Forces Fominykh E.I.)
  • 4th Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General of Tank Forces P. P. Poluboyarov)
  • 7th Guards Mechanized Corps (Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Korchagin I.P.)
  • 1st Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General V.K. Baranov)

2nd Belorussian Front (commander Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, chief of staff Colonel General A.N. Bogolyubov) consisting of:

  • 2nd Shock Army (Colonel General I. I. Fedyuninsky)
  • 65th Army (Colonel General Batov P.I.)
  • 70th Army (Colonel General Popov V.S.)
  • 49th Army (Colonel General Grishin I.T.)
  • 4th Air Army (Colonel General of Aviation Vershinin K.A.)
  • 1st Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Panov M.F.)
  • 8th Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Popov A.F.)
  • 3rd Guards Tank Corps (Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Panfilov A.P.)
  • 8th Mechanized Corps (Major General of Tank Forces Firsovich A. N.)
  • 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General Oslikovsky N.S.)

18th Air Army (Air Chief Marshal A. E. Golovanov)

Dnieper Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral V.V. Grigoriev)

Red Banner Baltic Fleet (Admiral V.F. Tributs)

Total: Soviet troops - 1.9 million people, Polish troops - 155,900 people, 6,250 tanks, 41,600 guns and mortars, more than 7,500 aircraft

In addition, the 1st Belorussian Front included German formations consisting of former captured Wehrmacht soldiers and officers who agreed to participate in the fight against the Hitler regime (Seydlitz troops)

Germany

Army Group "Vistula" under the command of Colonel General G. Heinrici, from April 28, General K. Student, consisting of:

  • 3rd Tank Army (General of Tank Forces H. Manteuffel)
    • 32nd Army Corps (Infantry General F. Schuck)
    • Army Corps "Oder"
    • 3rd SS Panzer Corps (SS Brigadeführer J. Ziegler)
    • 46th Tank Corps (Infantry General M. Garais)
    • 101st Army Corps (Artillery General W. Berlin, from April 18, 1945 Lieutenant General F. Sikst)
  • 9th Army (Infantry General T. Busse)
    • 56th Tank Corps (Artillery General G. Weidling)
    • 11th SS Corps (SS-Obergruppenführer M. Kleinheisterkamp)
    • 5th SS Mountain Corps (SS-Obergruppenführer F. Jeckeln)
    • 5th Army Corps (Artillery General K. Weger)

Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal F. Scherner, consisting of:

  • 4th Tank Army (General of Tank Forces F. Gräser)
    • Panzer Corps "Great Germany" (General of Panzer Forces G. Jauer)
    • 57th Panzer Corps (General of Panzer Forces F. Kirchner)
  • Part of the forces of the 17th Army (Infantry General W. Hasse)

Aviation support for the ground forces was provided by: 4th air fleet, 6th Air Fleet, Air Fleet "Reich".

Total: 48 infantry, 6 tank and 9 motorized divisions; 37 separate infantry regiments, 98 separate infantry battalions, as well as a large number of separate artillery and special units and formations (1 million people, 10,400 guns and mortars, 1,500 tanks and assault guns and 3,300 combat aircraft).

On April 24, the 12th Army entered the battle under the command of Infantry General W. Wenck, which had previously occupied the defense on the Western Front.

General course of hostilities

1st Belorussian Front (April 16-25)

At 5 a.m. Moscow time (2 hours before dawn) on April 16, artillery preparation began in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front. 9,000 guns and mortars, as well as more than 1,500 BM-13 and BM-31 RS installations, crushed the first line of German defense in the 27-kilometer breakthrough area for 25 minutes. With the start of the attack, artillery fire was transferred deep into the defense, and 143 anti-aircraft searchlights were turned on in the breakthrough areas. Their dazzling light stunned the enemy and at the same time illuminated the way for the advancing units. (German night vision systems Infrarot-Scheinwerfer detected targets at a distance of up to one kilometer and posed a serious threat during the assault on the Seelow Heights, and the searchlights disabled them with powerful illumination.) For the first one and a half to two hours, the offensive of the Soviet troops developed successfully, individual formations reached the second defense line. However, soon the Nazis, relying on a strong and well-prepared second line of defense, began to offer fierce resistance. Intense fighting broke out along the entire front. Although in some sectors of the front the troops managed to capture individual strongholds, they failed to achieve decisive success. The powerful resistance unit equipped on the Zelovsky Heights turned out to be insurmountable for rifle formations. This jeopardized the success of the entire operation. In such a situation, the front commander, Marshal Zhukov, decided to bring the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies into battle. This was not provided for in the offensive plan, however, the stubborn resistance of the German troops required strengthening the penetrating ability of the attackers by introducing tank armies into battle. The course of the battle on the first day showed that the German command attached decisive importance to holding the Seelow Heights. To strengthen the defense in this sector, by the end of April 16, the operational reserves of Army Group Vistula were deployed. All day and all night on April 17, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front fought fierce battles with the enemy. By the morning of April 18, tank and rifle formations, with the support of aviation from the 16th and 18th Air Armies, took the Zelovsky Heights. Overcoming the stubborn defense of German troops and repelling fierce counterattacks, by the end of April 19, front troops broke through the third defensive line and were able to develop an offensive on Berlin.

Real threat encirclement, forced the commander of the 9th German Army, T. Busse, to come up with a proposal to withdraw the army to the suburbs of Berlin and establish a strong defense there. This plan was supported by the commander of Army Group Vistula, Colonel General Heinrici, but Hitler rejected this proposal and ordered the occupied lines to be held at all costs.

April 20 was marked by an artillery strike on Berlin, delivered by long-range artillery of the 79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army. It was a kind of birthday gift for Hitler. On April 21, units of the 3rd Shock, 2nd Guards Tank, 47th and 5th Shock Armies, having overcome the third line of defense, broke into the outskirts of Berlin and started fighting there. The first to break into Berlin from the east were the troops that were part of the 26th Guards Corps of General P. A. Firsov and the 32nd Corps of General D. S. Zherebin of the 5th Shock Army. On the same day, Corporal A.I. Muravyov planted the first Soviet banner in Berlin. On the evening of April 21, the advanced units of the 3rd Guards Tank Army of P. S. Rybalko approached the city from the south. On April 23 and 24, fighting in all directions became especially fierce. On April 23, the greatest success in the assault on Berlin was achieved by the 9th Rifle Corps under the command of Major General I.P. Rosly. The warriors of this corps took possession of Karlshorst and part of Kopenick with a decisive assault and, reaching the Spree, crossed it on the move. The ships of the Dnieper military flotilla provided great assistance in crossing the Spree, transferring rifle units to the opposite bank under enemy fire. Although the pace of Soviet advance had slowed by April 24, the Nazis were unable to stop them. On April 24, the 5th Shock Army, fighting fiercely, continued to successfully advance towards the center of Berlin.

Operating in the auxiliary direction, the 61st Army and the 1st Army of the Polish Army, having launched an offensive on April 17, overcame the German defenses with stubborn battles, bypassed Berlin from the north and moved towards the Elbe.

1st Ukrainian Front (16-25 April)

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed more successfully. On April 16, early in the morning, a smoke screen was placed along the entire 390-kilometer front, blinding the enemy's forward observation posts. At 6:55 a.m., after a 40-minute artillery strike on the front edge of the German defense, reinforced battalions of the first echelon divisions began crossing the Neisse. Having quickly captured bridgeheads on the left bank of the river, they provided conditions for building bridges and crossing the main forces. During the first hours of the operation, 133 crossings were equipped by front engineering troops in the main direction of attack. With each passing hour, the amount of forces and means transported to the bridgehead increased. In the middle of the day, the attackers reached the second line of German defense. Sensing the threat of a major breakthrough, the German command, already on the first day of the operation, threw into battle not only its tactical, but also operational reserves, giving them the task of throwing the advancing Soviet troops into the river. However, by the end of the day, front troops broke through the main defense line on the 26 km front and advanced to a depth of 13 km.

By the morning of April 17, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies crossed the Neisse in full force. All day long, the front troops, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, continued to widen and deepen the gap in the German defense. Aviation support for the advancing troops was provided by pilots of the 2nd Air Army. Attack aircraft, acting at the request of ground commanders, destroyed fire weapons and manpower of the enemy at the front line. Bomber aircraft destroyed suitable reserves. By the middle of April 17, the following situation had developed in the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front: the tank armies of Rybalko and Lelyushenko were marching west along a narrow corridor penetrated by troops of the 13th, 3rd and 5th Guards armies. By the end of the day they approached the Spree and began crossing it. Meanwhile, in the secondary, Dresden, direction, the troops of the 52nd Army of General K.A. Koroteev and the 2nd Army The troops of Polish General K.K. Swierchevsky broke through the enemy’s tactical defenses and in two days of fighting advanced to a depth of 20 km.

Taking into account the slow advance of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, as well as the success achieved in the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, on the night of April 18, the Headquarters decided to turn the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front to Berlin. In his order to the army commanders Rybalko and Lelyushenko for the offensive, the front commander wrote:

Following the orders of the commander, on April 18 and 19 the tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front marched uncontrollably towards Berlin. The rate of their advance reached 35-50 km per day. At the same time, the combined arms armies were preparing to eliminate large enemy groups in the area of ​​Cottbus and Spremberg.

By the end of the day on April 20, the main strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front was deeply wedged into the enemy’s position and completely cut off the German Army Group Vistula from Army Group Center. Sensing the threat caused by the rapid actions of the tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the German command took a number of measures to strengthen the approaches to Berlin. To strengthen the defense, infantry and tank units were urgently sent to the area of ​​​​the cities of Zossen, Luckenwalde, and Jutterbog. Overcoming their stubborn resistance, Rybalko’s tankers reached the outer Berlin defensive perimeter on the night of April 21. By the morning of April 22, Sukhov's 9th Mechanized Corps and Mitrofanov's 6th Guards Tank Corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army crossed the Notte Canal, broke through the outer defensive perimeter of Berlin, and by the end of the day reached the southern bank of the Teltovkanal. There, encountering strong and well-organized enemy resistance, they were stopped.

On the afternoon of April 22, a meeting of the top military leadership was held at Hitler's headquarters, at which it was decided to remove W. Wenck's 12th Army from the Western Front and send it to join the semi-encircled 9th Army of T. Busse. To organize the offensive of the 12th Army, Field Marshal Keitel was sent to its headquarters. This was the last serious attempt to influence the course of the battle, since by the end of the day on April 22, the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts had formed and almost closed two encirclement rings. One is around the enemy’s 9th Army east and southeast of Berlin; the other is to the west of Berlin, around the units directly defending in the city.

The Teltow Canal was a fairly serious obstacle: a water-filled ditch with high concrete banks forty to fifty meters wide. In addition, its northern coast was very well prepared for defense: trenches, reinforced concrete pillboxes, tanks dug into the ground and self-propelled guns. Above the canal is an almost continuous wall of houses, bristling with fire, with walls a meter or more thick. Having assessed the situation, the Soviet command decided to carry out thorough preparations for crossing the Teltow Canal. All day on April 23, the 3rd Guards Tank Army prepared for the assault. By the morning of April 24, a powerful artillery group was concentrated on the southern bank of the Teltow Canal, with a density of up to 650 guns per kilometer of front, intended to destroy German fortifications on the opposite bank. Having suppressed the enemy defenses with a powerful artillery strike, the troops of the 6th Guards Tank Corps of Major General Mitrofanov successfully crossed the Teltow Canal and captured a bridgehead on its northern bank. On the afternoon of April 24, Wenck's 12th Army launched the first tank attacks on the positions of General Ermakov's 5th Guards Mechanized Corps (4th Guards Tank Army) and units of the 13th Army. All attacks were successfully repulsed with the support of the 1st Assault Aviation Corps of Lieutenant General Ryazanov.

At 12 noon on April 25, west of Berlin, the advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army met with units of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front. On the same day, another significant event occurred. An hour and a half later, on the Elbe, the 34th Guards Corps of General Baklanov of the 5th Guards Army met with American troops.

From April 25 to May 2, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front fought fierce battles in three directions: units of the 28th Army, 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies took part in the assault on Berlin; part of the forces of the 4th Guards Tank Army, together with the 13th Army, repelled the counterattack of the 12th German Army; The 3rd Guards Army and part of the forces of the 28th Army blocked and destroyed the encircled 9th Army.

All the time from the beginning of the operation, the command of Army Group Center sought to disrupt the offensive of the Soviet troops. On April 20, German troops launched the first counterattack on the left flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front and pushed back the troops of the 52nd Army and the 2nd Army of the Polish Army. On April 23, a new powerful counterattack followed, as a result of which the defense at the junction of the 52nd Army and the 2nd Army of the Polish Army was broken through and German troops advanced 20 km in the general direction of Spremberg, threatening to reach the rear of the front.

2nd Belorussian Front (April 20-May 8)

From April 17 to 19, troops of the 65th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front, under the command of Colonel General P.I. Batov, conducted reconnaissance in force and advanced detachments captured the Oder interfluve, thereby facilitating subsequent crossings of the river. On the morning of April 20, the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive: the 65th, 70th and 49th armies. The crossing of the Oder took place under the cover of artillery fire and smoke screens. The offensive developed most successfully in the sector of the 65th Army, which was largely due to the engineering troops of the army. Having established two 16-ton pontoon crossings by 1 p.m., the troops of this army captured a bridgehead 6 kilometers wide and 1.5 kilometers deep by the evening of April 20.

More modest success was achieved on the central sector of the front in the 70th Army zone. The left-flank 49th Army met stubborn resistance and was unsuccessful. All day and all night on April 21, front troops, repelling numerous attacks by German troops, persistently expanded bridgeheads on the western bank of the Oder. In the current situation, front commander K.K. Rokossovsky decided to send the 49th Army along the crossings of the right neighbor of the 70th Army, and then return it to its offensive zone. By April 25, as a result of fierce battles, front troops expanded the captured bridgehead to 35 km along the front and up to 15 km in depth. To build up striking power, the 2nd Shock Army, as well as the 1st and 3rd Guards Tank Corps, were transported to the western bank of the Oder. At the first stage of the operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front, through its actions, shackled the main forces of the 3rd German Tank Army, depriving it of the opportunity to help those fighting near Berlin. On April 26, formations of the 65th Army took Stettin by storm. Subsequently, the armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front, breaking enemy resistance and destroying suitable reserves, stubbornly advanced to the west. On May 3, Panfilov's 3rd Guards Tank Corps southwest of Wismar established contact with the advanced units of the 2nd British Army.

Liquidation of the Frankfurt-Guben group

By the end of April 24, formations of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front came into contact with units of the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, thereby encircling the 9th Army of General Busse southeast of Berlin and cutting it off from the city. The surrounded group of German troops began to be called the Frankfurt-Gubensky group. Now the Soviet command was faced with the task of eliminating the 200,000-strong enemy group and preventing its breakthrough to Berlin or to the West. To accomplish the last task, the 3rd Guards Army and part of the forces of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front took up active defense in the path of a possible breakthrough of German troops. On April 26, the 3rd, 69th, and 33rd armies of the 1st Belorussian Front began the final liquidation of the encircled units. However, the enemy not only put up stubborn resistance, but also repeatedly made attempts to break out of the encirclement. By skillfully maneuvering and skillfully creating superiority in forces on narrow sections of the front, German troops twice managed to break through the encirclement. However, each time the Soviet command took decisive measures to eliminate the breakthrough. Until May 2, the encircled units of the 9th German Army made desperate attempts to break through the battle formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the west, to join the 12th Army of General Wenck. Only a few small groups managed to penetrate through the forests and go west.

Assault on Berlin (April 25 - May 2)

At 12 noon on April 25, the ring closed around Berlin when the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps of the 4th Guards Tank Army crossed the Havel River and linked up with units of the 328th Division of the 47th Army of General Perkhorovich. By that time, according to the Soviet command, the Berlin garrison numbered at least 200 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and 250 tanks. The city's defense was carefully thought out and well prepared. It was based on a system of strong fire, strongholds and resistance units. The closer to the city center, the denser the defense became. Massive stone buildings with thick walls gave it particular strength. The windows and doors of many buildings were sealed and turned into embrasures for firing. The streets were blocked by powerful barricades up to four meters thick. The defenders had a large number of faustpatrons, which in the context of street battles turned out to be a formidable anti-tank weapon. Of no small importance in the enemy’s defense system were underground structures, which were widely used by the enemy to maneuver troops, as well as to shelter them from artillery and bomb attacks.

By April 26, six armies of the 1st Belorussian Front (47th, 3rd and 5th shock, 8th Guards, 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies) and three armies of the 1st Belorussian Front took part in the assault on Berlin. th Ukrainian Front (28th, 3rd and 4th Guards Tank). Taking into account the experience of capturing large cities, assault detachments were created for battles in the city, consisting of rifle battalions or companies, reinforced with tanks, artillery and sappers. The actions of assault troops, as a rule, were preceded by a short but powerful artillery preparation.

By April 27, as a result of the actions of the armies of two fronts that had deeply advanced to the center of Berlin, the enemy grouping in Berlin stretched out in a narrow strip from east to west - sixteen kilometers long and two or three, in some places five kilometers wide. The fighting in the city did not stop day or night. Block after block, Soviet troops “gnawed through” the enemy’s defenses. So, by the evening of April 28, units of the 3rd Shock Army reached the Reichstag area. On the night of April 29, the actions of the forward battalions under the command of Captain S.A. Neustroev and Senior Lieutenant K. Ya. Samsonov the Moltke Bridge was captured. At dawn on April 30, the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, adjacent to the parliament building, was stormed at the cost of considerable losses. The path to the Reichstag was open.

On April 30, 1945, at 21.30, units of the 150th Infantry Division under the command of Major General V.M. Shatilov and the 171st Infantry Division under the command of Colonel A.I. Negoda stormed the main part of the Reichstag building. The remaining Nazi units offered stubborn resistance. We had to fight for every room. In the early morning of May 1, the assault flag of the 150th Infantry Division was raised over the Reichstag, but the battle for the Reichstag continued all day, and only on the night of May 2 did the Reichstag garrison capitulate.

On May 1, only the Tiergarten and the government quarter remained in German hands. The imperial chancellery was located here, in the courtyard of which there was a bunker at Hitler's headquarters. On the night of May 1, by prior agreement, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General Krebs, arrived at the headquarters of the 8th Guards Army. He informed the army commander, General V.I. Chuikov, about Hitler’s suicide and the proposal of the new German government to conclude a truce. The message was immediately transmitted to G.K. Zhukov, who himself called Moscow. Stalin confirmed his categorical demand for unconditional surrender. At 18:00 on May 1, the new German government rejected the demand for unconditional surrender, and Soviet troops resumed the assault with renewed vigor.

At one o'clock in the morning on May 2, the radio stations of the 1st Belorussian Front received a message in Russian: “We ask you to cease fire. We are sending envoys to the Potsdam Bridge.” A German officer who arrived at the appointed place, on behalf of the commander of the defense of Berlin, General Weidling, announced the readiness of the Berlin garrison to stop resistance. At 6 a.m. on May 2, Artillery General Weidling, accompanied by three German generals, crossed the front line and surrendered. An hour later, while at the headquarters of the 8th Guards Army, he wrote a surrender order, which was duplicated and, with the help of loudspeaker installations and radio, delivered to enemy units defending in the center of Berlin. As this order was communicated to the defenders, resistance in the city ceased. By the end of the day, the troops of the 8th Guards Army cleared the central part of the city from the enemy. Individual units that did not want to surrender tried to break through to the west, but were destroyed or scattered.

Losses of the parties

USSR

From April 16 to May 8, Soviet troops lost 352,475 people, of which 78,291 were irretrievable. The losses of Polish troops during the same period amounted to 8,892 people, of which 2,825 were irretrievable. The losses of military equipment amounted to 1,997 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,108 guns and mortars, 917 combat aircraft, 215.9 thousand small arms.

Germany

According to combat reports from the Soviet fronts:

  • Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front in the period from April 16 to May 13

killed 232,726 people, captured 250,675

  • Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the period from April 15 to 29

killed 114,349 people, captured 55,080 people

  • Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the period from April 5 to May 8:

killed 49,770 people, captured 84,234 people

Thus, according to reports from the Soviet command, the losses of German troops were about 400 thousand people killed and about 380 thousand people captured. Part of the German troops was pushed back to the Elbe and capitulated to the Allied forces.

Also, according to the assessment of the Soviet command, the total number of troops that emerged from the encirclement in the Berlin area does not exceed 17,000 people with 80-90 units of armored vehicles.

German losses according to German sources

According to German data, 45 thousand German troops took part in the defense of Berlin itself, of which 22 thousand people died. Germany's losses in killed during the entire Berlin operation amounted to about one hundred thousand military personnel. It is necessary to take into account that data on losses in 1945 in the OKW were determined by calculation. Due to violations of systematic documentation and reporting, violations of troop control, the reliability of this information is very low. In addition, according to the rules adopted in the Wehrmacht, losses personnel Only the losses of military personnel were taken into account and the losses of troops of allied states and foreign formations that fought as part of the Wehrmacht, as well as paramilitary formations serving the troops, were not taken into account.

Overestimation of German losses

According to combat reports from the fronts:

  • The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front in the period from April 16 to May 13: destroyed - 1184, captured - 629 tanks and self-propelled guns.
  • Between April 15 and April 29, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front destroyed 1067 tanks and captured 432 tanks and self-propelled guns;
  • Between April 5 and May 8, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front destroyed 195 and captured 85 tanks and self-propelled guns.

In total, according to the fronts, 3,592 tanks and self-propelled guns were destroyed and captured, which is more than 2 times the number of tanks available on the Soviet-German front before the start of the operation.

In April 1946, a military-scientific conference was held dedicated to the Berlin offensive operation. In one of his speeches, Lieutenant General K.F. Telegin cited data according to which the total number of tanks allegedly destroyed during the operation by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front was more than 2 times greater than the number of tanks the Germans had against the 1st Belorussian Front front before the start of the operation. The speech also spoke of a slight overestimation (by about 15%) of the casualties suffered by German troops.

These data allow us to talk about the overestimation of German losses in equipment by the Soviet command. On the other hand, it is necessary to take into account that the 1st Ukrainian Front, during the operation, had to fight with the troops of the 12th German Army, which before the start of the battle took up defensive positions against American troops and whose tanks were not taken into account in the initial calculation. Partially exceeding the number of people hit German tanks above the number available at the beginning of the battle is also explained by the high “return” of German tanks to service after being knocked out, which was due to the efficient work of the services for evacuation of equipment from the battlefield, the presence large number well-equipped repair units and good maintainability of German tanks.

Results of the operation

  • Destruction of the largest group of German troops, capture of the capital of Germany, capture of the highest military and political leadership of Germany.
  • The fall of Berlin and the loss of the German leadership's ability to govern led to the almost complete cessation of organized resistance on the part of the German armed forces.
  • The Berlin operation demonstrated to the Allies the high combat capability of the Red Army and was one of the reasons for the cancellation of Operation Unthinkable, the Allied war plan against the Soviet Union. However, this decision did not subsequently influence the development of the arms race and the beginning of the Cold War.
  • Hundreds of thousands of people were released from German captivity, including at least 200 thousand citizens of foreign countries. In the zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front alone, in the period from April 5 to May 8, 197,523 people were released from captivity, of which 68,467 were citizens of the allied states.

Enemy recall

The last commander of the defense of Berlin, artillery general G. Weidling, while in Soviet captivity, gave the following description of the actions of the Red Army in the Berlin operation:

I believe that the main features of this Russian operation, as in other operations, are the following:

  • Skillful choice of directions for the main attack.
  • Concentration and deployment of large forces, and primarily tank and artillery masses, in areas where the greatest success was observed, quick and energetic actions to widen the created gaps in the German front.
  • Application of various tactics, achieving moments of surprise, even in cases where our command has information about the upcoming Russian offensive and expects this offensive.
  • Exceptionally maneuverable troop leadership, the operation of the Russian troops is characterized by clarity of plans, purposefulness and perseverance in the implementation of these plans.

Historical facts

  • The Berlin operation is listed in the Guinness Book of Records as the largest battle in history. About 3.5 million people, 52 thousand guns and mortars, 7,750 tanks and 11 thousand aircraft took part in the battle on both sides.
  • Initially, the command of the 1st Belorussian Front planned to carry out an operation to capture Berlin in February 1945.
  • Among the prisoners of the concentration camp near Babelsberg liberated by the guardsmen of the 63rd Chelyabinsk Tank Brigade M. G. Fomichev was the former Prime Minister of France Edouard Herriot.
  • On April 23, Hitler, based on a false denunciation, gave the order to execute the commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, Artillery General G. Weidling. Having learned about this, Weidling arrived at headquarters and obtained an audience with Hitler, after which the order to shoot the general was canceled, and he himself was appointed commander of the defense of Berlin. In the German feature film “Bunker,” General Weidling, receiving an order for this appointment at the chancellery, says: “I would prefer to be shot.”
  • On April 22, tank crews of the 5th Guards Tank Corps of the 4th Guards Tank Army freed the commander of the Norwegian Army, General Otto Ruge, from captivity.
  • On the 1st Belorussian Front, in the direction of the main attack, there were 358 tons of ammunition per kilometer of front, and the weight of one front-line ammunition exceeded 43 thousand tons.
  • During the offensive, soldiers of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps under the command of Lieutenant General V.K. Baranov managed to find and capture the largest breeding stud farm, stolen by the Germans from the North Caucasus in 1942.
  • The food rations given to Berlin residents at the end of hostilities, in addition to basic food products, included natural coffee delivered by a special train from the USSR.
  • The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front freed from captivity almost the entire senior military leadership of Belgium, including the chief of the general staff of the Belgian army.
  • The Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces established the medal “For the Capture of Berlin,” which was awarded to more than 1 million soldiers. 187 units and formations that most distinguished themselves during the assault on the enemy capital were given the honorary name “Berlin”. More than 600 participants in the Berlin operation were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 13 people were awarded the 2nd medal " Golden Star» Hero of the Soviet Union.
  • Episodes 4 and 5 of the film epic “Liberation” are dedicated to the Berlin operation.
  • The Soviet army involved 464,000 people and 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns in the assault on the city itself.

During the Great Patriotic War Soviet troops carried out the Berlin strategic offensive operation, the purpose of which was to defeat the main forces of the German army groups Vistula and Center, capture Berlin, reach the Elbe River and link up with the Allied forces.

The Red Army troops, having defeated large groups of Nazi troops in East Prussia, Poland and Eastern Pomerania during January - March 1945, reached the end of March on a wide front to the Oder and Neisse rivers. After the liberation of Hungary and the occupation of Vienna by Soviet troops in mid-April fascist Germany was under attack from the Red Army from the east and south. At the same time, from the west, without encountering any organized German resistance, Allied troops advanced in the Hamburg, Leipzig and Prague directions.

The main forces of the Nazi troops acted against the Red Army. By April 16, there were 214 divisions (of which 34 tank and 15 motorized) and 14 brigades were on the Soviet-German front, and against the American-British troops the German command held only 60 poorly equipped divisions, of which five were tank. The Berlin direction was defended by 48 infantry, six tank and nine motorized divisions and many other units and formations (a total of one million people, 10.4 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns). From the air, ground troops covered 3.3 thousand combat aircraft.

The defense of the fascist German troops in the Berlin direction included the Oder-Neissen line 20-40 kilometers deep, which had three defensive lines, and the Berlin defensive area, which consisted of three ring contours - external, internal and urban. In total, the depth of defense with Berlin reached 100 kilometers; it was intersected by numerous canals and rivers, which served as serious obstacles for tank forces.

During the Berlin offensive operation, the Soviet Supreme High Command envisaged breaking through the enemy's defenses along the Oder and Neisse and, developing an offensive in depth, encircling the main group of fascist German troops, dismembering it and subsequently destroying it piece by piece, and then reaching the Elbe. For this, troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal Georgy Zhukov and troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Ivan Konev were brought in. The operation was attended by the Dnieper military flotilla, part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet, and the 1st and 2nd armies of the Polish Army. In total, the Red Army troops advancing on Berlin numbered over two million people, about 42 thousand guns and mortars, 6,250 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and 7.5 thousand combat aircraft.

According to the plan of the operation, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to capture Berlin and reach the Elbe no later than 12-15 days later. The 1st Ukrainian Front had the task of defeating the enemy in the Cottbus area and south of Berlin and on the 10-12th day of the operation to capture the line of Belitz, Wittenberg and further the Elbe River to Dresden. The 2nd Belorussian Front had to cross the Oder River, defeat the enemy's Stettin group and cut off the main forces of the German 3rd Tank Army from Berlin.

On April 16, 1945, after powerful aviation and artillery preparation, a decisive attack by troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts of the Oder-Neissen defensive line began. In the area of ​​the main attack of the 1st Belorussian Front, where the offensive was launched before dawn, infantry and tanks, in order to demoralize the enemy, launched an attack in a zone illuminated by 140 powerful searchlights. The troops of the front's strike group had to successively break through several lines of deeply echeloned defense. By the end of April 17, they managed to break through the enemy’s defenses in the main areas near the Seelow Heights. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front completed the breakthrough of the third line of the Oder defense line by the end of April 19. On the right wing of the front's shock group, the 47th Army and the 3rd Shock Army successfully advanced to cover Berlin from the north and northwest. On the left wing, conditions were created to bypass the enemy's Frankfurt-Guben group from the north and cut it off from the Berlin area.

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the Neisse River, broke through the enemy’s main defense line on the first day, and wedged 1-1.5 kilometers into the second. By the end of April 18, front troops completed the breakthrough of the Niessen defense line, crossed the Spree River and provided conditions for encircling Berlin from the south. In the Dresden direction, formations of the 52nd Army repelled an enemy counterattack from the area north of Görlitz.

The advanced units of the 2nd Belorussian Front crossed the Ost-Oder on April 18-19, crossed the interfluve of the Ost-Oder and West Oder, and then began crossing the West Oder.

On April 20, artillery fire from the 1st Belorussian Front on Berlin marked the beginning of its assault. On April 21, tanks of the 1st Ukrainian Front broke into the southern outskirts of Berlin. On April 24, troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts united in the Bonsdorf area (southeast of Berlin), completing the encirclement of the enemy's Frankfurt-Guben group. On April 25, tank formations of the fronts, having reached the Potsdam area, completed the encirclement of the entire Berlin group (500 thousand people). On the same day, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the Elbe River and linked up with American troops in the Torgau area.

During the offensive, troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front crossed the Oder and, having broken through the enemy’s defenses, advanced to a depth of 20 kilometers by April 25; they pinned down the German 3rd Panzer Army, preventing it from launching a counterattack from the north against the Soviet forces encircling Berlin.

The Frankfurt-Guben group was destroyed by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian Fronts in the period from April 26 to May 1. The destruction of the Berlin group directly in the city continued until May 2. By 15:00 on May 2, enemy resistance in the city had ceased. Fights with separate groups, breaking through from the outskirts of Berlin to the west, ended on May 5.

Simultaneously with the defeat of the encircled groups, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Elbe River on a wide front on May 7.

At the same time, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, successfully advancing in Western Pomerania and Mecklenburg, on April 26 captured the main strongholds of the enemy’s defense on the western bank of the Oder River - Poelitz, Stettin, Gatow and Schwedt and, launching a rapid pursuit of the remnants of the defeated 3rd tank army, on May 3 they reached the coast of the Baltic Sea, and on May 4 they advanced to the line of Wismar, Schwerin, and the Elde River, where they came into contact with British troops. On May 4-5, front troops cleared the islands of Wollin, Usedom and Rügen of the enemy, and on May 9 they landed on the Danish island of Bornholm.

The resistance of the Nazi troops was finally broken. On the night of May 9, the Act of Surrender of the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany was signed in the Karlshorst district of Berlin.

The Berlin operation lasted 23 days, the width of the combat front reached 300 kilometers. The depth of front-line operations was 100-220 kilometers, the average daily rate of attack was 5-10 kilometers. As part of the Berlin operation, the Stettin-Rostok, Seelow-Berlin, Cottbus-Potsdam, Stremberg-Torgau and Brandenburg-Ratenow front-line offensive operations were carried out.

During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops surrounded and eliminated the largest group of enemy troops in the history of wars.

They defeated 70 enemy infantry, 23 tank and mechanized divisions and captured 480 thousand people.

The Berlin operation cost the Soviet troops dearly. Their irretrievable losses amounted to 78,291 people, and sanitary losses - 274,184 people.

More than 600 participants in the Berlin operation were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 13 people were awarded the second Gold Star medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

(Additional

The operation plan of the Soviet Supreme High Command was to deliver several powerful blows on a wide front, dismember the enemy’s Berlin group, encircle and destroy it piece by piece. The operation began on April 16, 1945. After powerful artillery and air preparation, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front attacked the enemy on the Oder River. At the same time, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front began to cross the Neisse River. Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, Soviet troops broke through his defenses.

On April 20, long-range artillery fire from the 1st Belorussian Front on Berlin marked the beginning of its assault. By the evening of April 21, his shock units reached the northeastern outskirts of the city.

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front carried out a rapid maneuver to reach Berlin from the south and west. On April 21, having advanced 95 kilometers, tank units of the front broke into the southern outskirts of the city. Taking advantage of the success of tank formations, the combined arms armies of the shock group of the 1st Ukrainian Front quickly advanced westward.

On April 25, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian Fronts united west of Berlin, completing the encirclement of the entire Berlin enemy group (500 thousand people).

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front crossed the Oder and, having broken through the enemy’s defenses, advanced to a depth of 20 kilometers by April 25. They firmly pinned down the 3rd German Tank Army, preventing it from being used on the approaches to Berlin.

The Nazi group in Berlin, despite the obvious doom, continued stubborn resistance. In fierce street battles on April 26-28, it was cut by Soviet troops into three isolated parts.

The fighting went on day and night. Breaking through to the center of Berlin, Soviet soldiers stormed every street and every house. On some days they managed to clear up to 300 blocks of the enemy. Hand-to-hand combat broke out in subway tunnels, underground communication structures and communication passages. The basis of the combat formations of rifle and tank units during the fighting in the city were assault detachments and groups. Most of artillery (up to 152 mm and 203 mm guns) was assigned to rifle units for direct fire. Tanks operated as part of both rifle formations and tank corps and armies, promptly subordinate to the command of combined arms armies or operating in their own offensive zone. Attempts to use tanks independently led to heavy losses from artillery fire and faustpatrons. Due to the fact that Berlin was shrouded in smoke during the assault, the massive use of bomber aircraft was often difficult. The most powerful strikes on military targets in the city were carried out by aviation on April 25 and on the night of April 26; 2,049 aircraft took part in these strikes.

By April 28, only the central part remained in the hands of the defenders of Berlin, shot from all sides by Soviet artillery, and by the evening of the same day, units of the 3rd Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Reichstag area.

The Reichstag garrison numbered up to one thousand soldiers and officers, but it continued to continuously strengthen. It was armed with a large number of machine guns and faust cartridges. There were also artillery pieces. Deep ditches were dug around the building, various barriers were erected, and machine gun and artillery firing points were equipped.

On April 30, troops of the 3rd Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front began fighting for the Reichstag, which immediately became extremely fierce. Only in the evening, after repeated attacks, Soviet soldiers broke into the building. The Nazis put up fierce resistance. Hand-to-hand combat broke out on the stairs and in the corridors every now and then. The assault units, step by step, room by room, floor by floor, cleared the Reichstag building of the enemy. The entire path of Soviet soldiers from the main entrance to the Reichstag to the roof was marked with red flags and flags. On the night of May 1, the Victory Banner was hoisted over the building of the defeated Reichstag. The battles for the Reichstag continued until the morning of May 1, and individual groups of the enemy, holed up in basement compartments, capitulated only on the night of May 2.

In the battles for the Reichstag, the enemy lost more than 2 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded. Soviet troops captured over 2.6 thousand Nazis, as well as 1.8 thousand rifles and machine guns, 59 artillery pieces, 15 tanks and assault guns as trophies.

On May 1, units of the 3rd Shock Army, advancing from the north, met south of the Reichstag with units of the 8th Guards Army, advancing from the south. On the same day, two important Berlin defense centers surrendered: the Spandau citadel and the Flakturm I (Zoobunker) concrete anti-aircraft defense tower.

By 15:00 on May 2, enemy resistance had completely ceased, the remnants of the Berlin garrison surrendered with a total of more than 134 thousand people.

During the fighting, out of approximately 2 million Berliners, about 125 thousand died, and a significant part of Berlin was destroyed. Of the 250 thousand buildings in the city, about 30 thousand were completely destroyed, more than 20 thousand buildings were in a dilapidated state, more than 150 thousand buildings had moderate damage. More than a third of metro stations were flooded and destroyed, 225 bridges were blown up by Nazi troops.

The fighting with individual groups breaking through from the outskirts of Berlin to the west ended on May 5. On the night of May 9, the Act of Surrender of the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany was signed.

During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops surrounded and eliminated the largest group of enemy troops in the history of wars. They defeated 70 enemy infantry, 23 tank and mechanized divisions and captured 480 thousand people.

The Berlin operation cost the Soviet troops dearly. Their irretrievable losses amounted to 78,291 people, and sanitary losses - 274,184 people.

More than 600 participants in the Berlin operation were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 13 people were awarded the second Gold Star medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

(Additional

Cutting through the darkness of the night, a dazzling searchlight beam shot vertically above the Kyustrin bridgehead. This was the signal for the start of the Berlin operation. The task facing the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front was not easy. The Third Reich was already obviously losing the war, but the Germans still had combat-ready units. In addition, from February to April 1945, the Nazis turned the 70-kilometer space from the Soviet bridgeheads on the Oder to Berlin into one continuous fortified area. In addition to fanaticism, units of the German 9th Army were driven by purely pragmatic considerations. Army commander Busset cynically remarked: “We will consider our task completed if American tanks hit us in the back.”

All this together required the highest professionalism from the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, G.K. Zhukov. His first trick was a reconnaissance in force with a pause carried out on April 15, which disoriented the Germans. The second trick was to shift the start of the offensive to the dark, which lengthened the first and most important day of the operation. A short but powerful artillery barrage began at 5:00 am Moscow time (3:00 am local time) on April 16, 1945. Then the anti-aircraft searchlights turned on, illuminating the path for the infantry. Subsequently, the solution with searchlights was sometimes criticized, but their illumination of the battlefield in the war was used more than once, including by the Germans. Zhukov did not invent anything fundamentally new, but only chose a technique appropriate to the situation. The searchlights played their role, highlighting the attack of the German forward positions.

The slowdown in the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front occurred when all the searchlights had already been turned off, around noon. The fact is that the terrain in the direction of the main attack of G.K. Zhukov’s troops was, frankly speaking, not a gift. The Oder Valley was completely cut up by irrigation canals, which in the spring turned into full-fledged anti-tank ditches. Overcoming these obstacles took time. The Seelow Heights, with which the Battle of Berlin is usually associated, blocked the path only for the left flank of the 69th and 8th Guards Armies; for the rest, the main obstacles were rivers and canals. Two armies of the 1st Belorussian reached the Seelow Heights in the afternoon - they were low, but steep, which forced them to advance along the roads. Also, bad weather on the first day of the battle limited the use of the “air hammer” of the 3 thousand front aircraft.

The delay in the Soviet offensive from schedule was temporary. Already on April 18, a gap was made in the German defense, through which the Seelow Heights began to be bypassed along their northern edge by the forces of the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies under the command of M.E. Katukov and S.I. Bogdanov. The German command tried to plug the breakthrough with a reserve, the 3rd SS Panzer Corps, but the SS men were flanked and bypassed. This graceful maneuver opened the road to Berlin for the Red Army. Already on April 22, tank units of the 1st Belorussian Front broke into the streets of the German capital.

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of I. S. Konev were also involved in the attack directly on Berlin. On the one hand, he was in an advantageous position: the Germans were not expecting his strike, and the regroupings carried out at the last moment were not revealed. On the other hand, the breakthrough site of the 1st Ukrainian Front was much further from Berlin. The troops of I. S. Konev successfully crossed the Neisse River, broke through the German defenses and soon, on the orders of I. V. Stalin, part of their forces turned to Berlin. Here they were detained in the forests on the Barut-Zossen line south of the city and were somewhat late for the outbreak of battles for the German capital.

However, at the same time, the adjacent flanks of the 1st Belorussian Front and the 1st Ukrainian Front to the southeast of Berlin closed an encirclement ring, which included about 200 thousand soldiers and officers of the German 9th Army. The main forces of the German “Oder Front” suffered a crushing defeat.

Thus, the preconditions were created for a quick assault by the Red Army on Berlin itself.

A. V. Isaev, Ph.D. n.

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