Where will you spend your old age? Surrounded by grandchildren, in hospitals or at parties? Depends on your zodiac sign!
Aries is going to live up to 120 years, so old age, according to his calculations, should begin at about 90 years old. Until that time, he is going to live as if age does not exist: at the age of 50 he enters a university (sometimes on the fifth higher education), at 60 he starts working as a DJ in clubs, at 70 he gets married and at the wedding promises to have many children, at 80 he plans to climb Everest. And neither the dentures nor the cane bother Aries at all.
Even if Taurus constantly complains about excess weight and high sugar, he will live a long time. This will probably upset his children and grandchildren, because in his old age, Taurus becomes a domestic tyrant and at every step threatens his descendants to deprive them of their inheritance (and he has a decent one). A happy old age is guaranteed only if all family members unconditionally recognize him as the patriarch and praise and exalt him. For this reason, Taurus, in general, worked hard.
Only towards retirement does a Gemini finally understand what he wants from life, and suddenly begins to make career progress or open his own business. Since he suddenly realizes that there are a lot of ideas, but time is running out, he begins to swim in an ice hole, switches to a raw food diet, and suddenly discovers homeopathy and treatment with leeches. It seems that it is not old age, but questionable medicine that threatens Gemini’s longevity.
Cancer diligently and in advance prepares for old age: from the age of 15 he thinks about pension savings, from the age of 30 he looks for a nursing home, and at 40 he begins to talk about himself as an old person, wise in life and not ready for risks (as if in his youth he had such a tendency!) Perhaps, Cancers make the best grandparents, because they do not feel any conflict with this role, do not look young and are happy to give advice and carrots to others.
Only Leo can compete with Taurus for the title of “The Most Creepy Despot.” By the age of 50-60, this sign becomes Don Corleone: he blesses or prohibits marriages, gives advice on all issues, offers a hand for a kiss. And only he can veto a purchase of any scale. Why does everyone obey Leo? Firstly, it costs yourself more to quarrel with him. Secondly, Leo manages to achieve success in many ways: an ideal wife and mother, a hero of work, a person with many hobbies and good health. What have you achieved to argue with Leo?
Virgo is obsessed with doing everything right, so her old age is quite boring: no fights in line at the clinic, no complaints to children about poverty, no conversations with the cat about old times. She usually allows herself to live only in old age, so she begins to travel, joins youth organizations, goes for morning jogs, and wears a T-shirt with the words “Sex, drugs, rock and roll.” In short, who would have expected this from her?
To prevent old age from setting in, Libra goes to a plastic surgeon. What are the signs of aging there? Wrinkled knees? Let's pull it up. Sagging arm muscles? Is it possible to have biceps and triceps implants there? Libra will do anything to ensure that at 70 they continue to be given no more than 25. Of course, from the outside the result sometimes looks scary, but the main thing is that Libra themselves are happy with the reflection. And, by the way, they successfully have affairs with people old enough to be their great-grandchildren.
By old age, Scorpio's supply of gunpowder does not deplete, so he continues to walk, and on a larger scale than in his youth. The source of poison dries up, so the trademark causticity gives way to good-natured wit (at best) or old man grumbling (at worst). Scorpio suddenly realizes that he urgently needs to do something great in order to remain for centuries, so he begins to write memoirs or compose a philosophical work, with quotes from which he torments everyone around him.
In case of old age, Sagittarius has two escape plans. Plan A is to steal a time machine and return to your hot youth to correct your mistakes, or at least drink and party again so that ulcers and rheumatism do not interfere. Plan B is to go somewhere to the islands, buy a house under the palm trees, swing in a hammock and live forever. Unfortunately, neither one nor the other option works out, so Sagittarius joins the ranks of those who nostalgically remember their youth.
Only towards retirement does Capricorn let go of the obsessive thought that he has to prove something to someone. And he relaxes: this concentrated expression disappears from his face, he learns to express his opinion, and masters new hobbies. If anything worries him, it’s only the thought that he began to breathe freely so late. But you shouldn’t despair: Capricorn often has good heredity, and therefore health, memory, and common sense remain with him until the last.
The grandmother in tiger leggings, crimson glasses and light green hair is definitely an Aquarius. This sign is eccentric even in youth, but in old age the brakes stop working altogether. Aquarius feels like the leader and patron of youth, so he lets his grandchildren try alcohol, tells them vulgar jokes and hides their adventures from their parents. But bake all these pies, dig up a garden at the dacha, knit a hat - no, we haven’t heard of that.
Pisces have a pathological fear of old age. Becoming a burden to others? Lose your attractiveness? Admit that there are no special talents, that everything is in the past? Pisces will first mourn the past bitterly, and then begin to courageously endure the bullying of age: it will not ask for help and will try to behave cheerfully in front of loved ones. You shouldn’t believe in this amazing acting, nor should you leave Pisces on its own: she doesn’t live alone for long.
Talented Moscow illustrator Olga Gromova created a funny art project “Zodiac Signs in Grandmothers” and provided each witty drawing with a brief description.
Aries
Motto: Where others slow down, I step on the gas!
Main features: ambition, self-confidence, fearlessness, impulsiveness, born for victories, very active and sociable, first they act, then they think, feelings overshadow the mind, passionate, capricious, do not tolerate the slightest objection, adventurers, they have too much of everything, over the edge.
Taurus
Motto: Don't disturb someone who is well seated.
Main features: practical, thrifty, realists, pragmatists, pessimists, love and respect wealth, but are tight-fisted, have a great craving for entertainment and sensual pleasures, family people, owners, good parents, hardworking, stubborn, the spirit of contradiction is strong in them, there is no complex inferiority, deep down they consider themselves the navel of the earth.
Twins
Motto: Ideas, like products, should not lie dormant.
Main features: duality, love to collect gossip, information, know everything about everything and are everywhere, elusive, witty, lively, sociable, eloquent, you never get bored with them, eager to please everyone, resourceful, easily adaptable, neurasthenic with ideas, they are like a nervous lump
Cancer
Motto: It would be nice to stock up on everything in the world - both jam and patience.
Main features: romantic, warm-hearted, love children, animals, highly developed sense of duty, notorious, suspicious, prone to self-sacrifice, heroes or hysterics, sentimental and conservative, homebodies, owners, very jealous, sensual, vulnerable and touchy, have a rich imagination and good intuition.
a lion
Motto: Why do you need the sun if I'm nearby?
Main traits: courage and generosity, authority and arrogance, love to lead, assertive, vain and self-centered, prestige is everything to them, born leaders, noble and sincere, straightforward, bright and energetic, have bright charisma, love flattery, love to be the center of attention .
Virgo
Motto: Others get pleasure from food, but I get vitamins and microelements.
Main features: restraint, pedantry, analytical mind, criticism, attention to detail, rationalism, practicality, diligence and diligence, exactingness, prudence and common sense.
Scales
Motto: Sometimes I myself don’t know whether I’m for the whites or the reds.
Main traits: indecisive, peace-loving, compliant, avoids conflicts, diplomatic, obsequious, does not like loneliness, idealists and romantics, charming, loves art, frivolous, impatient.
Scorpion
Motto: I am like a cactus: the flower opens rarely and only for a select few, but the spines are visible to everyone.
Main features: secrecy, tendency to go to extremes: all or nothing, passion, self-destruction, craving for mysticism, perseverance, self-confidence, tendency to take unjustified risks, emotionality, stubbornness, perseverance, taboo-breakers, owners, magnetically attractive, .
Sagittarius
Motto: My ideal is Ivan Tsarevich.
Main traits: straightforwardness, openness, fairness, spirit of quest, lack of sense of proportion, hot temper, tendency to go to extremes, impulsiveness, expansiveness, aggressive optimists, always on the move.
Capricorn
Motto: Show me that impudent person who dares to give me orders!
Main features: ambition, pragmatism, caution, ambitiousness, purposefulness, restraint, secrecy, independence, criticality, discipline, prudence, responsibility, conservatism, are very important for them material well-being and status, careerists.
Aquarius
Motto: Sex? There are more important things in life.
Main features: independence, originality, sociability, love of freedom, extravagance, they are altruists, idealists, ideological fighters, love to shock the public, have a broad outlook, are intellectual, hate routine.
Fish
Motto: Don't put off until tomorrow what you can do the day after tomorrow!
Main features: daydreaming, rich imagination, good intuition and hypersensitivity, charming, romantic, idealists, creative, artistic natures, go with the flow, weak-willed, indecisive, passive, prone to soul-searching and reflection, fatalists.
Zemsky Sobor 1653
The next zemstvo council on the Ukrainian issue took place in 1653. On October 1, it decided to reunite Ukraine with Russia. But this act was preceded by a long history.
The “Palace Discharges” states that on March 19 of this year “the sovereign ordered the sovereign’s letters to be sent to all cities to the governors and clerks” with a summons to the stewards, solicitors, Moscow nobles, and residents to Moscow by May 20 “with all the service.” It was planned that “at that time their sovereign will deign to look at Moscow on horseback” 1322. On May 2, this order was repeated, but in addition to it, the governors of a number of Zamoskovny and Ukrainian cities were ordered to “exile from each city, from a choice of two nobles, good and reasonable people.” The arrival date is the same - May 20, 1323. It is clear that two events were being prepared: the royal review of those serving on the “Moscow list” and the Zemsky Sobor - both of them were related to the struggle for Ukraine.
In the Sevsky table of the Discharge, a large column has been preserved containing materials on the elections of deputies to the council from among the nobles and children of boyars in a number of cities: Aleksin, Arzamas, Belgorod, Belev, Volkhov, Borovsk, Bryansk, Vladimir, Volok, Voronezh, Vorotynsk, Gorokhovets, Yelets , Kaluga, Karachev, Kashira, Kozelsk, Kolomna, Krapivna, Kursk, Livny, Lukh, Maly Yaroslavets, Medyn, Meshchera, Meshchovsk, Mikhailov, Mozhaisk, Murom, Mtsensk, Nizhny Novgorod, Novgorod Seversky, Novosil, Odoev, Orel, Oskol, Pereyaslavl Zalessky, Pochep, Putivl, Roslavl, Ruza, Rylsk, Ryazhsk, Ryazan, Sevsk, Serisysk, Serpukhov, Starodub, Suzdal, Tarusa, Tikhvin, Tula, Chernigov, Shatsk, Yuryev Polsky 1324. The given list of cities is approximately the same as that mentioned above when describing the elections to the Zemsky Sobor of 1651. Some discrepancies between the two lists, very minor, can be explained both by the degree of preservation of documents and by random circumstances or conditions of local development.
Documents relating to the elections of 1653 concern only service people; they do not mention “elected” townspeople. The materials of 1651 contain data on elections from among both the nobles and the townspeople. But we know that the townspeople were also present at the council of 1653. This means that either the circle of sources is not complete, or only the Moscow population was called up.
The Sevsky Table column consists of a number of cases related to individual cities. The full form for each case is as follows: 1) the royal letter to the governor on the conduct of elections; 2) a statement from the voivode regarding the implementation of this order; 3) “choice”, i.e. the act of electing representatives to the Zemsky Sobor at the congress of the district nobility, signed by voters. In a number of cases, only certain parts of this form have been preserved.
Most of the letters were sent from Moscow and received by provincial governors throughout May. But this matter extended into June. May 15 government officially postponed the date for the arrival of “electors” in Moscow from the provinces to June 5, 1325.
As in 1651, elections did not take place calmly and without complications everywhere. On May 9, 1653, Mozhaisk servicemen (six people) presented the voivode with a “fairy tale” that the “old” nobles of Mozhaichi, suitable for the “royal business,” were “settled in Zamoskovny and in rozny towns,” and they were “people of low power.” and the weak-minded." The voivode sent these small-scale, placeless and empty-placed (far from being the best, as required) nobles and boyar children to Moscow in 1326. At the elections that took place on May 9 in Serpeisk, it turned out that many Serpeisk service people lived in “roznye in distant cities,” and nobles who lived in Belevsky district were elected 1327. Voivode Bogdan Ushakov reported to the Discharge that the Vorotyn people “disobeyed” the tsar’s decree and did not hold elections until May 16 1328. In Suzdal, not all the nobles and boyar children who were supposed to showed up for the elections on May 20, and the elected delegates to the Zemsky Council did not show up at the governor’s office 1329. The Tula governor Osip Sukhotin received an order from the center to imprison three of the “best” nobles “for disobedience”: “that they, according to the previous ... sovereign decree, did not choose two people according to three letters” 1330. The voivode replied that he had imprisoned two nobles, and sent for the third “to the district,” but since no one was going from the “district” to Tula, there was no one to imprison 1331.
In addition to the Sevsky column, which contains documents about the elections to the Zemsky Sobor, which took place in May-June 1653, there is a Belgorod column with lists of nobles elected and who arrived in Moscow in 1332. The materials of the Belgorod Table were published by A.K. Kabanov 1333 and A.I. Kozachenko 1334 (to the latter, Kabanov’s publication apparently remained unknown).
Kozachenko called the document of the Belgorod table a “registration list” (compiled in the Rank) of the nobles who participated in the Zemsky Sobor. The name is not entirely accurate, since what we have before us is not just a sequential registration of persons in the order of their arrival in Moscow, but a well-known grouping of material. The document consists of several sections. First, a personal list of nobles who “by the sovereign’s decree were sent to Moscow for the sovereign’s and zemstvo’s affairs,” indicating from which city and when who came. The information forms, as it were, two chronological layers: May 15 - June 4 and May 21 - 24. Next comes the heading “The nobles showed up from the cities after the council,” and then the information for May 25 - June 19, 1335 follows in chronological order of the arrival of the belated nobles. In addition to the list of “elected” nobles, in the Belgorod column the cities where the elections took place are distributed into three groups. First, the cities from which the nobles were present at the council of 1336 are indicated, then the cities from which “the nobles came after the council” of 1337. The last section is entitled “The sovereign’s letters about the nobles were sent to the cities, but the Mayans had not visited Moscow until the 29th” 1338.
So, some city nobles got to the cathedral, others were late, but they were still registered, and the recording went on for more than a month, from May 15 to June 19. Why? Obviously, there was not one, but several conciliar meetings. The chronological layers identified in the Belgorod column (May 15-June 4, May 21-24, May 25-June 19) are guidelines for dating these meetings. Initially, the government deadline for the nobles to appear in Moscow was, as is known, set for May 20. Between May 20 and 25, one must think, the Zemsky Sobor met for the first time (by no means in full strength), as can now be concluded based on the analysis of this source. But even earlier, on May 15, taking into account the possibility of further meetings, the government postponed the date of arrival in Moscow for provincial servicemen until June 5. It is possible that a second meeting took place then. It is possible that the council met for the third time somewhere at the beginning of the third decade of June.
There is information about several convocations of the council in 1653 in some later acts. In the draft, which formed the basis of the conciliar act on October 1 on the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, it is written: “Last year, in the year 161, by decree of the Great Sovereign Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich of All Russia, the autocrat spoke at the council about the Lithuanian and Cherkasy affairs.” 1339. In the columns of the Order of Secret Affairs, the speech of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich Prince is retold. To A. N. Trubetskoy on April 23, 1654, before his campaign in Poland: “Last year there were councils more than once, at which two people were elected from you, from all cities of nobles; At these councils we spoke about the lies of the Polish kings, you heard this from your elected representatives...” 1340.
However, there is a source that allows you to determine exact time council meeting in May. To judge the May Council of 1653 and its date, a document opened by A.I. Kozachenko is important - a letter (undated) from Alexei Mikhailovich to the Russian ambassadors sent to Poland in April - Prince. B. A. Repnin, okolnichy B. M. Khitrovo and clerk Almaz Ivanov. In it we read: “...let you know, there was a council on the seventh week on Mayan Wednesday on (the numbers of the day are not clearly readable - L. Ch.) day, and we, the great sovereign, with our father and the pilgrim Nikon, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, at that council they spent a lot of time talking and interrogating all the people - whether to accept Cherkassy. And all sorts of ranks and public people unanimously spoke about this in order to accept Cherkassy. And we, the great sovereign, praised them with our merciful words for the fact that they want to serve with generous and self-willing hearts. And they, hearing our sovereign’s merciful words, were especially happy, and sent... And we have postponed until you arrive from the embassy...” 1341.
From the above text it is clear that in May 1653 a Zemstvo Council was held, at which the issue of admitting Ukraine to Russian citizenship was discussed. This already confirms the preliminary conclusion made above about the conciliar meeting in the first half of the 20th of May. The discussion was long, people of “all ranks” were interviewed. They also took into account the opinion of the “square people” (obviously, not the participants of the cathedral, but those who were on the square while the meeting was going on and somehow expressed their attitude towards it). As a result, a unanimously positive opinion was expressed about the accession of Ukraine to Russia. The letter expressed satisfaction with its voluntary nature on the part of the Ukrainians, but indicated that the final decision on the issue of their accession and the execution of this act were postponed until the return of the embassy from Poland to Moscow.
From the text of the letter in question, it is not entirely clear paleographically to the Russian ambassadors to which date of May the Zemsky Council on the issue of Ukraine should be attributed. A.I. Kozachenko read: “May 20,” without expressing any doubts about this. Meanwhile, familiarity with the original document causes fluctuations between two dates: May 20 and May 25, 1342. These hesitations are resolved in favor of the last date, since the council took place on Wednesday, and in 1653 Wednesday fell not on May 20, but on May 25. Thus, the exact time of the May Council is established.
This dating is confirmed by the data of a draft corrected copy of the report at the meeting of the May Zemsky Sobor, on the basis of which the text of the conciliar verdict on October 1 was subsequently compiled. This draft report has reached us as part of the archives of the Ambassadorial Prikaz. V.N. Latkin identified it as the “second copy” of the act of the October conciliar meeting, printed it “in a form corrected by the hand of a contemporary” 1343 and thereby significantly devalued it as a source, because he deprived researchers of the opportunity to carry out textual criticism based on the printed publication. And a comparison of the texts of this draft report with the materials of the Zemstvo Councils of 1651 and October 1653. leads to important results.
At the beginning of the document there is an amendment to its date. The number “May 25” is crossed out and above the crossed out is written: “October 1”. Consequently, the revised text refers to the May Council of 1653 1344
The May 1653 document is based on a “letter” reported at the council of 1651. Both documents are “letters” (or reports) “announced” to the participants of the councils, the composition of which is determined in the same way in both cases. To a large extent, these materials coincide not only in content, but also textually. However, there are also differences. At the council of 1651, they talked about “the Lithuanian affairs”, now - “about the Lithuanian and Cherkassy affairs” 1345. The importance of the Ukrainian issue is emphasized. The emphasis on the “non-corrections” of the king and the lords of 1346 was increased. The indictment of the Polish government has been given a more general character, therefore some specific examples distortion of royal names and titles by the lords or failure to fulfill obligations given to Russian envoys, but special emphasis was placed on the “constitution” of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which should punish for the “diminution” or “abolition” of the title 1347. As incriminating material, we used data from the embassies of Afanasy Pronchishchev, Almaz Ivanov, Prince. Boris Repnin, under which the question of the royal “honor” was called by the lords a “small matter” 1348.
When characterizing international relations references to Poland's hostile actions against Russia in relation to Sweden and Crimea are omitted (pass to the Swedish queen for the Crimean ambassador) 1349. Attention is focused on Ukrainian-Polish relations. This topic was almost absent from the “letter” of 1651. She was overwhelmed by the exposure of the royal “untruths” in relation to the Russian state. Now, in the May “letter” of 1653, a fairly vivid picture of the difficult situation of the Ukrainian people under the yoke of lordly Poland, the religious and national persecutions to which they were subjected in 1350 was developed.
The last part of the “letter” says that Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporozhye army sent “many of their envoys” to the Russian government asking for help. The Zaporozhye Cossacks do not want to “put up” with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, because the lords “cannot be trusted in anything”; they have already violated the treaties concluded near Zborov and Bila Tserkva. The Cossacks don’t want to be a “gibberish” to “the Turk Saltan or the Crimean Khan.” They ask to be accepted into Russian citizenship and to send Russian troops to their aid 1351.
According to the concept of the May “letter,” the question of war or peace with Poland was common to Russia and Ukraine. If Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the Zaporozhye army do not see a path to reconciliation with the Polish state, then Russia’s position is also clearly formulated: the inevitability of breaking off peaceful relations with Poland and giving this act international significance. “And he will not send his ambassadors and envoys to them (the Polish government. - L. Ch.) ahead (the sovereign. - L. Ch.), and orders them to write about those untruths and the violation of eternal consummation to all surrounding states to the great Christian and Busurman sovereigns" 1352.
At the end of the “letter”, in a handwriting different from the rest of the text, it is written: “And that day (i.e., obviously, May 25) according to this letter was announced, and the sovereign king and Grand Duke Alexey Mikhailovich of All Russia and the sovereign, His Holiness the Patriarch, and the authorities, and the boyars, the okolnichy, and the Duma people, and elected people of all ranks were in the Faceted Chamber at that time” 1353.
Above, arguments were given in favor of the possibility of a meeting of the Zemsky Sobor on June 5. The “Palace Classes” says that on this day the sovereign had a dinner in the Dining Hut, which was attended by Patriarch Nikon, boyars, and stewards, and at which “the sovereign ordered city nobles to be elected doubles” 1354. Of course, the connection between the Zemsky Sobor and the royal dinner can only be speculative, but if we compare the dates extracted above from the documents with the information of the “Palace Classes”, then this proposal hardly seems implausible. Indeed, by June 5, nobles from a number of cities were called to Moscow for “sovereign and zemstvo affairs.”
June 1653 is the month when a review of the combat readiness of part of the military forces was carried out in Moscow: on the Maiden Field “the sovereign looked at the captains, and solicitors, and nobles, and tenants with all their service in June from the 13th of June to the 28th” 1355. Registration in the category of “elected” continued until June 19 inclusive (which means the cathedral had not yet been dissolved). On June 22, a royal letter was sent to Bogdan Khmelnitsky with a notice of the Russian government’s decision to reunite Ukraine with Russia and preparations for war with Poland: “and our military people, by our royal majesty’s decree, are recruiting a soldier and building a militia” 1356. Around June 20, a situation had developed that made it very likely that a third meeting of the Zemsky Sobor would take place at this time. Of course, it is unlikely that the text on May 25 was revised at the two June meetings (June 5 and at the beginning of the last ten days). If it had been so, it would not have formed the basis of the verdict on October 1. Rather, it was about familiarization with the May “letter” of the “elected” nobles who arrived at different times from the provinces and its editing (it was subject to significant editing).
The last, decisive meeting of the Zemsky Sobor in 1653, when a resolution was adopted on the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, took place on October 1 in Moscow in the Faceted Chamber. The act of this council of 1357 has reached us. It contains three parts: 1) the royal decree on convening the council; 2) report from the government; 3) the verdict of the boyars and Duma people and the speeches of other class groups.
The following names were named as participants in the cathedral: the Tsar, Patriarch Nikon, Metropolitan Selivester of Krutitsa, Metropolitan Mikhail of Serbia, archimandrites, abbots, “with the entire consecrated cathedral”, boyars, okolnichy, Duma nobles, stewards, solicitors, Moscow nobles, residents, nobles from cities, boyar children, guests, trading people of the living room, cloth hundreds, tax people of the black hundreds and palace settlements, streltsy (streltsy heads). The stereotypical formula also appears: “people of all ranks.” This is approximately the same composition that was named in the “letter” of May 25, only residents, archers were added and more details were said about “trading people”. It is noteworthy that in the words “nobles and boyar children elected from cities” the definition “elected” is crossed out 1358. Obviously, the government no longer addressed the “elected” provincial service people at the last stage of the Zemsky Sobor. It dealt with them in May-June, when they were summoned to Moscow in 1359.
October 1 was a holiday, and the cathedral was of a solemn character. The Emperor came straight from the church with a procession of the cross. At the cathedral, a “letter” (a report in a new edition) was “read out loud to everyone” about the “untruths” of the Polish king and lords and about the “petition to the sovereign for citizenship” of Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the Zaporozhye army in 1360. This edition of the report is sometimes literally similar to the May one, sometimes represents its literary adaptation, and in some cases develops the thoughts contained in it, deepens its ideological content, supplements the text with new facts (the embassy to Warsaw of V. A. Repnin, who returned to Moscow on September 25, embassy to Moscow of the representative of Hetman L. Kapusta).
If, when characterizing Russian-Polish relations, the emphasis was previously placed on causing “dishonor” to the royal name, now there are also cases of direct violation “from the royal side” of the Russian-Polish border, causing damage to the population. “...They learned to be in great spirits in border areas: when they come to the sovereign’s side, their Polish and Lithuanian people of the sovereign’s border cities and nobles and children of the boyars’ estates and estates are ruined, and their people and peasants are robbed and tortured with pink torments, and taken abroad strongly and inflict all sorts of evil on them” 1361. This emphasizes the common national interests of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples in the fight against lordly Poland, which is pursuing a policy of land seizures and religious oppression. The idea is substantiated that the blame for starting the war lies with the Polish government. “And King Jan Casimir and the lords ... refused peace with the Cherkassy, and, although they eradicated the Orthodox Christian faith and the Church of God, they went to war against them under their great successors” 1362 (B. A. Repnine and others).
Under the petition of Bohdan Khmelnitsky and the Zaporozhye troops to accept them “under... the sovereign high hand“The conciliar act lays down the legal foundations: King John Casimir violated the oath of religious tolerance given at the coronation and thereby freed his subjects “from all loyalty and obedience...” 1363.
After the “reading” of the government report, a discussion followed. First, the conciliar act contains the opinion of the boyars, which is regarded as a “sentence” (“and after listening to the boyars they sentenced”, “and according to this they sentenced”) 1364. This is followed by statements from other “ranks” listed at the beginning of the document. Here we are no longer talking about a “sentence”, but about an “interrogation” (“interrogated according to rank, separately”) 1365. Obviously, representatives of each “rank” conferred with each other and then announced their opinion. There are no statements from the clergy, although they were present at the council. Perhaps it simply confirmed what was said at the council of 1651?
The “sentence” of the boyars was this: “there is a war against the Polish king,” and Bogdan Khmelnitsky with the Zaporozhye army “to accept their cities and lands.” Both proposals stemmed directly from the government report. The argumentation also coincides completely: the Polish side belittles the state dignity of Russia, the persecution of Orthodoxy, the threat of the Orthodox Ukrainian population transferring “to citizenship” to the Turkish Sultan or to the Crimean Khan, since the violation of the oath by the Polish king made his subjects “free people” 1366.
The conciliar act does not reproduce in detail the speeches of other “ranks”, it gives them concisely, summarily, noting their closeness to the statements of the boyars and combining them into two declarations - servicemen and merchants. The first said: “And they, the service people, will fight with the Lithuanian king for their state honor, not sparing their heads, and die for their state honor.” Traders of all ranks said: “Let us help and for their sovereign honor, we will die with our own heads for the sake of it” 1367. In short, it was about readiness to support the decision to go to war. It must be said that such declarations are not the original statements of the participants in the council on October 1, 1653. They have long been repeated from council to council in response to government requests for funds and military force. But one should not consider statements of this kind by service and trade “rankers” as mere etiquette. These were commitments made in a public political forum, which was supposed to serve as a guarantee of their implementation.
At the council in the Chamber of Facets, the composition of the embassy was approved to swear in the residents of Ukraine (boyar V.V. Buturlin, steward I.V. Alferyev, Duma clerk L. Lopukhin) 1368.
In “Palace Discharges” the news of the Zemsky Sobor on October 1, 1653 is presented from a certain angle. Of the two closely related issues discussed at it - the relationship between Russia and Poland and Bogdan Khmelnitsky’s appeal to the Russian government about the reunification of Ukraine with Russia - the second issue was chosen. For the Russian government and for the classes of the Russian state, this was the main thing. But above all, the question of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia was the main one for the broad masses of the people, both Russian and Ukrainian. They did not take part in zemstvo councils and did not make decisions on Ukraine’s entry into Russia. However, objectively this decision met the people’s interests and met the needs national development. Three major popular movements of the mid-17th century. - urban uprisings in Moscow and Pskov, the liberation struggle in Ukraine - gave rise to several zemstvo councils. They were close in social composition. But their historical meaning various. Councils 1648-1650 were busy strengthening the internal, class foundations of the feudal state. And although some progressive measures were taken, their main complex was aimed at strengthening serfdom. The war of liberation in Ukraine and its subsequent reunification with Russia did not and could not lead to the elimination of the feudal system, and the reunification itself took place in feudal forms. But the decision of the October Zemsky Sobor of 1653 provided the Ukrainian people with a more favorable path of historical development.
1322 Palace ranks, vol. III. SPb., 1852, stb. 343.
1323 Ibid., stb. 350.
1324 TsGADA, f. 210, Sevsky Stol, no. 148, pp. 1-192; No. 145, pp. 349-356 (several documents accidentally ended up in number 145 from a previously single column - number 148). As far as I know, this column has not yet been used as a source, although Kozachenko refers to it. See also: ibid., Belgorod Table, 360, l. 174; Kabanov A.K. Organization of elections to zemstvo councils of the 17th century. - ZhMNP, 1910, No. 9, p. 126, no. 8-9.
1325 Palace ranks, vol. III, stb. 351: “On the 15th day of May, the sovereign’s letters were sent to Zamoskovnye and Ukrainian cities to the governors and to the officials, it was ordered, according to the previous sovereign decree, elected people, good nobles, two people from the city, to be sent to Moscow by the previous specified date, June by the 5th.” See also the royal letter to the Voronezh governor F.Yu. Arsenev dated June 7, 1653: “It was written from us to you in advance of this May on the 15th day with the boyar’s son Ivashk Cherlenikov, and it was ordered that two of the Voronezh residents from the boyar’s children should come to us to Moscow and the choice for them for elected people will be sent by hand in June at 5 days. And you didn’t send the Voronazh men to us in this place, so you put our case in jeopardy” (Kabanov A.K. Decree. cit., p. 126, No. 9).
1326 TsGADA, f. 210, Sevsky table, d. 148, pp. 31-32.
1327 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
1328 Ibid., pp. 36-38.
1329 Ibid., pp. 107-108.
1330 Ibid., pp. 189-187.
1331 Ibid., pp. 188-190.
1332 Ibid., Belgorod table, no. 351, pp. 346-352.
1333 Kabanov L.K. Decree. cit., p. 127-130, No. 10.
1334 Kozachenko A.I. On the history of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653. Historical archive", 1957, No. 4, p. 223-227.
1335 Ibid., p. 224-226.
1336 Kozachenko A, Ya. On the history of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653, p. 227. The cities named: Zamoskovnye - Bezhetsky Verkh, Vyazma, Dmitrov, Zubtsov, Kashin, Pereyaslavl Zalessky, Rzheva, Rostov, Ruza, Staritsa, Tver, Uglich, Yuryev Polsky; Ukrainian - Aleksin, Volkhov, Vorotynsk, Kaluga, Kashira, Kozelsk, Kolomna, Likhvin, Medyn, Odoev, Ryazan, Sevsk, Serpukhov, Solova, Tarusa.
1337 Ibid., p. 227. The cities named: Zamoskovnye - Borovsk, Vereya, Vladimir, Gorokhovets, Lukh, Murom, Nizhny; Ukrainian and Polish - Bolev, Bryansk, Voronezh, Yelets, Karachev, Livny, Medyn, Meshchera, Mtsensk, Novgorod Seversky, Novosil, Pochep, Putivl, Rylsk, Yaroslavets Maly.
1338 Kozachenko A.I. On the history of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653, p. 227.
1339 TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1, 1653, d. 6, l. 1.
1340 Soloviev S. M. Decree. op., book. V (vol. 9-10), p. 624. They talk about several cathedrals: Platonov S.F. Notes on the history of zemstvo cathedrals. - Articles on Russian history (1883-1912), ed. 2. St. Petersburg, 1912, p. 22-25; Latkin V.N. Decree. cit., p. 236-237, approx. 1; Kozachenko A.I. Zemsky Sobor 1653, p. 152-155.
1341 TsGADA, f. 27, d. 79, l. 4; Kozachenko A.I. Zemsky Sobor 1653, p. 153-154.
1342 V.D. Nazarov drew my attention to this.
1343 TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1, 1653, no. 6; Latkin V.N. Decree. cit., p. 434-440.
1344 TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1, 1653, d. 6, l. 1; Kozachenko A.I. Zemsky Sobor 1653, p. 153.
1345 TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1, 1653, no. 6; l. 1; Reunion, vol. III, p. 7, no. 1.
1346 TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1, 1653, d. 6, l. 2.
1347 Ibid., l. 15; Reunion, vol. III, p. 9, no. 1.
1348 TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1, 1653, no. 6, pp. 16-17.
1349 Reunion, vol. III, p. 10, No. 1. The verdict on October 1, 1653 returned to this issue again.
1350 A large literary and editorial edit was made on the draft “letter”. Here is one example. The phrase “Jan Casimir and the lords of the Rada said that now they can’t bear peace with Cherkasy, because they have many troops gathered and they are going against their enemies, Cherkasy is going to war against them, but they don’t even want to hear the Treaty of Zborovsky, and they don’t want to give up the churches from them it is impossible for them” is crossed out, except for the first five words. Instead of what was crossed out, it is written: “...and that matter was treated as nothing, and they refused peace with the Cherkasy people, and although they eradicated the Orthodox Christian faith and destroyed the churches of God, they went to war against them” (TsGADA, f. 79, op. 1 1653, d. 6, l. 19).
1351 Ibid., l. 21, 25, 27-28.
1352 Ibid., l. 20.
1353 Ibid., l. 29.
1354 Palace ranks, vol. III, stb. 354.
1355 Palace ranks, vol. III, stb. 355-356.
1356 Reunion, vol. III, p. 322-323, No. 169.
1357 Ibid., p. 406-414, No. 197; SGGD, vol. 3. M., 1822, p. 481-489, No. 157; AUZR, vol. X. St. Petersburg, 1878, p. 3-18, No. 2; Acts relating to the history of zemstvo councils, p. 68-76, No. XX.
1358 Reunion, vol. III, p. 406-414, No. 197.
1359 “Palace ranks,” naming the members of the council on October 1, 1653, say: “and from the captains, and from the solicitors, and from the nobles, and from the tenants, and from the townspeople, there were elected people” (Palace ranks, vol. III, Art. 369). There is no talk about “elected” city nobles and boyar children.
1360 Reunion, vol. III, p. 407.
1361 Ibid., p. 410.
1362 Ibid., p. 411.
1363 Ibid., p. 411-412.
1364 Reunion, vol. III, p. 413-414.
1365 Ibid., p. 414.
1366 Ibid.
1367 Ibid.
1368 Palace ranks, vol. III, stb. 372.
This day in history:
On October 1, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor met in Moscow, whose task was to consider the issue of reuniting the lands of the previously unified ancient Russian state - Kievan Rus. And although at that time the satisfaction of the request of the Cossacks, who spoke on behalf of the entire people of South-Western Rus' (even then called Little Russia), considered by the Council, to be accepted “under the high hand of the Moscow sovereign”, which was considered by the Council, meant a war with Poland, the Council’s opinion on the formation of a single state was unanimous.
The reunification of Little Russia with Muscovite Russia corresponded to the vital interests and aspirations of the forcibly separated population of the ancient Russian state and was conditioned by the entire previous course of history.
The ancestors of both Little Russians and Great Russians were East Slavic tribes, which since ancient times inhabited the territory from the Carpathians to the Volga and from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The Eastern Slavs moved from a primitive communal system to a feudal one, having a common territory, religion, culture, a common language and way of life. In the VI-VIII centuries. AD they formed the largest single ancient Russian nation in Europe.
The interests of socio-economic, political and cultural development, as well as the need for defense against external enemies, led to the creation of one of the largest and most powerful states in Europe - Kievan Rus. However, due to the laws of development of feudal society, the ancient Russian state was divided into a number of separate principalities. In the 13th century The Mongol-Tatar invasion from the east, German and Swedish aggression from the west, hostile relations with the Poles and Hungarians put Rus' in extremely difficult conditions. She was able to repel German and Swedish attacks, but could not resist the Mongol-Tatar hordes.
After the Mongol-Tatar invasion, the ancient Russian state found itself significantly weakened, which its neighbors were quick to take advantage of. Already in the 14th century. Western Rus' (now Belarus), Volyn, Eastern Podolia, Kiev region, Chernigovo-Severshchina, as well as the Smolensk lands were captured by the Lithuanians. At the same time, the Poles captured the southwestern Russian lands - Galicia and Western Volyn (and in the 15th century, Western Podolia). Bukovina was included in the Principality of Moldova, and Transcarpathian Rus' back in the 11th century. fell into the hands of the Hungarians. In the 15th century, Turkey captured Moldova and the southern Russian lands of the northern coast of the Black and Azov Seas - Novorossiya (now part of Ukraine) and made the Crimean Khanate, which by that time had separated from the Golden Horde, into vassal dependence. In the 16th century, already from the Principality of Lithuania, Poland essentially tore away Eastern Volyn, Bratslav and Kiev regions with part of the left bank of the Dnieper. As a result of all these seizures, Kievan Rus was torn into territories that fell under the authority of various countries.
However, even in these difficult conditions, the ancient Russian people did not succumb to assimilation: the previously achieved high level of economic and cultural development and its internal strength had an impact. Ethnic, economic, cultural and political ties were preserved and continued to develop. The ideas of unity and independence, as evidenced, in particular, by the Kievan and Galician-Volyn Chronicles, * were firmly rooted in the consciousness of the entire Russian people even during the period of feudal fragmentation of Kievan Rus. Therefore, having strengthened themselves internally, the people waged a liberation struggle against their enslavers, trying to restore their unity.
This desire for unity manifested itself, first of all, in the form of the resettlement of the inhabitants of Little Russia to the Moscow state. Starting from the end of the 13th century, all classes moved: from peasants to boyars and princes. Moreover, the latter, as a rule, moved with their lands and peasants.
A wave of popular uprisings swept across the territory of the occupied lands. At the end of the 14th century, the Kiev region rebelled against foreign rule. At the beginning of the 15th century, uprisings swept Galicia, Volyn, Podolia and again the Kiev region. The struggle of the Little Russians against their enslavers reached particular strength in the second half of the 15th century.
At this time, the apotheosis of Russian resistance was the deliverance from the hated Mongol-Tatar yoke of North-Eastern Rus', which united into the Moscow state. Subsequently, it was it that played a decisive role in the liberation and unification of all occupied Russian territories. As it rose, Moscow became more and more the center of gravity for the Russian people, who found themselves under the yoke of foreign enslavers.
After the great “stand on the Ugra”, the tsarist government almost immediately took an active position on the issue of returning the seized lands. In 1492, Grand Duke Ivan III demanded from the Grand Duke of Lithuania: “... and you would surrender our cities and our volosts, the lands and waters that you hold behind you to us.” **. He declared to the Poles that “The United Great Russia will not lay down its arms until it returns all the other parts of the Russian land, torn off by its neighbors, until it gathers all the people” ***. All Russian lands were called “fatherland” based on the ethnicity of the population and their historical past. “It’s not just our fatherland, whose cities and volosts are now behind us: and the whole Russian land, Kyiv and Smolensk and other cities... from ancient times... our fatherland...” ****,” Russian diplomats explained.
Ivan the Terrible also demanded the return of Russian lands. So, in 1563, he presented King Sigismund II Augustus with a list in which a number of Russian lands and cities captured by the Poles were named. Among them were Przemysl, Lvov, Galich and others. Justifying the rights of Rus' to them, Russian diplomats declared: “... and those cities were the ancestral Russian sovereigns... and that patrimony fell for your sovereign... due to some hardships after Batu’s captivity, how the godless Batu captured many Russian cities, and after that because of our sovereigns... those cities withdrew” *****. Since the invaders did not even think about returning the seized territories, the Russian people more than once had to fight liberation wars for their liberation.
The Little Russians, for their part, also fought for unification with Muscovite Russia. In the 16th century on the territory of Southwestern Rus' they launched a broad people's liberation movement. A prominent place in it was occupied by the Cossacks who appeared in Zaporozhye (as earlier on the Don and in other places on the southern borders of the then Rus'), who were destined to subsequently play an important role in the historical fate of Little Russia, in its struggle for liberation from the oppression of the Polish-Lithuanian invaders and reunification with Russia.
In order to suppress the liberation struggle and strengthen their dominance, the Polish and Lithuanian lords united Poland and Lithuania into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Union of Lublin) in 1569. In Southwestern Rus', the Poles captured huge estates, numbering in some cases up to hundreds settlements. The Polish gentry intensified feudal-serfdom, religious and national-colonial oppression. Serfdom in Poland in the 16th century reached its peak high level in Europe. “The gentry even arrogated to themselves the right of life and death over their peasants: killing a slave for a gentry was the same as killing a dog” ******. The situation of local townspeople in Little Russia also deteriorated significantly. They were restricted in everything, even in the right of residence: in Lviv, for example, they were allowed to settle only on one street (“Russkaya Street”). The Poles waged a tough fight against Orthodoxy. In 1596, a union was formalized in Brest, proclaiming the subordination of the Orthodox Church to the Catholic Church, the recognition of the Pope as the head of the Uniates and the adoption of the basic dogma of Catholicism. The Orthodox clergy were subjected to repression.
The inculcation of Catholicism, Polonization, national discrimination - everything was aimed at the Vatican-inspired denationalization of the Little Russians, weakening their ties with the Moscow state, and strengthening the dominant position of the Poles and Lithuanians. The population was required to have compulsory knowledge of Polish as the only state language of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was forbidden to use National language V business correspondence, schools teaching in Russian were closed. This policy of the ruling circles of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth put the bulk of the local peasantry and philistines in an exceptionally difficult and powerless situation.
The strengthening of Polish oppression after the Union of Lublin and Brest caused a new rise in the liberation movement of the Little Russians. The main forces of this movement were the peasantry and Cossacks. In the early 90s of the 16th century, protests against Polish dominance became widespread.
At the end of the 16th century, the resettlement of Little Russians, primarily Cossacks, to the borders of Moscow Rus' intensified. Cossacks settled, as a rule, on its southern borders, protecting them. At the same time, they not only moved to the lands of the Russian state, but sometimes also became the subject of the tsar, along with the territories they cleared from the Polish lords. In this regard, a widely known example of such a transition is Cossack army led by Kr. Kosinsky, in correspondence with whom in 1593 the Russian Tsar already calls himself the sovereign of “Zaporozhye, Cherkassy and Nizovsky.”
The Polish lords responded to the liberation struggle of the people by strengthening national-colonial oppression. “To exterminate Rus' in Rus'” - this is how the goals and policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth regarding South-Western Rus' were defined in one of the appeals to the Sejm in 1623. The uprisings were suppressed with particular cruelty. The Poles continued to use force and coercion as the main means of maintaining their dominance. Individual attempts to somehow soften this policy led nowhere. For example, the so-called “Articles to calm the Russian people” of King Vladislav IV (1633) in fact did not provide any rights and freedoms to the oppressed.
Resistance to the Polish lords, the fight against common enemies - the Turks and Crimean Tatars contributed to the expansion and strengthening of military-political ties between Little Russians and Great Russians, especially the Cossacks of the Zaporozhye Sich and the Don. Russian-Little Russians have also undergone significant development. economic ties. After 1612, there was an increase in the liberation struggle and an increase in the desire of the population of the lands of Southwestern Rus' captured by the Poles to reunite with Eastern Russia, with Moscow.
In the 17th century, representatives of Little Russia repeatedly turned to the Russian sovereigns with requests to accept the Little Russians “under their high hand.” Such plans often arose among the Cossacks *******, especially since the Cossacks had been actively enlisting in the service of Moscow since the time of Ivan the Terrible. This service to the Russian Tsar with the entire Zaporozhye army ******** was sought even by such hetmans as Sagaidachny, a nobleman by birth who got along well with Warsaw (1620).
However, not only the Cossacks wanted to unite with Moscow Russia. Representatives of the Orthodox clergy, Archbishop Isaiah Kopinsky (later Metropolitan of Lithuania) in 1622 and Metropolitan Job Boretsky in 1625 turned to the Moscow Tsar with a request for patronage and the reunification of Little Russia with Russia.
After suppressing a number of uprisings in the 30s of the 17th century, the Polish lords further strengthened serfdom, national and religious oppression. Along with peasants and burghers, small Ukrainian gentry and the Orthodox clergy were subjected to oppression.
General discontent and protest resulted in the Liberation War of the Ukrainian people against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of 1648-1654. The fight against the oppression of lordly Poland was led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. At the initial stage of the war, he tried to win over the Turkish Sultan, the Crimean Khan, and the Swedish king to his side. At first, B. Khmelnitsky was lucky. The rebels won a series of victories: at Zheltye Vody, near Korsun and near Pilyavtsy. However, then, due to the betrayal of the Crimean Khan, the hetman suffered a number of serious defeats: in 1649 near Zborov, in 1651 near Berestechko and in 1652 in the vicinity of Zhvanets. The famous historian S.M. Soloviev wrote that “the defeat at Berestechko clearly showed B. Khmelnitsky and the Cossacks that they alone could not cope with Poland..., and one cannot rely on the khan either, when it comes to fighting with a large army, and not to rob..." *********.
For six years the Little Russians waged a difficult struggle with the Poles. The war required enormous sacrifices and enormous effort. The situation in Little Russia was extremely difficult. Under these conditions, the hetman became even more active in offering Moscow reunification. They sent about 20 embassies to the king with such a request. B. Khmelnitsky even suggested that Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, with the support of the rebels, take the vacant Polish throne at that time and thus unite Little Russia and Russia **********.
However, the Russian government, fearing a new war with Poland, took a restrained position. Muscovite Rus' has not yet fully recovered from the Troubles. In addition, such a war could have pushed (and later pushed) Sweden to seize Primorye (which was at that time in the hands of the Poles), which would have made it difficult for Moscow to return the Russian lands adjacent to the Baltic Sea.
At the same time, Rus' could not remain completely aloof from the struggle of the Little Russians and provided assistance to the rebels with “bread and guns,” as well as through diplomatic methods. In 1653, the tsar demanded that Warsaw not violate the rights of the Orthodox population in Little Russia and stop persecuting Orthodox Church. However, the embassy sent in this regard returned with nothing.
Taking into account the numerous requests from representatives of Little Russia for its acceptance into Russia and the danger that threatened the Little Russians from the Poles, as well as the Turks and Tatars ***********. (who increasingly asserted their claims to Southwestern Rus'), the tsarist government decided to convene a Zemsky Sobor in order to enlist the support of the entire people when deciding the issue of reunification.
On October 1 (11), 1653, almost all segments of the population of the then Russian state gathered in Moscow: the clergy, boyars, representatives of Russian cities, merchants, peasants and archers.
When considering the issue of “petitioning the sovereign for citizenship of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian Army,” the serious danger looming over Little Russia was emphasized: “in 161 (1652) at the Sejm in Brest-Litovsk it was indeed sentenced that they, Orthodox Christians... who live in Koruna Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to beat..." *************. The intentions of the Poles to “eradicate the Orthodox Christian faith and completely destroy the holy churches of God...” ************** were also noted.
The Council was informed that the Turkish Sultan had called upon the Little Russians to become his subjects, but the hetman “denied him this”; that the Cossacks called the Crimean Khan and his horde to be their allies against the Poles “involuntarily”; that the Cossacks sent their embassies with a request to accept them as citizenship and help in the war with Poland “many times.”
Despite the fact that the report was discussed separately at meetings of each estate, the decision was unanimous. The Council “sentenced”: “that the Great Sovereign Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich of all Rus' would deign that Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporozhye Army with their cities and lands to accept under his sovereign high hand for the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches of God...” ** ************* Here we were talking not only about the hetman’s army, which a year ago it was proposed to resettle on the lands of Muscovite Rus', but also about “cities” and “lands”, i.e. about all of Little Russia. Liberation of Little Russians from the citizenship of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in legal terms was justified not only by their desire, but also by the failure of the king himself to fulfill the oath in terms of non-oppression of his subjects of non-Catholic faith.
It was obvious that in connection with the reunification of Russian lands, war with the Poles could not be avoided. Taking this into account, the Council decided: “the message of war is against the Polish king.” **************** On October 23 (November 2), 1653, in the Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin, the king, referring to this decision, announced about the beginning of the war with Poland.
The resolutions of the Council were announced to the Russian people and met with unanimous support.
The Hetman's embassy headed by L. Kapusta was also present at the Council, which immediately after its end went to B. Khmelnytsky and informed him about decisions made. To complete the process of reunification, a special royal embassy was also sent to the hetman, headed by a close boyar, V.V. Buturlin. Having received Moscow's consent to the unification, B. Khmelnitsky on January 8, 1654 in the city of Pereyaslavl convened a national assembly - the Rada, which, according to Cossack traditions, alone was competent to resolve the most important political issues. The Rada was “explicit,” that is, open to the entire people. It represented both all the Little Russian lands and all classes (Cossacks, clergy, townspeople, merchants, peasants). Thus, the issue of reunification with Russia and in Little Russia was resolved with the widest possible representation. After the polls, the people unanimously “cryed out: We are willing under the Eastern Tsar, the Orthodox... God confirm, God strengthen, that we may all be one forever!” *****************.
After the Rada, first the residents of Pereyaslavl, and then the Cossack regiments (military administrative units of Little Russia) and the population of the cities of Little Russia swore allegiance to the Russian sovereign.
The March Articles of 1654 formalized the position of Little Russia within Russia, and also defined the rights and privileges of the Cossacks, Ukrainian gentry and clergy.
The decisions of the Zemsky Sobor and the Pereyaslav Rada clearly demonstrated the will of a single people, divided even during the years of the Mongol-Tatar invasion, to live in a single state. Then, in accordance with the clearly expressed desire of all segments of the population of Malaya and Great Rus' their reunification into a single state began.
There were still centuries ahead of the struggle for the return of all the lands seized from Kievan Rus. Only after the bloody wars with the Polish lords in 1667, according to the Truce of Andrusovo, Left Bank Little Russia was transferred to the Moscow state, and in 1686, according to the “Eternal Peace”, Kyiv and its surroundings were returned. The Northern Black Sea region or Novorossiya was conquered from Turkey in the wars of 1768-1774. and 1787-1791 Right Bank Little Russia became part of Russia as a result of the divisions of Poland in 1793 and 1795. Galicia and Northern Bukovina were returned in 1939-1940, and Transcarpathian Rus' in 1945. Russian Crimea, recaptured from the Turks in 1783, was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. The modern independent state of Ukraine appeared on political map world in 1991.
___________________________________________________________
* Great Soviet Encyclopedia, third edition, M., “ Soviet encyclopedia", 1977, T.26, p.539.
** Collection of the Russian Historical Society, St. Petersburg, 1882, volume XXXV, pp. 61-66.
*** V.O. Klyuchevsky, Course of Russian history. Works in 9 volumes, M. Mysl, 1988, T.III, p. 85.
**** Collection of the Russian Historical Society, St. Petersburg, 1882, volume XXXV, pp. 457-460.
***** Ibid., pp. 265-270
****** V.O.Klyuchevsky, T.III, p.97.
******* Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (RGADA), f. 210, Discharge order, Moscow table, stb. 79, pp. 370-372.
******** Reunification of Ukraine with Russia. Documents and materials in three volumes, M., publishing house of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1953. T.1, No. 1.
********* S.M. Soloviev. Works in 18 volumes. History of Russia from ancient times. M., Mysl, 1990, T.T. 9-10, pp. 559.
********** Reunification of Ukraine with Russia Vol. II, pp. 32-33.
*********** V.O. Klyuchevsky, T III, p. 111.
************* Reunification of Ukraine with Russia, Vol. III, p. 411.
*************** Ibid.
*************** Ibid., p. 413.
**************** Right there.
***************** Ibid., page 461.
Historical and Documentary Department
On January 8, 1654, the Pereyaslav Rada decided to reunite the Ukrainian people with the Russian people in a single Russian state. This event was preceded, as is known, by the resolution of the Zemsky Sobor in 1653 on the acceptance of Ukraine into Russian citizenship and on the war with Poland.
Despite the great historical significance of this Council, it has not yet attracted the attention of researchers. It is therefore necessary to at least briefly highlight his activities.
Since the beginning of the liberation war of 1648, the Russian government provided broad economic and financial assistance struggling Ukraine. Diplomatic support for Ukraine from Russia gradually expanded, as well as assistance in people, weapons, and ammunition. At the beginning of 1649, the Russian government recognized Hetman Khmelnytsky and from that time regularly exchanged ambassadors with him. At the same time, the government informed the hetman of its readiness to accept Ukraine into Russian citizenship, but considered it necessary to avoid war with Poland for now.
In its diplomatic speeches in Poland, the Russian government did not hide the fact that, depending on the outcome of the negotiations, the eye would bring the issue of Ukraine to the Zemsky Sobor. Thus, the Russian ambassadors G. and S. Pushkin and G. Leontyev, having arrived in Warsaw in 1650, very decisively raised the issue of “untruths” with the royal government, threatening to break off relations. At the same time, the Russian ambassadors warned the Polish government that if the gentlemen “do not correct themselves,” then the Tsar “will order a Council to be held in Moscow” and at it “subtract the royal untruths” and discuss the violations by the other side of the “peaceful end” 1 . The lords “did not reform”; in December 1650, the Sejm decided to resume the war in Ukraine.
At the end of 1650 - beginning of 1651, the hetman's embassy headed by M. Sulichich arrived in Moscow. The Russian government confronted him with the question of how to carry out the transition of Ukraine to citizenship and how to organize the management of Ukraine in the future 2 . Soon after this, the Russian government for the first time considered it necessary to bring the Ukrainian question to the Zemsky Sobor. This was done by the Councils of 1651 and 1653.
At the end of January 1651, after negotiations with the embassy of M. Sulichich, the government decided to hastily convene the Zemsky Sobor. Its convocation was scheduled for February 19, 1651. In the “conscription letter” of the government dated January 31, 1651, it was ordered to choose two people from the nobles, “and from the townspeople, two people immediately,” sending the elects “by the specified date” 3 .
However, at first only the consecrated Council was convened. He started
1 S. M. Soloviev. Russian history. Book 2. T. VI - X. St. Petersburg, b. g., p. 1596
2 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia." Documents and materials in three volumes. T. II. M. 1953, pp. 490 - 492.
3 B. Latkin. Materials for the history of Zemsky Sobors of the 17th century in St. Petersburg. 1884, p. 91.
his work in Moscow on February 19, 1651. The government reported to the clergy on the state of affairs in Ukraine, on Russia's relations with Poland, as well as on the threat to Russia from Crimea, Poland and Sweden 4 .
On February 27, 1651, the clergy, led by Patriarch Joseph, presented their opinion (“advice”) to the government. Its meaning was this: if the Polish government “does not give justice and justice to the guilty under the agreement and eternal consummation,” then the church “can give permission” for the kissing of the cross under the agreement; in this case, “Etman from Cherkasy can be accepted with approval.” However, it was recommended that even if the Polish king was “right,” then even then the government would act according to the circumstances, as “God will tell” 5 .
Having received a response from the clergy, the government convened the full secular part of the Zemsky Sobor. Here were represented, in addition to the tsar, clergy, boyars and duma people, stewards, solicitors, Moscow nobles, nobles and boyar children, elected from cities, living rooms, cloth and black hundreds and settlements and city elected merchants. The “postscript” to the government’s report to the consecrated Council states that the meeting of the secular part of the Council took place in the “dining hut” in the Kremlin on February 28 and was announced to those gathered “according to this letter” 6 . However, in the available documents there is no information either about the decision of the secular part of the Council, or about the decision of the Council in its entirety.
Until now, historians believed that this was the result of poor preservation of the sources. Now, we think this idea should be reconsidered. The Russian government, through its ambassadors, warned Poland that it would raise the issue of the “untruths” of the Polish government at the Council. But in February 1651, only the opinion of the spiritual part of the Council was requested. The secular part of the Council was only informed of these “untruths.” However, she apparently did not make decisions on this issue, since Russia was not yet sufficiently prepared for war with Poland at that moment. The secular part of the Zemsky Sobor made this decision in its final form only in 1653. It is no coincidence that the decision of the Council of 1653, especially its first half, largely repeats the text of the materials of the Council of 1651. It can be assumed that the discussion of the issue of Ukraine at the Zemsky Sobor in 1651 was important for the Russian government in order to prepare public opinion for the war with Poland over Ukraine. This was the significance of the Council of 1651.
After this Council, the Russian government increasingly took the path of realizing the reunification of Ukraine with Russia. In this regard, the special meeting on the question of Ukraine, convened at the beginning of 1653, which was little covered in our historical literature, was very important. At one time, S. M. Solovyov mentioned this fact, but did not attach much importance to it. Materials about this meeting, unfortunately, were not included in the three-volume book “Reunification of Ukraine with Russia.”
The meeting began on February 22, 1653 in Moscow. The Tsar and the boyars took part in it. It ended on March 14, 1653. At this meeting, it was decided to send a great embassy to Poland, convene a Zemsky Sobor in Moscow and begin preparations for war with Poland. At the same time, it was planned to strengthen ties with Hetman Khmelnytsky and inform him of the Russian government’s consent to accept the Zaporozhian Army into its citizenship and, finally, send an embassy to the hetman “to receive” Ukraine. All these activities were carried out.
4 See “Reunification of Ukraine with Russia”. T. III. page 11.
5 Ibid., pp. 11 - 12.
6 See ibid., p. 11.
On March 19, 1653, a decree was sent “to all cities” to “be of service to people” in Moscow “by the 20th of May, with all the service, and for that period the sovereign will deign to look at Moscow, at the horse” 7.
On April 24 of the same year, it was decided to send an embassy to Poland headed by Prince B. A. Repnin-Obolensky and B. M. Khitrovo. At the same time, preparations began for the convening of the Zemsky Sobor. There is no reason to believe that the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 was convened only on October 1 and lasted only one day, as stated, for example, by S. M. Solovyov 8. As early as May 2, 1653, that is, shortly after the state meeting in February - March, the government sent out a “conscription letter” calling elected people from the nobility to Moscow. In the “Palace Discharges” for 1653, the following entry speaks about this: “On the second day of May, the sovereign’s letters were sent to Zamoskovnye and all Ukrainian cities to the governors and officials. It was ordered in all cities to send two people from each city of their choice nobles, good and reasonable people, and send them to Moscow for a specified period, May 20th" 9.
By the deadline, the majority of the elected officials came to Moscow 10. On the appointed day, May 20, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor began its work. This is directly indicated by the June letter we discovered from Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich to the ambassadors in Poland B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo. “Be it known,” this letter reported, “there was a Council on the seventh week in the Mayan environment on the 20th day...” The same document indicates that one question was brought to the Council - about Ukraine. The discussion dragged on; “The conversation went on for a long time,” the letter reported. “And all ranks of people were interrogated about whether to accept Cherkassy” 11.
By May 25, the unanimous opinion of the Council became clear. “And all sorts of ranks and public people unanimously spoke about this, so that Cherkassy could be accepted.” The Tsar approved this opinion, which made those present at the Council “most rejoiced” 12.
The fact that on May 25 the opinion of the Council was determined is confirmed by the surviving draft of the decision of this Council (or the report at it) 13 . Subsequently, this draft formed the basis final verdict Council passed on October 1, 1653. As is known, this sentence began with a reference to the May discussion of the issue: “In the past, in the 161st year of May 25, by decree of the great sovereign... it was spoken at the council about the Lithuanian and Cherkassy affairs. And this year, in the 162nd year of October, on 1 day the great sovereign... indicated that a council should be held about the same Lithuanian and Cherkasy affairs..." 14. The expression “spoken at the Council” confirms the fact that the issue was discussed at a number of meetings of the Council, as evidenced by the above June royal letter. On October 1, the Council met with its previous composition only to formalize its final decision, prepared on May 25. This connection is indicated by the beginning of the sentence on October 1, 1653. On October 1, 1653, the Council met with the composition elected in May, since during the period from June to September 1653 there were no new elections.
The Zemsky Sobor of 1653, of course, belongs to the number of so-called “complete” Sobors. It included more than one rank or class. In the record of the "Palace ranks" the composition of the Cathedral is defined as follows: the Tsar, the consecrated Cathedral, the boyars, the okolnichy, the Duma people, "with the stolniks and with
7 We were talking about the general review of the Russian army, which took place on the Devichye Pole from June 13 to June 28, 1653. "Palace ranks". T. III. St. Petersburg. 1852, pp. 343, 356.
8 S. M. Soloviev. Decree. cit., p. 1631.
9 "Palace ranks". T. III, p. 350.
10 Central State Archive of Ancient Acts (TSGADA), Rank. Belgorod Table, p. 351, pp. 346 - 351.
11 Ibid., State Archives, Rank XXVII, N 79, 1653, l. 1
14 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". T. III, p. 406.
solicitors, and from the Moscow nobles, and from the tenants, and from the elected townspeople... and from the stolniks, and from the solicitors, and from the nobles, and from the tenants, and from the townspeople, there were elected people" 15.
From the very beginning, this Council included a significant part of the elected “from Zamoskovnye and Ukrainian cities” - from nobles, children of boyars and merchants 16. It also included the consecrated Council - the patriarch, two metropolitans, a bishop, abbots, as well as the Boyar Duma in its entirety and the tsar. It should be noted that Metropolitan Michael of Serbia also participated in the work of the Council and was especially mentioned in the verdict. In the draft decision of the Council of May 25, among the non-elected participants, also named were stewards, solicitors and noblemen of Moscow and clerks, who were present, apparently at the call of the government. The verdict of the Zemsky Sobor on October 1 speaks of a more expanded composition of its participants. In addition to those who previously participated in the work of the Council, the cathedral act also names, along with Moscow nobles, residents, then guests and living rooms and cloth hundreds and black hundreds, and palace settlements and all ranks of people, and archers. In the final part of the verdict on October 1, moreover, the heads of the Streltsy were named and it was clarified that taxable people from the Black Hundreds and palace settlements participated 17 .
Thus, the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 began its work in May in a limited composition, in which the proportion of elected representatives from the provincial nobility (2 people from the county) and merchants was relatively high. When the verdict was passed, the composition of the Council was significantly expanded to include the Moscow administrative administration, the Streltsy heads, as well as taxable merchants from the Moscow Black Hundreds, palace settlements and Streltsy. Since the statement of the opinion of these ranks in the verdict speaks only about service and trade people of “all ranks”, we can conclude that from the Black Hundreds and palace settlements only trade people were recruited, that is, in fact, townspeople, although legally they could be peasants. It was important for the government to know the opinion of merchants of all ranks, since the financing of the upcoming war was connected with this.
The Zemsky Sobor of 1653 opened on May 20, met with long interruptions and completed its work only on October 1. On May 25, when the unanimous consent of the Council members to the annexation of Ukraine was determined and a draft of its verdict had already been drawn up, the work of the Council was interrupted. This break can be established not only from the above quote from the verdict of October 1. In the list of cities that we found in the archives, from which “nobles were sent to Moscow by the sovereign’s decree and were at the council” of 1653, those cities are also named from where “the nobles came after the cathedral.” Those who arrived after May 25, 18 are included in the list of absentees.
The government was going to resume the activities of the Council on June 5. This is evidenced by letters sent from the Discharge to Kursk, Putivl, Sevsk and Voronezh. Thus, in a letter received in Kursk on May 30, it was ordered that the elected officials who did not appear should be sent “to Moscow to the Discharge for the period of June by the 5th” 19 .
How can we explain the break in the meetings of the Council? This is answered directly by the royal letter sent to Poland in June to B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo. Having announced the agreement of the Zemsky Sobor to “receive Cherkassy,” the government announced the adjournment of the meetings of the Council until the ambassadors returned from Poland: “and we postponed this until you...” 20 .
15 "Palace ranks". T. III, p. 369.
16 TsGADA, Discharge, Sevsky table, pp. 145, 148. Belgorod table, pp. 351, 362, 366; Polish Affairs, 1653, NN 6 and 8.
17 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". T. III, pp. 407, 414.
18 TsGADA, Discharge, Belgorod table, p. 351, l. 352a.
19 Ibid., Sevsky Table, p. 148, pp. 152, 154, 179.
20 Ibid., State Archives, Rank XXVII, N 79, l. 1.
It is known that the embassy, which left for Poland on April 30, completed negotiations only on August 7 and returned to Moscow only in September 21. That is why the Council did not resume its work on June 5, since the government intended in its decision to take into account the results of the embassy of Prince B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo.
The government was well aware of the sentiments of all the ranks of the Zemsky Sobor. In this regard, the departure of the embassy of A. Matveev and I. Fomin to Ukraine in early June becomes clear. A. Matveev later stated that he was “sent to Hetman Khmelnytsky to call for citizenship” 22 .
Already on June 22, the government, with a royal letter, notified the hetman of its agreement to accept Ukraine as citizenship. This letter was also sent after the preliminary opinion of the Zemsky Sobor was revealed. Information received shortly before about the growth of aggressive aspirations on the part of Turkey accelerated this step of the government. The royal letter of June 22, 1653 notified the hetman of his readiness to accept Ukraine and that “our military people ... are recruiting and building for the militia”; the government proposed to mutually exchange ambassadors 23 .
Meanwhile, there was still no news from the embassy of Prince B. A. Repnin from Poland. Then it was decided to send ambassadors R. Streshnev and M. Bredikhin to the hetman. They had to inform the hetman that the government was waiting for the return of B. A. Repnin’s embassy to make a final decision. At the same time, it was instructed to clarify with the hetman issues of future joint military operations, to scout out the forces of enemies, etc.
Streshnev and Bredikhin left Moscow on September 13, and in the middle of that month news was received that the embassy from Poland was returning. Therefore, on September 20, a royal letter was sent to M. Bredikhin and R. Streshnev, in which the government invited the ambassadors to notify the hetman that the royal decree would be sent “soon” through the hetman’s personal representative L. Kapusta, who arrived in Moscow at that time. At the same time, the ambassadors were punished to inform the hetman about accepting Ukraine as citizenship if the battle with the royal army had already taken place, and, conversely, that the hetman should wait for the decree if the battle had not yet taken place 24.
This directive of the Russian government in no way gives reason to perceive the presence of any hesitations in its policy. If the war in Ukraine resumed and the battle had already taken place, then this predetermined Russia’s entry into the war even before the final decision of the Council. If there was no battle, then a responsible decision, which should have entailed Russia’s entry into the war with Poland, should have been made with the participation of the Zemsky Sobor. The decision of the Council was necessary, since the upcoming war would inevitably require great human and material sacrifices on the part of Russia.
This was the meaning of the instructions sent by the government to Streshnev and Bredikhin. Klyuchevsky was mistaken in considering this directive a “cruel mockery.”
On September 25, 1653, the Russian ambassadors finally returned from Poland and were immediately received by the Tsar, who was at that time in the Trinity-Sergius Monastery. In September, but somewhat earlier, the hetman’s embassy arrived in Moscow, headed by Bohdan Khmelnitsky’s personal confidant, Colonel Lavrin Kapusta, Chigirinsky. L. Kapusta asked the government to immediately send to Ukraine - to Kyiv and other cities -
21 In the article list of the embassy there is a mention of the royal charter received on July 5 (TsGADA, Polish Affairs, 1653, No. 84, l. 552).
22 "The story of the innocent imprisonment... of boyar Artemon Sergeevich Matveev." St. Petersburg. 1776, p. 43.
23 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". T. III, p. 323.
24 See ibid., p. 406.
yes - under the governors of "military people, although with 3000 people." He reported that the horde was already under the White Church, that ambassadors from the Turkish Sultan had arrived to the hetman, persistently “calling him to be his subject,” but that the hetman “to him (the Sultan. - A.K.) He refused, but relied on the sovereign's mercy" 25.
The situation in Ukraine was indeed very serious. The response of the Polish government, delivered by B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo, spoke of Poland’s intention to resume the war in Ukraine, which had already actually begun; The hetman set out with his army on a campaign. A final decision had to be made. The Zemsky Sobor was sufficiently prepared for this during its work from May 20.
On October 1, the last, final meeting of the Zemsky Sobor took place, at which the conciliar act was approved. The meeting took place in the Kremlin, in the Faceted Chamber. It is significant that the entry for “Palace Discharges” notes that at the Council, in fact, only the question of Ukraine was discussed; relations with Poland are not even mentioned 26 . The Tsar came to the final meeting with a religious procession from St. Basil's Church. This emphasized the solemn nature of the meeting. At the Council in full, the “letter” of the government, that is, the report, was “read aloud”. Basically, the first part of the report, devoted to the analysis of relations between Russia and Poland after the Peace of Polyanovsky, repeated the report to the Council of 1651 and the draft edition of May 25, 1653. Then the results of the embassy of B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo to Poland were reported.
The embassy demanded that the Polish government stop all “untruths”, punish those responsible, and invited the king to make peace with Ukraine. The lords refused to comply with this and, in turn, demanded the complete surrender of Khmelnitsky. With the departure of the embassy, Poland resumed the war in Ukraine.
In the report to the Council, the Russian government especially emphasized that the king took an oath not to oppress Orthodox subjects, and in case of its violation, the subjects are released from the oath to the king.
The report further stated that the hetman's embassy headed by L. Kapusta had arrived in Moscow, that the war in Ukraine had resumed and was developing favorably for the Ukrainian people's army, but the lords were not giving in and in the future they intended to fight with Russia. It was also reported that the hetman requested to send at least 3 thousand military men to Ukraine.
To make a decision, all ranks participating in the Council were interrogated carefully and separately. The answer was given primarily by the boyars and duma people, that is, the secular non-elected part of the Council. They spoke out for war with Poland and for the acceptance of Ukraine. The question of freeing the population of Ukraine from the oath to the Polish king was considered very important, because it affected the principles of monarchism. According to Duma officials, in connection with the violation of the oath on the part of the Polish king, the Ukrainian people were thereby freed from their oath to the king, and, therefore, the tsarist government accepted “free people” and not rebels. “And according to this, they sentenced everything: accept Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhye Army with cities and lands” 27.
After this, the opinion of the elected people was sought. They were interviewed according to class groups. All of them spoke out in favor of declaring war on Poland, “for the honor” of the king, “to stand and wage war against the Lithuanian king.” A particularly conciliar act reports the unanimous decision of elected representatives of the two main classes - service people and townspeople. The service people promised that they would “fight without sparing their heads.
25 Ibid. page 412.
26 "Palace ranks". T. III. pp. 369 - 372.
27 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". T. III, p. 414.
and for the sake of dying for their sovereign honor." Posad, trade "people of all ranks" "people are helping and for their sovereign honor their heads will die for the sake of." These assurances of servicemen and townspeople, of course, were especially important for the government. In general, the elected part The Council strongly recommended that the government accept Ukraine into Russian citizenship: “And Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky... the great sovereign would grant... according to their petition, he ordered them to be accepted under his sovereign high hand” 28 .
As we see, in the conciliar act of October 1, 1653, there is no mention of the opinion of the clergy consecrated by the Council, and this is not accidental, since this opinion was already expressed on February 27, 1651 at the first Zemsky Council, dedicated to the issue of Ukraine.
How did the Council’s verdict on October 1 differ from the draft decision (or government report) on May 25? In general, the verdict sounds more decisive, referring to the justification for the break with Poland and the adoption of Ukraine as citizenship, while in the draft this intention was not formulated. It recalled the obligation of the parties not to lay claim to other people’s lands, “and not to fight or encroach on both sides of the land, and to put aside all sorts of old and new matters that have long been forgotten and to reconcile and move forward... do not take revenge on any unfriendships” 29 .
The verdict does not mention this. But it strengthens the indictment against the Polish government with reference to the results of the embassy of B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo. For example, it is reported about the king’s relations with the khan, about the passage of Crimean ambassadors to Sweden “for quarrels and war.” The verdict also strengthened the concept of the liberation war of the Ukrainian people, providing an explanation of the reasons for Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s alliance with the khan and the hetman’s appeals to Russia.
The verdict accuses the Polish king Jan Casimir of violating his oath of religious tolerance and thereby substantiates the right of Ukrainians to consider themselves free from the oath to the Polish king. Finally, and most importantly, the verdict contains a final part with a decision on war against Poland and the acceptance of Ukraine into Russian citizenship.
Thus, by comparing these two documents related to the beginning and end of the work of the Zemsky Sobor, we can trace a certain evolution in the views of the Russian government, its readiness to finally make a firm decision on this issue by October 1, 1653.
In accordance with the position of individual ranks in the Russian feudal-absolutist state of the mid-17th century. The participation of all these ranks in the Zemsky Sobor was also of a different nature. While the boyars and Duma people “sentenced on everything” and their sentence was entirely included in the decision of the Council, the remaining ranks were only interrogated “separately”. The serving people could only answer whether, according to this decision, they were ready to “fight without sparing their heads” with the king. The trading people had to answer whether they would provide the war with “assistance” or whether they would fight.
By the end of the final meeting, the Council was informed of the government's intention to send an embassy to Ukraine led by V. Buturlin in order to “bring its inhabitants to faith.” "And on this date (October 1. - A.K.) Boyar Vasily Vasilyevich Buturlin and his comrades in the Faceted Palace were told" 30, - recorded in the "Palace Discharges".
On October 4, the hetman’s embassy headed by Lavrin Kapusta left for Ukraine, and on October 9, V. Buturlin’s embassy left Moscow to “receive” Ukraine.
29 TsGADA, Polish affairs, 1653, N 6, l. 3.
30 "Palace ranks". T. III, p. 372.
The decision of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 under the conditions of a feudal-absolutist monarchy could not be binding on the tsarist government. However, the government took the opinion of the “officials” of the state into account. It is enough to recall, for example, the royal letter to the embassy of Prince B. A. Repnin and B. M. Khitrovo regarding the break in the work of the Council in June 1653.
However, in relations with both new subjects, tsarism never referred to the decision of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 and did not even mention it. An example is the royal letter sent on the second day after the decision was made to ambassadors Streshnev and Bredikhin to Ukraine, as well as the article list of the embassy of V.V. Buturlin, which “received” Ukraine 31.
For all that, the decision of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653 certainly had historical significance. It expressed the opinion of certain social circles (landowners, merchants and archers close to the masses, as well as the taxing Black Hundreds and palace settlements). The opinion of these circles, represented at the Council in 1653, was undoubtedly influenced by the mood of the Russian people, their sympathetic attitude towards the struggling Ukraine. Without the categorical and unanimous verdict of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653, the tsarist government would not have risked taking Ukraine into citizenship and starting a war for it with lordly Poland.
Soviet historical science gave a correct assessment of the Zemsky Sobor of 1653. This assessment was expressed in the “Theses on the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia,” approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU: “The decision of the Zemsky Sobor was an expression of the will and desire of the entire Russian people to assist the fraternal Ukrainian people in their liberation struggle against foreign enslavers” 32.
31 "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia". T. III, p. 415.
32 "Theses on the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia (1654 - 1954)". M. 1954, p. 10.
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