Victory of the Japanese fleet
The situation before the battle
“Varyag” and “Korean” before the battle
The Japanese admiral offered to surrender, but the Russian ships ignored the signal.
- 11 hours 45 minutes.
After the cruiser had completely turned around, a large-caliber shell pierced the port side under water; Water poured into the hole and the 3rd stoker's compartment began to quickly fill with water, the level of which approached the fireboxes. Coal pits were battened down and filled with water. The senior officer and the senior boatswain applied a patch, the water was pumped out all the time, the level began to drop, but the cruiser continued to list to the left side.
The shell, which passed through the officers' quarters, which were destroyed, pierced the deck and set fire to the provisions department. After this, the bed nets on the waist under the infirmary were pierced, and fragments fell into the infirmary; the beds in the nets caught fire, the fire was quickly stopped. Serious damage forced to leave the sphere of fire for a longer time, which is why the cruiser went at full speed to the raid, continuing to fire back with its left side and stern guns.
"Varyag" under Japanese fire in Chemulpo Bay
The Japanese squadron followed the Russian ships, leaving Yodolmi to the north and stopped on the parallel of this last island. . Distance to the cruiser Asama during the pursuit there were about 30 cables.
According to the cruiser's logbook Varangian :
“During the continuation of the battle, one of the 6 shots” of gun No. XII destroyed the aft bridge of the cruiser “Asama” and started a fire on it, and “Asama” temporarily stopped firing. Its rear turret was apparently damaged, as it was no longer operational until the end of the battle."
Damage to the stern bridge was also noted in the gunboat's logbook.
- 12 hours 40 minutes.
When the cruiser approached the anchorage, the Japanese fire became dangerous for foreign ships in the roadstead, they stopped it and pursued Varangian two cruisers returned to the squadron remaining behind the island of Yodolmi. Fire with Korean was terminated simultaneously with the Japanese squadron.
- 12 hours 45 minutes.
The shells stopped reaching the Japanese cruisers, Varangian stopped fire.
- About 1 p.m.
Korean anchored 4 cables from the island of So-Wolmi (Observatory), remaining in full combat readiness.
- 13 hours 15 minutes.
Approaching his former anchor place, Varangian dropped the left anchor abeam the cruiser Talbot at a distance of about 1½ -2 cables from it. The second patch was supplied, work began to repair the damage, the rest of the team was separated into guns in anticipation of a possible enemy attack in the roadstead.
During the hour-long battle, the following shells were fired: 6-inch - 425, 75-mm - 470, 47-mm - 210. Total - 1,105.
After anchoring, the foreign ships, despite their readiness to leave, immediately sent boats with orderlies and doctors.
Destruction
When inspecting the cruiser, in addition to the listed damages, the following were also found:
- All 47mm guns are unfireable.
- Another 5 6-inch caliber guns received various serious damages.
- Seven 75mm guns were damaged in their mounts and compressors.
- The upper bend of the 3rd chimney was destroyed.
- All fans and boats are turned into sieve.
- The upper deck is broken in many places.
- Four more underwater holes were found, as well as many other damages.
Flooding
Explosion of "Korean"
- 13 hours 35 minutes.
The captain of the cruiser on a French boat went to the English cruiser Talbot, where he declared that he intended to destroy the Varyag due to its complete unsuitability. He received consent to transport the team to an English cruiser.
2) Ammunition consumption According to the canonical version (going back to the report of V.F. Rudnev), “Varyag” spent:
152 mm 425
75 mm 470
47 mm 210
total 1105
The standard ammunition of the Varyag included 2,388 rounds of 152 mm caliber, 3,000 rounds of 75 mm, 1,490 rounds of 64 mm caliber for airborne guns, 5,000 rounds of 47 mm caliber and 2,584 rounds of 37 mm caliber. However, during the process of raising the Varyag, the Japanese removed 128 shells of 152 mm caliber from it. They were handed over to the arsenal, several of them were rejected. Next, 2027 152 mm caliber charges, 391 steel 152 mm projectiles, 545 forged 152 mm projectiles, 587 cast iron 152 mm projectiles, 336 152 mm shrapnel, 88 152 mm segment projectiles were recovered from the raised cruiser. In total, 2,087 152-mm shells and 2,027 charges for them were raised. Subtracting these numbers (either of the two) from the ammunition we get a figure that is significantly less than the 425 shells declared by Rudnev. It is clear that we do not have data on the Varyag’s ammunition load before the battle, but it is quite logical to assume that it was standard or even less than standard.
The article also provided interesting data on the consumption of ammunition by Japanese ships:
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Takachiho |
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203 mm |
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152 mm |
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It is clearly seen that it was mainly “Asama” and “Niitaka” that fought. The rest made their presence known more. In addition, when the “Varyag” escaped and retreated to Chemulpo, it collided with Fr. Iodolmi and the Japanese, except for the Asama that rushed in pursuit, could not shoot at him.
It is clear that there is no point in advertising such things. You just need to know and draw conclusions. For myself, yes.
Original taken from visualhistory at the 110th anniversary of the feat of “Varyag”
In 1907, the commander of the cruiser, Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, was awarded the Japanese Order of the Rising Sun - in recognition of the heroism of Russian sailors, becoming one of the first Russians (and Europeans in general) to receive this order.
But here is the opinion of a participant in the Russo-Japanese War and Knight of St. George Martynov, who can hardly be suspected of not understanding what a military feat is:
“It was clear to everyone that if some determination was required from the commander of the ship in order to meet an enemy superior in strength, then on the part of the other ranks, mere presence on the ship (perhaps involuntary) in itself did not constitute a merit worthy of being awarded by the highest military order.
The dissatisfaction among the officers became even stronger when it later became clear that in general in the said battle the crew of the Varyag did not accomplish any feat, and there were even almost no losses on the Koreyets.”
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FIGHT IN CHEMULPO
Life is for the Motherland,
Soul to God
Honor - no one .
Motto on the margin of the Varyag logbook
By the beginning of 1904, relations between Russia and Japan had deteriorated to the limit. War could break out over the slightest trifle. Therefore, the command was strictly forbidden to take any initiative, so as not to provoke the Japanese.
At first, the Varyag’s service at the Chemulpo roadstead proceeded very calmly. On January 5, he was joined by the gunboat “Koreets” under the command of Captain II Rank G.P. Belyaev. On January 14, telegraph communication with Port Arthur was interrupted. On January 26, the “Korean” tried to leave Chemulpo, but was stopped at sea by a Japanese squadron. Having no order to engage in battle, Belyaev decided to turn back. And the next morning, Russian sailors learned about the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War.
The commander of the Japanese squadron, Rear Admiral S. Uriu, sent messages to the commanders of the warships of neutral countries located in Chemulpo - the English cruiser Talbot, the French Pascal, the Italian Elba and the American gunboat Vicksburg - messages with a request to leave the raid due to possible military operations against the "Varyag" and "Korean". The commanders of the first three ships protested that fighting in the roadstead would be a flagrant violation of Korea's formal neutrality, but it was clear that this was unlikely to stop the Japanese.
Early in the morning of January 27, 1904, V.F. Rudnev took part in a meeting of ship commanders, which took place on board the Talbot. Despite the obvious sympathy on the part of the British, French and Italians, they could not provide the Russian sailors with any obvious support for fear of violating neutrality.
Convinced of this, V.F. Rudnev told the commanders gathered on the Talbot that he would make an attempt to break through and take the fight, no matter how great the enemy’s forces were, that he would not fight in the roadstead and did not intend to surrender.
Returning to the cruiser, the commander announced to the officers the start of hostilities. The general opinion of the officers was to break through, and in case of failure, to blow up the ship, but under no circumstances give it to the enemy. Everyone had, however, a faint hope that the Japanese, offering to “leave the port,” would allow the ship to go to sea, where there was a greater chance of success than in a narrow, shallow roadstead or in the fairway, which deprived any freedom of maneuver.
At 10.45 V.F. Rudnev addressed the team lined up on the deck. Reporting the Japanese ultimatum, the commander said: “There can be no talk of surrender - we will not surrender our cruisers or ourselves to them and we will fight to the last opportunity and until last straw blood. Each one perform his duties accurately, calmly, and slowly, especially the gunners, remembering that each shell must harm the enemy. If there is a fire, extinguish it without publicity, letting me know.” The sailors of the Varyag supported the commander’s speech with a thunderous “hurray.” The “Korean” team greeted the news of the battle with the same enthusiasm. “I remember with reverence,” the Varyag doctor M.L. Banshchikov later recalled, “the unforgettable picture of the general enormous uplift of spirit; there seemed to be no barrier to these transformed people.”
At 11.20 on January 27, 1904, the cruiser “Varyag” and the gunboat “Koreets” raised anchors and headed towards the exit from the roadstead. The teams of foreign ships, lined up in front on the decks of their ships, paid tribute to the courage of the Russians going into a hopeless battle to the Russian anthem. “We saluted these heroes who walked so proudly to certain death,” the commander of the French cruiser Pascal, V. Sene, later wrote in a report.
The distance between the ships was maintained by 1-2 cables, the speed was approximately 6-7 knots. The weather that day was calm and frosty, and the sea was completely calm. At 11.25, Captain 1st Rank V.F. Rudnev ordered the combat alarm to be sounded and the topmast flags to be raised. The Japanese squadron was guarding the Russians at the southern tip of Phillip Island. The “Asama” was closest to the exit, and it was from it that the “Varyag” and “Koreets” walking towards them were discovered. Rear Admiral S. Uriu at this time received an officer from the Talbot on board the cruiser Naniva, who delivered documents from the commanders' meeting. Having received the news from the Asama, the commander quickly ended the conversation and ordered the anchor chains to be riveted, since there was no time to raise and remove the anchors. The ships began to hastily pull out onto the reach, forming combat columns as they went, in accordance with the disposition received the day before.
The Asama and Chiyoda were the first to move, followed by the flagship Naniwa and the cruiser Niitaka, somewhat behind. Destroyers from one of the detachments were walking abeam the non-firing side of the Naniva. The remaining destroyers with the cruisers Akashi and Takachiho, having developed a large speed, rushed in a southwestern direction. Advice "Chihaya" together with the destroyer "Kasasagi" were on patrol at the exit from the 30-mile fairway. Russian ships continued to move
The Japanese admiral offered a signal to surrender, but the commander of the Varyag did not consider it necessary to respond, and then, at 11.45, the first shot from the cruiser Asama fired from an 8-inch gun, after which the entire Japanese squadron opened fire. "Varyag", in turn, upon leaving the neutral roadstead, having carried out zeroing, opened fire with armor-piercing shells from a distance of 45 cables.
"Asama", observing the breakout cruiser on the port side, approached without stopping fire. He was actively supported by Naniva and Niytaka. At the same time, "Chiyoda" attacked "Korean". The Russian ships energetically responded with their starboard guns. The gunboat initially fired high-explosive shells from the right 8-inch gun alternately at the lead cruiser and Takachiho. Soon, the reduction in distance allowed the Korean to use the stern 6-inch gun.
One of the first Japanese shells destroyed the upper bridge of the Varyag and broke the fore shrouds. In this case, midshipman Count Alexey Nirod died, and all the rangefinders of station No. 1 were killed or wounded.
Subsequent shots from the Japanese knocked out a 6-inch gun, and all the gun and supply personnel were killed or wounded. At the same time, the plutong commander, midshipman Gubonin, was seriously wounded in the leg; he refused to go for a bandage and continued to command the plutong until, exhausted, he fell.
The cruiser began to burn. A fire broke out on the quarterdeck and was quickly extinguished by midshipman Chernilovsky-Sokol. Cartridges with smokeless powder, the deck and whaleboat No. 1 caught fire. The fire was caused by a shell that exploded on the deck, and 6 guns were knocked out. Other shells almost demolished the battle mainsail, destroyed rangefinder station No. 2, knocked out several more guns, and set fire to the armored deck lockers.
At 12.12, the signal “P” (“Rest”) was raised on the surviving halyards of the foremast, which meant “Turning to the right.” From that moment on, a chain of tragic events followed, accelerating the end of the battle. First, one enemy shell broke the pipe in which all the steering gears were laid. As a result, the uncontrollable ship rolled into circulation onto the rocks of Yodolmi Island. Almost simultaneously, a second shell exploded between Baranovsky's landing gun and the foremast. In this case, the entire crew of gun No. 35 died, as well as quartermaster I. Kostin, who was at the wheelhouse. The fragments flew into the passage of the conning tower, mortally wounding bugler N. Nagle and drummer D. Korneev. The cruiser commander escaped with only a slight injury and concussion. Further control of the ship had to be transferred to the aft steering compartment.
Suddenly a grinding sound was heard, and the ship, shuddering, stopped. In the conning tower, instantly assessing the situation, we gave the car the fullest reverse, but it was too late. Now the Varyag, turning to the enemy on its left side, was a stationary target. The Japanese commander, noticing the plight of the Russians, raised the signal “Everyone turn to approach the enemy.” The ships of all groups set a new course, simultaneously firing from their bow guns.
The Varyag's position seemed hopeless. The enemy was quickly approaching, and the cruiser sitting on the rocks could not do anything. It was at this time that he received the most severe injuries. At 12.25 a large-caliber shell, having pierced the side under water, exploded in coal pit No. 10, and at 12.30 an 8-inch shell exploded in coal pit No. 12. The third stoker began to quickly fill with water, the level of which approached the fireboxes (water poured into the stoker through open doors coal pit from which coal was taken). The stoker quartermasters Zhigarev and Zhuravlev, with remarkable dedication and composure, battened down the coal pit, stopping the access of water to the stoker. At the same time, senior officer Captain 2nd Rank Stepanov and senior boatswain Kharkovsky, under a hail of shrapnel, began placing plasters under the holes. And at that moment the cruiser itself, as if reluctantly, slid off the shoal and reversed away from the dangerous place. Without further tempting fate, Rudnev ordered to take a reverse course.
However, the situation still remained difficult. Although the water was pumped out by all means, the Varyag continued to list to the left side, and a hail of enemy shells showered it. One of them hit the third chimney, killing two gunners from the servants of the 75-mm gun on the left side. On the poop, the fire division unsuccessfully fought the fire in the provision department - flour was burning there, ignited by the explosion of an 8-inch shell (this fire was extinguished only after the cruiser returned to the roadstead). Soon another source of fire arose - the bed nets between the first and second chimneys ignited. But, to the surprise of the Japanese, the Varyag, having increased its speed, confidently moved towards the raid.
Due to the narrowness of the fairway, only the cruisers Asama and Chiyoda could pursue the Russians. “Varyag” and “Koreets” fired back furiously, but due to the sharp heading angles, only two or three 152-mm guns could fire. At this time, an enemy destroyer appeared from behind Yodolmi Island and rushed to attack. It was the turn of small-caliber artillery - from the surviving Varyag and Koreets guns they opened dense barrage fire. The destroyer turned sharply and left without causing any harm to the Russian ships.
This unsuccessful attack prevented the Japanese cruisers from approaching the Russian ships in a timely manner, and when the Asama again rushed in pursuit, the Varyag and Koreets were already approaching the anchorage. The Japanese had to cease fire as their shells began to fall near the ships of the international squadron. Because of this, the cruiser Elba even had to move deeper into the raid. At 12.45 the Russian ships also ceased fire. The fight is over.
In total, during the battle, the Varyag fired 1,105 shells: 425 152 mm, 470 75 mm and 210 47 mm. The effectiveness of its fire, unfortunately, is still unknown. According to official Japanese data published during the Russo-Japanese War, there were no hits on the ships of the Uriu squadron, and no one from their crews was injured. However, there is every reason to doubt the truth of this statement. So, on the cruiser "Asama" the bridge was destroyed and caught fire. Apparently the rear turret was damaged, as it ceased firing for the rest of the battle. The cruiser Takachiho also received serious damage. The cruiser "Chiyoda" was sent to the dock for repairs. After the battle, the Japanese brought 30 dead to A-san Bay. This information was obtained from Italian and English sources, as well as from the official report of our envoy in Korea. According to the official document (sanitary report for the war), the losses of the Varyag amounted to 130 people - 33 killed and 97 wounded. The "Korean" did not receive any damage and had no losses in the crew - it is clear that all the attention of the Japanese was turned to the "Varyag", after the destruction of which they expected to quickly finish off the boat.
Information about losses in personnel of the cruiser "Varyag"
In total, the cruiser was hit by 12-14 large high-explosive shells. Although the armored deck was not destroyed and the ship kept moving, it should be recognized that by the end of the battle the Varyag had almost completely exhausted its combat capabilities for resistance due to large losses in personnel and numerous serious damages.
The commander of the French cruiser Pascal, Victor Sene, who boarded the Varyag immediately after the battle, later recalled: “I will never forget this stunning sight that presented itself to me: the deck is covered in blood, corpses and body parts are lying everywhere. Nothing escaped destruction: in places where shells exploded, the paints were charred, all the iron parts were broken, the fans were knocked down, the sides and bunks were burnt. Where so much heroism had been shown, everything was rendered unusable, broken into pieces, riddled with holes; The remains of the bridge hung deplorably. Smoke was coming from all the holes in the stern, and the list to port was increasing.”
When inspecting the cruiser, in addition to the damage listed above, the following were also revealed:
- all 47 mm guns are unfit for firing;
- five 6-inch guns received various serious damages;
- seven 75-mm guns had their knurlings, compressors and other parts and mechanisms completely damaged;
- the upper bend of the third chimney was destroyed;
- all fans and lifeboats were destroyed;
- the upper deck was broken in many places;
- the command room was destroyed;
- damaged fore-mars;
- Four more holes were discovered.
Naturally, all this damage in the conditions of a besieged port could not be repaired and corrected on its own.
Rudnev, on a French boat, went to the English cruiser Talbot to negotiate the transportation of the Varyag crew to foreign ships and report on the supposed destruction of the cruiser right in the roadstead. The commander of the Talbot, Bailey, objected to the explosion of the Varyag, motivating his opinion by the large crowding of ships in the roadstead. At 13.50 Rudnev returned to the Varyag. Hastily gathering officers, he announced his intention and received their support. They immediately began transporting the wounded, and then the entire crew to foreign ships. At 15.15, the commander of the Varyag sent midshipman V. Balk to the Koreets. G.P. Belyaev immediately convened a military council, at which the officers decided: “The upcoming battle in half an hour is not equal, will cause unnecessary bloodshed... without harming the enemy, and therefore it is necessary... to blow up the boat...”. The crew of the Korean moved to the French cruiser Pascal. The Varyag team was divided into Pascal, Talbot and the Italian cruiser Elba. Subsequently, the commanders of the foreign ships received approval and gratitude from their envoys for their actions.
At 15.50, Rudnev and the senior boatswain, having walked around the ship and made sure that there was no one left on it, got off it along with the owners of the hold compartments, who opened the kingstons and flood valves. At 16.05 the Koreets was blown up, and at 18.10 the Varyag lay on its left side and disappeared under water. The team also destroyed the Russian steamship Sungari, which was in the bay.
The crews of the Russian ships were taken by foreign stationers to Shanghai, and from there they were sent to Russia on neutral transports. The sailors “Varyag” and “Korean” were greeted in triumph in Odessa. A special train transported the heroes across the country, and an enthusiastic reception awaited them at every station.
On April 14, 1904, the heroes of Chemulpo were solemnly welcomed in Moscow. On the Garden Ring in the area of the Spassky barracks was erected Triumphal Arch in honor of this event. Two days later, the teams of “Varyag” and “Koreyets” make a ceremonial march along Nevsky Prospect from the Moscow Station to the Winter Palace, where they are met by the Emperor. Next, the gentlemen officers were invited to breakfast with Nicholas II in the White Hall, and lunch was arranged for the lower ranks in the Nicholas Hall of the Winter Palace.
In the concert hall, a table with gold service was set for the highest persons.
Nicholas II addressed the heroes of Chemulpo with a speech: “I am happy, brothers, to see you all healthy and safely returned. Many of you, with your blood, have entered into the chronicle of our fleet a deed worthy of the exploits of your ancestors, grandfathers and fathers, who accomplished them on the Azov and Mercury. Now, with your feat, you have added a new page to the history of our fleet, adding to them the names “Varyag” and “Korean”. They will also become immortal. I am confident that each of you will remain worthy of the reward that I gave you until the end of your service. All of Russia and I read with love and trembling excitement about the exploits that you showed at Chemulpo. Thank you from the bottom of my heart for supporting the honor of St. Andrew’s flag and the dignity of Great Holy Rus'. I drink to further victories of our glorious fleet. To your health, brothers!”
Rudnev nominated the officers and sailors who distinguished themselves in battle for awards, and the emperor not only approved the submitted submissions, but also awarded orders to all participants in the battle in Chemulpo without exception.
Battle at Chemulpo
Opponents
Commanders of the forces of the parties
Strengths of the parties
The last battle of the cruiser "Varyag"- took place at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, near the city of Chemulpo in Korea between the Russian cruiser "Varyag", the gunboat "Koreets" under the overall command of Captain 1st Rank Vsevolod Rudnev and the Japanese squadron of Rear Admiral Sotokichi Uriu. During the battle, the Varyag received a number of damage and, together with the Korean, returned to the port, where the Russian ships were subsequently destroyed by their teams, who switched to neutral ships.
Position of forces before the battle
Chemulpo, view of the bay
Coast map
Chemulpo (an outdated name for the city of Incheon) is a strategically important port in Korea; warships of the world's leading powers were constantly stationed here. Political situation Korea was extremely unstable, and the military presence was a necessary condition different states defending their interests in this region. In preparation for the war with Russia, the Japanese command developed several variants of attack plans. All of them assumed the capture of Korea as a springboard for a further offensive. Under pressure from the ground forces, the Japanese landing was to take place in Chemulpo Bay, as the most convenient and closest harbor to Seoul.
Preparing for war
In a future war, Japan relied on surprise and speed of deployment of troops. They were stationed in Korea Japanese troops both openly (security forces based on international agreements) and secretly, living under the guise of civilians. They prepared the infrastructure for a future landing operation in advance, built food warehouses, communication points and barracks, and unloaded coal, boxes and bales with various cargoes from transport ships arriving at the port. All this was done with the tacit consent of the Korean authorities, who believed that all these were peaceful concerns of the local Japanese residents, of whom there were more than 4,500 people in Chemulpo.
| Cap. 1 rub. Rudnev reported in Port Arthur about the establishment of food warehouses by the Japanese in Chemulpo and Seoul. According to reports total the total Japanese provisions already reached 1,000,000 poods, and 100 boxes of ammunition were delivered. At the same time, the Japanese openly delivered scows, tugboats and steam boats to Chemulpo, which, as reported by the commander of the territory. "Varyag" clearly indicated extensive preparations for landing operations. Along railway Seoul-Fuzan, the Japanese set up officer stages connected by separate telegraph and telephone lines to a common telegraph line. All these preparations clearly pointed to the imminent occupation of Korea by the Japanese. |
In January, Japan completed preparations for the formation of an amphibious corps, transport ships, landing craft and logistics support. The Japanese fleet prepared the ships assigned to participate in the operation. This did not go unnoticed by Russia.
But no measures were taken by the Russian command. Underestimation and neglect of intelligence data had a serious impact on the course of hostilities at the beginning of the war. On the contrary, in order not to provoke the Japanese, St. Petersburg forbade the command and commanders of the ships any manifestation of initiative.
On February 7, ships carrying the Japanese expeditionary force began to drift off the coast of Korea in Asanman Bay. Having received fresh intelligence, Rear Admiral Uriu adjusted the landing plans.
The "Korean" incident
On January 26, the gunboat Koreets, having received mail, weighed anchor, but at the exit from the roadstead it was blocked by a squadron of Rear Admiral S. Uriu consisting of the armored cruisers Asama and Chiyoda, the cruisers Naniwa, Takachiho, Niitaka and Akashi, as well as three transports and four destroyers. The destroyers attacked the gunboat with two (according to another version, three) torpedoes, but were unsuccessful. Having no order to open fire and not knowing about the start of hostilities, the commander of the “Korean”, Captain 2nd Rank G.P. Belyaev, ordered to turn back.
| Our squad, like a giant snake, crawled along the fairway towards Incheon and, when half of its body had already circled Hachibito, the “Korean” appeared towards us. We were supposed to maintain a peaceful appearance until the end of the landing of troops, but when we saw the enemy, the thought flashed through everyone’s minds: “shouldn’t we capture him here, next to the island, since nothing will be visible from Inchon?” But we continued moving, and a few minutes later a small skirmish broke out between the “Korean” and two of the four destroyers. Uriu, of course, was somewhat concerned about this, but at the same time, being on the bridge and observing the skirmish, he noted with feigned indifference: “I don’t see any point in this.” |
During the trial, Commander Takachiho denied a mine attack on the Russian boat, and the actions of the destroyers, according to him, were dictated by the protection of transports from the attack of the “Korean”. As a result, the incident was presented as a misunderstanding. All night the Japanese landed troops. And in the morning, Russian sailors learned that the war between Russia and Japan had begun.
Ultimatum
Rear Admiral Uriu sent messages to the commanders of the warships of neutral countries located in Chemulpo (the English cruiser Talbot, the French Pascal, the Italian Elba and the American gunboat Vicksburg) with a request to leave the raid in connection with possible actions against the Varyag and the Korean. After a meeting on the English cruiser, the station commanders agreed to leave the harbor if the Russian ships did not leave it.
| At a meeting of commanders, various combinations were discussed, then, in a meeting secret from me, they decided: if I stay in the roadstead, they will leave, leaving me with the “Korean” and the steamship “Sungari”. Together with this, they decided to send a protest to the admiral against carrying out an attack on the roadstead. When asked by the commanders for my opinion, I replied that I would make an attempt to break through and accept battle with the squadron, no matter how large it was, but I would never surrender, and also fight in a neutral roadstead |
V.F. Rudnev, who was the commander of a detachment of Russian ships, decided to go to sea and try to fight his way to Port Arthur. The officers of “Varyag” and “Koreyets” unanimously supported this proposal at the military councils.
Characteristics of the parties involved
Takachiho with flags at half-mast to mark the death of Empress Mother Eisho, 1897
"Varyag" in 1901
"Korean" before last fight, the masts were cut down to make it more difficult for the enemy to aim
Japan
On the Japanese side, the armored cruisers Asama and Chiyoda, armored cruisers Naniwa, Takachiho, Niitaka, Akashi and three destroyers of the 14th detachment (Hayabusa, Chidori and Manazuru) took part in the battle. The detachment was diverse; the ranks included both veterans of the Sino-Japanese War with extensive combat experience and untrained newcomers.
IJN Asama
After this, the Russian cruiser, unexpectedly for the Japanese, slowed down and began to circulate to the right, turning to the opposite course (according to Russian data, the turn began at 12:15/12:50, according to Japanese - 10 minutes earlier). According to Rudnev’s report, one of the Japanese shells broke the communication pipe with the drives to the steering gear, but an examination of the Varyag after lifting traces of hits in the area of the pipe and combat damage to the steering gear did not reveal. The turn of the cruiser was motivated by its commander’s desire to temporarily get out of the enemy’s sphere of fire, put out the fires and correct the steering.
| While passing abeam Iodolmi Island, one shell broke the pipe in which all the steering gears pass, and at the same time, the cruiser commander was concussed in the head by fragments of another shell (exploded at the foremast), which flew into the passage near the conning tower... Control of the cruiser was immediately transferred to the manual steering wheel in the tiller compartment, since the steam pipe to the steering engine was also broken. With the thunder of shots, orders to the tiller compartment were hard to hear, it was necessary to control the machines, and the cruiser did not obey well, being, moreover, in a strong current. At 12 o'clock 15 m., wanting to temporarily leave the sphere of fire in order to correct, if possible, the steering gear and extinguish the fires that arose in different places, they began to turn the vehicles around and, since the cruiser did not obey the steering wheel well and due to the proximity of the island of Iodolmi, they reversed (the cruiser was parked in unfavorable position relative to the island at a time when the steering gear was broken with the steering wheel in the left position). The distance to the enemy decreased, his fire intensified and the hits increased; Around this time, a large-caliber shell pierced the left side under the water, water poured into the huge hole and the third firebox began to quickly fill with water, the level of which approached the fireboxes. Stoker quartermasters Zhigarev and Zhuravlev battened down the coal pits, which filled with water. |
According to Japanese data, in a short period from 12:05/12:40 to 12:06/12:41, “Varyag” received a large number of hits - one 203-mm shell between the bow bridge and the funnel, and five or six 152-mm shells into the bow and central part of the ship. The last hit was recorded at 12:10/12:45 - a 203-mm shell exploded in the stern of the Russian cruiser.
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There was a very fast current in the battle area, which made it difficult to control the ship, and it was impossible to maintain a constant course. |
Until 11:59/12:34, only Asama fired at the Varyag, then until 12:13/12:48, all Japanese cruisers fired with varying intensity. Afterwards, Asama and Niitaka fired until the end of the battle. According to Rudnev’s report, during the period of circulation, the “Varyag” experienced difficulties in steering, as a result of which, in order to prevent a collision with the island of Yodolmi (Phalmido), it was necessary to briefly reverse; some sources claim that the “Varyag” still ran aground, but got off it in reverse.
At 12:13/12:48, the Varyag completed its circulation and, together with the Korean, moved back to the anchorage, pursued by the Japanese cruisers Asama and Niitaka. At 12:40/13:15, due to the approach of Russian ships to the anchorage, which, if the battle continued, created a threat to neutral ships, the Japanese cruisers ceased fire and retreated. Five minutes later, due to the increased distance to the enemy, the Russian ships also completed firing, and at 13:00/13:35 they anchored in their anchorages.
Results of the battle
The Japanese cruisers fought in three battle groups: Asama and Chiyoda, Naniwa and Niitaka, Takachiho and Akashi. The destroyers were located 500-600 m from the non-firing side of Naniwa and did not actually take part in the battle. The battle was complicated by the narrowness of the fairway, which made it difficult for the Japanese to bring all ships into battle at the same time, a strong current, which made it difficult to maintain course, as well as the Varyag's periodic hits on target with the island of Phalmido, which forced individual Japanese ships to temporarily cease fire. Japanese ships actively maneuvered during the battle, developing speeds of up to 18 knots. The battle took place at a distance of 4800 to 8000 m.
The most active participants in the battle were Asama, Chiyoda and Niitaka. The remaining Japanese cruisers fired a small number of shells.
| Asama | Chiyoda | Niitaka | Naniwa | Takachiho | Akashi | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 203 mm | 27 | 27 | |||||
| 152 mm | 103 | 53 | 14 | 10 | 2 | 182 | |
| 120 mm | 71 | 71 | |||||
| 76 mm | 9 | 130 | 139 |
The consumption of shells in battle by Russian ships remains a subject of debate. According to Rudnev's report, the Varyag fired 425 152-mm shells, 470 - 75-mm, 210 - 47-mm, that is, significantly more than all Japanese ships combined. However, the calculation of the shells remaining on it, carried out by the Japanese after the cruiser was raised, does not confirm this information and gives significantly lower figures for the Varyag’s ammunition consumption in battle. According to calculations, the cruiser fired no more than 160 shells of 152 mm caliber and about 50 shells of 75 mm caliber. The consumption of shells by the “Korean”, according to the report of its commander, was: 203 mm - 22, 152 mm - 27, 107 mm - 3.
During the battle, the following shells were recorded hitting the Varyag on Japanese ships: 203 mm from Asama - 3, 152 mm - 6 or 7 (4-5 from Asama and one each from Naniwa and Takachiho). Chiyoda also reported an alleged single hit on the Koreets that caused a fire, which is not confirmed by Russian data.
The Varyag's logbook and Rudnev's reports record a number of hits, including one in the underwater part of the ship, which caused the flooding of part of the coal pits and a noticeable list of the ship to the left side. Two hits were noted in the stern of the cruiser, which caused fires, and in one case, artillery powder charges, the deck and the whaleboat burned, and in the second, the officer's cabins were destroyed and the flour in the provision department was set on fire (this fire was never completely extinguished). Other hits destroyed rangefinder station No. 2, damaged the main top and chimney No. 3, and knocked out a number of guns. The explosion of one of the shells, fragments of which flew into the conning tower, concussed the cruiser commander, killing and wounding several more people. An inspection carried out after the battle revealed damage to: five 152 mm, seven 75 mm and all 47 mm guns.
From the Varyag team, 1 officer and 22 lower ranks died directly during the battle (after the battle, 10 more people died within a few days). During the short battle, the cruiser lost about a quarter of its entire crew killed and wounded; the exact number of wounded remains debatable, since different figures appear in the sources. The cruiser's logbook indicates that one officer and 26 lower ranks were seriously wounded, "less seriously wounded" - the cruiser commander, two officers and 55 lower ranks, all wounded are indicated by name. Rudnev’s report to the head of the Naval Ministry indicated that one officer and 85 lower ranks were seriously and moderately wounded, two officers and more than a hundred lower ranks were lightly wounded, the report to Governor Rudnev gives other figures - one officer and 70 lower ranks were seriously wounded, lightly - two officers, as well as many lower ranks, received minor wounds from shell fragments. The official sanitary report on the results of the Russo-Japanese War gives a figure of 97 wounded; finally, according to the historical journal HMS Talbot, a total of 68 wounded were taken onto neutral ships (four officers and 64 lower ranks), several of whom subsequently died. The gunboat "Koreets" had no crew losses, and damage was limited to one fragmentation hole in the ram compartment.
Damage diagram of the Varyag (from the report of Rear Admiral Arai Yukan)
During the recovery of the Varyag, the Japanese examined the cruiser and described in detail the damage found. In total, traces of 9 battle damage were found in the hull and superstructures (masts and pipes were dismantled during lifting), as well as one damage that occurred after the ship was sunk:
- A hole measuring 0.6 × 0.15 m on the forward bridge on the starboard side and next to it several small holes
- A hole measuring 3.96 × 1.21 m and next to it there are 10 small holes on the deck on the starboard side in the area of the forward bridge
- A hole measuring 0.75 × 0.6 m and next to it three small holes in the bulwark on the starboard side, between the first and second chimney
- A hole measuring 1.97 × 1.01 m in the left side at the waterline (the lower edge of the hole went 0.8 m below the waterline), between the second and third chimney
- An underwater hole measuring 1.99 × 0.15 m in the left side, behind the fourth chimney, caused by pushing through the side with stones after the ship was flooded
- 12 small holes in the central part of the upper deck, near the mainmast
- A hole measuring 0.72 × 0.6 m in the left side, 1.62 m above the waterline, under the 152 mm gun No. 10
- A very large (3.96 × 6.4 m in size) hole on the upper deck on the port side, in the area of 152 mm guns No. 11 and 12, where a large fire occurred
- Six small holes on the starboard side at the aft end behind the 152 mm guns
- A hole measuring 0.75 × 0.67 m on the upper deck at the aft end
Taking into account the hits in the dismantled structures, A. Polutov comes to the conclusion that there were 11 hits in the Varyag. According to V. Kataev, damage No. 5 occurred as a result of the cruiser landing on rocks near the island of Phalmido, and damage No. 8, 9 and 10 are not of a combat nature and are the result of a fire and explosion of ammunition that occurred in Chemulpo on a ship abandoned after the evacuation of the crew.
As a result of the Japanese examination of the ship, it was also found that 1⁄6th of the ship was damaged by fires, the deck in the aft part was especially damaged. The power plant and mechanisms of the propeller-rudder group did not have any combat damage and were in good condition. After inspection, the Japanese declared all 152-mm guns, as well as at least six 75-mm and two 47-mm Varyag guns, suitable for use.
According to Russian sources (reports by Rudnev and Belyaev, ship logs), it was observed that Asama hit the aft bridge with a fire and sunk one of the destroyers. According to information received by Rudnev from various sources (including rumors), the cruiser Takachiho sank after the battle while moving to Sasebo, the cruisers Asama and Naniwa were docked to repair the damage, the Japanese brought 30 dead ashore. However, Japanese historical and archival sources claim that there were no hits on the ships of the Japanese squadron, as well as any damage or losses. The fate of the ships of the Japanese fleet is now well known; in particular, the cruiser Takachiho was lost during the First World War during the siege of Qingdao, the destroyers of the 9th and 14th detachments were excluded from the lists of the fleet in 1919-1923 and scrapped.
The firing of Russian ships was assessed by Uriu as “indiscriminate” and having “extremely low accuracy.” The ineffectiveness of the firing of Russian ships is explained by the poor training of the gunners (for example, during training firing at the shield on December 16, 1903, out of 145 shells fired by the Varyag, only three hit the target), errors in determining the distance to enemy ships (associated, among other things, with the failure of in the battle of rangefinder stations), destruction of the fire control system.
Destruction of Russian ships
Explosion of the gunboat "Korean"
"Varyag" after flooding, at low tide
After anchoring, the officers and crew of the Varyag began inspecting the ship and repairing the damage. At 13:35, Rudnev went to the Talbot, where he announced to its commander his intention to destroy the Varyag and transport the crew to neutral ships. Having received Bailey's consent, Rudnev returned to the cruiser at 13:50 and reported his decision to the officers, who supported the commander at the general council (it should be noted that the officers' decision was not unanimous, in particular, the senior officer of the Varyag, V. Stepanov, was not invited to the council, and Rudnev’s order to leave the ship came as a complete surprise to him).
| I voted for a breakthrough from Chemulpo to the sea, and this opinion was supported by all the officers in the control room. Damage to the steering gear apparently forced the proposed plan to be changed, and the commander, I believe, to correct the damage, went on a raid in order to get out of the enemy’s sphere of fire. Captain 1st Rank V.F. Rudnev, after the battle with the Japanese to anchor the cruiser in the Chemulpo roadstead, having informed of all the damage to the cruiser received during the battle, went on a French boat with the commander of the cruiser Talbot, Captain Belly, as the senior officer on the roadstead. Upon returning from the cruiser Talbot, the commander made known his decision to sink the cruiser and transport people to foreign ships anchored in the roadstead. Before the trip to the cruiser Talbot, the commander did not gather a council and did not express a definite decision. I cannot say how and in what form Captain 1st Rank V.F. Rudnev announced the decision to the officers. I was not invited to the council. From the moment the cruiser left the enemy's sphere of fire, he was busy with orders to prepare the ship for a new meeting with the enemy. I didn’t expect at all that we had to leave our cruiser. |
Boats from foreign ships with doctors began to arrive at the Varyag, who began transporting first the wounded, and then the rest of the ship’s crew to the English, French and Italian cruisers. The commander of the American gunboat, having no instructions from the leadership, refused to accept Russian sailors, and therefore Rudnev sent her boat with a doctor. By 15:50, the transportation of the cruiser’s crew was completed; at the request of the commanders of foreign ships, who feared damage to their ships in the explosion (which took place according to Rudnev’s message), it was decided to limit the sinking of the Varyag by opening the valves and seacocks, while no measures were taken to to render the cruiser's weapons and equipment unusable. The team took a minimum of things; the bodies of the dead were not evacuated and were left on the ship. At 18:10, the Varyag, with an ongoing fire at the stern, capsized on the left side and lay on the ground.
At 15:30, the commander of the “Korean” gathered the officers, informed them about the decision made by Rudnev and proposed to discuss future fate gunboat. All officers, starting with the youngest, spoke out about the pointlessness of a new battle due to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy and the impossibility of causing any damage to him. In this regard, it was decided to blow up the “Korean” and take the crew to neutral ships. Due to the haste of the evacuation, the team did not take things, and secret documents were burned in the presence of a special commission. The last lifeboat left the boat at 15:51, and at 16:05 the gunboat was blown up and sank. At the same time, the Sungari steamer was set on fire, and after some time it landed on the ground.
Fate of the teams
The officers and crews of the Russian ships were stationed on the French cruiser Pascal (216 people), the English cruiser Talbot (273 people) and the Italian cruiser Elba (176 people). Considering the high overcrowding and the lack of conditions for caring for the wounded (8 of whom soon died), a decision was made to transport 24 seriously wounded ashore to the Japanese Red Cross hospital. At the same time, negotiations were held through diplomatic channels about the status of the Russian sailors; the Japanese agreed to return them to their homeland, subject to their commitment not to participate in the war anymore, for which the highest permission was required.
On February 27, Nicholas II gave his consent to the Japanese conditions, but the removal of the crews of Russian ships began earlier, under the obligations of foreign governments. On February 16, Pascal left for Shanghai and then to Saigon, where he landed Russian sailors. The English and Italian cruisers went to Hong Kong, where the crews of the Russian ships on the Talbot were transported via Colombo to Odessa (where they arrived on April 1), and the sailors from Elba to Saigon. From Saigon via Crete and Odessa, the sailors arrived in Sevastopol on April 23. After the ceremonial meeting in St. Petersburg, the ships' crews were disbanded and distributed among different fleets, except for the Pacific (in accordance with the agreement with the Japanese on the non-participation of the crews in hostilities).
The remains of the dead sailors were transferred to Vladivostok in 1911 and buried in a mass grave at the city's Marine Cemetery. An obelisk made of gray granite is installed above the grave.
"Varyag", raised by the Japanese from the bottom of the bay
The Japanese army was given the opportunity for strategic deployment in the north of the Korean Peninsula, and not in the south, as previously determined. The rapid occupation of Seoul was important both militarily and politically. On February 12, the Russian envoy left Seoul, thereby Russia lost its last opportunity to influence the policies of the Korean imperial court and government.
The landing of the 12th Division, called the “Operation to Pacify Korea,” brought Japan in two weeks what it had long and unsuccessfully sought during diplomatic negotiations with Russia - complete control over Korea. On February 23, 1904, a Japanese-Korean agreement was signed in Seoul, establishing a Japanese protectorate over Korea, which allowed Japan, during the war with Russia, to operate unhindered throughout Korea, to use its ports, land communications, administrative, human and material resources.
In 1905, Varyag was raised by the Japanese, repaired and commissioned on August 22 as the 2nd class cruiser IJN Soya (after the Japanese name for the La Perouse Strait). It was used by the Japanese for training purposes for more than seven years. It is widely believed that as a sign of respect for Russian sailors, the Japanese left the old name of the ship on the stern. However, according to the testimony of the former sailor of the “Varyag” Snegirev, who served as a helmsman in the First World War and met his former cruiser in a Japanese port, the Japanese were forced to leave the Russian state emblem - a double-headed eagle - and the name “Varyag”, since they were structurally embedded in the aft balcony . The Japanese attached the hieroglyphs of the new name to the grille of the balcony.
Assessment by contemporaries
The actions of the Japanese side in modern sources are assessed as competent and professional. They made it possible to complete all the assigned tasks - to ensure a landing and neutralize Russian ships without suffering losses. It is noted that the victory was achieved by the Japanese primarily due to the overwhelming superiority in forces and the characteristics of the battle area, which deprived the Russian ships of freedom of maneuver. The decision to enter Russian ships into battle against significantly superior enemy forces is assessed as heroic, including from the Japanese side.
The reaction to the death of the Varyag was not clear. Some naval officers did not approve of the actions of the Varyag commander, considering them illiterate both from a tactical and technical point of view. At the same time, it is noted that the provisions of the “Naval Charter” left no other option for Rudnev than to accept a fight - surrendering the ship to the Japanese or sinking it without a fight would be classified as a malfeasance. According to a number of authors (in particular, V.D. Dotsenko, as well as Major General A.I. Sorokin), the commander of the Varyag made a number of serious mistakes:
- was not used for a breakthrough the night before the battle;
- going for a breakthrough, the “Varyag” tied itself down to the slow-moving “Korean”, without using its advantage in speed (this mistake was also noted by the naval historian and theorist V.A. Belli);
- After the battle, the Varyag was not blown up, but scuttled in shallow water, which allowed the Japanese to raise it and put it into operation.
Rudnev's decision to return to Chemulpo instead of continuing the battle, as well as the ineffective use of artillery by Russian ships, as a result of which the Japanese ships did not suffer any damage, is criticized.
Considering the unsuccessful start of the war, the tsarist government decided to widely use the battle for propaganda purposes, which came as a surprise to some participants in the battle (according to the memoirs of the Varyag navigator E. Behrens, returning to Russia, they believed that they would be put on trial).
In Odessa, Sevastopol and St. Petersburg, ceremonial meetings of the participants in the battle were organized, and in the capital - with the participation of Emperor Nicholas II. Without exception, all participants in the battle were awarded - officers, as well as civilian ranks (including officials and doctors) of both ships received the Order of St. George, 4th degree or other orders, lower ranks received insignia of the Military Order of the 4th degree. Two sailors received insignia of the Military Order of the 3rd degree, since they already had a 4th degree award. Moreover, the officers of the “Korean” were even awarded twice - in addition to the Order of St. George, they also received regular orders with swords. All participants in the battle were awarded a specially established medal “For the battle of “Varyag” and “Korean””.
Such a massive awarding of high awards was an unprecedented event for the Russian fleet. Already in Soviet time, in 1954, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the battle, its surviving participants by that time were awarded medals “For Courage”. It is noteworthy that for the first time doctors and mechanics were awarded the Cross of St. George along with combat officers. The unprecedented awarding of the highest military awards to all ship crew members was met with ambiguity among officers:
| The Cross of St. George... gives great service advantages and is awarded only for outstanding military exploits, moreover, by the verdict of the Duma, composed of gentlemen of this order... However, they also managed to discredit the St. George Cross. At the very beginning of the war, under the first impression of the “feat” of the “Varyag” and “Korean”, all the officers, doctors and mechanics on board were awarded, by special order of the Highest, in addition to the Duma, the Cross of St. George. Such a massive award, in connection with the unheard-of honors rendered to the crews of these ships in Russia, made a very unfavorable impression on the army. It was clear to everyone that if some determination was required from the commander of the ship in order to meet an enemy superior in strength, then on the part of the other ranks, mere presence on the ship (maybe involuntary) in itself did not constitute a merit worthy of being awarded the highest military order . The dissatisfaction among the officers became even stronger when it later became clear that in general in this battle the crew of the Varyag did not accomplish any feat, and there were even almost no losses on the Koreyets... |
Image in art
As a result of the patriotic upsurge caused by the feat of Russian sailors, several works were born: the march “Varyag”, written by A. Reiderman, the song “Varyag is going to accomplish his glorious feat”, written by Caesar Cui, “Heroic Feat” by A. Taskin, the poem “ Varyag" by the Riga amateur poet Yakov Repninsky (which was later set to music by Yuryev University student Fyodor Bogoroditsky, resulting in the song "Cold Waves Splashing"). But the song “Varyag” became the most popular.
The author of the poems was the Austrian writer and poet Rudolf Greinz, who wrote about the life and traditional way of life in Tyrol. He often collaborated with the Munich magazine Jugend, where his satirical notes on the topic of the day were published. On the pages of the 10th issue of the magazine “Jugend” dated February 25, 1904, the poem “Der “Warjag”” was published. The magazine strictly adhered to the anti-militaristic and anti-imperial position, which Greinz shared, which, along with the fact that the poem was placed in the vicinity of humorous and satirical materials, without any opening remarks, according to some historians, indicates that the poem was originally a pamphlet in verse - “The text, decorated with expressive adjectives, was of a rather naturalistic nature, in order, perhaps, to show the absurdity of the act of those who went to real death for the sake of some abstract ideas "
The poem was translated into Russian by N.K. Melnikov and Evgenia Mikhailovna Studenskaya (née Shershevskaya), who published her translation in the April “New Journal of Foreign Literature, Art and Science” for April 1904. According to one version, on a wave of patriotism that swept across Russian society, musician and student of the 12th Astrakhan Grenadier Regiment Alexey Sergeevich Turishchev wrote music for Studenskaya’s translation.
The song “Our proud “Varyag” does not surrender to the enemy”, sounded for the first time at the imperial reception on the occasion of awarding the sailors from the “Varyag” and “Korean”, became especially beloved among naval employees, however, there were also many of its fans among the civilian population.
In 1946, the Soviet film studio “Soyuzdetfilm” shot the feature film “Cruiser “Varyag””, where the “made-up” cruiser “Aurora”, directed by Viktor Eisymont, starred in the role of “Varyag”.
Cruiser "Varyag". - 2nd ed., revised. and additional . - L.: Shipbuilding, 1983. - 288 p.
Cruiser "Varyag". During the Soviet era, there would hardly have been a person in our country who had never heard of this ship. For many generations of our compatriots, the Varyag became a symbol of the heroism and dedication of Russian sailors in battle.
However, perestroika, glasnost and the “wild 90s” that followed came. Ours has been subject to revision by all and sundry, and throwing mud at it has become a fashionable trend. Of course, “Varyag” also got it, and in full. His crew and commander were accused of everything! It was already agreed that Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev deliberately (!) sank the cruiser where it could be easily raised, for which he subsequently received a Japanese order. But on the other hand, many sources of information have appeared that were not previously available to historians and lovers of naval history - perhaps their study can really make adjustments to the history familiar to us from childhood heroic cruiser?
This series of articles, of course, will not dot all the i’s. But we will try to bring together information about the history of the design, construction and service of the cruiser up to and including Chemulpo, based on the data available to us, we will analyze the technical condition of the ship and the training of its crew, possible breakthrough options and various scenarios of action in battle. We will try to figure out why the commander of the cruiser, Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, made certain decisions. In light of the above, we will analyze the postulates of the official version of the Varyag battle, as well as the arguments of its opponents. Of course, the author of this series of articles has formed a certain view of the feat of the “Varyag”, and it will, of course, be presented. But the author sees his task not in persuading the reader to any point of view, but in giving maximum information, on the basis of which everyone can decide for himself what the actions of the commander and crew of the cruiser "Varyag" are for him - a reason be proud of the fleet and your country, a shameful page in our history, or something else.
Well, we’ll start with a description of where such an unusual type of warship came from in Russia, such as high-speed armored cruisers of the 1st rank with a normal displacement of 6-7 thousand tons.
The ancestors of the armored cruisers of the Russian Imperial Navy can be considered the armored corvettes “Vityaz” and “Rynda” with a normal displacement of 3,508 tons, built in 1886.
Three years later, the Russian fleet was replenished with a larger armored cruiser with a displacement of 5,880 tons - it was the Admiral Kornilov, ordered in France, the construction of which began at the Loire shipyard (Saint-Nazaire) in 1886. However, then there was a slowdown in the construction of armored cruisers in Russia long pause - almost a decade, from 1886 to 1895, the Russian Imperial Navy did not order a single ship of this class. Yes, and the Svetlana (with a displacement of 3828 tons), laid down at the end of 1895 at the French shipyards, although it was a quite decent small armored cruiser for its time, was still built rather as a representative yacht for the admiral general, and not as a ship , corresponding to the doctrine of the fleet. “Svetlana” did not fully meet the requirements for this class of warships by Russian sailors, and therefore was built in a single copy and was not replicated at domestic shipyards.
What, strictly speaking, were the fleet’s requirements for armored cruisers?
The fact is that the Russian Empire in the period 1890-1895. began seriously strengthening its Baltic Fleet with squadron battleships. Before this, in 1883 and 1886. two “battleships-rams” “Emperor Alexander II” and “Emperor Nicholas I” were laid down, and then only in 1889 - “Navarin”. Very slowly - one armadillo every three years. But in 1891 the Sisoy the Great was laid down, in 1892 - three squadron battleships of the Sevastopol type, and in 1895 - Peresvet and Oslyabya. And this is not even counting the laying of three coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Senyavin type, from which, in addition to traditional solutions to problems for this class of ships, they were also expected to support the main forces in the general battle with the German fleet.
In other words, the Russian fleet sought to create armored squadrons for a general battle, and of course, such squadrons required ships to support their operations. In other words, the Russian Imperial Navy needed reconnaissance officers attached to the squadrons - it was precisely this role that armored cruisers could quite successfully perform.
However, here, alas, dualism had its say, which largely predetermined the development of our fleet at the end of the 19th century. When creating the Baltic Fleet, Russia wanted to get a classic “two in one”. On the one hand, forces were required that were capable of giving a general battle to the German fleet and establishing dominance in the Baltic. On the other hand, they needed a fleet capable of entering the ocean and threatening British communications. These tasks completely contradicted each other, since their solution required different types ships: for example, the armored cruiser Rurik was excellent for ocean raiding, but was completely inappropriate in a linear battle. Strictly speaking, Russia needed a battle fleet to dominate the Baltic and, separately, a second cruising fleet for war in the ocean, but, of course, the Russian Empire could not build two fleets, if only for economic reasons. Hence the desire to create ships capable of equally effectively fighting enemy squadrons and cruising in the ocean: a similar trend affected even the main strength of the fleet (the Peresvet series of “battleship cruisers”), so it would be strange to think that armored cruisers would not be supplied similar task.
As a matter of fact, this is exactly how the requirements for the domestic armored cruiser were determined. He was supposed to become a scout for the squadron, but also a ship suitable for ocean cruising.
Russian admirals and shipbuilders at that time did not at all consider themselves “ahead of the rest”, therefore, when creating a new type of ship, they paid close attention to ships of a similar purpose, built by the “Mistress of the Seas” - England. What happened in England? In 1888-1895. Foggy Albion built a large number of 1st and 2nd class armored cruisers.
At the same time, 1st class ships, strange as it may sound, were the “successors” of the Orlando-class armored cruisers. The fact is that these armored cruisers, according to the British, did not live up to the hopes placed on them; due to overload, their armor belt went under the water, thereby not protecting the waterline from damage, and in addition, in England, William took the post of chief builder White, opponent of armored cruisers. Therefore, instead of improving this class of ships, England in 1888 began building large armored cruisers of the 1st rank, the first of which were the Blake and Blenheim - huge ships with a displacement of 9150-9260 tons, carrying a very powerful armored deck (76 mm, and on bevels - 152 mm), strong weapons (2 * 234 mm, 10 * 152 mm, 16 * 47 mm) and developing a very high speed for that time (up to 22 knots).
Armored cruiser "Blake"
However, these ships seemed to their lordships to be excessively expensive, so the next series of 8 cruisers of the Edgar type, which entered the stocks in 1889-1890, was smaller in displacement (7467-7820 tons), speed (18.5/20 knots at natural /forced traction) and armor (the thickness of the bevels decreased from 152 to 127 mm).
All these ships were formidable fighters, but they, in fact, were cruisers not for squadron service, but for the protection of ocean communications, that is, they were “defenders of trade” and “raider killers,” and as such, were not very suitable for the Russian fleet. In addition, their development led the British to a dead end - in an effort to create ships capable of intercepting and destroying armored cruisers of the Rurik and Rossiya type, the British in 1895 laid down the armored deck Powerful and Terrible, which had a total displacement of over 14 thousand. etc. The creation of ships of this size (and cost), without vertical armor protection, was obvious nonsense.
Therefore, the analogues for the newest Russian armored cruisers were considered to be the English 2nd class cruisers, which had similar functionality, that is, they could serve with squadrons and perform overseas service.
Since 1889-1890 Great Britain laid down as many as 22 Apollo-class armored cruisers, built in two subseries. The first 11 ships of this type had a displacement of about 3,400 tons and did not carry copper-wood plating of the underwater part, which slowed down the fouling of ships, while their speed was 18.5 knots with natural draft and 20 knots when boosting the boilers. The next 11 Apollo-class cruisers had copper-wood plating, which increased their displacement to 3,600 tons, and reduced their speed (natural thrust/boosted) to 18/19.75 knots respectively. The armor and armament of the cruisers of both subseries was the same - an armored deck with a thickness of 31.75-50.8 mm, 2 * 152 mm, 6 * 120 mm, 8 * 57 mm, 1 * 47 mm guns and four 356 mm torpedo tubes apparatus.
The next armored cruisers of the British, 8 ships of the Astraea type, laid down in 1891-1893, became a development of the Apollo, and, in the opinion of the British themselves, not a very successful development. Their displacement increased by almost 1,000 tons, reaching 4,360 tons, but the additional weight was spent on subtle improvements - the armor remained at the same level, the armament “increased” by only 2 * 120 mm guns, and the speed decreased further, amounting to 18 knots with natural thrust and 19.5 knots with forced thrust. However, they served as the prototype for the creation of a new series of British 2nd class armored cruisers.
In 1893-1895. The British are laying down 9 cruisers of the Eclipse type, which we called the “Talbot type” (the same “Talbot” that served as a stationary on the Chemulpo roadstead along with the cruiser “Varyag”). These were much larger ships, the normal displacement of which reached 5,600 tons. They were protected by a somewhat more solid armored deck (38-76 mm) and they carried more solid weapons - 5 * 152 mm, 6 * 120 mm, 8 * 76- mm and 6*47 mm guns, as well as 3*457 mm torpedo tubes. At the same time, the speed of the Eclipse-class cruisers was frankly modest - 18.5/19.5 knots with natural/forced thrust.
So, what conclusions did our admirals draw from observing the development of the armored cruiser class in the UK?
Initially, a competition was announced for the cruiser project, and exclusively among domestic designers. They were asked to present designs for a ship with a displacement of up to 8,000 tons and a speed of at least 19 knots. and artillery, which included 2*203 mm (at the extremities) and 8*120 mm guns. Such a cruiser for those years looked excessively large and strong for a reconnaissance officer attached to a squadron; one can only assume that the admirals, knowing the characteristics of the English 1st class armored cruisers, were thinking about a ship capable of resisting them in battle. But, despite the fact that during the 1894-1895 competition were received very interesting projects(7,200 – 8,000 tons, 19 knots, 2-3*203 mm guns and up to 9*120 mm guns), further development they did not receive it: it was decided to focus on British armored cruisers of the 2nd rank.
At the same time, it was initially planned to focus on Astraea-class cruisers, with the obligatory achievement of 20 knot speeds and “a possibly larger area of operation.” However, almost immediately a different proposal arose: the engineers of the Baltic Shipyard presented MTK with preliminary studies of designs for cruisers with a displacement of 4,400, 4,700 and 5,600 tons. All of them had a speed of 20 knots and an armored deck 63.5 mm thick, only the armament differed - 2 * 152- mm and 8*120 mm on the first, 2*203 mm and 8*120 mm on the second and 2*203 mm, 4*152 mm, 6*120 mm on the third. A note accompanying the drafts explained:
“The Baltic Shipyard deviated from the English cruiser Astrea prescribed as an analogue, since it does not represent the most advantageous type among other new cruisers of different nations.”
Then the Eclipse-class cruisers were chosen as a “role model”, but then data became known about the French armored cruiser D'Entrecasteaux (7,995 tons, armament 2 * 240 mm in single-gun turrets and 12 * 138 mm , speed 19.2 knots). As a result, a new cruiser design was proposed with a displacement of 6,000 tons, a speed of 20 knots and armament of 2 * 203 mm and 8 * 152 mm. Alas, soon, by the will of the Admiral General, the ship lost its 203-mm guns for the sake of uniformity of calibers and... thus began the history of the creation of domestic armored cruisers of the Diana type.
It must be said that the design of this series of domestic cruisers became an excellent illustration of where the road paved leads good intentions. In theory, the Russian Imperial Navy was supposed to receive a series of excellent armored cruisers, superior to the British ones in many respects. The armored deck of a single 63.5 mm thickness provided at least equivalent protection to the English 38-76 mm. Ten 152-mm guns were preferable to the 5*152-mm, 6*120-mm English ship. At the same time, “Diana” was supposed to become significantly faster than “Eclipse” and this was the point.
Tests of warships of the Russian fleet did not include boosting the boilers; Russian ships had to show the contract speed using natural thrust. This is very important point, which is usually missed by the compilers of ship personnel directories (and behind them, alas, the readers of these directories). So, for example, data is usually given that the Eclipse developed 19.5 knots, and this is true, but it is not indicated that this speed was achieved by boosting the boilers. At the same time, the contract speed of the Diana is only half a knot higher than that of the Eclipse, and in fact, cruisers of this type were only able to develop 19-19.2 knots. From this we can assume that the Russian cruisers turned out to be even less fast than their English “prototype”. But in fact, the “goddesses” developed their 19 knots of speed on natural thrust, at which the speed of the “Eclipses” was only 18.5 knots, that is, our cruisers, with all their shortcomings, were still faster.
However, let's return to the Diana project. As we said earlier, their protection was expected to be no worse, their artillery better, and their speed one and a half knots greater than that of the British Eclipse-class cruisers, but that was not all. The fact is that the Eclipses had fire-tube boilers, while the Dianas were planned to have water-tube boilers, and this gave our ships a number of advantages. The fact is that fire tube boilers require much more time for distributing vapors, it is much more difficult to change operating modes on them, and this is important for warships, and in addition, flooding a compartment with a working fire tube boiler would most likely lead to its explosion, which threatened the ship with immediate destruction (as opposed to the flooding of one compartment). Water tube boilers were free of these disadvantages.
The Russian fleet was one of the first to switch to water tube boilers. Based on the results of research by specialists from the Naval Department, it was decided to use boilers designed by Belleville, and the first tests of these boilers (the armored frigate Minin was converted in 1887) showed quite acceptable technical and operational characteristics. It was believed that these boilers were extremely reliable, and the fact that they were very heavy was perceived as an inevitable price to pay for other advantages. In other words, the Navy Department realized that there were boilers of other systems in the world, including those that could provide the same power at significantly less weight than the Belleville boilers, but all this had not been tested and therefore raised doubts. Accordingly, when creating armored cruisers of the Diana type, the requirement to install Belleville boilers was completely categorical.
However, heavy boilers are not at all the best choice for a high-speed (even relatively high-speed) armored cruiser. The weight of the “Dian” machines and mechanisms amounted to an absolutely absurd 24.06% of their normal displacement! Even the later-built Novik, which many spoke of as a “destroyer weighing 3,000 tons” and a “case for cars,” whose combat qualities were obviously sacrificed for speed - and its weight of cars and boilers was only only 21.65% of normal displacement!
The Diana-class armored cruisers in their final version had 6,731 tons of normal displacement, developed 19-19.2 knots and carried an armament of only eight 152 mm guns. Without a doubt, they turned out to be extremely unsuccessful ships. But it’s hard to blame the ship’s designers for this - the supermassive power plant simply did not leave them enough room to achieve the rest of the planned characteristics of the ship. Of course, the existing boilers and engines were not suitable for a high-speed cruiser, and even the admirals “distinguished themselves” by authorizing the weakening of the already weak weapons for the sake of saving a penny on the scales. And, what’s most offensive, all the sacrifices that were made for the power plant did not make the ship fast. Yes, despite not reaching the contract speed, they were, perhaps, still faster than the British Eclipses. But the problem was that the “Mistress of the Seas” did not often build really good ships (the British were just good at fighting with them), and the armored cruisers of this series certainly could not be called successful. Strictly speaking, neither the 18.5 Eclipse nodes nor the 20 contract Diana nodes in the second half of the 90s of the 19th century were sufficient to serve as a reconnaissance unit for the squadron. And the armament of eight openly standing six-inch guns looked simply ridiculous against the background of two 210-mm and eight 150-mm cannons located in the casemates and turrets of the German armored cruisers of the Victoria Louise type - these are the cruisers that the Dianas would have to fight with in the Baltic in in case of war with Germany...
In other words, the attempt to create an armored cruiser capable of performing the functions of a scout for a squadron and, at the same time, “pirating” in the ocean in the event of a war with England, was a fiasco. Moreover, the inadequacy of their characteristics was clear even before the cruisers entered service.
The Diana-class cruisers were laid down (officially) in 1897. A year later, a new shipbuilding program was developed, taking into account the threat of a sharp strengthening of Japan: it was planned, to the detriment of the Baltic Fleet (and while maintaining the pace of construction of the Black Sea), to create a strong Pacific Fleet capable of leveling out the emerging Japanese naval power. At the same time, the MTK (under the leadership of the Admiral General) determined the technical specifications for four classes of ships: squadron battleships with a displacement of about 13,000 tons, reconnaissance cruisers of the 1st rank with a displacement of 6,000 tons, “messenger ships” or cruisers of the 2nd class with a displacement of 3,000 tons and destroyers 350 tons.
In terms of creating armored cruisers of the 1st rank, the Maritime Department took a rather logical and reasonable step - since the creation of such ships on its own did not lead to success, it means that an international competition should be announced and the lead ship should be ordered abroad, and then replicated in domestic shipyards, thereby strengthening the fleet and acquiring advanced shipbuilding experience. Therefore, the competition put forward significantly higher tactical and technical characteristics than those of the Diana-class cruisers - MTK formed an assignment for a ship with a displacement of 6,000 tons, a speed of 23 knots and an armament of twelve 152-mm and the same number of 75-mm mm guns. The thickness of the armored deck was not specified (of course, it had to be present, but the rest was left to the discretion of the designers). The conning tower was supposed to have 152 mm armor, and the vertical protection of the elevators (feeding ammunition to the guns) and the bases of the chimneys was 38 mm. The coal reserve had to be at least 12% of the normal displacement, the cruising range was not less than 5,000 nautical miles. The metacentric height was also set with a full supply of coal (no more than 0.76 m), but the main dimensions of the ship were left to the discretion of the competitors. And yes, our specialists continued to insist on using Belleville boilers.
As you can see, this time MTK did not focus on any of the existing ships of other fleets of the world, but sought to create a very powerful and fast cruiser of moderate displacement that had no direct analogues. When determining the performance characteristics, it was considered necessary to ensure superiority over the Elswick cruisers: as follows from the “Report on the Naval Department for 1897-1900,” domestic armored cruisers of the 1st rank were to be built: “like Armstrong’s fast cruisers, but superior their displacement (6000 tons instead of 4000 tons), speed (23 knots instead of 22) and the test duration at full speed increased to 12 hours.” At the same time, the armament of 12 rapid-firing 152-mm cannons guaranteed it superiority over any English or Japanese armored cruiser of similar or smaller displacement, and its speed allowed it to evade larger and better armed ships of the same class (“Edgar”, “Powerfull”, “ D'Entrecasteaux”, etc.)
As a matter of fact, this is how the story of the creation of the cruiser “Varyag” begins. And here, dear readers, a question may arise - why was it necessary to write such a long introduction, instead of immediately getting to the point? The answer is very simple.
As we know, a competition for designs for armored cruisers of the 1st rank took place in 1898. It seemed that everything should have gone as planned - many proposals from foreign companies, selection of the best project, its modification, contract, construction... No matter how it goes! Instead of the boring routine of a well-established process, the creation of “Varyag” turned into a real detective story. Which began with the fact that the contract for the design and construction of this cruiser was signed even before the competition. Moreover, at the time of signing the contract for the construction of the Varyag, no cruiser project yet existed in nature!
The fact is that soon after the competition was announced, the head of the American shipbuilding company William Crump and Sons, Mr. Charles Crump, arrived in Russia. He did not bring any projects with him, but he undertook to build the best warships in the world at the most reasonable price, including two squadron battleships, four armored cruisers with a displacement of 6,000 tons and 2,500 tons, as well as 30 destroyers. In addition to the above, Charles Crump was ready to build a plant in Port Arthur or Vladivostok, where 20 destroyers from the above 30 were to be assembled.
Of course, no one gave such a “piece of the pie” to Ch. Crump, but on April 11, 1898, that is, even before the competitive designs of armored cruisers were considered by the MTK, the head of the American company, on the one hand, and Vice Admiral V.P. Verkhovsky (head of GUKiS), on the other hand, signed a contract for the construction of a cruiser, which later became the Varyag. At the same time, there was no design for the cruiser - it still had to be developed in accordance with the “Preliminary Specifications”, which became an annex to the contract.
In other words, instead of waiting for the project to be developed, reviewing it, making adjustments and changes, as has always been done, and only then signing a construction contract, the Maritime Department, in fact, bought a “pig in a poke” - it signed a contract that provided development of a cruiser project by Ch. Crump based on the most general technical specifications. How did Ch. Crump convince V.P. Verkhovsky that he is capable of developing the best project of all that will be submitted to the competition, and that the contract should be signed as quickly as possible so as not to waste precious time?
Frankly speaking, all of the above indicates either some kind of childish naivety of Vice Admiral V.P. Verkhovsky, or about the fantastic gift of persuasion (on the verge of magnetism) that Ch. Crump possessed, but most of all it makes you think about the existence of a certain corrupt component of the contract. It is very likely that some of the arguments of the resourceful American industrialist were extremely weighty (for any bank account) and could rustle pleasantly in the hands. But... not caught - not a thief.
Be that as it may, the contract was signed. On what happened next... let's just say, there are polar points of view, ranging from "brilliant industrialist Crump, struggling through the bureaucracy Tsarist Russia, is building a first-class cruiser of breathtaking qualities" and to "the scoundrel and swindler Crump, through deception and bribery, handed over a completely worthless ship to the Russian Imperial Navy." So, in order to understand, as impartially as possible, the events that occurred more than 100 years ago, the dear reader must definitely imagine the history of the development of armored cruisers in Russian Empire at least in the very shortened form in which it was presented in this article.
To be continued...
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