Is China a democratic country or not? The arrival of the concept of “democracy” in China. What happened

and his first interpretations.

Democracy is a concept that is both simple and complex. This is due to the fact that, firstly, the meaning attached to the concept of “democracy” has changed historically, and secondly, in each given period there were different interpretations of it. Our time is no exception when, regarding the essence of democracy, even if we discard formulas clearly designed to camouflage the undemocratic nature of regimes (“socialist democracy”, “people’s democracy”, “guided democracy”, “sovereign democracy”, etc.) There are heated, often politicized debates.

Without going into details, we can say that in the modern scientific world there are two main approaches to democracy: the first, clearly formulated by J. Schumpeter, focuses on the elective nature of government. Going back to T. Jefferson, he proceeds from the rationality of people who, in conditions of freedom, will always choose a worthy power for themselves. In modern Western everyday consciousness, this idea of ​​the primacy of elections has merged with the theory of “natural rights”: the right to choose power, perceived as “natural” and “inalienable,” cannot be limited by definition, regardless of the consequences of its use. Other theorists of democracy, from the authors of The Federalist to R. Dahl, fear that an unfettered right to choose could lead to the dictatorship of the majority on the one hand, or the authoritarianism of the elected leader on the other. They believe that a democratic regime can be sustainable if elections are complemented by other important elements of the political system: the division of powers into three independent branches, the division of powers between the center and the regions, and a system of constitutional guarantees of the political rights of individuals and minorities. Later, in the social democratic tradition, the idea of ​​the need to ensure the social rights of citizens was formed (see more details:).

When analyzing early Chinese ideas about democracy, it is necessary to take into account that concepts such as “liberal democracy” (the idea that democracy provides freedom), “representative democracy” (the idea that the election of representative bodies is consistent with the principles of democracy), as well as the idea that the right to choose government is one of the inalienable human rights, and democracy is the most perfect system of social order (so clearly expressed in the famous aphorism of W. Churchill), did not take shape immediately, let alone become dominant in the West itself, but only approximately from the middle of the 19th to the middle of the 20th century. Before that, the dominant attitude in Western thought was a critical attitude towards democracy as the rule of the poor and uneducated majority (a tradition coming from Plato and Aristotle) ​​and as a system of direct decision-making by all citizens, applicable only in small states (C. Montesquieu).

In the more than 4 thousand-year history of Chinese thought, the concept of “democracy” is relatively young. It was borrowed from abroad in the second half of the 19th century. During the same period, a whole complex of new words and concepts appeared in the Chinese language and in Chinese thought: “elections,” “parliament,” “constitution,” “separation of powers,” “freedom,” “party,” “nationalism,” “socialism.” ", "capitalism", "president", etc. Many of them came to China through Japan, where they were first written down in Chinese characters. Chinese thinkers and politicians perceived these concepts not from a blank slate, but against the background of theories and concepts of traditional Chinese thought that were well known to them. This was largely facilitated by the peculiarities of the Chinese language, due to which, in the vast majority of cases, borrowed words were not transcribed, but translated, and hieroglyphs close in meaning were selected for the new word, which had a thousand-year history of traditional use and involuntarily transferred elements of old meanings to the new concept.

Principle minben- traditional basis for the perception of the idea of ​​democracy

The concept of traditional Chinese thought closest to the idea of ​​democracy, from which it was possible to draw some conclusions about the right of the people to decide their own destiny, is the principle minben民本 (“the people as the basis”). Concept minben took shape in ancient China, its basis is a phrase from the ancient canon “Shujing”: “The people are the root-foundation of the state, if the root is strong, then the state is at peace” (quoted from:).

According to Liang Qichao, who studied this issue, it developed in the pre-Qin era (28, p. 44). At the same time, according to more modern research, in pre-Confucian China the concept minben was in its infancy, and was finally formed later (see). Its essence is that Heaven (tian) elects one of the people who will be the father of the people and the ruler of the whole earth as an emperor - “Son of Heaven” ( Tianzi). In the same “Shujing” it is said: “The Son of Heaven is the father and mother of the people, and therefore he is the ruler of the Celestial Empire” (2, p. 107). Thus, initially the concept implied two principles: any person can become an emperor, and he must rule in accordance with the desires of the people, which were transmitted to him by Heaven and coincided with the desires of Heaven. The authors of the special study describe the idea as follows: minben: “Heaven in classical works is the father of all people, including Tianzi himself. Any person, in principle, can be appointed by Tianzi Heaven, and in this regard, all people are equal. Since it was believed that any person could be chosen as the Son of Heaven, the position of Tianzi does not belong to one person or family forever” (18, p. 75).

Associated with this last idea is the use already in antiquity of the concept minben those who justified their actions to overthrow the existing ruler. Thus, already in “Shujing” it is said: “The ruler of Xia committed many crimes, and Heaven appointed me to destroy him…. Fearing the Heavenly Emperor (Shandi), I do not dare not to punish him... and not to carry out the punishment prescribed by Heaven" (quoted from:). The idea of ​​the justice of an uprising against an emperor who rules not in the interests of the people, within the framework of Confucianism, was especially clearly developed in the treatise “Mengzi” (4-3 centuries BC). According to the famous saying of Mencius, “the people are the main one (in the state), they are followed by the spirits of the earth and grain, the sovereign takes the last place” (2, p. 247). Elsewhere, Mencius, answering the question of the ruler of the kingdom of Qi about whether it is possible to kill his sovereign, reasoned in the sense that a ruler who has lost his love of humanity and justice loses the right to be called a sovereign and becomes a commoner who can be killed (see) .

Hong Kong researcher of Taiwanese origin Jin Yaoji (Ambrose Yeo-chi King) identified six basic principles of “policy minben": 1) the importance of the people as the main subject of politics; 2) the importance of the people’s consent to the monarchical power of a ruler who will work for the people; 3) the importance of the ruler’s duty to protect the people and provide for their vital needs; 4) the interests of the people are higher than the private interests of the ruler; 5) the importance of implementing “perfect government” ( wandao) and preventing “despotic rule” ( badao); 6) the purpose of government is to serve the people, and not to serve the ruler (see). Naturally, we are talking here about a certain ideal, derived from Confucius, Mencius and other philosophers, and not about political practice.

Despite the fact that subsequently numerous reformers and supporters of democracy both in China and in other states of the Confucian area from Kang Youwei to Kim Te Chung (see:) referred to the principle minben As evidence of the existence of a democratic tradition in China, its differences from the modern understanding of democracy are obvious. The idea that one must govern in the interests of the people is not democracy. As for the idea that the monarch needs the sanction of the people to rule, in order for it to become democratic, it must be supplemented by the development of mechanisms for identifying this sanction, as well as its withdrawal. Naturally, there was no talk of elections of officials, separation of powers, or equality before the law in traditional China. However, this does not mean that the issue of the mechanism for revealing the will of Heaven and, through it, the people, was not discussed. The most famous in this regard is Mencius’s interpretation of the fact that the mythical Emperor Yao transferred the throne not to his son, but to the official Shun, which was also subsequently constantly referred to by Chinese reformers. According to Mencius, a ruler can only recommend his successor to Heaven, but cannot appoint him as ruler. In order to understand the opinion of Heaven, Yao ordered Shun to be in charge of sacrifices and manage the affairs of the state, which he did for 28 years. During this time, the spirits were happy, affairs were orderly, and the people were calm, and this, according to Mencius, testified that the people were handing over the Celestial Empire to Shunya through Heaven. In addition, Shun did not immediately receive the throne. After enduring three years of mourning, he left the capital, and only when all the officials reached out to him for advice, and the singers began to sing his praises, thereby demonstrating the will of the people, he returned (see).

This history can be seen as a guide to choosing a successor based on his experience and abilities, rather than as a manual on the democratic transfer of power. As for the idea of ​​replacing an inhumane ruler by the people, its mechanism could only be a forceful action: an uprising or a coup. In this regard, as many researchers have noted, it is really close to J. Locke’s idea of ​​the justice of an uprising against a tyrant, but it lacks other elements of the English philosopher’s constructs: the theory of natural rights, the concept of separation of powers, etc. (cm. ). In the absence of an idea about the mechanisms for the people to exercise their power and public control over it, the traditional Chinese consciousness was closer to the idea of ​​​​an uprising against an unjust sovereign than to gradual reforms with the aim of expanding the rights and freedoms of the population. This, in particular, is evidenced by the rapid assimilation by Chinese thought of the Western term “revolution”, which began to be translated as gemin(革命). According to a number of researchers, the traditional meaning of this term - “the change of the heavenly sanction of the ruler to power” - is largely preserved in modern Chinese (see:).

Interpretation of the term “democracy” in English-Chinese dictionaries and translated literatureXIXcentury

Another source that influenced early Chinese ideas was the first interpretations and translations of the word by foreigners. In translated literature, dictionaries, information articles in magazines published in the 19th century in China by foreigners (primarily missionaries) one can find many such interpretations.

It is striking that in the most famous English-Chinese dictionaries of the 19th century, Western authors themselves interpret “democracy” not neutrally, but as a negative phenomenon. Thus, in the Dictionary of the Chinese Language by R. Morrison (1782-1834), published from 1815 to 1823, the word “democracy” is provided with an English commentary: “reprehensible, since it is reprehensible not to have a leader.” The Chinese translation of this phrase is: “Just as it is unacceptable for no one to lead, it is also unacceptable for many people to rule indiscriminately” (15). Chinese historian Xiong Yuezhi, who first drew attention to dictionary interpretations of the concept of “democracy,” notes in this regard: “The Chinese lexicon obviously did not have one term to translate the word “democracy,” and Morrison had to use an entire sentence to express his (negative) attitude towards this concept.” (19, p. 73) In the “English and Chinese” dictionary of W. Medhurst (1796-1857), published in 1847, “democracy” is explained in Chinese as “government of the state by many people” (众人的国统), and provided with the following explanations: “the principle of governing by many people” (众人的治理), “indiscriminate management by many people” (多人乱管), “abuse of power low people"(小民弄权) (14). "English and Chinese Dictionary" by W. Lobscheid (1822-1893), published from 1866 to 1869 in Hong Kong, gives a neutral translation minzheng民政 (“rule of the people”), but adds the following Chinese explanations: “government by many people” (众人管辖) and “abuse of power by ordinary people” (白姓弄权) (13). Only in the dictionary published in 1902 by the Shanghai publishing house “Shangu Yinshuguan”, the interpretation of the concept of “democracy” acquires a neutral character: translation minzheng there it is explained as “control of power by ordinary people” (白姓操权) and “people's management of state affairs” (民主之国政) (34).

The negative interpretation of the concept of “democracy” in foreign dictionaries is quite natural. It is explained by the fact that in the West, the tradition of understanding democracy as the unlimited power of the poorest and uneducated majority, exercised directly in a relatively small state, going back to Plato and Aristotle and developed by C. Montesquieu, was generally preserved until approximately the middle of the 19th century. The struggle for the expansion of the rights of the population, against monarchical regimes, was carried out not under the slogan of democracy, but under the slogans of the republic and freedom (as, for example, during the War of Independence in the United States and the Great French Revolution). A republic based on representative government was often contrasted with democracy as direct rule by the people. The system of “checks and balances,” that is, the separation of powers at the federal level and between the federal government and the states, was precisely what theorists of American constitutionalism developed to counter possible democratic tyranny against minorities and individual rights. Many European thinkers, for example, E. Burke and A. de Tocqueville, pointed out the dangers of democracy for freedom. Although the idea that democracy is identical to representative government and the idea that democracy promotes the expansion of freedom existed earlier (for example, in the works of T. Jefferson), they became dominant only towards the end of the 19th century, and even after that they were questioned.

Although the dictionary comments may have formed the basis of Chinese readers' understanding of democracy, they did not provide the term itself for translation this concept. Term minzhu(民主), which later acquired the meaning “democracy,” is found in ancient Chinese texts, but its meaning there is completely different: “ruler of the people.” According to Chinese researchers, in the new meaning of “people's rule” it began to be used in China in the 60-70s of the 19th century in translated literature. It first appeared in the book of the American jurist and diplomat G. Wheaton, translated into Chinese and published in 1864 by the Presbyterian missionary W. A. ​​P. Martin, “Elements international law"(24). Along with the term “democracy,” this translation, which gained great popularity among Chinese intellectuals, used a number of words new to China and directly related to the idea of ​​democracy. Thus, the Chinese reader could learn that “the great policy of the United States is to ensure that all the states remain forever democratic (民主)”, that “if a country is democratic” (民主之国), then its rulers and officials are freely elected by the people in in accordance with the laws of the state." The book also reported that “in democratic countries, the responsibility of sending and receiving envoys can be exercised either by the leaders or the national assembly (国会), or jointly by the leader and the national assembly (see ). In the 70s the term minzhu has already been widely used on the pages of “Xigo Jinshi Huibian” (an official digest of translations of publications about foreign life published in Shanghai), as well as the popular newspaper of American and English missionaries “Wanguo gongbao” (see).

It is widely believed among Chinese linguists that the term minzhu in the meaning of “democracy” is of Japanese origin (33, p. 291). Direct evidence of the influence of the Japanese term Mingxu on W. A. ​​P. Martin or the first authors of articles on democracy in Chinese newspapers and magazines has not yet been found, but such an influence is quite likely. In the Chinese language there is a whole group of words that previously existed with a different meaning, but were changed by the influence of the Japanese language, where they were chosen to translate new Western terms without any connection with their original meaning. An expert on Japanese borrowings in Chinese, Chen Shenbao, includes them as minzhu(38). At the same time, it is obvious that the term minzhu, in contrast to the term minquan(discussed below) have much more fundamental roots in traditional Chinese thought.

Term minzhu in the works of reformers of the second halfXIXcenturies and the idea of ​​democracy

The emergence of the concept of democracy cannot be considered outside the context of the internal political struggle in China in the second half of the 19th century. By this time, the political weakness of China, its defeats in wars with European powers, cast doubt on the traditionalist theories of the self-sufficiency of Chinese civilization, the savagery and lack of culture of the inhabitants of all other “barbarian” countries. The conservatives were initially opposed by a group of supporters of the “assimilation of overseas affairs” (洋务派). Its leaders, major government officials Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909), Feng Guifen (1809-1874) and others put forward the slogan of “self-strengthening” (自强), the meaning of which was formulated in Zhang Zhidong's famous formula "Chinese science as the basis, Western science for (utilitarian) application." This meant the measured use of some, primarily military-technical, achievements of Western civilization while maintaining the traditional political and ideological foundations of the empire.

The policy of “self-strengthening” has not led to a solution to China’s problems. Continuous uprisings, new military defeats (in the Franco-Chinese War of 1884-1885, and later, in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895) led to the emergence of a school of thought, whose supporters in Chinese historical science are usually called early reformers (早期 改良派 or 早期维新派). They came up with a program of deeper reforms in various areas: education, economics, culture and politics. Their essence boiled down to a fundamental change in the foundations of the country’s social structure and the acceptance of those elements of foreign experience, which the ideologists of “self-strengthening” attributed not only to objects for utilitarian use, but also to the basis itself. In the political field, the main demand of this group was the introduction of representative bodies, and it is in this context that new terms appear in their vocabulary minzhu And minquan, which reflected various aspects of the European concept of “democracy”.

Although they put forward proposals for change in other areas, the main difference between the group of "early reformers" was the presence of a political program. At the same time, they were distinguished from later proponents of political change who advocated revolutionary methods by being reformist, supporting nonviolent, evolutionary methods of bringing about social change, and hostile to mass movements and revolution. In this regard, this group can be called a group of “supporters of political reforms.”

Supporters of political reforms include, in particular, the first Chinese envoy to England and France Guo Songtao (1818-1891), publicist Wang Tao (1828-1897), entrepreneur and politician Zheng Guanying (1842-1922), his associate and theorist reforms Chen Chi (1855-1900), translator and publicist Yan Fu (1854-1921), diplomat, entrepreneur and journalist Song Yuren (1857-1931), poet and diplomat Huang Zunxian (1848-1905), diplomat Xue Fucheng (1838- 1894), Hong Kong publicists He Qi (1859-1914) and Hu Liyuan (1847-1916) and a number of other public figures. They are also joined by the main organizers of the unsuccessful attempt at the so-called “hundred days of reform” in 1898 (戊戌变法): Kang Yuwei (1858-1927), Tang Sitong (1865-1898), Liang Qichao (1873-1929), Wang Kannian (1860-1911), whose program in its main points was practically no different from the proposals of other supporters of political reforms. These thinkers and publicists, despite all the differences in worldview, came up with a relatively coherent and integral political program based on a common understanding of the most important political terms. This understanding did not always correspond to European counterparts, and therefore often gave researchers a false impression of confusion.

Thoughts on the need to improve the system government controlled In parallel with the borrowing of foreign technologies, supporters of the “assimilation of overseas affairs” were already speaking out. Thus, Zeng Guofan, in a diary entry dated June 3, 1862, dedicated to a conversation with subordinates, noted: “If we want to find a path to self-strengthening, our urgent tasks should be to improve public administration ( Xiu Zhengshi, 修政事) and the search for talented people, and the art of making shells, cannons, learning to make steamboats and other tools should follow these tasks” (17). The probable author of the expression “self-strengthening” Feng Guifen noted that China lags behind the “barbarians” not only in the field of technology, but also because of the greater “gap between the ruler and the people.” (17). Some of the most radical supporters of “self-strengthening” also spoke about the need to introduce representative bodies (32, pp. 371-374), which they saw as advisory under the existing government, although others sharply criticized these plans.

Supporters of political reforms went further. Well acquainted with the European political system (many of them lived abroad for several years), they understood that, in addition to the absolute monarchy that dominated China, junzhu君主 (“rule of a monarch” or “autocracy”), there are at least two more political regimes in the world - the opposite of monarchy, democracy or republic minzhu民主 ("rule of the people") and constitutional monarchy junmin gongzhu军民共主 (“joint rule of the monarch and the people”).

Thus, in a collection of articles published in 1882 by Wang Tao, one of the first supporters of political reforms, he wrote that the state systems of Western countries can be divided into three types. In one, the ruler is called “emperor” ( enbola) - and these are absolute monarchies ( junzhuzhi guo), the same as Chinese. In another, the ruler is called "president" ( bolisitiande), these are democratic republics ( Minzhuzhi Guo), existing in France, Switzerland and the USA. Thirdly, the ruler is called "king" ( ching from "king"), they exist in England, Italy and Spain. According to Wang Tao, the public administration system of these three types of countries differs fundamentally (see:). In his “Description of Japan” published in 1890, Huang Zunxian writes that in the states of the world “there is either a system of government headed by one person, which is called an absolute monarchy ( junzhu), or a system in which many people discuss politics, called democracy ( minzhu), or a system in which the upper and lower divisions share responsibilities and power, called a constitutional monarchy ( junmin gongzhu)" (quoted from: ). According to Tan Sitong, “In Western countries, there are parliaments (议院), and the legislative branch and the executive branch are separate. Legislators are members of parliament, and executive power is exercised by monarchs and the people” (quoted from:).

Here it is necessary to clarify that the terms “absolute monarchy”, “constitutional monarchy” and “democracy” can only be used conditionally to translate these Chinese terms, since their meanings do not completely coincide. The greatest coincidence of meaning is observed in the Chinese term junzhu and the Western term “absolute monarchy”: under junzhu In China, the traditional system of public administration was understood, limited only ideologically, but not institutionally. Minzhu- this is not just “democracy”, but rather “democracy-republic”, i.e. complete power of the poor and uneducated people in the absence of a monarch. This is not a mechanism for realizing the interests (rights) of the people (the term was used to express this meaning minquan), but the very power of the people who overthrew the monarch. About the prevalence of the term at that time minzhu in the meaning of “democracy-republic” is evidenced by Xue Fucheng’s address to the French president during the presentation of his credentials in 1890 as the Great President of the Great French Democratic State (大法民主国), as well as its appearance in the name of the first republic on Chinese territory - “Taiwan” minzhuguo" (台湾民主国) - a state proclaimed in May 1895 by local authorities after the transfer of Taiwan to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and which existed only a few days before the Japanese occupation of the island.

It cannot be said that European thought was completely alien to the identification of democracy with the republican form of government. European conservatives - opponents of republican revolutions, for example, E. Burke, spoke about democracy in a similar sense. But in European political thought, especially in the second half of the 19th century, this line, naturally, was not the main one. Democracy was rather considered a method not associated with a particular political regime. However, the more republics became, the more they were associated with democracy, and democracy was also critically assessed as political regime and the republican form of government gradually changed to a positive one.

The political ideas of the most radical Chinese reformers of the second half of the 19th century V. were in many ways reminiscent of the assessments of European conservatives. In relation to democracy, they followed European thought, but until the end of the 19th century. (and even later) lagged behind, maintaining its understanding as the unlimited power of the poor majority and a negative attitude towards it. As a result, in China “among those who wanted to overcome the absolute monarchy in the 19th century, there was not a single person who did not criticize “democracy”” (19, p. 87).

Thus, Wang Tao criticized both the monarchy ( junzhu), and democracy ( minzhu) and supported the joint rule of the monarch and the people ( junmin gongzhu) (cm. ). Chen Chi, calling for the introduction of parliament ( yuan), while also criticizing democracy: “A system of popular government will lead to chaos caused by attacks on superiors.” Song Yuren argued that the introduction of a democratic system and presidential elections would lead to “the destruction of the laws of the state, as a result of which parties advocating the equalization of poor and rich will arise” (quoted in:).

Moreover, many supporters of political reforms believed that for Europe, where the people are enlightened, rich and prepared, a republican-democratic system is suitable, where it even strengthens the state. However, it cannot be introduced in China due to at least, for the foreseeable future, as long as the Chinese people remain poor and uneducated. This view was held, for example, by one of the first translators of Western works into Chinese, Yan Fu. His views were formulated in a concentrated form in a series of articles published in the first half of 1895 in the Tianjin newspaper Zhibao. Impressed by China's defeat in the war with Japan, Yan Fu criticized the policy of “self-strengthening.” Based on the theory of Charles Darwin and social Darwinism of G. Spencer, he explained fundamental difference between Western and Chinese civilizations in that the latter is not based on freedom. It was precisely thanks to the “difference between freedom and unfreedom,” according to Yan Fu, that China encountered difficulties in the development of science and in public administration (see). Arguing that both civilizational systems are integral, in the article “Sources of Power” he clearly criticizes the concept Zhongxue Wei Ti, Xixue Wei Yun, explained that in Western civilization “freedom is the basis and democracy is the means ( yun)" (以自由为体，以民主为用; see ). At the same time, Yan Fu believed that complete power of the people in China was a matter of the distant future: “Does this mean that today we can abandon the institution of rulers? In no case. Why? Yes, because such a time has not yet come, the (necessary) habits have not developed, the people are not ready for self-government. Even the exemplary states of the West are incapable of this, what can we say about China!” (quoted from:). He put the following words into the mouth of the perfectly wise ruler: “I placed myself over millions of people only out of necessity, because they could not govern themselves. The people could not govern themselves because their abilities had not yet been revealed, their strength had not yet become stronger, their morality had not yet reached perfection... Freedom was given to the people by Heaven, and how can I take it away? ...So, as soon as the happy day comes when the people can govern themselves, I will return [all power] to them” (quoted from:).

Interpretation of the concepts “constitutional monarchy”, “representative bodies/parliament” and “people's rights”

Supporters of political reforms opposed the system they designated to the “democracy-republic” that was unsuitable for China. junmin gongzhu or Junmin Jianzhu君民兼主 (“joint rule of the monarch and the people”). Thus, He Qi and Hu Liyuan noted: “While respecting the rights of the people ( minquan) the ruler still continues to receive his post by inheritance. In democracy ( minzhu) the people elect a person who has power in the state for a period of several years. Speaking about the rights of the people, we would like the Chinese monarch to inherit the throne from generation to generation and so that the one whose place is determined by Heaven does not change. We are not talking about a democratic state” (35, p. 406). Liang Qichao wrote: “The advantage of introducing representative bodies ( yuan) is that the power of the monarch and the power of the people are harmoniously combined, wishes easily reach [the leaders]. When the discussion and execution of laws are separated, things are easy to complete” (27, p. 2). Wang Tao had similar thoughts: “When one person rules from above, and hundreds of officials and tens of thousands ordinary people they are bustling about below, an order comes out - and it must be carried out, the word is spoken - and it cannot be disputed - this is the rule of the monarch ( junzhu). When government affairs are brought up for discussion in parliament ( yuan议院), and if the majority approves of them, they pass, and if not, then they are suspended, and the president is nothing more than the highest talent - this is the rule of the people ( minzhu). When on all major political issues facing the court: military, criminal, ceremonial, entertainment, awards, fines, it is necessary to gather the people in the upper and lower houses of parliament, with the approval of the monarch, but without the consent of the people, the decision cannot pass, and with the approval of the people, but without the consent of the monarch, the decision also cannot pass, but only after the opinions of the monarch and the people coincide, the decision can be made public everywhere - this is a joint rule of the monarch and the people ( junmin gongzhu). The writings say that if a monarch rules, then constant peace and a long reign can only be achieved if there is a monarch like Yao and Shun at the top. If the people rule, the legal system becomes confused and unity of will is difficult to achieve. If this is taken to the limit, then abuse cannot be avoided. Only when the monarch and the people rule together ( junmin gongzhu), there is a relationship between the top and bottom, the innermost thoughts of the people reach the top, the mercy of the monarch also descends to the bottom. Such a discussion of affairs with the sovereign is a forgotten idea that existed even in the period before the Three Dynasties” (20, pp. 18-19).

We find similar thoughts in Kang Yuwei’s comrade-in-arms, Wang Kangnian: “If the rights of the people (minquan) are partially used, then there will be thousands of ears and millions of eyes that cannot be closed or clouded. And if a thousand people point at something, then it is impossible not to see it. If an order or prohibition needs to be implemented, everything will be carried out in accordance with the will of the emperor. Therefore, although it may be said that the rights of the people are partially exercised, there is no better way to exercise them than by using the power of the emperor. Moreover, when people do not have power, they do not understand that the country belongs to all people, and they move away from the emperor. When people have some power, they understand that the state is their common concern, and they will approach the emperor” (16, pp. 162-163).

The form of government that supporters of political reforms sought (joint rule of the monarch and the people) is usually identified by historians from the PRC with the modern concept of “constitutional monarchy” (in modern language- 君主立宪). However, this identification is not entirely accurate. Indeed, the term junmin gongzhu European constitutional monarchies were designated. Sometimes it was even said that these states had a constitution. However, when it came to China, there was no talk of a constitution at that time, so the very concept of “constitutional” for such a monarchy is relative. It is more accurate to translate this term, at least when applied to China, as “representative monarchy,” since the key importance in it was not attached to the constitution, but to the representation of the population.

All supporters of the transformation of the traditional political system advocated the introduction of elected representative bodies in China, which, as a rule, were designated by the term yuan议院. Translating this term with the concept of “parliament” is also not entirely accurate. Firstly, under yuan This meant not only national representative bodies, but also local ones. Secondly, the purpose of introducing these bodies at that time in China was not considered to limit the power of the monarch, but to provide him with a sufficient amount of advice and recommendations coming from the population.

Thus, the meaning of creating democratic institutions, according to the Chinese political reformers of the 19th century, was not to realize the right of citizens to self-government, and not to represent various public interests, but to awaken the creative forces of the people in order to use the best advice and suggestions in public administration, in strengthening the unity of the people to achieve national goals. One of the first supporters of the introduction of the parliamentary system, Zheng Guanying, for example, wrote: “Parliament ( yuan) is an institution in which matters of public administration are discussed and united mental forces are directed towards the general benefit of the state... Without parliament, there are many barriers between the ruler and the people, because of which the will of the first and the desires of the second are misdirected, the power is fragmented and the power is weakened ... " (quoted from:). Calling to “establish a parliament in the capital and order public elections of county and regional rulers throughout the Celestial Empire,” Yan Fu emphasized that this is the only way to “awaken everyone’s love for China” and “raise the moral qualities of our people to such an extent that they, merging his strength and will into a single whole, he directed them to repel the external enemy” (quoted from:). Another supporter of reforms, Chen Chi, who considered parliament to be the source of military power and national welfare of European and American states, argued in his book “Yongshu” (1893) that the Western parliamentary monarchy, on the model of which he proposed to reform the Chinese state system, “unites the monarchy and the people into a single whole, and the intentions of the ruler and subjects merge into a single channel” (quoted from.

It is noteworthy in this regard that the desire often encountered among supporters of political reforms is to associate the monarchy with the private interests of the monarch, for which the concept of traditional Chinese philosophy was used sy私 (“private”), which had a negative meaning, and the system junmin gongzhu and democracy- minzhu, ensuring the rights of the people ( minquan), - with the general interests of the state, expressed by the traditional concept gong公 (“general”), which had a positive connotation. We find this interpretation, for example, in He Qi and Hu Liyuan, who associated minquan with the “common state of the whole nation” (国民之公国), which was opposed to the “private state” (私国) of the monarch (11). Liang Qichao wrote in 1897: “What is monarchy ( junzhu)? This is only private. What is government of the people? minzhu)? This is only general” (29).

This approach in theoretical terms can be compared with the theory of the “general will” of J.-J. Rousseau, but in this case it certainly needs to be considered in the Chinese socio-historical context as determined by the desire of supporters of political reforms to borrow Western political mechanisms not as a goal of social development, but as an instrument for the revival of a powerful, influential and effective Chinese state.

Contrasting the 19th century reformers' concept of "co-rule between monarch and people" with the ancient principle minben, we can say that, thanks to representative bodies, the system of ideal power acquired the missing link - the criterion of compliance of government with the people's desires, which will be directly expressed. At the same time, almost nowhere in the writings of the 19th century was there any talk about the mechanisms of “joint rule of the monarch and the people,” the separation of powers and the constitution. Meanwhile, in descriptions of the governance of Western countries, the concepts of “constitution” and “separation of powers” ​​were presented quite often. However, unlike the ideas of elections and parliament, they were less accepted by Chinese theorists, since they were much more alien to traditional Chinese thinking. The very requirement of a constitution and a national legislative body (国会) is first found in its most general form only in the works of Kang Youwei and some other participants in the “100 Days of Reforms”, however, according to a number of researchers, these passages were later insertions, and in the period of reforms, proposals Kang Youwei did not go beyond what was generally accepted among supporters of the introduction of a representative monarchy (see).

Appeal to principle minben This is especially typical for participants in the “Hundred Days of Reform.” Thus, Kang Yuwei, in his book “A Study of the Teachings of Confucius on the Reform of the State System” （孔子改制考）, convinced readers that the idea of ​​representative bodies was put forward by Confucius himself. As evidence, he cited the story of Shun’s rise to power, to whom Yao transferred power. Having received power, Shun "to convene a representative body ( yuan) gathered the dignitaries in the Mingtang throne room and opened the gates on all four sides” (8, p. 76). The need for such an interpretation of antiquity, caused both by the Chinese tradition of appealing to historical precedent and by the practical desire of reformers to find the best form of convincing the authorities of the need for reforms, was clearly formulated by Liang Qichao in his work “Research on the Representative Chamber of Antiquity” (古议院考), dedicated to the search ancient origins of Chinese parliamentarism. Liang Qichao wrote: “When talking about Western politics, it is necessary to look for roots in antiquity.” Based on the study of ancient Chinese texts, he came to the conclusion that although the term yuan in ancient times it did not exist; the representative bodies themselves supposedly existed (see).

The idea of ​​representative bodies, including parliament, was known in China much earlier, for example, from the book of the collection of documents “Description of the Four Continents” （四洲志）, compiled under the leadership of a major official Lin Zexu (1785-1850) in 1841, also from geographical descriptions of foreign countries by authors such as Wei Yuan (1794-1857), Xu Ziyu (1795-1873) and Liang Tingnan (1796-1861). However, the terminology used in them has nothing in common with the terminology of the group of supporters of political reforms. In addition, according to Chinese researchers, in various sources of the 19th century one can find about 30 various options renderings of the word "parliament", including several variants of borrowings and various European languages ​​- baliman, bolimen, bolaman and so on. (31, pp.74-78; 22). What is the reason why supporters of political reforms chose the term yuan? Taiwanese researcher Gui Hongcheng gives the following explanation: “Why at that time Liang Qichao and other intellectuals initially chose the word yuan to convey the concept of “parliament”? Considering the analogies drawn by Liang Qichao with the system of “imperial advisers” that existed in ancient times ( jianyi諫议), we can come to the conclusion that to a certain extent he understood the functions of parliament as the functions of “imperial advisers” ( jian dafu諫大夫), “chief scientists” ( boshi博士), “leading the debate” ( Ilan议郎) and other critical imperial dignitaries ( yanguan言官). Therefore the hieroglyph And(议) from the word yuan(议院) was primarily associated with the system that already existed in ancient times yanguan, an advanced concept in which the emperor allowed officials to discuss government affairs and give advice. In addition, due to the presence in the name yuan hieroglyph yuan(院), this institution could be considered as governmental, belonging to the system of imperial power. Thus, to translate the word “parliament” into Chinese as yuan meant to give it the sense of an organ or chamber established by the government” (22).

A meaningful alternative yuan there was a term gouhui国会, in contrast to yuan perceived not as a body in the system of monarchical power, but as a government body opposing it, created by the people. Its leadership function as a body of state power, and not just an advisory one, was evidenced by the hieroglyph th国 - state. Term Guohui sometimes used by supporters of political reform to name the parliaments of foreign countries. For example, Wang Tao translated the name of the French National Assembly this way (30). However, according to Gui Hongcheng, until the fall of the monarchy it was never used in official reports to the court with proposals to establish representative bodies (22).

Thus, under yuan supporters of political reforms in China understood both parliament (as applied to Western states) and representative bodies in general, including those of an advisory nature (in this sense, the term was usually used to refer to elected bodies in China that were proposed to be created). The distinction here was very conditional, since specific powers yuan discussed in the most general form.

In the historiography of the PRC, it is customary to criticize supporters of political reforms of that time for “conciliation” and “inconsistency.” However, it seems that in this case, the Western ideas of the supporters of evolutionary development were willingly accepted by the Chinese reformers not only for tactical reasons, that is, due to the inability to propose to the monarchical authorities to abolish the monarchy. Their sincere and detailed explanation of their position, criticism of the sovereignty of the people, especially as applied to Chinese conditions, and contrasting it with the advantages of a constitutional monarchy allows us to conclude that there are genuine concerns about the ability of an uneducated people to assume power and the possible consequences of this for Chinese civilization. In addition, it is obvious that the Western evolutionist approach corresponds to traditional Chinese ideas within the framework of the concept minben: power must be exercised for the people, but not by the people themselves, but by the emperor with the help of specially educated and trained people. The role of the representative body in this sense was to ensure that power is exercised for the people, to articulate their aspirations for power.

That is why supporters of political reforms actively proposed the introduction of various qualifications. Thus, Chen Guanying believed that, while representing the entire people, the parliament itself should have consisted only of wealthy people who had achieved certain “academic successes.” Chen Chi believed that those participating in elections should be at least 30 years old and have a net worth of at least 1 thousand jinei. He Qi and Hu Liyuan proposed that only holders of the title could be elected to county-level representative bodies syutsya, district - Juren, and provincial - Jinshi(7, p. 61; 26, p. 58).

Democracy and minquan

From the above it is clear that the term played an important role in the constructions of supporters of political reforms in the second half of the 19th century minquan(power, rights, powers of the people). Unlike minzhu, minquan- a term apparently of Japanese origin. This combination of characters is not found in classical Chinese texts, although the characters themselves ming(“people”), and quan(power, rights) naturally existed. According to most researchers, the term minquan(in Japanese minken) was compiled in Japan, where after the Meiji reforms the "freedom and people power" movement (自由民权) arose, and then borrowed by Chinese reformers. According to Cheng Shengbao's classification, it can be classified as a different group (compared to minzhu) Chinese borrowings from Japanese: terms “re-created in Japan by combining Chinese characters” (10, p. 22).

According to Xiong Yuezhi, it was first used in China by Guo Songtao, then an envoy to England, who noted in a diary entry dated May 19, 1878 that “the rights of the people” are ensured in Western monarchies. Somewhat later, Huang Zunxian and Xue Fucheng used it in the same meaning (see). According to Xiong Yuezhi, the Japanese influence on the latter two is beyond doubt, since the term minzhu used by Huang Zunxian in his book Description of Japan (日本国志), which he wrote from 1879 to 1887 while he was envoy to Japan. Xue Fucheng wrote the preface to this book, and in 1890, together with Huang Zunxian, he was sent as an envoy to Europe. As for Guo Songtao, the evidence of borrowing is not so direct. According to Xiong Yuezhi, with a high degree of probability he could have learned about this term from conversations in England with the Japanese envoy in this country, who often told his Chinese colleague about state structure your country (see).

In 1893 the term mingquan appears in the works of entrepreneur and politician Zheng Guanying, known for his criticism of "self-strengthening" policies and theory Zhongxue Wei Ti, Xixue Wei Yun, according to which it was necessary to adopt some Western, mainly technical, innovations, leaving the essence of the Chinese political and economic system unchanged. More precisely, the term minquan appeared in published by Zheng Guanying as an appendix to one of the chapters of his 1893 book “On the Dangers of the Prosperous Age” (盛世危言) of the Japanese author T. Miyama’s work “On the Rights of the People, the Republic and the Rights of the Monarch” (民权共治 君权三论) (31).

Zheng Guanying called for borrowing not only the technical elements of Western civilization ( yun), but also those that relate to the “base” ( you). To the latter, in particular, he attributed parliamentarism and democracy. In calling for the creation of representative bodies, Zheng Guanying used the term minquan to indicate the participation of the people in them (7, pp. 60-62). The term minzhu Wu Zheng Guanying meant “rule of the people” in the sense of “republic” and was opposed to monarchy ( junzhu). Zheng Guanying himself advocated the establishment of a British-style constitutional monarchy in China, which he called junmin gongzhi(“joint rule of the monarch and the people”) (37, pp. 314, 316).

Thus, coming to China, the term minquan changed its meaning compared to Japanese. If in Japan it meant democracy itself, that is, the power of the people, then in China its meaning began to differ from the meaning of the term minzhu. Xiong Yuezhi explained this difference this way: “At that time minquan was understood as “power, powers, rights of the people” (人民的权利), and minzhu as the “master people” (人民作主), that is, a state in which the people dominate (人民统治国家). So the term minzhu conveyed much more clearly the indivisible and intransferable character of popular sovereignty and directly opposed the concept junquan(power of the monarch, monarchy). The meaning of the term minquan was quite vague, it could be interpreted both as “full power of the people” and as “partial power of the people.” In the first interpretation, it served as a synonym minzhu. In the second interpretation, it could be understood as granting partial rights to the people without overthrowing the power of the monarch. Thus, it had both an anti-monarchical aspect and an aspect of coexistence with monarchical power. Its anti-monarchical edge was not so frightening, and provided for the possibility of coexistence with the monarchy. This flexibility of semantic interpretation was very convenient for reformers. Thanks to their approach to monarchical rule, which involved both fighting it and finding compromise, minquan became their most ideal slogan, reflecting both the contradictions with monarchical power and the possibility of coexistence with it, and emphasizing the need to have political rights without overthrowing the monarchical system” (31, pp. 10-11).

According to a number of Chinese researchers, belonging to a rather amorphous group of “early reformers” should be determined precisely by the promotion and support of the slogan minquan. Opposition to democracy cannot serve this purpose ( minzhu) constitutional monarchy junmin gongzhu or calls for the creation of representative bodies yuan, since both could be found among some representatives of the “self-strengthening” movement (see).

conclusions

In the views of the reformers of the second half of the 19th century on democracy, despite all their differences, a number of common points can be identified.

1. Regardless of the term used, the purpose of introducing elements of a democratic political system for all Chinese reformers without exception was to improve the Chinese system of government, giving it greater dynamism, in order to eliminate the threat from an external enemy, thanks to which China should take its proper place (i.e. i.e. leading) place for him in world politics. It was China’s military defeats in wars with Western powers, as well as with Japan (which, according to Chinese reformers, won thanks to the successful borrowing of some elements of Western civilization) that gave rise to the very idea of ​​the defectiveness or backwardness of traditional Chinese civilization, at least in its some aspects. Expressing this thought, Kang Youwei wrote: “If the Europeans had not come to China, we might not have made changes, but now several dozen states are opposing China and oppressing it... Du Fu said: “We cannot allow the whips (of foreigners) to be whipped again.” they sprinkled blood on the clothes of Chinese subjects.” If foreigners come to China, our country will perish and Confucianism will decline” (qtd.).

2. In their desire to make China the powerful power that it was throughout most of its history, supporters of borrowing Western democracy did not disagree with supporters of the policy of “self-strengthening”; they debated only about the scale of the necessary borrowing. Reformers criticized supporters of “self-strengthening”, believing that borrowing only technical achievements was insufficient and practically impossible, since the very development of technology in the West became possible thanks to the participation of the “people” in government. Thus, the idea of ​​democracy in China, unlike the West, did not grow organically from Chinese philosophical concepts or religious ideas, but was the result of foreign policy problems, and was naturally seen as a means of solving these problems. Only in retrospect, after becoming acquainted with Western political theories, did Chinese thinkers begin to search for analogies and similar concepts in traditional philosophy, first of all, in principle minben. This meant, in particular, that the failure of democracy to solve these problems could lead to the fact that the remedy would be considered unsuccessful and the idea of ​​replacing it with another would arise.

3. The idea of ​​“natural rights” and the concept of “inalienable rights” that grew from it, which became the basis of the struggle for democracy as the right of a person to participate in government, was alien to the Chinese consciousness. However, during the period under review, this concept had not yet become widespread in the West. For example, the author of the first translation of the term “natural rights” into Chinese, Yan Fu, based his ideas about freedom on the works of J. St. Mill and G. Spencer, who did not consider freedom to be an unconditional right of all people. Both the utilitarian J.S. Mill and the social Darwinist G. Spencer, whose works, thanks to Yan Fu’s translations, gained extraordinary popularity in China, despite differences in views on the essence and mechanisms of social development, considered freedom as the result of the slow evolution of society, and authoritarian despotism as a necessary method of control at the lower stages of development. In the famous treatise “On Liberty,” J.S. Mill, for example, wrote: “Despotism is a legitimate method of ruling barbarians if the goal is good and is truly achieved. Freedom is in principle inapplicable to a society preceding an era where one can calmly improve through free and equal discussions” (6, p. 12).

4. In this regard, another general idea of ​​the Chinese reformers acquires great importance: the backwardness of the Chinese people and their unpreparedness for the immediate introduction of democracy. The consequence of this, according to almost all reformers, was that the most suitable form of government for China was not a republic, but a constitutional monarchy, in which the monarch ( jun) and "people" ( ming) will be managed jointly ( junmin gongzhu). Introduction of pure rule by an unprepared and uneducated people ( minzhu) seemed dangerous, as it would divide society and lead to internal struggle, unrest and even revolution. In this case, we can compare the understanding of democracy ( minzhu) Chinese theorists with Aristotle: as the power of the poorest and uneducated majority. At the same time, as an ideal, unlike Aristotle, they put forward not a polity (which has signs of democracy and oligarchy), but “joint rule of the monarch and the people,” in which the “rights of the people” would be respected ( minquan). Antonym of the term minquan("rights of the people") was the term junquan(“the rights of the monarch”), and minzhu("People power") - junzhu(“the power of the monarch”). So the introduction minquan was perceived as a more moderate option compared to minzhu- ensuring the rights of the people did not mean infringement of the rights of the monarch, but the power of the people meant the elimination of the power of the ruler. Hence the oppositions often found in the works of Chinese supporters of reforms minzhu(“democracies”) and minquan(“the rights of the people”, which may be respected for the people, but not directly exercised by them), and also junzhu(“monarchy”) and minju(“democracy”) - junmin gongzhu("a constitutional monarchy").

5. The translation of the term “democracy” was not finally established in China until the second decade of the twentieth century. Up until this time, other expressions were also used: a transcription of the English term ( demokelasi 德谟克拉西), minzheng民政 ("rule of the people") pingminzhui平民主义 (“the principle of people’s equality”), Shuminzhui庶民主义 (“the principle of rule by the masses”), minbenzhui民本主义 (“the principle of the people as the root-foundation”) (29, pp. 329-330). And only then the term “democracy” was finally assigned minzhu, however, its meaning has changed, turning into a direct correspondence to the European concept (at least in the linguistic sense). The meaning of the term has also changed minquan: Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionary figures of the early twentieth century already had the term minquan zhuyi means the complete power of the people, that is, from the previous understanding minquan only part of it has survived (31, p. 402; 21). Later term minquan fell into disuse, becoming renquan- modern concept of “human rights”.

However, a correct understanding of the early interpretations of the concept of “democracy” in China is of great theoretical and practical importance. Their study allows us to see how foreign concepts came to China, being rethought under the influence of cultural and linguistic tradition and political circumstances. It also creates a basis for considering the further evolution of the understanding of democracy in China, the role of “democratic” slogans in social movements in this country, and provides rich material for intercivilization comparisons.

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Art. publ. entitled « The arrival of the concept of “democracy” in China and its first interpretations» : Society and state in China: XXXIX scientific conference / Institute of Oriental Studies RAS. - M.: Vost. lit., 2009. - 502 pp. - Scientific notes of the China Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Vol. 1. pp. 274-295.

China - one of the oldest states on Earth - has experienced in its long history periods of consolidation, centralization, expansion to the outer limits and expansion of its possessions and periods of desolidation, decentralization, disintegration of the empire into separate, often warring principalities, periods in which the influence of Chinese culture fell on neighboring peoples. A long period can be distinguished in the history of China independent, autonomous and even closed from the outside world of development, when the country developed on its own basis, while at the same time accepting all the reasonable innovations of its neighbors, of which there were not so many. During this period, the political system of China was a typical eastern despotism, a hierarchical empire, which included various territories and people, and the political culture had a clearly expressed subject character with traditions of reverence for authority and seniority in general, with the norms of a patriarchal family, mutual responsibility in the peasant community and a paternalistic state .

Another important period in Chinese history that can be called period of European influence, began during the Age of Discovery with the appearance of Portuguese ships in Chinese ports, the development of maritime trade and the founding of the Portuguese colony of Macau on the southeastern coast of mainland China. At first (XVI - XVIII centuries), the emperors of the Manchu Ming dynasty, who ruled the country, seeing the destructive nature of European influence on the feudal structure of Ming society and state, on the strength of their power, in every possible way prevented the establishment of ties with Europeans. But in the 19th century. the efforts of the leading colonial powers Great Britain, France, Russia, and then the USA, Germany, Japan, which, winning wars (for example, the first and second opium wars of Great Britain with China, the Franco-Chinese war, the Sino-Japanese war) and (or) imposing treaties on trade, navigation, settlementmen (foreigner settlements), borders and military naval bases, led not only to the transformation of the once all-powerful empire into a semi-colony, but also to the strengthening of European cultural influence and the development of industrial relations in it. Political process in the Chinese Empire under semi-colony regime identified conflicts that can be divided into 1. conflicts between Chinese and foreigners and 2. intra-Chinese conflicts.

But the most significant conflict at that time, which played an important role in the emergence of democracy, was conflict between European cultural influence and Chinese cultural tradition.

This conflict gave rise to acceleration in economic development, changes in the social structure of society and way of thinking, innovations in social life and political culture. Representatives of the “Westernizing” school of thought, progressive government officials put forward the concept of “self-strengthening the empire by imitation of foreigners,” that is, borrowing from the most developed nations technical achievements in the construction of ships and the production of tools, retraining the army and navy to strengthen the internal political position of the empire and prevent its division. At the same time, they categorically objected to the borrowing of Western political ideas. On the initiative of “imitators of foreigners” in 1870-1880. translations of European textbooks and books on mathematics, technology, shipbuilding, geography, and economics began into Chinese. Children of officials and landowners began to be sent abroad to receive education. This was very reminiscent of the processes that took place in Russia during the time of Peter I.

The transformation of the Westernist current of thought into political reform movement occurred after another defeat of the empire, this time in the war with Japan of 1894-1895, which resulted in the loss of Taiwan and the payment (once again) of a huge indemnity. Immediately after receiving news of the terms of the Japanese-Chinese, so-called Shimonoseki Treaty, representatives of the liberal public drew up a Collective Memorandum to the Manchurian court in Beijing, which condemned the inability of the political regime to resist Japanese aggression, called for the continuation of the war and the implementation of urgent reforms in the field of economics, culture, political management, military affairs, which were supposed to not only strengthen the international position of the country, but also prevent internal strife and riots like the Taiping uprising. The main political demand was introduction of the constitution and establishment of parliament.

On the platform of this memorandum, in August 1895, the Association for Strengthening the State was formed in Beijing, which became, on the one hand, a political club of supporters of liberal reforms, and on the other, the headquarters movement of liberal constitutionalists. Branches of the Association immediately opened in Shanghai and Nanjing, and one of the leaders Liberal reformers Kan-Yuwai began publishing a newspaper that took a liberal-patriotic position, opposing defeatist sentiments, against the division of the country, and for the transformation of the Chinese state and society in the European spirit. The imperial government already closed the newspaper and the Association in December 1985, but its work as the first liberal proto-party in China was continued by other unions, societies and clubs created on the liberal-patriotic platform of the Memorandum. During the same period, a significant number of liberal reformist newspapers and magazines appeared. Another famous liberal reformer was Liang Qichao, who distinguished between “bloody and destructive” for one’s own culture and “bloodless” options for progress. Liang Qichao's model state of modernization was Japan, which retained imperial rule and many norms traditional culture, but adopted a constitution, parliamentarism and political parties, carrying out reforms in a variety of areas: from education and land management to the military industry and the armed forces.

Liberal reformers were opposed conservative groups military, landowners, officials, courtiers who tried to maintain the status quo, and if they carried out any reforms, then under the condition of maintaining the political system of the empire and under the leadership of the ruling dynasty. It should be noted that there was no agreement in the ranks of the imperial camarilla on the issue of reforms. If Emperor Guaxu listened to the liberals, then the all-powerful Empress Cixi served as the center of gravity for conservatives who were interested in delaying long-overdue reforms. After the death of Guaxu and Cixi, three-year-old Pu Yi became emperor (1908), and his father Prince Chun, who became the leader of the court conservative camarilla, became regent. The leader of another national conservative General Yuan Shikai, the son of a major official, became a group representing not the Manchu Qing dynasty, but the Han elite.

Another direction of the liberal democratic movement was represented by the Union for the Renaissance of China, which united representatives of the intelligentsia from the southern provinces of the country that were most advanced in capitalist development. Unlike liberal reformers, revolutionary democrats The first goal was the armed overthrow of the Manchurian monarchy and the establishment of a democratic republic. Therefore, the Chinese Revival Alliance was created abroad, in Honolulu (Hawaii Islands) during 1894-1895. The leader and main ideologist of the Renaissance Union from its very creation was Sun Yat-sen. His political program was based on the "three principles of the people":

• 1 .nationalism, meaning that the first priority is to overthrow the Manchu (Qing) dynasty and return power to the national (Han) government, which in relations with foreign campaigns and governments must defend national interests;
• 2. democracy, meaning that after the overthrow of the Qing monarchy, a democratic republic should be established;
• 3. people's welfare, that is, a fair solution to the agrarian question by nationalizing the land and establishing equal rights for all those working on it.

These political forces, not yet formed into political parties: liberal constitutionalists, national conservatives and national democrats, opposed the imperial regime in the Xinhai Revolution, which abolished the imperial system of government, counting time according to the reign of the Bogdykhans (Manchu emperors) and introduced republican form of government(1912). The government, composed of representatives of liberal constitutionalists and revolutionary democrats, was headed by Sun Yat-sen, and Yuan Shikai was elected interim president.

In 1912, more right-wing, conservative-reformist-minded liberals and democrats united in Republican Party (RP Wu Gunhedan), based on the population of northern China.

More left-wing, revolutionary-reformist-minded Democrats and Republicans in the same year, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, formed National Party (NP Wu Kuomintang) whose program was based on the “three principles of the people”, but in comparison with the program of the Renaissance Union, assessments of the actions of the colonial powers in relation to China were softened. The Kuomintang relied on the population of the more developed southern and southeastern provinces.

At the end of 1912 it was adopted China's first constitution(56 articles in total), which introduced a republican political system with a presidential form of government. The president was elected by parliament for a term of 4 years. He was considered the head of the executive branch, commander-in-chief of the army, and had the right to issue decrees and appoint civil and military officials. Parliament - the national assembly consisted of House of Representatives And Senate elected by provincial parliaments-assemblies. The Cabinet of Ministers was appointed with the consent of the National Assembly and was accountable to it. The Constitution contained the first in Chinese history Declaration of Citizens' Rights(vv.5-15), secured civil equality“without distinction of tribes, classes and religion”, inviolability of person and property, freedom of speech, petitions and meetings. It was proclaimed universal suffrage.

However, the democratic political system in China was only proclaimed, but did not actually function, except for the parliamentary elections in December 1912, in which the Sun Yat-sen National Party won a landslide victory, gaining 90% of the votes.

In 1913, civil war broke out between government forces led by President Yuan Shikai and revolutionary forces led by Prime Minister Sun Yat-sen. Yuan Shikai believed that the revolution had achieved its goal and now the main task of the government was to calm the anarchy and establish a peaceful life. Sun Yat-sen advocated the continuation of revolutionary changes. Civil War ended in the defeat of the Kuomintang. Sun Yat-sen was forced to emigrate.

Yuan Shikai banned the Kuomintang. Was accepted new edition, constitution(1914), according to which the president received much greater powers and the right to be elected for 10 years, and the National Assembly became unicameral. If, according to the constitution of 1912, China was a presidential-parliamentary republic, then in accordance with the new edition of the constitution it became a clearly presidential republic. But this was not a democratic republic. A significant part of the deputies of the National Assembly were appointed by the President himself by decree. Elections were not actually held, and “President” Yuan Shikai hatched plans to revive the empire by marrying his daughter to the deposed emperor Pu Yi. However, death (1916) prevented him from realizing his plans. Vice President Li Yuanhong, who took over the vacated post of president, announced the resumption of the 1912 constitution. Emigrants, including Sun Yat-sen, returned to the country. The power of the central government was further weakened. In the provinces, leadership actually passed to the commanders of the mercenary provincial armies - the dujuns. Duan Qirui became the new prime minister. It was he, with the support of the Dujuns, who insisted on China's entry into the war on the side of the Entente (August 14, 1917).

In defiance of the Beijing government, another government was created in Guangzhou under the chairmanship of Sun Yat-sen, which did not recognize the Beijing cabinet and set as its task the establishment of a constitution of five powers in China (legislative, executive and judicial, as in the West, and also examination and control, as has traditionally been the case in China) and implement the Kuomintang's three principles program.

In conditions of the impotence of the central government and external pressure from foreign powers, a peculiar Dujunat mode, which had deep historical roots. Quite often in the history of China, when the central government weakened, neighboring provinces united into groups that defended common interests. The most influential during the First World War were the Beiyang group (of the northern provinces), which in turn was divided into the Fengtian (Manchu), Zhili and Anhui groups. Premier Duan Qirui relied on the Beiyang people. In the South-West, Yunnan and Guangxi groups formed, on which President Li Yuanhong relied. Foreign powers have also used these groups to advance their own interests. For example, Japan financed the Fengtian and Anhui groups, and Great Britain financed the Zhili group. The dujunat regime was established because it allowed the regions, on the one hand, to support the weakened central government, on the other, to lobby for their own interests, and on the third, to stabilize the entire political system.

• ,9Y - see Isaev B.A.. Partology. Part II. Party and political systems of the leading countries of the world. St. Petersburg, 2007, pp. 240-245.

China: Wealth and Democracy

If China reaches Western levels of prosperity, will it adopt the Western model of democracy?

In their report, economists Malhar Nabar and Papa N’Diaye argue that if the Chinese authorities can implement the country’s needs economic reforms, then by 2030 China will become a high-income economy. In nominal terms, a high-income economy has a gross national income (GNI) of more than $12,616 per person. In essence, this is the line of demarcation between rich countries and poor ones. Of course, China will enter the rich nations club with its current GNI of $5,720, but the Chinese economy is still a long way off from matching the enormous wealth of the US (where GNI is $52,340 per capita). However, given China's size, the country is certain to overtake the US by 2030 to become the world's largest economy.

This will have enormous consequences for the future balance of power in world politics. Equally, being a high-income country will have enormous consequences for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the country's domestic political system. In the current state of affairs, great socialist revolution in China has already transformed into a developed version of intensive capitalism. Market reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s have created a thinly disguised capitalist culture that rises above the communist façade.

At the first hint of reform, foreign commentators immediately began to hail the death of communism and the beginning triumph of democracy. It appears that the persistently repeated refrain of the CCP's impending demise serves as a comforting digression for commentators who berate (quite correctly) the oppressive nature of the communist system. But in many ways this is done out of fear of a rising country not from the Western camp. Alex Lo of the South China Morning Post writes of critics of the communist regime that they "showcase their own democratic credentials and criticize the Chinese state system, believing that the central government has no real legitimacy and that unrest will begin when growth slows." society, and the regime will collapse over time.” Moralizing about the lack of respect for human rights in China is one thing, but the reality of the CCP's dominance in the country is quite another.

There is no doubt that the Chinese Communist Party is navigating uncharted waters. Economic development has already produced a society that is better educated, better paid, and more material. The Chinese already enjoy a degree of personal freedom that is unprecedented in Chinese society. These freedoms can hardly be put on a par with the freedoms of liberal democracies, but Chinese citizens are becoming more politicized, expressing their point of view more often and more clearly. Thus, recent demonstrations against the initiatives of local authorities show that people can mobilize to protest against the authorities. Today, the Chinese are witnessing phenomenal economic progress, and as a result they expect more and strive for more. And this begs the question of what China's citizens will demand from their leaders in a seemingly endless economic development will come to an end.

This question seems timely in light of the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, which still looms over the CCP. Communism is not dead then, but many observers believe it will collapse as the Chinese middle class begins to demand reform. This line of thinking among commentators is based on the progressive Western premise that those who gain wealth will demand new political solutions. This is a linear concept of the past: from artisanal workshop to capitalist enterprise; from mercantilism to free market; from monarchy to nation state; from an elite society to mass democracy. All roads have been successfully passed, and the end point of the route is invariably liberal democracy. But during the industrial age, the spread of wealth among the educated middle classes in the West forced the elite to reconsider the terms of political control. With industrialization, with the growth of abundance and financial prosperity, with the development of mass media, people began to become increasingly important. In such conditions, even conservatives in the person of British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli began to show unprecedented goodwill, giving universal male suffrage in an attempt to suppress the most radical demands of the people. Even German Chancellor von Bismarck initiated innovative social security reform, making concessions to the sentiments of the revolutionary workers. Old regimes adapted to change, and those who did not accept such measures faced dangerous prospects of confrontation with the crowd.

In the contemporary context of our globalized world, the master storyline of democratization has reached a dead end. In the United States, there is stagnation and polarization of the political system. There is skepticism and dissatisfaction in Europe. Then there is the myth of the Arab Spring. Outside observers seem shocked that the revolution in countries North Africa, such as Egypt, instead of ushering in a new era of democracy led to a modern Thermidorian reaction, and the military returned to its old autocratic habits.

The idea of ​​the collapse of the Communist Party and the gradual victory of democracy in China is nothing more than an extremely erroneous view of the current situation. The Party in Chinese society acts as a harmonizing and unifying force. This is a much more important consideration for the middle class, given the painful legacy of China's historical fragmentation in the 19th and early 20th centuries. It goes without saying that if the CCP manages to raise the country and bring it into the upper echelons of income, then the party will become a powerful tool in strengthening the legitimacy of the regime.

If you will, Chinese nationalism is a much more popular topic of discourse in mainstream society, be it populist hatred of Japan or the huge crowds of people flocking daily to the flag-raising ceremony in Tiananmen Square. When it comes to maintaining harmony, nationalism can be a double-edged sword for the CCP. Displays of patriotism help maintain unity and distract the population's attention from pressing domestic problems. At the same time, zealous nationalism is harmful to China's international reputation and threatens to weaken the image of its peaceful growth. Nationalism, like everything else in China, must be carefully managed and orchestrated to prevent it from causing social destabilization.

Such governance and social stability are key words in the vocabulary of the CCP leadership. Beijing is learning to account for its actions to the people. For example, due to growing concerns about air pollution in the capital, authorities have begun to pay more attention to environmental issues. Policy changes aimed at tackling air pollution demonstrate the ability of authorities to reallocate resources to find and correct shortcomings. Thus, given the authorities' attention to public opinion, thoughtful and gradual changes in the coming years and decades seem likely, although this will largely depend on the courage and determination of the party leadership. Time will tell what form this will take: new powers for the National People's Congress, more participatory party-level decision-making, or more local democracy. However, the PDA is by no means flimsy House of cards. As Eric X. Li writes in Foreign Affairs, Beijing is more than “capable of tenaciously and dynamically lifting the country out of its ills, thanks to the CCP's adaptability, system of meritocracy, and the party's legitimacy in Chinese society.”

This in no way guarantees the CPC's strong viability for the foreseeable future. As in any political system, changing socio-economic conditions inevitably influence political regimes. But even if the regime loses its communist facade and is replaced by a more democratic model, no one and nothing says that the elite or the “red princes” playing the role of an invisible state will be removed from their positions of power. In fact, revolutions and changes to the status quo are usually not as radical as people think. The pragmatic elite inevitably negotiates in a changing situation, and it seems that the political order has also changed. It is easy to carry out reforms, but throwing out the power of elites and dynasties from the system is much more difficult. China's colossal income inequality shows that in the event of a post-communist collapse, the elite will be ready to take appropriate positions in the resulting gaps, as the oligarchs did in Russia. Thus, the West should watch China's political stability very carefully. Yes, liberal political reforms are urgently needed to improve the human rights situation. However, a radical split in the political system could spell the threshold of an uncertain future for China and the world.

So, let's summarize. The most expensive album in the history of music, which, by the way, in no way adds to its honor. But, at the same time, the most anticipated. Did it live up to expectations? Undoubtedly. Except perhaps for those who were waiting for “Appetite for Destruction #2” or didn’t even know what to expect. I admit that I myself have a very ambiguous attitude towards the album. Partly because I heard it all in different versions and liked some of it more than in the final version (more on that later), and partly because I heard it all millions of times. But for those who haven't heard more than live recordings, this is certainly a huge surprise. We are accustomed to the fact that Guns N' Roses are crazy, uncompromising hard rock, quite diverse due to the presence of punk and blues shades, but this music has always been explosive. But running around the stage in shorts with an American flag has already exhausted itself, and that's all moved to a slightly different format: more mature and measured. Of course, there are many shortcomings here, compared to the old sound on which they made a name for themselves. But unlike the almost faceless “Death Magnetic” (Metallica) and “Saint of” released this year Los Angeles" (Motley Crue) that no one would have noticed special attention, without the releases of famous groups, "Chinese Democracy" is an unusual and striking album. You can say hundreds of times that this is a step into the abyss, a thoughtless experiment on the good name of Guns n' Roses, you can, on the contrary, blindly admire it, but I will try to proceed from the impressions that I experienced when I heard all this for the first time.

However, before we touch on the album itself, I would like to say a few words about the creators. Of course, it was impossible to create such an album with an ordinary quintet. Reading the booklet, it sometimes seems that the group's composition is more like a football team, but in fact, more than half of the musicians who took part in the recording made their necessary contribution. Axl Rose once again amazed everyone with his composing talent, because it is no secret that many people call the album “One man Show” for a reason. All the texts, which have not become at all impoverished since the 90s, are the work of Axl. Well, the second pleasant surprise from him is, of course, his voice. Chills to the core. Axl is a master of high notes, and not just howl on falsetto, but emotional, beautiful vocals. Although listening to “Shackler's Revenge”, you wonder why he doesn’t experiment with rough low tones. We can hear five guitarists on the album: Paul Tobias, Robin Fink, Richard Fortus, Ron “Bamflut” Tal and Buckethead. And if the last two are masters of their instrument, then Fortus and Fink are very mediocre players. Apart from frequent problems with technique, they cannot in some places convey the full brightness of guitar solos: somewhere the bends are lame, somewhere the vibrato. It is not clear why Axl, of all the musicians who could respond upon his invitation to the group, I chose these two. But I think this question will remain open for a long time. Paul Tobias can be heard very rarely, he worked on the album even before Fortus appeared, and many of his parts were re-recorded. Buckethead, despite the fact that that he is not listed in the line-up today, he is the second most important person on the album. He looks strange, he behaves generally incomprehensibly, but he has a certain charisma. But first of all, he has a great feel for his guitar... all his slow parts are simply touching , although there is nothing special about them, and quick saltines completely blow your mind. We don't learn much about Ron Tal, except that he is a rather original, but also a decent guitarist. Drums are the weak point of GN"R in principle. But in the days of Adler and Sorrum there was nothing superfluous in them... now there is a certain conglomeration of everything that Fran Ferrer, Brian and keyboardist Dizzy Reed created together with their electronic beat. About The bass cannot be said anything - on “Democracy” it is not as clearly audible as in previous times, but the role of Tomy Stinson in the group is rumored to be very large: they say he is the second organizer and leader after Axl. The abundance of keyboards is surprising. Precisely the keyboard, and not the strange “synth” instrument, which, judging by the booklet, is played by a certain Chris Pitman. In general, there are now a total of three people in the group who can handle keyboards.

The design of the album itself, as a GN"R fan, unpleasantly surprised me. On foreign forums, I have more than once seen many design options for “Democracy” that are much nicer than the one that became the final one. And a considerable number of fans were with the image of a bicycle. But this is not the most important thing, although in the past the covers seemed to reflect the integrity of the album, and did not make one doubt it.

But it wasn’t the cover that we were all waiting for. We were waiting for what was inside. Album of the century. And the bar for him was oh so high. The album opens with a song of the same name with an intro soldered to it. In principle, the song is quite incomprehensible, although personally it seems to me that Axl was more likely to play the fool, or was thinking more about something of his own than about China. A rather passable thing, although many may find it interesting. Then comes an explosive vinaigrette called “Shackler's Revenge”. An attempt to add drive, but obviously in the wrong way. Sadly, the song is about nothing, which deserves the “pop” stamp in all respects. The only interesting thing in it: Bucklerhead’s solo, which, as always, turned out to be on top. “Better” is the complete opposite of the previous track. A very interesting, tasty song, with a lot of meaning. The song is also significant because Fink gave his best here with his solo. And this happens. “Street of Dreams” is famous fans, like “The Blues”, was rather renamed so that there would be no repetition against the background of “Shotgun Blues.” I remember this song from Rock in Rio in 2001. Even though Axl was quite fat there, his voice was far from height, but then there was something that made the heart clench for a second. Here it no longer sounds so soulful and beautiful, but this is rather subjective. After “Street of Dreams” comes the mesmerizing “If the World”. Not that it’s outstanding composition, but something about it attracts. Possibly bluesy-tinged keyboards, perhaps a classical guitar. There's definitely something about her. The pathetic introduction to “There was a Time” is its entire essence. One of the weakest points on the album. By the way, I advise fans to listen to the demo from 1999 - completely different impressions. Number “7” – “Catcher in the Rye”. Brian May from Queen originally recorded the solo for it, but for some unknown reason he wasn’t there. The song is good, if you don't pay attention to the title. Such a thing is not worth even two pages in Selinger’s book of the same name. “Scraped”, despite the abundance of negative reviews, I liked it. Here you can clearly hear that the main instrument on the album is Axl's voice. But unlike “Shakler’s Revenge”, it has a certain drive and melody. “Rhiad N" Bedouins” has a very beautiful chorus and a very ugly “tut-tut” in the intro. But overall, the song is excellent, somewhat reminiscent of the previous one. “Sorry” once again proves that the strong point of this album is sluggishness. Guitar in reverb mode, Axl's measured voice. Beautiful, insanely beautiful. And certainly an addition to the classics of the genre. "IRS" is another thing that makes us think of a guy with a bucket of fried chicken on his head, i.e. about Buckethead. Frankly, in the early demos the solos sounded much better; here you can hear some kind of cacophony. But the disturbing rhythms of the song itself are somehow catchy. Hidden almost at the very end of the record, “Madagascar” is a masterpiece for me personally. Immensely sad, filled with melancholy detachment, a kind of competitor to “Estranged”, if not for the album performance. I remember that at the “Ganz” performance at the MTV VMA in 2002, beautiful, heart-warming footage was shown on the screens, and Axl, with his weak voice, gave it his all. On the album, the vocals sound like a sleepy cry. But the song itself will not leave anyone indifferent. I read somewhere on a foreign forum that “Madagascar” conveys the feelings of Axl, who, like Madagascar, remained a small island, separated from something big, from “ big land", which he cannot get to. This may be true, but we can only guess. “This I Love” is a song that makes at least half an album. No matter how much you want, words are useless here, you have to feel it. The penalty is beyond praise. No one will say a bad word, even if they really want to. “Prostitute” is a kind of mix, again not pleased with the name. Calling it “Message for You”, “Hans” would have made an excellent closing. It is noteworthy that Axl played the opening keyboard part as the intro to “November Rain” live, in particular this can be heard on “Live Era”. The song itself is again one of the trump cards, even the electronic drums didn’t spoil it.

From all this abundance of mixed feelings, the joy of surprises and disappointments, I would like to give either a very sad or a very good verdict. But in the end, I’ll probably give it a “4” out of “5” (or “8” out of “10”). Still, the album is atypical, but there are shortcomings, albeit small ones. And I advise all readers of reviews not to trust a single word of others, but to buy this marvel and listen to it for yourself.

Asking “Where is there more democracy, in China or in Russia?” is much the same as asking “Who has more femininity, Sylvester Stallone or Arnold Schwarzenegger?” We can compare muscle sizes for a long time and we can think for a long time about who has a more tender soul, but Russia and China are essentially two undemocratic states. The average Chinese or average Russian is perhaps richer and freer today than ever before; But neither country meets the minimum definition of democracy - the presence of competition in elections, the result of which is unknown in advance.

Of course, these countries have not escaped the general trends of democratization and globalization. If in the past non-democratic regimes could rely on monarchical power or ideology, now the right to power can be claimed only if there is already popular support. Coercion has ceased to be the main logic of survival of the Russian and Chinese regimes.

The result of “democratization” should be an increase in the influence of the people, in particular, the increasing role of technology and communication in a globalizing society. No matter how hard non-democratic countries try, they cannot prevent people from using the Internet, maintaining international connections, traveling and receiving information from around the world.

To these general trends Another factor has been added - the financial crisis. When economic difficulties first began, some analysts predicted that the changes would lead to destabilization in emerging democracies, while others said that no authoritarian regime could withstand the crisis.

But something more complex has happened - the blurring of the line between “democracy” and “authoritarianism.”

The systems of Russia and China are far from being an alternative to the “era” of democratization, but they, in fact, were able to adapt to it. Speaking in the most general sense, Russia is a sham democracy, just as China is a sham communism.

Two great tricksters

At the turning point of 1989–1991, the communist leadership, both in the USSR and in China, realized that communism had become an unviable system. But they had different understandings of what was flawed in each system. In the USSR M.S. Gorbachev believed that socialist ideas in themselves were good, but what was unsatisfactory was that the Communist Party had lost the ability to mobilize society and set the energy for its development. Gorbachev's idea of ​​social transformation meant the rejection of the party monopoly and the creation of a Western-style state of political competition. The Chinese Communist Party thought differently. The Chinese communists became convinced that in communism the communist and socialist ideas themselves are false, especially in economic terms, but at the same time, the Communist Party itself is beneficial - its ability to keep society under control. Therefore, the Chinese did everything to keep the power infrastructure unchanged.

What do these regimes look like today? The Russian regime, if you look at it from the outside, looks like a democracy. It enjoys a democratic Constitution, holds elections, has a multi-party political system, a range of free media, and has never sent tanks against mass protests. If an alien with a degree in political science were to land in Russia, he would likely assume that it was a democratic country. And China will not seem like a democracy to our alien friend. Before us, apparently, is a classic communist regime. As Richard MacGregor notes in his book The Party, “Beijing retains many of the characteristics of twentieth-century communist regimes. The Party in China continues to root out and destroy political enemies, trample on the independence of the courts, the press, restrict religion and civil society, expand the network of security services and send dissidents to labor camps.”

At the level of institutional design in China, little has changed since 1989, while in Russia everything has changed. But, paradoxically, the imitation of democratic institutions in Russia led to the establishment of an ineffective political regime that has lost its real dynamics: decision-making in it is of low quality. The Chinese regime, by general recognition, is much more effective than the Russian one: the quality of decision-making there is much better. In general, China also turns out to be more democratic than Russia: the Chinese authorities are much better able to learn from their mistakes. The Chinese leadership has succeeded in mastering the key points of democracy while maintaining the communist infrastructure of power.

Five reasons why China is more democratic than Russia

Change of power

There are elections in Russia, but there is no change of power. In the two decades since the fall of communism, a president has never lost an election. Therefore, elections there are needed not to ensure a change of power, but to prevent it. In China, of course, the opposition also has no chance of winning the elections. But on the other hand, Chinese leaders are not in power for more than ten years, after which a new party leader and president are automatically elected. In other words, if in the Russian system elections are a way to legitimize the lack of rotation, then the institutional structure of the Chinese Communist Party is simply designed for a change of power. Of course, these regimes equally do not allow political competition. But the Chinese leadership understands that leaders must be changed from time to time, otherwise this will result in major problems. The Chinese system, based on the principle of collective leadership, does not allow the emergence of personalized authoritarianism and includes many more checks and balances. In contrast to Russia, China is not obsessed with choosing a “successor”: the party provides clear succession mechanisms.

Connection with the people

Non-democratic regimes, by definition, have broken feedback mechanisms. Monitoring and rating public opinion polls cannot replace information coming from people in free competition in elections. Democratic elections are not only an opportunity to select suitable leaders, but also the most direct way to know the aspirations of the people.

There is an important difference between China and Russia in terms of ensuring “connection with the people.” The Chinese government does not criminalize worker protest. Conflicts in production, as a rule, directed against local authorities or enterprise management, are not considered dangerous for the ruling party. Hundreds of thousands of strikes take place every year and they have become an important source of reliable information about people's lives. When people come out to protest, it says more about their position than any ratings - not only because the protests are open, but because the protesters challenge the ability of local leaders to resolve conflicts. In Russia, which is considered a more democratic system, we will not see strikes, because the cost of protests for further labor relations is too high. Russian staged “elections” are too weak a test to judge either the mood of the people or the ability of local leaders to take their sentiments into account.

Tolerance of opposition and dissent

Democratic decisions depend on the extent to which differences of opinion are welcomed and mutual disagreement is accepted. Here another point of divergence between Russia and China is revealed. In Russia, of course, there is much more tolerance for organized opposition. Although the screws are being tightened now, you can register a party, you can take to the streets to protest, you can call on Putin to “resign.” The Chinese regime is harsher and more intolerant in this regard. But while the Kremlin generally “tolerates” the opposition, it never listens to it. The Kremlin will not tolerate the slightest disagreement on political issues, and government officials are not inclined to defend proposals made by the opposition.

Although the Chinese system is much closer to classical authoritarianism and communism, its decisions are made of better quality and take into account more opinions. In Russia, if you disagree with the power elite, they will point out to you that this is a simple divergence of economic interests. Whereas under collective leadership in China, differences of opinion are legitimate.

The loyalty test in China is only required when the Communist Party has already made a decision. A loyalty test in Russia is required immediately after the president makes a proposal.

And a general sense of optimism and uplift is allowing China to become more tolerant of political differences.

Elite Recruitment

The most interesting point of comparison between the two political systems is the methods of recruiting elites. Where do the people who occupy the most important positions in the state and in the leading industries come from? A study conducted by the Russian Reporter magazine at the end of 2011 revealed a number of interesting facts. First of all, most of Russian elite - graduates of Moscow or St. Petersburg universities. Secondly, none of those occupying the top 300 positions in power and management come from Far East. And finally, the decisive factor that ensured membership in the elite was acquaintance with V.V. Putin even before he became president. In short, Russia is governed by a circle of friends. This is by no means a meritocratic system: most of these people did not make their own careers, they were simply included in the ruling groups.

The Chinese Communist Party functioned differently. It is important for her to act in different sectors of society to make the entire system sufficiently meritocratic. If you are somewhat cynical and know how to achieve your goals, if you want to earn money, the Communist Party is open to you.

The Communist Party is the driving belt for the recruitment and socialization of elites, and the Chinese leadership itself invests a lot in strengthening regional offices and reassigning personnel to new fronts of work.

An experiment in politics

The final point of comparison between the two systems is the differences between China and Russia in their views on the experimental nature of politics. Chinese political and economic reforms are organized around experimenting with different models in different regions to see what works best for governance interests. In Russia, everything is different: the word “experiment” will cause mistrust and is used almost as a curse. The construction of a “managed state” proceeds without any preliminary experiments.

What does this all mean?

In general, if we once measured democracies with an eye to institutions, now we need to ask how these institutions function. Do these systems appear to be democracies? Are fake democracies possible? Russia is a shining example of the latter, giving us pause for thought. Russia is adorned with a democratic façade, but behind it all types of undemocratic practices flourish. China is a different country, authoritarian and harshly uncompromising. But the very pressure of the system, the difference in ideas of transformation, as well as the country’s participation in world politics, make its political practices more open than can be concluded from the characteristics of its formal institutions.

The nature of any political regime is indicated by the degree of its readiness to correct mistakes; the ability to change and public accountability are at the heart of all democratic gains. But many in the Kremlin are convinced of the opposite: excessive democratization has led to problems with the new statehood. Many in the Kremlin look with envy at “genuine” Chinese authoritarianism. But in fact, in many of its practices, China is more democratic than Russia; China's decision-making system is undoubtedly superior to Russia's. Over the past two decades, China has been building up its “capacity system,” while Russia has been too busy hiding its ineffectiveness. Western analysts trying to understand the differences in behavior of new authoritarianisms may find it useful to look beyond the façades of formal institutional design.