Syrian air defense forces responded to this attack by shooting down an Israeli F-16.
After this, Israel attacked 12 targets inside Syria, which included not only the suspected locations of Iranian forces, but also Syrian air defense bases. Jerusalem called this operation the largest attack on Syrian air defenses since the First Lebanon War in 1982. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), the attack was carried out in three rounds, resulting in the deaths of at least six people - soldiers of the Syrian army and their allies from other countries.
An Israeli F-16 was shot down by a missile from the S-200 anti-aircraft missile system, designed in the USSR back in the 1960s, says Anton Mardasov, an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council. Previously, the Syrian government forces claimed that they used the S-200, but until now there were doubts about the system’s ability to carry out full combat duty, Mardasov explained to RBC.
The American research center Eurasia Group suggests that, as part of the containment policy, Tel Aviv will continue to demonstrate to Iran and Syria its readiness to continue airstrikes, Reuters quotes an analytical note from the center's experts. “However, the next such incident could easily push the parties into a regional conflict,” warns Eurasia Group.
“There is a possibility that the Iranian drone was used as a bait for the Israelis, followed by an air defense strike, but this is difficult to confirm,” Mardasov noted.
Negotiations for three
After the fighter jet crashed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu telephoned Russian President Vladimir Putin and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. “Our position is clear: Israel will defend itself against any aggression and attempts to violate its sovereignty. “I assured Putin that it is our right and duty to defend ourselves from attacks from Syria,” Netanyahu said about the content of the conversation.
Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu (Photo: Alexey Nikolsky / Sputnik / Reuters)
On this matter, the Kremlin’s website succinctly states that the Russian side advocated that the parties avoid any steps that could lead to an escalation of confrontation in the region.
State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert expressed “unequivocal support” for Israel’s actions to protect sovereignty after Netanyahu’s conversation with Tillerson.
“Iran’s calculated escalation of the threat and its attempts to expand its sphere of influence endanger everyone in the region, from Yemen to Lebanon,” Nauert said, adding that the United States will continue to resist Tehran’s “malign activity.”
Moscow is already acting as a mediator in contacts between Israel and Syria with Iran in order to prevent an escalation of the confrontation, diplomatic sources assure The Times of Israel.
According to Mardasov, Russia has neither the desire nor the ability to radically influence Iran’s actions: “Firstly, Tehran is a tactical ally of Moscow. Secondly, Iran has already created a powerful zone of influence in southwestern Syria, on the border with Israel, relying on local forces, in addition to foreign support. The maximum possible to pacify Tehran is steps to disengage forces or an attempt to dilute Iranian influence in the pro-government militia.”
Dangerous skies
Behind last week The confrontation in the skies over Syria has intensified. On February 3, armed Syrian opposition forces shot down a Russian Su-25 attack aircraft in Idlib province in northwestern Syria; pilot Roman Filipov was killed in action on the ground. On February 10, not only an Iranian drone and an Israeli F-16 were shot down, but also a Turkish T129 ATAK helicopter.
The growing air losses were a consequence of the aggravation of contradictions between all participants in the Syrian conflict, which began after the military victory over the Islamic State (a terrorist group banned in Russia), Mardasov notes. “Now it is difficult to camouflage these contradictions under the fight against terrorism. The increasingly clear multifaceted nature of the Syrian conflict is what leads to such incidents,” the expert added.
The war in the Syrian Arab Republic, which has been going on since March 2011, has led to a significant weakening of government aviation. At the same time, the air force has not been replenished for many years, which threatens the country with even more serious military-political consequences.
Syrian Air Force Review
During fierce battles, government aircraft continue to strike militant positions. However, large losses in equipment raised the question of urgent replenishment and modernization of the country's aircraft fleet.
In retrospect, it should be noted in this regard that since the late 1950s, the USSR has provided enormous assistance to the Syrian Arab Republic; Thanks to large-scale supplies of fairly modern Soviet aircraft, the Syrian Air Force was one of the strongest in the region before the conflict.
Currently, despite the successes of our aviation in the fight against terrorism, the West is making comprehensive preparations for a new stage of actions against Damascus. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the fact that gangs, with the help of gunners and traitors, carry out regular attacks on air bases, during which the best pilots are killed. The command of the Syrian army has repeatedly issued statements saying that these raids are carefully planned specifically against the flight personnel. An experienced pilot in Syria is a desirable target for extremists, and this method of “suppressing the air force” is not only effective, but also much cheaper than using cruise missiles.
During the fighting, the Syrian Air Force suffered enormous damage not only during the defense of air bases, but also from terrorist attacks from the ground using anti-aircraft artillery and MANPADS. In addition, many planes and helicopters were written off due to a lack of spare parts. Moreover, squadrons equipped with more outdated aircraft (MiG-21bis, MiG-23BN/MiG-23MF, Su-22M) are experiencing especially great difficulties.
This article provides only approximate data on the SAR Air Force aircraft fleet. Below is shown its approximate quantitative composition at the beginning and during the conflict:
|
Type and make of aircraft* |
Delivered (data as of March 2011) |
In service (data as of June 2016) |
|
|
Aircraft |
|||
|
MiG-23/MiG-27 |
|||
|
Su-20/Su-22M |
|||
|
L-39ZA "Albatross" |
|||
|
Il-76T/Il-76M |
|||
|
Helicopters |
|||
|
Over 100 helicopters |
|||
|
More than 40 cars |
|||
|
SA 342J "Gazelle" |
|||
|
Mi-14PL/Mi-14PS |
Over 20 helicopters |
||
|
No data |
|||
*Note: All supplied modifications are included.
In addition, it is necessary to note one more fact that negatively affected the state of the Syrian Air Force. We are talking about elementary negligence on the part of the Syrian command, which at the beginning of the war did not take measures to camouflage planes and helicopters in caponiers in advance, and weak security units were either destroyed by terrorists or abandoned vehicles in shelters.
During his reign, Bashar al-Assad repeatedly tried to modernize the army aviation fleet. In particular, the Syrians wanted to purchase Su-27 and MiG-31E fighter-interceptors from Russia. Damascus has shown particular interest in new aircraft since 2003 after the Western aggression against neighboring Iraq. However, the Israelis and Americans made every effort to ensure that the arms contracts did not take place. The West has something to be nervous about: according to military experts, even if Syria has six to eight MiG-31Es, the risk of losses during the operation against Damascus increases significantly.
The issue of supplies of Yak-130 combat training aircraft to Syria also remains very confusing. At first, 36 vehicles of this type were ordered for a total of $550 million, but this contract was essentially up in the air.
In this difficult situation, the Syrians need to increase economic ties with their remaining allies (although this is an extremely difficult task under conditions of political blockade), and Russia, despite the cries of the West, must supply aircraft to government troops. If this does not happen, then we can safely say that even if the extremists are defeated, Syrian aviation will gradually cease to exist. There is no need to say what the consequences will be for Syrian statehood; comments are unnecessary.
To whom is war, and to whom is mother dear
Against the backdrop of a significant weakening of Syria, those who wanted to profit from it quickly found themselves. In this situation, the enemies of Bashar al-Assad act on the principle: “Weakness is a reason for violence.” Let's consider only the most important enemies of Damascus:
The first enemy is Türkiye. Ankara considers Syria a zone of its special geopolitical interests, but it does not want to share it with anyone, especially since the Syrian Arab Republic has natural resources, in particular, rich oil and gas deposits.
The second pro-American vassal is Israel. Syria remembers very well the series of Arab-Israeli wars in the second half of the 20th century, the initiator of which, as a rule, was Tel Aviv. Of course, Israeli provocations were carried out and are still being carried out under the patronage of the United States.
The third actual party to the conflict is the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf, which provide abundant assistance to extremists of various stripes; thereby Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Western satellites not only serve the interests of Washington, but also seek to strengthen their economic and political positions.
The participation of our pilots in the anti-terrorist operation once again eloquently shows that potential aggressors only consider force, therefore, in the current situation, Russia cannot leave the Syrian Arab Republic (constant violations of the ceasefire regime are proof of this).
If we consider the possibility of a hypothetical conflict between Syria and NATO, it is necessary to take into account that in the event of aggression by the North Atlantic Alliance, the Syrian Air Force, with all its combat experience accumulated in the Six-Day War of 1967, the war “ doomsday" 1973, the Lebanon campaign of 1982 and the current anti-terrorist carnage are ultimately doomed. Even taking into account the quality of Russian weapons and the morale of the Syrian army, government troops are only able to hold out against NATO for one or two months. Even in the case of military assistance from Iran, Syria has no chance of victory (however, Western public opinion will be agitated by the loss of forces of the Western alliance). The only thing that can somehow help the Syrian troops is the use of anti-ship missiles to destroy enemy aircraft carrier strike groups, as well as carrying out large-scale sabotage at military airfields in Turkey and the Persian Gulf countries, but most importantly, Russia must maintain its won military-political positions in favor of the legitimate government of Bashar al-Assad.
Thus, despite enormous pressure, Syria must resist Western blackmail; Without a deep modernization of its own combat aviation, the country is essentially doomed to destruction. In turn, Russia needs to bring the anti-terrorist operation to a victorious conclusion.
ABOUT THE GALLOPING TREND OF WORSIENING OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC SITUATION ON THE WESTERN APPROACHES TO RUSSIA
Through the thick veil of alarming and sometimes tragic events that have befallen our people since February 2018, the scenario of that final round, the foundation of which has been prepared by our overseas and Western European “partners” since April 4, 1946, when it saved the world from fascism, is beginning to become more and more clearly visible. The superpower was immediately opposed by the largest military-political bloc in the modern military - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which reformatted the post-war world into that field of pre-escalation tension and absurdity that we have been observing for 72 years. To date, the European Command of the US Armed Forces, as well as the Strategic Command of NATO Allied Operations (the structure of the latter includes the majority of the General Staff of the armies of Western European member countries of the alliance) have almost completed the formation of strike “fists” in several operational directions at once, including the Black Sea, Baltic and Karelian. The main air components for conducting a strategic aerospace offensive operation against military-industrial facilities and air defense systems of the Russian Aerospace Forces in the Southern and Western military districts today are:
- 52nd Tactical Fighter Wing of the US Air Force; has experience in operational transfer from the German Spangdahlem airbase to the Polish Air Base Redzikowo and is represented by a squadron of 25 F-16C/D Block 50, as well as 2 AN/TPS-75 Tipsy long-range radar detection radars for more efficient performance of air superiority missions and control of the tactical air situation; also specializes in the tasks of suppressing air defenses and destroying strategically important enemy ground targets using AGM-88E AARGM and AGM-158B JASSM-ER anti-radar missiles, respectively;
- 48th Tactical Fighter Wing of the US Air Force in Lakenhus, represented by two squadrons of modernized tactical fighters F-15E "Strike Eagle", which recently gained the ability to use the same long-range air-to-ground missiles JASSM-ER and long ago adapted to the use of tactical missiles AGM-84H SLAM-ER, equipped with advanced anti-jamming IKGSN, which uses the correlation method of targeting the ATA (“Atomatic Tagerting Acquisition”), characterized by increased noise immunity, which forces tank and motorized rifle units to saturate to the maximum with military self-propelled air defense systems of the new generation and active defense systems, because the “equipment” of SLAM-ER provides for the use of co-targeting BAT combat elements;
- 2nd tactical air wing of the Polish Air Force, consisting of 36 advanced multirole fighters F-16C Block 52+ and 12 two-seat aircraft of a similar version F-16D Block 52+, stationed simultaneously at 2 air bases (Poznan and Lask); in the first half of the 20s, these vehicles will receive 70 AGM-158B extended-range cruise missiles through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) from the Defense Cooperation Agency (DSCA); in January 2017, the first JASSM variants with a range of 370 km entered service with the 31st Tactical Air Base in Poznan.
The above elements of the Allied NATO Air Force are not the only components in the contemplated massive missile attack on our military, energy and industrial infrastructures. It also considers the use of American Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers loaded with RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV ammunition, as well as strike modifications of the Ohio nuclear submarines - SSGN, equipped with ammunition of 154 Tomahawk strategic cruise missiles each. And this is only described small part those air attack weapons that NATO Allied Forces can use in the event of an escalation of a regional conflict with Russia, because there is also the German Air Force, which is armed with Typhoon multirole fighters equipped with high-precision KEPD 350 TAURUS cruise missiles. An upcoming attempt at aggression on the part of the North Atlantic Alliance can also be seen in the “pumping up” of the Eastern European conventional theater of operations with ground-based missile defense systems to fend off a retaliatory strike with Kh-101 and 3M14K/T missiles from the Russian Navy and Aerospace Forces.
The most unpleasant moment here is that, for example, the Romanian Ministry of Defense signed a 3.9 billion dollar contract with the US companies Raytheon and Lockheed Martin for the purchase of 7 Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile systems and 168 MIM-interceptor missiles. 104F as ammunition. These anti-aircraft guided missiles are equipped with an active millimeter Ka-band radar homing head, and therefore Kh-101 cruise missiles that break into the airspace of NATO countries can be intercepted even beyond the radio horizon; after all, target designation is received not only from the battery combat control point, but also from third-party airborne AWACS systems via the Link-16 radio channel. In long-range anti-aircraft missiles 9M82MV (S-300V4 complex), the implementation of work on over-the-horizon targets with third-party target designation, although theoretically possible, has not been confirmed in practice, which can be said about the 9M96E/E2 missiles of the S-400 complex.
HOW HEL HAAVIR WENT TO SYRIAN AIR DEFENSE...
If on European theater military operations, our defensive potential is so far only being “tested” during the increasingly frequent reconnaissance flights of Global Hawks and strategic RER RC-135V/W “Rivet Joint” aircraft, allotting time to the Aerospace Forces command to take countermeasures, then in the Middle Eastern theater of operations the Aerospace Forces Russia and friendly units of the Syrian army are tested for their capability in crisis situations “to the fullest extent,” and not with the help of intelligence tools, but with aggressive force methods. One of such incidents can be considered the recent massive missile and air strike of the Israeli Air Force (Hel Haavir) on strategically important targets of the Syrian Arab Army (including the T4 air base, where the Iranian air wing of UAVs was deployed, which at one time took part in optical-electronic reconnaissance of the formations IS), units of the Hezbollah movement, as well as facilities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
This is not the first air strike operation of the Israeli tactical fighters F-16I “Sufa” and F-15I “Ra`am” against the Syrian government forces and the IRGC units deployed to fight the pseudo-caliphate, because back in the summer of 2016, during the International Herzliya Conference, the head of Israeli military intelligence, Major General Herzi Halevi, pointed out the undeniable advantages for Tel Aviv from ISIS’s actions in Syria, while any of the most combat-ready Iranian and pro-Iranian forces (IRGC and Hezbollah) only accelerated the fall of ISIS enclaves. Despite the fact that there were no massive missile attacks on Israeli territory with Fatech-110 and Fatech-313 missiles from the IRGC in Syria, Tel Aviv was the first to resort and is resorting to the tactics of provocative strikes, and this time seriously miscalculated.
In response to an alleged violation of Israel’s northern air border by an Iranian UAV, which was shot down by an Apache attack helicopter Hel Haavir on February 10, two flights of F-16I Sufa multi-role fighters (8 aircraft) reached the missile launch line at targets in Syria not on standard cunning tactics (using airspace over the Anti-Lebanese mountain ranges), and by brazenly invading Syrian airspace near Damascus and Palmyra. Obviously, the calculation was made that the channel of the divisional radar tracking and guidance systems of the Buk-M1/2E, S-125 Pechora-2M, S-200 and Pantsir-S1 complexes would be critically overloaded by several dozen launched from suspensions of the F-16I high-precision equipment, and the process of “tying target routes - capturing” in the literal sense of the word “will fall” against the background of the operation of electronic warfare systems installed on the Sufs. As a result, Israeli pilots expected complete demoralization of the Syrian air defense systems, expecting that instead of target markers, on the indicators of the 9S35M1/2, SNR-125M, 5N62V, and 1RS2-1E “Helmet” radars, only anti-overlays and glare from electronic warfare systems would be visible jammers. But later it turned out that they were very mistaken!
Apparently, feeling like masters of the situation in the Syrian skies, the pilots of the Israeli F-16I “Sufa” decided not to adhere to the main rule of air operations of the 21st century over territories with developed anti-aircraft/anti-missile zones A2/AD - low-altitude flights following the terrain. It is possible that such a decision was made due to fears of falling within the range of Syrian anti-aircraft artillery and MANPADS (I remembered the lesson of November 20, 1983, when the Kfir C.2 was intercepted by an anti-aircraft artillery complex). This time, the Israelis completely entrusted their fate to the on-board REP complex and personal protection SPJ-40 “Elisra”, a modern all-aspect radiation warning station (SPO) SPS-3000, as well as the PAWS-2 infrared attack missile detection complex, which should detect the launch of most types of missiles by radiation from torches of burning solid fuel or liquid charges. Naturally, the direction finding range of a launched missile using PAWS-2 (photo below) depends mainly on the thrust and radiation of its engine.
Sensors of the Elisra PAWS-2 attack missile detection complex of the right hemisphere on the South Korean UBS FA-50
According to numerous Syrian and Israeli sources, one of the vehicles was intercepted after the completion of the first massive missile and air strike (MRAU). The impact of a powerful high-explosive fragmentation warhead fell on the rear hemisphere of the F-16I (on a catch-up course), at the moment of leaving Syrian airspace (over the Golan). And, based on numerous photographs of eyewitnesses, which depict the “burnt out” upper stages of 5V27 anti-aircraft guided missiles and fragments of 3M9 missiles, the destruction of the fighter was carried out either by the modernized S-125 Pechora-2 anti-aircraft missile system, or by the Kub complex ( "Square").
The use of the S-200V is also confirmed, since the central segment of the 5B28 anti-aircraft missile was also discovered on the ground, but the Sufa was shot down by one of the above-mentioned complexes, since it was able to overcome another 100 km, taking into account the single-engine power plant with much less survivability than twin-engine for the F-15I. The 5B28 anti-aircraft missile is equipped with a powerful 217-kilogram high-explosive fragmentation warhead with a 120-degree dispersion angle of 37,000 destructive elements, which would have completely riddled the engine nacelle and the entire airframe of the F-16I “Sufa”, turning it into a pile of metal, but the vehicle survived and was able to deliver pilots all the way to the area of Kibbutz Harduf. It is obvious that either the 72-kilogram warhead of the 5B27 interceptor missile (Pechora-2 complex) or the 57-kilogram 3N12 warhead of the 3M9 anti-aircraft missile (the Kub military complex) exploded near the fighter.
An even more interesting detail of what happened in the sky over the western part of Damascus province is that the Israeli F-16I was intercepted not at the extreme limit of the Pechora or Cuba range of 15 - 23 km, but at a distance of 8 to 12 km, since on a catch-up course (taking into account the fact that the missiles are not so high-speed: 2M for 3M9 and 2.3M for 5B27) only such a destruction range could be achieved. Consequently, favorable conditions existed for the PAWS-2 on-board attack missile detection system: the torch of a launching anti-aircraft missile could be detected literally instantly, but the effectiveness of the IR sensors left much to be desired. The SPS-3000 radiation warning station also demonstrated complete incapacity, which either failed to notify the F-16I crew about the capture of their fighter using the Pechora or Kuba illumination radar, or the missile was guided according to the optical-electronic sighting device in passive mode, preventing the SPS-3000 from detecting the fact of the complex’s fire operation.
As you can see, there are complex technological problems with the airborne defense complex (ADS) of the F-16I “Sufa” fighters, which led to the crew’s failure to perform an early anti-missile maneuver. Representatives of Israeli assets tried to carefully circumvent the sharp edges in this situation, saying that the fault was the incorrect configuration of the use of airborne electronic warfare systems during the first airstrike. But how could the most technologically advanced and experienced air force in the region allow this to happen? After all, developing tactics for breaking through funds air defense in Hel Haavir has been going on since the operation to destroy the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor; Moreover, before the recent operation in Hel, Haavir were well aware of the structure and technological qualities of the updated Syrian air defense. But that's not the most interesting thing.
During the first massive missile and air strike on military targets on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, F-16I “Sufa” Hel Haavir units used at least 26 tactical air-to-ground missiles with an effective reflective surface within 0.05 m2. And, despite the fact that the Elisra SPJ-40 electronic countermeasures systems on board the F-16I were likely activated, Syrian air and missile defense systems were able to destroy 19 of them. Here, all the merit can be safely attributed to the Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems, covering the “dead zones” of the Pechora and Kvadratov missiles. These complexes, equipped not only with X-band guidance radars 1RS2-1E "Helmet", but also with autonomous optical-electronic modules 10ES1-E in the infrared and television viewing ranges, make it possible to destroy enemy high-precision weapons with ESR up to 0.01 - 0.02 kV . even in the most complex jamming installation (when using EA-18G “Growler” electronic warfare aircraft, etc.). It is not difficult to guess what awaits F-16I tactical fighters in a collision with more formidable S-300V4 air defense systems.
Information sources:
https://militarizm.livejournal.com/120630.html
http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4948918
http://forum.militaryparitet.com/viewtopic.php?id=19532
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/c200/c200.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/pechora_2/pechora_2.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/kub/kub.shtml
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-558.html
Almost from the very beginning civil war in Syria in various means mass media Reports began to appear about the use of heavy equipment and aircraft against the rebels. Regardless of their veracity, these at one time became another reason for criticism and accusations towards the administration of Syrian President B. Assad. A little later, more worthy confirmation appeared that the Syrian military does use combat aircraft and helicopters in its operations, but this use in most cases is reduced to a transport function. If strikes are made against the enemy, they are quite rare due to characteristic features civil war.
At the start of the armed conflict, the Syrian Air Force was one of the largest in the region. At the same time, quantity in this case almost does not turn into quality. The newest combat aircraft of the Syrian military aviation is the Soviet/Russian MiG-29 fighter. According to various sources, the total number of such aircraft of all modifications does not exceed 75-80 units. Not long ago, the Syrian leadership intended to modernize the existing MiG-29, but the war prevented the implementation of these plans. As a result, the MiG-21 remains the most popular type of aircraft in the Syrian air force. Total number These aircraft are estimated at 140-200 aircraft. Such a large difference in estimates is due to strict regime secrecy imposed by the Syrian military leadership. However, even secrecy cannot significantly increase the combat potential of MiG-21 fighters and bring them to the modern level. Because of this, such aircraft are used mainly for reconnaissance. The second largest aircraft of the Syrian Air Force are MiG-23. There are more than a hundred of them. At the same time, there is information about the destruction of at least two such fighter-bombers. One of them burned down at the airfield as a result of shelling by insurgents in March of this year, the other was allegedly shot down by them in August. There is no objective confirmation of the rebels' second success, and it is not expected. Finally, the Syrian Air Force has several dozen Su-24 front-line bombers and MiG-25 interceptors. Their total number is insignificant and is unlikely to have a serious impact on the course of any serious conflict.
The helicopter fleet of the Syrian Air Force, as can be seen from its composition, is rather adapted to solving transport problems. The majority of rotary-wing aircraft - more than a hundred - are helicopters of the Mi-8 family. Total attack helicopters of three models does not exceed 75-80 units. These are Soviet-made Mi-24, French SA-342 and Mi-2 modified accordingly. In addition to helicopters, transport functions in the Syrian Air Force are performed by about twenty aircraft of seven types, mostly Soviet-made.
As we can see, the numerical indicators of the Syrian Air Force look significant compared to other countries in the region. In the same time, a large number of old equipment does not in any way increase the combat potential of this type of troops. The main reason such problems are economic processes that have occurred throughout the Middle East in recent decades. As of 2009, the total Syrian air force allocation was about 3.5% of gross domestic product. For comparison, 25-30 years ago this part of the budget exceeded the threshold of twenty percent. At the same time, for last years The budget for the purchase of new weapons and equipment has increased significantly. In the nineties, the average annual investment in new technology did not exceed 550-600 million dollars. In the last years before the Civil War, these figures increased to several billion per year. However, in 2007, during Israel's Operation Orchard, the combat potential of the Syrian Air Force was unable to repel an attack by enemy aircraft.
In addition to economic difficulties, the rapid renewal of not only the Air Force, but also all of the Syrian armed forces, is also hampered by the foreign policy situation. In 2003, Damascus was subject to international sanctions due to suspicions of cooperation with Iraqi armed groups that appeared after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Even after the softening of attitudes towards Syria, almost every contract for the supply of weapons and equipment became the subject of a scandal of one magnitude or another. For example, in 2007, shortly after the successful Israeli strike, rumors appeared about Syria's possible purchase of Russian MiG-31 aircraft in export configuration. Such interceptors could replace the outdated MiG-25 and significantly improve the Syrian Air Force's ability to protect its country's airspace. However, almost immediately, several third countries expressed their concerns about such deliveries and doubted the purpose of the aircraft. Sluggish debate over the MiG-31 for Syria continued until the end of spring 2009, when media reports appeared about the suspension of negotiations due to financial problems in Damascus. In the end, in October 2010, the management of Rosoboronexport calmed everyone “worried” and officially announced that there was no contract.
Another one, which can be considered an example of the difficulties with updating the armed forces, occurred this summer. The most ordinary flight of the most ordinary cargo ship called Alaed caused a flurry of criticism and almost a scandal. From some sources it became known that three Mi-25 helicopters of the Syrian Air Force, repaired and modernized in Russia, are transported on board the ship. In addition, “popular rumor” attributed the cargo ship to another military cargo: some anti-aircraft missile systems. Despite the specific nature of the use of this type of weapon, hypothetical deliveries of air defense systems have also become the object of criticism. And yet, over time, that story was forgotten and supporters of the Syrian rebels switched to other, more pressing issues.
In general, the state of the Syrian Air Force looks ambiguous, and problems with updating the fleet of equipment only add to the pessimism in the assessments. It is worth noting that even with the existing forces, Syrian military pilots are quite capable of solving the tasks that are currently being assigned to them. However, only if the war with the insurgents continues. If the Syrian war follows the same scenario as the war in Libya, then the Damascus air force is unlikely to be able to seriously respond to the threats. Considering the “traditional” methodology for NATO countries local wars, it can be assumed that in the event of an international operation against Syria, the main elements of its defense will be air defense troops. They are the ones who can theoretically repel an air attack. Unfortunately, Syrian air defense may also not be able to cope with repelling attacks, but at present the quantitative and qualitative composition of the air force and air defense forces does not allow us to make bold plans.
As a result, the Syrian Air Force finds itself in a specific position: it cannot adequately resist foreign aggression and, at the same time, has too much strike potential for most tasks that arise during a civil war. For example, strikes by MiG-23 fighter-bombers, for obvious reasons, are only possible during battles in large open spaces. In turn, urban battles almost completely exclude the use of aviation, with the exception of transport helicopters for quickly transporting units to the desired area. Thus, tactical issues are added to the economic problems of the Syrian air force. Both of these problems “jointly” greatly hinder both the Air Force and the entire Syrian armed forces as a whole.
Based on materials from sites:
http://globalsecurity.org/
http://periscope2.ru/
http://sipri.org/
http://defense-update.com/
As the conflict in Syria escalates, its air force is making headlines in the world's leading media. Over the past year, the country has been rocked by protests and violence caused by the opposition's fight against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, and in this conflict the air force has a significant role to play in the fight against the insurgency.
This year has been a very busy one for one of the most private air forces in the Middle East. Since the Baath Party came to power in 1963, the Syrian Air Force has played a leading role in the Syrian power structure. Air force officers led by Hafez al-Assad, the father of the country's current president, led the coup that brought the Baath Party to power. Since then, the Air Force began to play a special role in the life of the country.
Military necessity (possibly coupled with personal preferences) led to the dramatic growth of the air force - while an ally of the USSR, Syria entered into a brutal confrontation with Israel, intervened in the conflict in Lebanon, and also had serious contradictions with the Iraqi branch of the Baath Party under the leadership of Saddam Hussein. 1980s turned out to be very stressful for Syrian aviation: fighting against Israel led to the fact that new modifications of the MiG-23 fighter managed to win victories over a previously invulnerable enemy - however, at the cost of the loss of 30 of their own aircraft. This situation demonstrated a positive trend in the air force's capabilities compared to the conflicts of the 1970s, especially the Yom Kippur War, when the Syrian air force was almost completely destroyed on the ground.
Growing from a small core prepared by the British in 1948, by the end of the 1980s. The Syrian Air Force has reached its peak. They included 650 aircraft, 100 thousand regular military personnel and 37.5 thousand reservists. Modernization of the fleet was a priority in development; the first order for MiG-29 fighters was placed in 1986. After completion Cold War the load on the Syrian Air Force decreased in the 1990s. participation in military operations practically ceased. Syria never emerged from war with Israel, but the end of the Lebanese civil war and the overwhelming power of the Israeli army led to a stalemate. The number of regular Air Force personnel was reduced to 60 thousand people, and reservists - to 30 thousand people. The number of aircraft decreased to 555 units.
On paper, the Syrian Air Force still outnumbers the air force of neighboring states, including such regional leaders as Israel and Egypt. However, these numbers hide the obsolescence of the Syrian aviation fleet - even the most modern Syrian aircraft (more than 60 MiG-29 fighters, more than 30 MiG-25 fighters and more than 20 Su-24 front-line bombers) cannot compete with the modernized Israeli Air Force. Thus, the situation in Syria, which cannot boast of progress in this matter, looks in sharp contrast to the rapidly developing UAVs in Israel. Although the Syrian Air Force has reconnaissance squadrons, they are not equipped with modern equipment. Much of the fleet still consists of MiG-21MF/bis fighters, which were almost completely destroyed in their last encounter with the Israeli Air Force in the early 1980s, which claimed 45 victories. Syria also has approximately 100 MiG-23 fighters, one of which (a MiG-23MS of 678 Squadron) was reported to have been destroyed at Abu ad Duhur airbase by opposition forces on March 7, 2012. In addition, there is video footage of another MiG-23 , which crashes and explodes on August 13, 2012. The opposition claims that it was its units that shot down the fighter while it was attacking ground targets, but so far there is no independent confirmation of this victory.
Hard times
The Syrian Air Force went through a period of some neglect by the authorities, when national military spending was cut, like other countries in the Middle East. From a level of 21% of national GDP in the mid-1980s. they fell to 5.3% in the late 1990s. and to 3.5% in 2009. They shrunk further after the UN imposed tough sanctions on the Syrian government in 2003 as tensions rose over alleged Syrian support for militants in Iraq. Hostility with the United States and rising tensions with Israel have forced the Syrian air force to increase spending and begin a force build-up that has seen arms contracts rise from $600 million in the 1990s. up to $5.2 billion in the period 2005-2008. During this period, incursions by Israeli Air Force aircraft into Syrian airspace increased, culminating in 2007's Operation Orchard, in which Israeli F-15I and F-16I fighter jets destroyed a suspected nuclear reactor at Deir Ez -Zor in eastern Syria, without encountering any resistance from Syrian aircraft. There were rumors that this Israeli success was ensured by a cyber attack on Syrian air defense networks. This version has little evidence - however, the raid itself was carried out from the north, where air defense coverage in any case is patchy.
Russian support
Russia maintains its Cold War-era role as Syria's arms supplier, and the Syrian air force has asked its longtime ally to help modernize. Recently, attention has been focused on the repair and return to Syria of Mi-25 combat helicopters (an export modification of the Mi-24D helicopter) - the most controversial aspect of the military-technical cooperation with Russia due to the alleged use of the helicopters against demonstrations by the Syrian opposition. An earlier story about the sale of a MiG-31E interceptor (an export modification with degraded characteristics) to Syria also raised many questions. The contract, concluded in 2007 almost immediately after the Israeli attack on the Deir ez-Zor facility, provided for the supply by Russia of MiG-31E fighters to replace the MiG-25 interceptors. At the time, it was believed that eight aircraft had been ordered, but in May 2009, Russian media reported that the contract had been suspended due to financial difficulties among the Syrians. All this was refuted on October 27, 2010, when CEO Rosoboronexport reported that no contract for the supply of MiG-31E to Syria had been signed.
Another contract for the supply of MiG-29M fighters worth $1 billion is in limbo. The Israelis expressed dissatisfaction with this deal, especially when negotiations were underway to sell Israeli UAVs to Moscow. Another contract allegedly concerns the supply of 36 Yak-130 combat training aircraft to Syria. On January 23, 2012, senior Russian sources reported that the contract for the supply of these aircraft was signed at the end of December 2011 and was worth $550 million. But as far as can be judged, deliveries have not yet taken place.
Although these “sales” have attracted significant attention from the United States and its allies, it still appears that Russia intends to fulfill its obligations. If anything can slow down the implementation of contracts, it is the low creditworthiness of the Syrians. However, in 1971, the USSR and Syria entered into an agreement that allows the Russian Navy to use the logistics point in Tartus. This may explain Moscow's loyalty to its client.
With growing opposition to the Syrian government, the modernization program began to experience disruptions, and the last deliveries were stopped. The transport ship Alaed, carrying refurbished Mi-25 attack helicopters, was stopped in British waters when its insurance was revoked at the request of the British government. The ship returned to Kaliningrad, from where, at the end of July, under the escort of Russian warships, it went to sea again. The exact number of transported helicopters remains unknown, but is estimated at 30-40 units.
Syrian opposition groups claim that Mi-25s are being used to attack protesting citizens and opposition residences, especially in the city of Homs, where heavy fighting is taking place. The Mi-25 is equipped with four 57-mm NURS containers and a 12.7-mm YakB machine gun.
The Free Syrian Army, an armed force that includes many former officers from all branches of the Syrian military, reported that its units had shot down several helicopters, but these claims were not confirmed. To confirm their words, a video made by the opposition was posted on YouTube, showing government helicopters under fire from the ground.
Mi-25 and Mi-17 helicopters are most likely the backbone during operations against opposition forces. The Mi-17 is equipped with additional armor for the cockpit and can be used for tactical landings, especially behind enemy lines. It is possible that a small number of Syrian Mi-2 helicopters have also found use, although it is believed that no more than ten such machines remain in combat-ready condition. In addition to them, the Syrian Air Force has a large number of Aerospatiale SA-342L Gazelle helicopters, which have shown their effectiveness in the fight against Israeli armored vehicles during the Lebanese conflict, especially when they were used in pairs. It is unlikely that French assistance in their maintenance will continue, so at present the Syrians have to rely only on Russian assistance to modernize their aircraft fleet.
Defectors
When unrest began in Syria in early 2011, the role of the Air Force was initially minor. Air Force Intelligence (Air Force Intelligence Agency) played a major role in coordinating actions on land against opposition forces. This led to the opposition organizing an explosion in one of the territorial intelligence departments, after which rumors arose about the death of several high-ranking officials from the intelligence service as a result of this terrorist attack.
As the conflict escalated, the functions of the Air Force began to expand. The air force's primary role has been to assist in the movement of troops and is believed to have targeted rebel positions from helicopters - some of these strikes have been described by the opposition as massacres, but independent verification of these claims has been difficult. As it gets worse political situation Air Force personnel began to be involved in carrying out all more conflicting orders, and pressure on the Air Force began to mount.
The first crack appeared on June 20, when Colonel H.M. Hamada (Hassan Mari Hamada) during a flight on a MiG-21 fighter became separated from his flight of four aircraft, which was performing a training flight over the Daraa desert in southern Syria. Colonel Hamada descended to an altitude of 50 m in order to avoid detection by the Jordanian air defense radar, and then reported an emergency on board, after which he was allowed an emergency landing at King Hussein Airport near Al Mafraq. He was detained by Jordanian security forces; he was subsequently declared a political refugee.
The Syrian government declared Colonel Hamada a traitor and asked Jordan to return the plane. The controversial MiG flew from Dumair Air Base northeast of Damascus and was in service with the 73rd Airlift Brigade, part of the 20th Air Division's test wing. A few weeks later, several more Air Force officers joined Hamada.
In response, Syrian authorities banned all flights in this division, which is responsible for testing all Syrian aircraft. The Air Force then conducted a major four-day exercise that included bombing drills, mock battles, and drop-off training landings that were observed by senior officers. MiG-29 and Su-24 aircraft, Mi-25, Mi-17 and Gazelle helicopters took part in the exercises. Officials noted the high level of professionalism shown during the exercise, perhaps in an effort to boost morale and loyalty.
This attempt appears to have failed. Press reports indicate that at least ten helicopter pilots jumped across the border in July alone. Former Air Force officers have also appeared as representatives of the Free Syrian Army.
Destroying a Turkish plane
On June 22, Syrian air defenses shot down a Turkish RF-4E Phantom reconnaissance aircraft, which crashed into the sea 10 km off the Syrian coast, although Turkey stated that the aircraft did not invade Syrian airspace. Both members of the reconnaissance crew were killed. Syria announced that two aircraft were involved in the incident.
As reported, the Phantom flew at an altitude of 91 m to test Turkish air defense. The Turkish government also claimed that Syrian air defenses opened fire on the aircraft, which was conducting a search and rescue mission after the RF-4E crashed. Both incidents led to a deterioration in Syrian-Turkish relations. Turkey deployed additional air defense forces near the Syrian border and issued a stern warning calling on Syrian aircraft to keep a respectful distance from the border.
Initially, media reports claimed that the downed aircraft was an F-4E-2020 Terminator, which was politically beneficial for the Syrians, since the modernization was carried out by the Israeli company IAI. With her help in the mid-1990s. The aircraft's avionics and radar were improved. The connection with Israel should have somewhat complicated the position of the Turkish government, which itself began to distance itself from cooperation with Tel Aviv after Israeli ships intercepted the “Freedom Flotilla” heading to the Gaza Strip from Turkey in 2010.
The tail of the plane was raised by the Syrians and presumably traces of shells were visible on it. This gave rise to some claims that he was shot down by anti-aircraft fire. The subsequent increase in Syrian activity in the border area, primarily due to helicopter flights, forced Turkey to scramble F-16 fighter jets whenever the route of Syrian aircraft came too close to the border. This incident to some extent raised the prestige of the Syrian air defense, which achieved minimal results during the Lebanese events in the 1980s. Apparently, the Syrian air defense, according to at least in the northern regions of the country, located in high degree readiness to repel air attacks.
As with the aircraft, the impressive size of the Syrian air defense hides a chaotic organizational structure, training and control systems. Most Syrian air defense systems are Soviet S-125 and Kvadrat systems, which are highly vulnerable to active jamming or anti-radar missiles. Since 2009, the Syrian air defense has been equipped with a different Russian system- ZRPK "Pantsir-S". Damascus is believed to have received between 36 and 50 Pantsirs, plus an option to purchase even more SAMs under a 2006 contract that likely resulted from the Israeli attack on Deir ez-Zor.
Uncertain future
Over the next few months, the Syrian Air Force and its intelligence service will play a key role in the ongoing conflict. Inside Syria, helicopters and planes will continue to strike rebel positions, while the country's leadership is not particularly concerned about the issue of civilian casualties.
If an operation similar to Libya is carried out against Syria, it is unlikely that the Syrian Air Force will be able to provide serious resistance to an enemy equipped with the most modern weapons. The Syrian air defense system will be high on the list of targets, along with command posts, control centers and air bases. Russia's commitment to fulfilling its contractual obligations means that the Syrian Air Force will continue to receive more and more modern systems weapons, but the question remains whether the Syrians will have required time for their full integration. Perhaps more important than all these aspects is the morale of the troops, who are given orders by their commanders who carry out the policies of Assad. But here there are signs that the state of affairs is not very favorable for the authorities. Having been at the center of Syrian politics for all these years, the Syrian Air Force can once again lead the change and remove from power the son of the Air Force officer who created the current regime.
Syrian Air Force
| Aircraft make and type | Delivered | In stock |
| Aero Vodochody L-39ZA Albatros | 44 | 30+? |
| Aero Vodochody L-39ZO Albatros | 55 | 40+? |
| Aerospatiale SA342L Gazelle | 65 | 30+? |
| Antonov An-24V | 2? | 1 |
| Antonov An-26 | 4 | 4 |
| Antonov An-26B | 2 | 2 |
| Antonov An-74TK-200 | 2 | 2 |
| Dassault Aviation Falcon 20E | 2 | 1 |
| Dassault Aviation Falcon 900 | 1 | 1 |
| Ilyushin Il-76M | 3? | 2? |
| Ilyushin Il-76T | 1? | 1 |
| Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm MBB-SIAT 223K1 Flamingo |
58? | 30+? |
| MiG MiG-21* | 200+ | 100+? |
| MiG MiG-21U** | 30+? | 15+? |
| MiG MiG-23*** | 180+ | 100+ |
| MiG MiG-23UB | 20+? | 8+? |
| MiG MiG-25**** | 40? | 30+? |
| MiG MiG-29***** | 70+ | 60+? |
| MiG MiG-29UB | 8-10? | 8? |
| Mil Mi-2 | 20+? | 10+? |
| Mil Mi-25 | 40+? | 30+? |
| Mil Mi-8****** | 100+? | 70+? |
| Pakistan Ae MFI-17 Mushshak | 6 | 6? |
| Sukhoi Su-17M-2K******* | 60+ | 50+? |
| Sukhoi Su-22UM-3K | 10? | 8? |
| Sukhoi Su-24MK | 24? | 20+ |
| Tupolev Tu-134B-3 | 6 | 4 |
| Yakovlev Yak-40 | 8? | 2? |
* — All delivered modifications of the MiG-21 are included (MiG-21PF, PFM, M, MF, R and bis, U, US and UM);
** — It is believed that the MiG-21U has already been taken out of service;
*** — All delivered modifications of the MiG-23 are included (MiG-23BM, BN, MF, ML, MS and MiG-27). 33 MiG-23s were purchased from Belarus in 2008, although their exact modification and level of combat readiness are unknown;
**** — All delivered modifications are included (MiG-25PD, PU, RB);
***** — It is reported that a number of fighters of the MiG-29S modification have been delivered;
****** — All modifications are included (Mi-8, Mi-17, etc.);
******** — All delivered modifications are included (Su-17M-2K, Su-20 and Su-22M4).
Original publication: Syrian Skies — Air Forces Monthly, October 2012
Translation: Andrey Frolov
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