Smolensk operation 1943- SMOLÉSKAYA OPERATION 1943, coming. operation of the troops of the West and the lion. wing of the Kalinin fr., held on August 7. - 2 oct. The goal is to defeat the lion. the wing is mute. fasc. Army Group Center, prevent the transfer of its forces to the southwest. direction,… … Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: an encyclopedia
The offensive operation of the troops of the Western and left wings of the Kalinin fronts on August 7, October 2 during the Great Patriotic War of 1941 45. In the summer autumn campaign of 1943, the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts had the task of advancing on ... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia
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7.8 2.10.1943, during the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet troops of the Western (Colonel General, since August General of the Army V.D.Sokolovsky) and the left wing of the Kalininsky (Colonel General A.I. Eremenko) fronts defeated 7 divisions and inflicted ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary
SMOLENSK OPERATION, 7.8 2.10. 1943, during the Great Patriotic War. The troops of the Western (Colonel General, since August General of the Army V.D.Sokolovsky) and the left wing of the Kalininsky (Colonel General A.I. Eremenko) fronts defeated 7 divisions ... Russian history
August 7 October 2, 1943, during the Great Patriotic War. Soviet troops of the Western (Colonel General, from August General of the Army V.D.Sokolovsky) and the left wing of Kalininsky (Colonel General, from August General of the Army A.I. Eremenko) ... ... encyclopedic Dictionary
Main article: Blockade of Leningrad Krasnoborskaya operation (1943) Great Patriotic War, World War II ... Wikipedia
Gorodok operation 1943 offensive operation of the right wing of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of General of the Army I. Kh. Baghramyan during the Great Patriotic War near the town of Gorodok, Vitebsk region 13 31 ... ... Wikipedia
The Smolensk offensive operation was carried out by the troops of the Western Front under the command of General of the Army V.D.Sokolovsky and by the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front under the command of General of the Army A.I. Eremenko. It began during the Soviet counteroffensive near Kursk and ended during the battle for the Dnieper and Right-Bank Ukraine. This operation was an integral part of the general offensive of the Soviet Army in the summer-autumn campaign of 1943 and was of great strategic importance.
By the beginning of August 1943, the general situation on the Soviet-German front, including on the western strategic direction, was determined by the victories won by the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk.
The attempt of the Hitlerite command to launch an offensive in the Kursk region in the summer of 1943 ended in complete failure. Within a few days, in a fierce defensive battle, the Red Army broke the powerful offensive of the German fascist troops from the regions of Orel and Belgorod and itself launched a counteroffensive.
The troops of the left wing of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts developed an offensive, striking the enemy one blow after another. The Red Army firmly held the strategic initiative in its hands, successfully waging a struggle against the main forces of Nazi Germany and its allies. Under these conditions, it was very important to take active actions in other directions to defeat as many enemy forces as possible (and above all in those sectors of the front that were closest to the Kursk region) in order not to allow him to use these forces to counter our counteroffensive. These sectors of the front primarily included the western direction, as it was directly adjacent to the region of the Kursk salient.
To this end, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command was preparing a major offensive operation in the western direction, attaching great importance to it. The command of the Western and Kalinin Fronts was timely oriented that in the summer of 1943 the Soviet troops would deliver the main blow in the southwestern strategic direction, where the main grouping of German fascist troops was located. At the same time, the attention of the front commanders was drawn to the fact that the enemy holds large forces (over forty divisions) in front of the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, so if they are not defeated or pinned down, then the fascist German command will be able to regroup some of these forces to the south and thus most complicate the offensive of the Soviet troops, which inflicted the main blow.
To prevent this, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the commanders of the Western and Kalinin fronts to start preparing an offensive operation in the Smolensk and Roslavl areas.
The troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts were to defeat the 3rd Tank and 4th Armies of the enemy, which were part of Army Group Center, and capture the Smolensk-Roslavl line. The plan provided for the possibility of action by the main forces of the Western Front troops in the southern direction, west of Bryansk, to assist the offensive of the Bryansk Front troops if their advance slowed down.
In accordance with the purpose of the operations, the main blow was planned to be delivered in the Roslavl direction by the troops of the Western Front, which were to defeat the enemy in the areas of Yelnya and Spas-Demensk and further develop the offensive on Roslavl.
The troops of the right wing of the Western Front, in cooperation with the formations of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, were to defeat the enemy in the area of Yartsev and Dorogobuzh and then advance in the general direction of Smolensk.
The troops of the Kalinin Front were to strike with their left wing on the Dukhovshchina and, in cooperation with the formations of the right wing of the Western Front, defeat the enemy grouping in the Dukhovshchina region and further advance in the direction of Smolensk.
The headquarters of the Supreme Command from its reserves reinforced the Western and Kalinin fronts with rifle troops, artillery, tanks, mechanized and cavalry units and formations. However, the main forces of mobile troops and aviation at that time acted in the direction of the main attack of the Red Army, and the Headquarters was unable to allocate to the Western Front the number of troops and ammunition that was supposed to be allocated when developing the plan for the Smolensk operation.
The offensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts was to be carried out in close strategic cooperation with the troops advancing in the Bryansk and Belgorod-Kharkov directions.
Before the troops of the Kalinin Front, by the beginning of the Smolensk operation, the 3rd Panzer Army and part of the forces of the 27th Army Corps of the 4th Army of the enemy, which had up to 20 divisions, defended themselves. In the first echelon, the enemy had 15 divisions, the remaining divisions (including two guard divisions) constituted an operational reserve. In addition, the 18th motorized division, which was in the reserve of the commander of the 4th German army, was located at the junction of the Kalinin and Western fronts in the Dukhovshchina region.
In front of the troops of the Western Front, the 4th Army and part of the forces of the 2nd Panzer Army, which had 23 divisions (including one tank division), defended themselves. Of these, 18 infantry and part of the forces of the motorized divisions were in the first echelon, the rest of the divisions were in the operational reserve. The numerical strength of the Nazi divisions was 2 times greater than the divisions of the Western and Kalinin Fronts.
The main forces of the enemy troops were located in the tactical defense zone. The battle formation of the divisions defending the main defense zone was built, as a rule, in one echelon. The division defended a strip 10-15 km wide.
In the direction of the offensive of the forces of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, the enemy, using the favorable conditions of wooded and swampy terrain, many rivers and lakes, created a strong defense with a total depth of 100 - 130 km.
In the zone of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, the enemy defense was being prepared within five months, and in some sectors - up to one and a half years. It consisted of a tactical zone and three to four defensive zones in the operational depth. The tactical zone, up to 12-15 km deep, included the main and second defense zones. The main line of defense had two or three positions located at a depth of 4.5 - 5 km, with a developed system of trenches, strong points and nodes of resistance, interconnected by communication passages. In the main defense zone, there was a large number of armored machine-gun points and bunkers, the density of which reached 6 - 7 structures per 1 km of the front. The front edge of the main line of defense was covered with barbed wire and continuous minefields.
The second line of defense ran at a distance of 8-10 km from the front edge of the main strip and consisted of a system of strong points connected by trenches and covering the most important areas. Between the main and second lines of defense, the enemy created strong points with garrisons for a company and more.
The cities of Vitebsk, Surazh, Velizh, Rudnya, Demidov, Dukhovshchina, Yartsevo, Dorogobuzh, Smolensk, Yelnya, Spas-Demensk, Roslavl were prepared by the enemy as powerful nodes of resistance, and the approaches to them were covered with barbed wire and minefields. Roads in the most important directions, bridges and defiles were mined. Defensive lines in the depths were created mainly behind water barriers.
Thus, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts had to break through the heavily fortified, deeply echeloned enemy defenses with a significant density of manpower, fire weapons, engineering structures and obstacles and advance in wooded and swampy terrain with a large number of rivers and lakes, which made it difficult to use military equipment, especially tanks and heavy artillery.
Based on the task received and the assessment of the situation, the commander of the forces of the Kalinin Front decided to deliver the main blow with the formations of the left wing of the front (troops under the command of Lieutenant General K. D. Golubev and Lieutenant General A. I. Zygin) in the general direction of Dukhovshchina, Smolensk.
The advancing troops were tasked with crushing the enemy's 27th Army Corps and by the end of the second day of the operation to seize Dukhovshchina. In the future, they were to develop an offensive against Smolensk and, in cooperation with the troops of the right wing of the Western Front, occupy Smolensk on the eighth or ninth day of the operation. It was planned to break through the enemy's defenses in three sectors with a total width of 20 km. After breaking through the defense, it was planned to enter the front's mobile group with the aim of developing success in the direction of Smolensk.
The commander of the Western Front decided to deliver the main blow in the general direction to Roslavl with the task of breaking through the enemy's defenses, crushing the main forces of the 4th German army and seizing an important junction of railways and highways - Roslavl.
To assist the main grouping of the front in destroying enemy forces in the area of Spas-Demensk, part of the forces of the left wing of the front would go on the offensive from the Kirov area to Obolovka and Vorontsovo. In addition, the forces of the right wing of the front planned to deliver two more attacks with the aim of routing enemy groupings in the Yartsev and Dorogobuzh areas. Part of the forces of the front was to defend the previously occupied lines in readiness to start pursuit with the beginning of the enemy's withdrawal. After the defeat of the main forces of the 4th enemy army, the advancing front forces were tasked with reaching the Yartsevo, Pochinok, Roslavl, Dubrovka line.
Breaking through the fortified enemy defenses on difficult terrain in rainy weather required a lot of preparatory work for engineering support. Both in the Western and Kalinin fronts, considerable attention was paid to the engineering equipment of the starting areas for the offensive, making passages in minefields and other obstacles, to providing the advancing troops with the necessary number of roads and column routes and keeping them in a passable condition. The presence of a significant number of water lines in the offensive zones of both fronts required special care of the commanders and their staffs for the preparation of ferry means. The engineering troops of the fronts also did a tremendous job of building command and observation posts, and carried out a number of other engineering measures.
To organize more precise command and control of troops, command and observation posts at all levels were brought closer to the troops. At the same time, a lot of work was carried out on the material and technical support of the troops for the upcoming offensive.
As a result of the preparatory measures carried out, especially large regroupings of troops, superiority in forces and equipment over the enemy was created in the directions of the main attacks of both fronts. However, it should be noted that due to the lack of proper secrecy and camouflage, enemy reconnaissance managed to uncover the preparation of the offensive, which allowed the fascist German command to strengthen the defense in these areas. By the beginning of the offensive, the enemy had concentrated two additional divisions against the strike grouping of the Kalinin Front and three divisions against the strike grouping of the Western Front.
In the course of hostilities and the nature of the tasks performed, the Smolensk strategic offensive operation is divided into three stages. The first stage covers the period of hostilities from 7 to 20 August. During this stage, the troops of the Western Front conducted the Spas-Demensky operation. The troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front began the Dukhovshchinsky offensive operation. At the second stage (August 21 - September 6), the troops of the Western Front conducted the Yelnensko-Dorogobuzh operation, and the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front continued to conduct the Dukhovshchinsky offensive.
At the third stage (September 7 - October 2), the troops of the Western Front, in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, carried out the Smolensk-Roslavl operation, and the main forces of the Kalinin Front carried out the Dukhovshchinsko-Demidov operation.
By early August, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts completed their regrouping. The shock groupings of troops took up their initial position for the offensive in areas north of Dukhovshchina, northeast of Yartsev, southeast of Dorogobuzh, north of Spas-Demensk and Kirov.
In the afternoon of August 6, reconnaissance in force was carried out on the offensive zone of the main strike grouping of the Western Front, as a result of which it was established that the enemy had not withdrawn his troops from the first position, but firmly occupied it.
Early in the morning of August 7, after artillery preparation, the troops of the Western Front (formations under the command of Generals V.S.Polenov and K.P. Trubnikov) launched an offensive from the area north of Spas-Demensk in the direction of Roslavl. The battles in the main lane immediately took on a protracted character. Providing stubborn resistance to our troops, the enemy, on the very first day of our offensive, brought part of the forces of the 2nd tank and 36th infantry divisions into battle against the troops of the shock group. By the end of the day, as a result of a fierce battle, the troops advanced from 2 to 5 km.
On August 8, the troops of the right wing of the Western Front went on the offensive in the Yartsevo direction. The fascist German command brought in the 18th motorized division from the army reserve. Reflecting strong enemy counterattacks, our troops advanced up to 4 km that day, but could not develop the success.
The next day, the most stubborn battles took place north of Spas-Demensk. The enemy brought into battle in this direction the 2nd tank, 36th and 56th infantry divisions, which he had transferred from the Oryol direction to the beginning of the operation. By the end of the day, instead of 2.5 divisions, 5.5 enemy divisions were already defending against the troops of the main strike grouping of the Western Front.
As a result of three days of battles, the troops of the main strike group, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, advanced up to 7 km, widened the breakthrough to 23 km and reached the Massola line, east of Zhdanovo, Dyuki, creating a threat to the flank and rear of the enemy group defending in the Spas area. Demensk.
In order to defeat the enemy in the area of Spas-Demensk, the commander of the Western Front, in accordance with the planned plan, gave an order on August 10 to go over to the offensive of the strike group from the Kirov area, which was to strike in the northwestern direction and, together with the main strike group, to encircle and destroy the enemy troops in the area of Spas-Demensk.
On August 10, fierce fighting continued. The most successful were the troops advancing from the Kirov region, which broke through the defenses at the front up to 8 km, forced the Bolva River on the move and advanced to a depth of 5-6 km. During August 11, the breakthrough was expanded to 10 km along the front and in depth.
The commander of the Western Front forces decided, in order to develop the apparent success in the southern sector of the Spas-Demensk salient, to regroup a part of the mobile troops from the area northeast of Spas-Demensk to the area north of Kirov and send them into the designated breakthrough in the general direction to Obolovka. On August 12, these troops began to advance and by the end of the day, having completed a 130-kilometer march, concentrated 5 kilometers north of Kirov.
Attempts to introduce these troops into the breakthrough in the morning of August 13 were unsuccessful, since the enemy managed to organize a defense with the retreating troops at a previously prepared intermediate line. One of the serious shortcomings that led to the unsuccessful actions of these troops was the poor organization of their combat support, especially air defense.
In the next three days, until August 16, inclusive, the troops of the strike group advancing from the Kirov area advanced another 5-10 km. On August 16, mobile troops were withdrawn to the front reserve. Although the offensive of the troops of the Western Front north and south of the Spas-Demensk salient was developing at a slow pace, nevertheless, the exit of our troops to the railway in the Pavlinovo station area and the threat of intercepting the Varshavskoe highway south of Spas-Demensk created a real threat of our troops entering the retreat path of the enemy who was defending in the area of Spas-Demensk.
In this regard, the fascist German command on August 12 began hastily to withdraw its formations from the Savior Demen salient. At the same time, in the period from 7 to 14 August, it transferred five more divisions to the Western Front from the area west of Orel and Zhizdra. Three tank divisions of them had already been brought into battle by August 13 against the Kirov strike group of the Western Front. Thus, on a front with a length of up to 15 km, together with the troops previously operating here, the enemy already had up to four tank divisions and created a tactical density of up to 4 km per division. With this tank "barrier" he hoped to wear out our troops and stop them in front of a prepared defensive line along the Bolva River west of Obolovka.
On the morning of August 13, the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front in the Dukhschino direction went over to the offensive. Here, as well as on the Western Front, the struggle for the main line of defense took on a protracted nature. For five to six days of fighting, the advancing troops only managed to drive a wedge into the enemy's defenses to a depth of 5-6 km. Nevertheless, the offensive actions of the troops of the left wing of the front fettered the opposing forces of the enemy and forced him to additionally transfer two divisions to this direction.
On August 13, the troops of the Western Front began pursuing the enemy retreating along the Varshavskoe highway. On this day, they advanced from 6 to 25 km and captured the city and station Spas-Demensk, capturing significant trophies.
The forces of the Western Front did not succeed in breaking through the enemy's defenses on the Yartsevo and Dorogobuzh sectors. The advancing troops in some areas only wedged into the enemy's defenses to a depth of 3-5 km.
On the left wing of the Western Front, due to the fact that the main forces of the enemy forces were drawn into battle against the main strike grouping of the front, favorable conditions were created for the transition to the offensive of the remaining troops, which had previously been solving defensive tasks. These troops on August 14, by order of the front commander, went on the offensive and on August 16 liberated the city of Zhizdra.
In the days that followed, the fighting developed with even greater ferocity. The fascist German command brought three more infantry divisions into battle against the advancing troops of the Western Front. Overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, by August 20, our troops broke through the enemy's tactical defense zone in the Savior Demen area, liberated more than 500 settlements and reached the Terenino, Tsirkovshchina, Malye Savki line.
The troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, developing an offensive in the western direction, by this time had liberated the city of Karachev and reached the approaches to Lyudinovo, Dyatkovo, Bryansk.
Thus, in 14 days of the offensive, the troops of the Western Front broke through the enemy's tactical defense zone in the Spas Demen area and advanced to a depth of 35-40 km.
Considering the course of military operations of the troops of the Western Front in the Spas-Demensk operation, it should be noted that the battles to break through the enemy's defenses were very stubborn and protracted. One of the essential reasons for such protracted battles was the arrival of enemy formations from the reserves from the Oryol-Bryansk direction. Only in the period from August 1 to August 18, the enemy was forced to transfer up to 13 divisions against the Western and Kalinin Fronts, of which 11 divisions were directed to the direction of the main attack of the Western Front.
Due to the slow pace of breaking through the enemy's defenses, the enemy was able to occupy the previously prepared lines by formations that arrived from other sectors of the front, and by retreating troops.
Despite the insignificant advance of the forces of the Kalinin and Western fronts, the main task of the first stage of the operation - to defeat the opposing large enemy forces and prevent him from transferring them to the southwestern direction - was completed.
In the second half of August 1943, in connection with the defeat of the enemy in the battle of Kursk, fundamental changes in the situation took place at the front. The troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, pursuing the retreating enemy, reached Bryansk by August 20, while the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were fighting for Kharkov. In the south, an offensive operation of the troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts began to liberate Donbass. Thus, on a huge section of the front from Smolensk to the coast of the Sea of Azov, the Soviet Army launched successful offensive operations with decisive goals. As a result of the successful offensive of the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts and their entry to the approaches to Lyudinov and Bryansk, a situation was created in which the continuation of the offensive of the main forces of the Western Front on Roslavl, as well as their turn to the southern direction, were no longer expedient.
In this regard, the commander of the Western Front considered it necessary to shift the direction of the main attack to Yelnya, Smolensk and accordingly regroup forces, create new shock groupings and, after a short pause, go on the offensive.
From 20 to 27 August, the troops of the Western Front carried out a partial regrouping and were preparing to resume the offensive. The main forces of the front were concentrated in the Elnensk area. The shock group of the front, which included troops under the command of generals K.P. Trubnikov, N.I. Krylov, was supposed to advance on a front of 36 km, and break through the defense in a sector 20 km wide. In addition, shock groups were created in the Yartsevo, Dorogobuzh and Roslavl directions. The plan for a further offensive developed by the front was approved by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on August 22, 1943.
It should be noted that neither the Western nor the Kalinin fronts received any significant reinforcement for the development of the offensive; they were insufficiently provided with ammunition. However, the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, where our troops were developing a successful offensive, demanded not to allow the transfer of German-fascist troops from the western direction to the Donbass and to the Right-Bank Ukraine. In this regard, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to continue the offensive with the available forces and means of the Western and Kalinin Fronts.
At a time when the troops of the Western Front were regrouping and preparing a new operation, the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, having received reinforcement from the front reserves, on 23 August again went over to the offensive in the Dukhshchino direction. The hostilities, which lasted until September 6, were not successful and, with the permission of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, were temporarily suspended. Despite the fact that the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front did not manage to break through the enemy's defenses, their active actions in the Dukhshchina sector fettered the opposing forces, diverted some of the enemy's reserves to be transferred to themselves and thereby contributed to the successful offensive of the Western Front troops.
On August 28, after a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the central strike group of the Western Front launched an offensive in the Elnensk direction. As a result of three days of fighting, they broke through two defensive lines in the operational depth of the enemy's defenses and crossed the Ugra River. On August 30, the mobile formations introduced into the breakthrough, in cooperation with the combined-arms formations, captured the most important strongholds of the enemy defense in the Smolensk direction, the city and the Yelnya railway station. For several days of fighting, our troops advanced 15-30 km forward, expanding the breakthrough to 50 km.
Sensing the threat of a breakthrough in the Smolensk direction, the fascist German command began hastily to pull up forces to the area west of Yelnya. It transferred the 330th Infantry Division from the Velizh area and the 1st SS Brigade from the Smolensk area.
On August 31, the troops of the Western Front launched an offensive in the Yartsevo, Dorogobuzh and Roslavl areas. Having successfully crossed the Dnieper, the front troops liberated the city of Dorogobuzh on September 1.
Fascist German troops, driven back from the Yelnya and Dorogobuzh regions, tried to stop our offensive on other defensive lines. However, already on September 2, our troops broke through the defenses in a number of sectors. Developing the offensive, by September 5 they reached the line of Manchin, Bolshaya Nezhoda, Gorbachevka, Malye Savki. At this line, the enemy had prepared a defense in advance with a well-organized system of fire and engineering barriers. The Hitlerite command additionally transferred three more divisions from its reserve and from other directions against the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts.
To break through this defense, it was required to create new shock groups, accumulate ammunition and prepare troops. In this regard, a seven-day break was made in the offensive, during which the troops were preparing for a new offensive.
During the second stage of the Smolensk operation, the troops of the Western Front, in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, defeated the enemy grouping in the Yelnya and Dorogobuzh areas, advanced westward on average from 30 to 40 km, captured these cities and liberated over 1000 other settlements. As a result of the losses inflicted on the enemy, the composition of his divisions was significantly reduced. The number of German-fascist divisions and battle groups of divisions now ranged from 5,000 to 6,500 people.
The western front, as before, occupied an enveloping position in relation to the enemy grouping located in the Roslavl, Bryansk region, threatening its flank and rear. The fascist German command strove at any cost to prevent a further advance of the Western Front troops in the Smolensk direction.
At the third stage of the Smolensk operation, the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin and Western fronts were faced with the task of defeating the enemy grouping in the Smolensk and Roslavl directions, capturing the cities of Smolensk, Roslavl and developing an offensive on Vitebsk and Orsha.
At the beginning of the third stage, the troops of the left wing of Kalinin, the right wing and the center of the Western Fronts carried out a regrouping of forces and conducted reconnaissance of the enemy's defenses. The troops of the left wing of the Western Front at this time continued the offensive and approached the Desna River.
The goal of the offensive of the troops of the left wing of the Western Front, deployed on a front up to 100 km, was to defeat the enemy troops covering the Roslavl direction, overcome the forest area east of the Desna River on the move, force it and capture a bridgehead on the western bank. As a result of ten days of fighting, these troops reached the Desna by September 14.
Taking advantage of the success of the left-flank formations of the Western Front, the commander of the Bryansk Front forces regrouped significant forces in the offensive zone of the left wing of the Western Front and struck in the south-west direction towards the flank and rear of the enemy force grouping, which was defending on a heavily fortified line along the western bank of the Bolva River. As a result of this blow, the troops of the right wing of the Bryansk Front liberated the city of Bytosh on September 11 and forced the Nazi command to hastily withdraw troops to the Zhukovka, Dyatkovo line, and then to the Desna River line.
At the third stage of the operation, the commander of the forces of the Western Front decided to concentrate the main efforts of his troops on the direction of Smolensk and Orsha.
The troops of the front shock group were to break through the enemy defenses in the Ivonino, Kukuevo sector, seize the Pochinok area, cutting off the railway and the Smolensk-Roslavl highway. In the future, with a blow to Smolensk by part of their forces, in cooperation with the troops of the right wing of the front, they were to capture it, and with the main forces to develop the offensive in the general direction of Orsha.
The formations of the right wing of the front were to, in cooperation with the troops of the Kalinin Front, destroy the enemy in the Yartsevo area and reach the Vop and Dnieper rivers. In the future, in cooperation with the troops of the main grouping, liberate Smolensk.
The formations of the left wing of the front were ordered to continue the offensive, to force the Desna and, in cooperation with the troops of the main grouping, to capture the city of Roslavl.
The troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, in cooperation with the troops of the right wing of the Western Front, were to defeat the enemy grouping in the Dukhovshchina, Demidov area and develop an offensive in the general direction of Rudnya and Vitebsk.
After artillery preparation, the advancing troops, under cover of a barrage and with the support of tanks and aviation, broke through the enemy defenses in several sectors with a swift blow. Developing the offensive, the troops of the right wing of the Western Front on September 16 captured an important stronghold on the approaches to Smolensk - the city and the railway station Yartsevo, and the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front (under the command of General N.E.Berzarin) on September 19 - a strong knot of resistance on the routes to Smolensk - Dukhovshchina.
The offensive of the main grouping in the center of the Western Front was also successfully developing, where mobile formations were introduced on September 17 to develop the success. The troops of the left wing of the Western Front crossed the Desna and continued their offensive in the Roslavl direction.
The fascist German command made desperate efforts to stop the Soviet offensive, using for this purpose prepared defenses along the Khmost, Volost, Khmara and Oster rivers northeast of Roslavl. During September 19, 20 and 21, stubborn battles unfolded on these lines, as a result of which the enemy's defenses were broken through throughout the entire zone of the Western Front's offensive.
The offensive of the troops of the Kalinin Front developed no less successfully. On September 20, the troops of the center of the Kalinin Front liberated the city of Velizh, and on September 22, the city of Demidov.
Now, on the way to Smolensk and Roslavl, the enemy had no pre-prepared defensive lines. The advancing troops displayed high heroism, straining their forces as much as possible in order to accelerate the pace of the offensive and prevent the enemy troops from gaining a foothold and creating defenses along the Smolensk-Roslavl railway line and along the Oster River.
Developing the offensive and overcoming enemy resistance, the troops of the Western Front on September 24 reached the line 6-10 km east and southeast of Smolensk, and on September 25, with a blow from the north, east and southeast, they liberated Smolensk - the most important strategic defense center of the Nazi troops on westward direction. On the same day, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front under the command of General V.S. Popov captured Roslavl - an important communications center and a powerful stronghold of the enemy's defense.
Having lost such important defense centers as Smolensk and Roslavl, the enemy tried to detain our troops on the Sozha and Vikhr rivers. However, these attempts of the enemy were thwarted.
Skillfully using mobile formations in cooperation with combined arms formations, the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts forced Sozh, Vihra and, pursuing the enemy, liberated the cities of Rudnya, Krasnoe, Mstislavl, Krichev.
In close cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Western Front, the offensive was carried out by the troops of the Bryansk Front, which were conducting the Bryansk offensive operation at that time. In mid-September, the troops of the Bryansk Front crossed the Desna, and on September 17 they liberated the cities of Bryansk and Bezhitsa. By September 30, they reached the Krichev-Vetka line, and by October 2 - to the Pronya River in the section from Petukhovka to Slavgorod and further to the eastern bank of the Sozh River.
Partisans operating behind enemy lines on the territory of the Smolensk and Kalinin regions played an important role in the success of the offensive of the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts. To combat them, the Hitlerite command was forced to allocate four security divisions (281, 201, 286 and 203rd).
Having reached the Rudnya, Dribin, Slavgorod line on October 2, the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts met organized enemy resistance. Attempts to continue the offensive in the Orsha and Mogilev directions were unsuccessful.
As a result of the third stage of the Smolensk offensive operation, the troops of the Western and left wings of the Kalinin Fronts inflicted a serious defeat on the enemy, liberated a number of large cities and over 5 thousand settlements. In 17 days of the offensive, after breaking through the enemy's defenses north of Dukhovshchina and west of Yelnya, the front troops advanced 100-180 km. The greatest progress was in the Roslavl direction.
At the end of the Smolensk operation, a battle unfolded between the troops of the Central and Ukrainian fronts for the Dnieper and Right-Bank Ukraine. In this situation, it was necessary to continue the operations of the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts in the Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev sectors against the main forces of Army Group Center. By carrying out a number of operations in these sectors, the forces of the Kalinin and Western Fronts did not allow the enemy to transfer forces to the southern sector, where the main task of the campaign was being solved.
The Smolensk offensive operation, carried out by the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, was an integral part of the general offensive of the Soviet Army, which unfolded on the Soviet-German front in August - September 1943, and was of great strategic importance.
As a result of this operation, the main forces of the 3rd Panzer, 4th and part of the forces of the 9th enemy armies, which were part of Army Group Center, were seriously defeated. During the offensive, Soviet troops broke through 4, and in some places 5 fortified enemy lines, defeated 5 infantry, tank and motorized divisions, and inflicted heavy defeat on eleven infantry and three tank and motorized divisions of the enemy. The Soviet Army drove out the German fascist invaders from the Smolensk region and laid the foundation for the liberation of Belarus. The front was far removed from the capital of our Motherland - Moscow. Soviet troops liberated over 7,500 settlements, including the cities: Smolensk, Roslavl, Yartsevo, Yelnya, Spas-Demensk, Dorogobuzh, Velizh, Dukhovshchina, Demidov, etc.
The active offensive operations of the forces of the Kalinin and Western Fronts pinned down large enemy forces in the western direction, preventing the Nazi command from carrying out any transfers to other directions. This contributed to the successful completion of the Battle of Kursk, the operations to liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine and Donbass, as well as the successful deployment of the Battle of the Dnieper and Right-Bank Ukraine. The implementation of the Smolensk operation significantly expanded the general front of active operations of the Soviet troops.
In the Smolensk offensive operation, the task of breaking through the well-prepared, deeply echeloned enemy defense was solved. It should be borne in mind that the Hitlerite command attached great importance to the organization of a strong defense in the western direction, since this direction led to its vital facilities. The formations of the troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts pushed to the west posed a real threat to the flanks and rear areas of the enemy groupings operating in the Baltic States and south of the Roslavl-Bryansk line. Therefore, the fascist German command in the Smolensk and Roslavl areas kept the most combat-ready and manned divisions with combat experience, and also transferred large forces and equipment here during the operation, not even considering the weakening of their grouping operating in the Orel region.
As a result of the successful implementation of the Smolensk offensive operation, our troops broke into the heavily fortified multi-lane and deeply echeloned enemy defenses and advanced 200-225 km westward. During the offensive, the Soviet Army crossed the Dnieper, Dniester, Sozh, knocked out the enemy from the interfluve of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, liberated thousands of settlements and a number of large cities, including the most important strategic center of enemy defense in the western direction, the ancient Russian city, the regional center - Smolensk ...
This is a strategic offensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, carried out from August 7 to October 2. Its purpose was to defeat the left wing of Army Group Center, liberate Smolensk and prevent the transfer of German troops to the southwestern strategic direction.
Defeat as many enemy forces as possible
The victories won by the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk greatly influenced the situation on the Soviet-German front by the beginning of August 1943. An attempt by the Nazis to launch an offensive in the Kursk region in the summer of 1943 ended in complete failure. In just a few days, our soldiers in a fierce battle not only overcame a powerful enemy offensive from the regions of Orel and Belgorod, but also launched a counteroffensive. The Soviet army firmly held the strategic initiative in its hands: the troops of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts dealt blow after blow to the enemy. In this situation, it was very important to inflict defeat on as many enemy forces as possible by active actions in other directions, so as not to allow the Nazis to use these forces to counter our offensive. These sectors of the front, first of all, included the western direction, which was close to the region of the Kursk salient.
To successfully solve this problem, the Soviet High Command decided on a major offensive operation in the western direction. The command of the Western and Kalinin Fronts was informed that the enemy opposed more than forty divisions to our fighters, who would operate in the southwestern direction. If they are not destroyed, he will be able to regroup these forces to the south, which will complicate the offensive of the Soviet troops, which delivered the main blow.
Liberate Smolensk, open the road to Belarus
The task was not only to push the enemy even further from Moscow, but also to liberate the ancient Russian city of Smolensk, as well as to open the road to Belarus. In this direction, the enemy was located 200-300 km from Moscow. The enemy threatened her and the entire Central industrial region of the country, and also closed the shortest routes to Belarus and the Baltic states for our troops.
The enemy believed that the liberation of Smolensk by the Red Army would lead to the fact that it would receive favorable positions for military operations in the Minsk region. Taking this into account, the German command created a powerful defensive line in the Smolensk sector. It consisted of 5-6 strips 100-130 kilometers deep. There were wire obstacles, minefields, pillboxes, bunkers, as well as anti-tank ditches, holes, rubble ... The natural conditions also played into the hands of the enemy: woodland and a large number of swampy places.
At the end of July, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts together numbered about 1.3 million people, as well as more than 20 thousand guns and mortars, about one and a half thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 1.1 thousand aircraft. The enemy - Army Group Center - had the opportunity to put into operation over 850 thousand people, 8.8 thousand guns and mortars, as well as about 500 tanks and assault guns and up to 700 aircraft. With the command of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin, who came to the places where the fighting was to unfold, discussed the plan of the operation and its preparation.
Smolensk offensive operation
The goal was strikes in several directions, first to dismember the Hitlerite grouping, and then to destroy it piece by piece. The main role here was assigned to the troops of the Western Front. The enemy was to be destroyed in the areas of Spas-Demensk and Yelnya. Next it was necessary to advance to Roslavl - in order to help the Bryansk front advancing precisely on the Roslavl direction. And such help was extremely necessary, because he was opposed by a large and powerful German group. The troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts were tasked with first inflicting powerful blows on the enemy in the regions of Dorogobuzh, Yartsevo, Dukhovshchina, and then liberating Smolensk. This plan was called "Suvorov I". In the event that the Bryansk Front would advance successfully without the support of the Western Front, it was planned to turn the forces of the Bryansk Front to Smolensk (the plan was called "Suvorov II").
Since the operation near Smolensk was planned very carefully, our command was able to create shock groups of troops in the breakthrough areas that outnumbered the enemy both in manpower and equipment. Unfortunately, however, there were no second echelons in the armies. In addition, the weak side of our troops was the lack of careful observance of the requirements of camouflage. The Nazis discovered areas of concentration of enemy forces and pulled up additional reserves. The troops of the strike grouping of the Western Front went over to the offensive on the morning of August 7. The fighting immediately went into a protracted phase, the Nazis showed stubborn resistance.
At the cost of losses we went to victory
Already the very first day of the battle showed examples of the courage of our soldiers. For example, the detachment under the command of Major F.N. Belokonya. On the night of August 8, the soldiers, with the support of artillery, went to the assault on Hill 233.3, a strong enemy stronghold. The enemy suffered heavy losses, the height was taken. Our soldiers' losses were only two people killed and nineteen wounded. Major Belokon was awarded a high military award - the Order of Alexander Nevsky, and his soldiers were awarded orders and medals. More than 530 settlements (including Spas-Demensk) were liberated by the soldiers of the Western Front in just two weeks. During this time, they advanced to a depth of 30-40 kilometers.
However, further, unfortunately, the pace of the offensive stopped: on the line west of Yelnya, the enemy had strong positions prepared earlier. The soldiers of the Kalinin Front also suffered heavy losses. The Hitlerite command, seeking to stop the Red Army at any cost, redeployed 13 divisions from Orel and Bryansk, as well as from other sectors of the fighting. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to suspend the offensive of the Western and Kalinin Fronts in order to more carefully prepare a new strike.
At the end of August, at the beginning of September
At the end of August and at the beginning of September, in ten days, the troops of the Western Front took part in the Yelninsko-Dorogobuzh operation, as a result of which Yelnya and Dorogobuzh were liberated. The conditions for the conduct of hostilities were very difficult (the forest and swamps made it difficult for our forces to advance). But, nevertheless, overcoming the growing resistance of the enemy, the troops of the front crossed the rivers Ustrom, Desna and Snoot. This allowed them to gain a foothold on the line west of Yelnya.
In order to overcome the enemy's resistance, it was decided to prepare more thoroughly for a further offensive. And it started. On September 14, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts again entered into intense hostilities. During two operations (Dukhovshinsko-Demidov and Smolensk-Roslavl), they broke through the enemy's defenses and liberated the cities of Yartsevo, Demidov, Roslavl and Smolensk. The advance of our army was 130-180 kilometers.
Aviation provided significant support to our fronts. And, undoubtedly, the help of the partisans operating on the territory of the Smolensk, Kalinin regions and Belarus was very noticeable. Their vigorous actions, which historians would later call the "Rail War", led to the fact that the invaders refused to transport military force along railways and country roads. On October 2, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts reached the line west of Velizh, Rudnya, Dribin and further south along the river. Penetrating, stopping the offensive by order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
Joint action of the fronts
The successful completion of the Smolensk operation by the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts made it possible to advance westward by 250-300 kilometers, with a strip of 300 kilometers. The Smolensk region and part of the Kalinin region were liberated from the Nazis. Our troops entered the territory of Belarus. The achievement of success in the Smolensk operation was facilitated by the actions of the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts, which pinned down significant Wehrmacht forces in the north-western direction, depriving the German command of the opportunity to strengthen the troops in the central direction. The front line from Moscow was significantly pushed back. A threat was created to the northern flank of Army Group Center. 7 enemy divisions were defeated, and 14 suffered a heavy defeat. The Germans had to transfer 16
divisions from other sectors of hostilities. This contributed to the successful completion of the Battle of Kursk and the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine. The losses of our troops were as follows: irrecoverable over 107 thousand people, sanitary - 34.3 thousand people. The soldiers demonstrated high dedication during the Smolensk operation. 73 formations and units of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, which especially distinguished themselves during the hostilities, were given honorary titles - Smolensk, Demidov, Roslavl ... Tens of thousands of soldiers were awarded with military awards.
SMOLENSK OPERATION 1943(codename "Suvorov"), a strategic offensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts, carried out from August 7 to October 2 with the aim of crushing the left wing of Army Group Center, liberating Smolensk and preventing the transfer of it. troops to the southwestern strategic direction.
The leitmotif of the actions of the Soviet troops was the appeal of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: "Forward to defeat the German occupiers and drive them out of our homeland!"
The task of the troops was not only to push the enemy even further from Moscow, but also to liberate the ancient Russian city of Smolensk and open the road to Belarus. In this direction, the enemy was 200-300 km from Moscow and continued to threaten it and the entire Central Industrial Region of the country, and also closed the Sov. troops the shortest paths to Belarus and the Baltic states.
The German command believed that the liberation of Smolensk by the Red Army would create favorable starting positions for it for subsequent operations in the Minsk region. To prevent this, the troops Wehrmacht for a long period of stay here, a strong defense was created in the Smolensk direction. a line (central part of the "Eastern Wall") of 5-6 lanes (total depth 100-130 km), saturated with barbed wire, minefields, pillboxes, bunkers, anti-tank ditches, roadblocks, rubble, etc. In addition, the natural conditions of the area combat operations favored defense: woodland, with large swampy areas.
At the end of July, the troops of the Kalinin (general-regiment A.I. Eremenko) and Western (general-regiment. V.D. Sokolovsky) fronts together numbered approx. 1.3 million people, more than 20 thousand rubles. and mortars, approx. 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 1.1 thousand aircraft. On the Smolensk and Roslavl directions, they took up defenses along the Velizh line east of Safonovo, west of Kirov and further to the southeast. The opposing army group "Center" (General Feldm. G. Kluge) had St. 850 thousand people, approx. 8.8 thousand op. and mortars, approx. 500 tanks and assault guns, up to 700 aircraft and was supported by 6VF aviation.
To get acquainted with the situation in the Smolensk direction in early August, Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin. The plan of the operation, its preparation, operational camouflage, etc. were discussed with the command of the Western and then Kalinin fronts.
Sov. the command planned to dismember it with strikes in several directions. grouping and smash it piece by piece. The main blow was inflicted by the armies of the Western Front (31A, 5A, 10 Guards A, 33A, 49A, 10A, 50A, 68A, 21A, 1VA, 2 Guards TK, 5 MK, 6 Guards KK) in order to defeat the enemy in the Yelnya areas and Spas-Demensk. In the future, his troops were to move to Roslavl in order to help the Bryansk front advancing on the Roslavl direction in the fight against the powerful it deployed against it. grouping. The troops of the right wing of the Western Front, together with the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front (4 strikes A, 43A, 39A, 3VA, 3rd Guards KK) had the task of hitting the enemy in the regions of Dorogobuzh, Yartsevo, Dukhovshchina and then liberating Smolensk. This plan was called "Suvorov I". Subject to the successful development of the offensive of the Bryansk Front without the support of the Western Front, it was planned to turn the forces of the Bryansk Front to Smolensk (the plan was called "Suvorov II").
In the course of preparing for the Smolensk operation, the command managed to create shock groupings of troops that surpassed the enemy in the breakthrough sectors. However, for the development of the operation, there were no strong second echelons in the armies, and in the fronts there were no mobile groups. When preparing the Smolensk operation, camouflage measures were not sufficiently observed - this allowed the enemy to determine the areas of concentration of shock groups and to advance additional reserves there in advance.
The Smolensk operation included 4 front-line operations. On the morning of August 7, the troops of the strike grouping of the Western Front went on the offensive, starting the Spas-Demensk operation of 1943. The fighting immediately took on a protracted nature, accompanied by continuous counterattacks and stubborn resistance from the Germans.
On the very first day of the offensive, the soldiers and officers showed heroism and courage. To seize a strong enemy stronghold at an altitude of 233.3, the command formed a special detachment from the soldiers of the 1st assault engineer-sapper brigade under the command of Major F.N. Belokonya. On the night of August 8, the companies of the detachment, with the support of artillery, simultaneously launched an assault on the heights from 3 sides. The detachment knocked the enemy out of the trenches, overcame the anti-tank ditches, broke into the dugouts and fortified at the height. The enemy suffered heavy losses, and the losses of the detachment amounted to 2 people. killed and 19 wounded. For courage and heroism, Major Belokon was awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky, most of the soldiers were awarded orders and medals.
The front troops advanced to a depth in 14 days. 30-40 km, more than 530 settlements were liberated, incl. Spas-Demensk (August 13). By the end of August 20, the offensive of Kr. army was stopped by the enemy at the positions prepared by him in advance on the line south-west of Yelnya, Zimtsy. On August 13, 43A (Lieutenant General KD Golubev) and 39A (Lieutenant General A.I. Zygin) of the Kalinin Front launched an offensive from the region north-west and east of Dukhovshchina, which also met stubborn enemy resistance and , suffering heavy losses, in 5 days they wedged into its defenses by 6-7 km.
In an effort to stop Kr. army at any cost, it. the command in the first half of August transferred to the Smolensk direction from near Orel, Bryansk and other sectors Soviet-German front up to 13 divisions. In these conditions, the Supreme Command Headquarters gave the order to suspend the offensive of the Western and Kalinin Fronts in order to more carefully prepare a new strike.
August 28 - September 6, the troops of the Western Front conducted the Elninsko-Dorogobuzh operation of 1943, during which they liberated the years. Yelnya (August 30), Dorogobuzh (September 1). Overcoming the growing resistance of the enemy, in the difficult conditions of the wooded and swampy terrain, the troops of the front crossed the river. Ustrom, Desna and Snoot, and by the end of September 6, were entrenched on the line north-east of Yartsevo, west of Yelnya.
The Kalinin Front also stopped active hostilities for more thorough preparations for a further offensive. On September 14, the offensive resumed by the troops of the Kalinin, and on September 15 - of the Western fronts, carrying out the Dukhovshchinsko-Demidov operation of 1943 and the Smolensk-Roslavl operation of 1943, respectively. troops broke through the enemy's defenses, liberated the years. Yartsevo (September 16), Demidov (September 22), Smolensk and Roslavl (September 25), advanced 130-180 km.
The troops were actively supported by aviation 3VA (general-leith. Aviation N.F. Papivin) and 1VA (general-lieutenant. Aviation M.M. Gromov), great help to the advancing Kr. the army was rendered by partisans of the Kalinin, Smolensk regions and Belarus. They, interacting with the troops of the Kr. army during the operation "Rail War", forced the invaders to abandon the transportation of troops by rail. and country roads passing through the forests south of Bryansk (see also Guerrilla movement). "The situation with the partisans has deteriorated in such a way that the withdrawal of troops, especially on the southern flank ... becomes possible to ensure only as a result of stubborn battles of our units intended for this," - said in a report from the headquarters of Army Group Center for September 28. On October 2, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts reached the line west of Velizh, Rudnya, Dribin and further south along the river. Penetrating, stopping the offensive by order of the Supreme Command Headquarters.
As a result of the Smolensk operation, the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts advanced 200-250 km westward in a strip of lat. 300 km, liberated from the invaders Smolensk and part of the Kalinin region. and entered the territory of Belarus. This significantly pushed the front line away from Moscow, ensured the collapse of the "Eastern Wall" in the upper reaches of the river. Dnieper and posed a threat to the northern flank of Army Group Center. 7 divisions were defeated and 14 enemy divisions were heavily defeated. Him. the command was forced to transfer 16 divisions to the area of operation from other directions, incl. from the central, which contributed to the successful completion Battle of Kursk 1943 and conducting operations to liberate the Left Bank Ukraine.
Loss of owls. troops were: irrevocable - St. 107.6 thousand people, sanitary - 34.3 thousand people. The troops acted courageously and purposefully, showed courage and military skill. Particularly distinguished 73 formations and units of the Western and 16 - Kalinin fronts received the honorary names of Smolensk, Demidov, Roslavl and others. Many formations and units were awarded orders, tens of thousands of soldiers were awarded with military awards.
Research Institute (Military History) VAGSh RF Armed Forces
For more than a month, the 3rd GKK stayed near Rossosh, and in early August it was sent to Rzhev, then even further north. The corps entered the active army on August 14. But they really didn't have a chance to fight on the Kalinin Front - they took care of the cavalry in order to lead it into a breakthrough when it was formed.
The troops of the Kalinin Front during the Smolensk offensive operation (Fig. 13.) in August - early September 1943 wedged into the enemy's defenses by 6-7 kilometers, but could not develop success. The enemy had here a well-equipped multi-lane defense, the overcoming of which was complicated by the wooded and swampy nature of the terrain.
From September 1 to September 8, the 3rd GKK was withdrawn from the active army: at this time, preparations were being made for its transfer to the south. On September 9, the corps was placed at the disposal of the Western Front (commanded by General of the Army V.D.Sokolovsky). From 12 to 15 September, the horse guards marched through the Safonovo and Dorogobuzh area to the south, and north of Yelnya turned west. From September 15 to October 2, they were to actively participate in the Smolensk-Roslavl operation (Fig. 15.).
In these parts, from August 14 to early September, the Dar'insky junior sergeant Lazarev Pyotr Gerasimovich, born in 1909, also fought. He served as the commander of the telephony department in the 46th GKP of the 13th GKD, and died on September 9, 1943 in the Elninsky district of the Smolensk region. P. G. Lazarev was posthumously awarded the medal "For Courage", and was buried in the Lapinsky farm. Another fellow villager of his grandfather - Ogloblin Ivan Dmitrievich, born in 1896 (Fig. 22), died near Smolensk on September 17. For fearlessness and heroism - he was the first to break into the fascist trenches, destroyed more than 10 Germans with two grenades and carried away his comrades - Sergeant Ogloblin was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the II degree. He fought in the 1197th joint venture of the 360th SD, and was buried in the village of Alekseevka.
The fascist German command, trying to hold the occupied lines east of Smolensk and Roslavl, concentrated its main forces in this direction. The enemy had a strong defense (the central part of the "Eastern Wall"), which included 5-6 zones with a total depth of 100-130 kilometers. The cities of Velizh, Demidov, Dukhovshchina, Smolensk, Yelnya, Roslavl were turned into powerful fortified centers.
In total, 44 divisions were concentrated on this sector on the German side: over 850 thousand people, about 8,800 guns and mortars, about 500 tanks and assault guns, up to 700 aircraft.
The troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts occupied an encompassing position in relation to the enemy grouping and by the beginning of the Smolensk operation (August 7 - October 2) there were 1,253 thousand people, 20,640 guns and mortars, 1,436 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,100 aircraft.
From the front diary of the communications officer of the headquarters of the 6th GKD of the Guard Senior Lieutenant Igor Antonovich Panteleimonov, born in 1915. "12.9.43
Today at 19.00 we went to the march. We walked 40 km. We stopped in the village of Dvorishche. I slept all day. At 19.00 again to the march.
We walked 35 km. We stopped in the village of Shelkino. We all slept in a heap, in a dugout. Tomorrow we go into battle (Fig. 14.).
Our aviation has been hanging in the air since the morning. Bombers, attack aircraft, fighters in groups of 40-50 ... in a continuous stream go to the West. The front is 25-27 km away from us. … A continuous roar of explosions: they are punching a hole for us. ...
16.9.43 went into operation. We walked 20 km. We stopped in the village of Chaptsevo. Of course there is no village. We slept on stacks of straw. In the morning I went to the 5th GKD (Guards Cavalry Division. - Ed.) For communication. At 1.00 a.m. on 17.9.43 he went to the front from the 5th GCD. The infantry cannot make a breakthrough in any way, they had to go on their own, the enemy stubbornly resists. The 17th and 24th regiments entered the battle, pushed the Germans a little. 1st squadron moved to the western bank of the river. Volost, but then the order came to hand over the areas to the infantry and retreat. Surrendered, moved away. And on 19.9.43 we went ahead again. The enemy withdrew. We go after him. I move with 5 GCD. Our division goes behind - in reserve. Now I am sitting in the forest, 1-2 km ahead of the 17th and 22nd regiments are fighting. They have already crossed the river. Livna, but the enemy counterattacked with infantry, tanks and self-propelled guns and threw them back to the eastern bank.
I just arrived from the front line. It's hot there. Continuous fire does not allow you to raise your head. After all, the Germans are fighting desperately!
Received a letter from my mother. It is terribly difficult for her to live there. And there's nothing I can do to get her out of there! How to be? There are no letters from Maria. And they are unlikely to be.
… I didn’t keep a diary for 10 days. There was absolutely no time. I don’t dismount my horse all day and night. All the time on the front lines. Now with one regiment, now with another. 26.9.43 at night at the crossing of the 23rd GKP (Guards Cavalry Regiment) through a swampy stream in the area of the village of Drogan 'received a light concussion.
It's hard to forget this crossing!
In a deep ravine, illuminated by huts and stacks of bread burning on both sides of the ravine, squadrons are ferrying; noise, shouts, whistles ... sometimes, covering all the noises, the voice of the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Zhigailov, is heard. Suddenly, very close, 1-1.5 km to our right, a gun shot, another, third, shells fall directly on the column descending into the gully. Continuous fire continued until the entire regiment crossed the beam and turned to fight. Several killed, up to 20 wounded, a broken 76 m / m cannon - the result of the crossing. On September 29, 1943, our division reached the banks of the Dnieper near the village of Syrokorenino. I got the task: to cross to the right bank of the Dnieper and find our infantry. I took two scouts and drove off. Dawn, swam across the Dnieper. The pleasure is below average! The water is like ice, and the width is quite solid - 80-100 meters. Swam across the night if only by sight. Traveled for about 3 hours, still found the damn infantry!
It’s even worse to cross back - it’s dark, cold!
9/30/43 left the village of Vinnye Luki in the village of Dukhatino for reconnaissance of the way. How stupid our bosses sometimes go! I left with a group of submachine gunners, followed by quarters with sappers and signalmen, and after that they sent a patrol to find out if there was an enemy in Dukhatin or not!
Yesterday at 20.00 I received a task: to find 5 GKD and get in touch with her, ... nobody knew where she was. The night is very warm, the rain is so light, disgusting ... I drove until 3.00 - no division! He spat, drove into the first village he came across and went to bed, got up at 6.00 and by 8.00 had already found the division. At 11.30 I was at home. Now we have been withdrawn from the battle, we are waiting for the infantry to make a breakthrough. We live both boring and crowded. I do not receive letters, I sent a letter to my mother, and I will not write to Maria until I receive it from her. It is unlikely that there will be letters from her. And I will not write either, it is obvious that after the war we will not have life with her.
Another 6 days have passed. The division withdrew from the battle. We are waiting for the infantry to break through the front so that we can enter it and be able to operate in the rear of the Germans. Yesterday, at a party meeting, I was noted as an excellent worker in the most difficult conditions of a combat situation. I really want to get to work in the operational department, but there are very few chances for this, because vacancies in this department are completed. Yesterday, i.e. On 5.10.43 at 22.30 we set out from Dukhatino, where we had been standing since 30.9.43. We walked 30 km and stopped in the village of Nov. Kornilovka. The small village is all surrounded by greenery, the only street is lined with tall slender birches. Autumn. … The weather is quiet, sunny, but already cool, so it's chilly even in the daytime without a greatcoat. There are no letters. A few days ago I received a letter from my mother. Yes, it is very difficult for her, but what can I do? I wrote to the NKO (People's Commissariat for Defense. - Ed.) A request to issue her a pass to enter Moscow, but so far there has been no response. Maria, apparently, is not worried about the pass, and I am too far away to do anything. Maria still doesn't write. Obviously she doesn't need me. ...
11.10.43
We are still in Nov. Kornilovka. Received a letter from Musya. Finally. The letter is good: she now realized how heartless her attitude towards me was. Maybe she will understand how much I love her and change her attitude. Now all the time I am occupied with the thought of how to transport Allochka to Moscow, because today she is 5 years old! How big she must have become! For two and a half years I have not seen her and my mother. Today I wrote to Musa, mother and S. Tokarev. ...
Something for a long time the infantry does not break through the front. Today our aircraft hangs in the air all day. Gromov's 1st Aviation Army arrived here, to our sector. Maybe she'll speed things up. We are intensively preparing for the crossing of the Dnieper. Obviously, the operation will have to force the Dnieper by swimming. "
Senior Lieutenant I. A. Panteleimonov was awarded the Order of the Red Star for repeated exemplary performance of combat missions and the courage and courage of the guards displayed at the same time.
In the period from 20 to 26 September, the 6th GKD fought in the area of the railway (until 23.09) and the Roslavl - Smolensk highway east of Laptevo. The village of Laptevo and the hamlet of Dolgomostye were liberated by the 23rd Guards Cavalry Regiment on 23 September. But even after our breakthrough, the Nazis firmly defended some sections of this strategically important road. In the area where my grandfather fought, “the Germans sat down and fired from two heavy machine guns. The battery commander orders me to destroy these enemy firing points. I took a reference point, determined the distance, gave the command to my gunner (I was the commander of the mortar crew). I say: "6 minutes of runaways, fire at the enemy machine gun!" - the machine gun choked. I give the command: "0.30 to the right on the second machine gun!" - and this machine gun fell silent. The Germans rushed to skelp, I give the command: "For the retreating enemy, the distance is such and such, fire!" And we there, on the road, filled 65 Fritzes. For this battle I was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the II degree.
On September 26, 23, the GKP occupied the settlements of Velichkovo and Oblozhnoe. At the last farm, the Germans really "taxed" themselves, and my grandfather distinguished himself. Order No. 9 / n 23 of the GKP 6 GKD of October 1, 1943 says: to award the medal “For Courage” “31. Commander of the calculation of 82-mm mortar mortar battery of the Red Army Guard Torgashev Alexei Mikhailovich for the fact that in the battle on September 26, 1943 for the settlement of Oblozhnoe Comrade. Torgashev scattered up to two enemy infantry platoons with his mortar fire and destroyed 10 German soldiers ”(See Appendix).
On September 27, the scouts of the 23rd GKP distinguished themselves near the Chernyshi farm, and on September 28, the soldiers of the same regiment captured the crossing near the eastern outskirts of the Gluboky farm.
From the grandfather's recollections: “We began to move on. Early in the morning, it was still dark, the shepherd suddenly barked. The battalion commander says: "Comrade Torgashev, hit the barking dog." I replied: "There is a hit!" I give the command to the gunner: "6 minutes of runaways on the dog - fire!" The dog fell silent. It was dawn, we drove up, we were told that the mortarmen had killed a German officer, horses and a dog. This officer turned out to be a staff worker who was carrying a full tarantass of documents. The regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Zhigailov, approached and asked:
Who shot?
I, the Red Army soldier Torgashev!
Well done, you got the language for us, this is very important. I am awarding you with the medal "For Courage".
At different times and in different places, the regiments of the 3rd GKK crossed the Dnieper and grouped together for the next march. On September 29, the 23rd GKP reached the Dnieper bank in the Syrokorenino area, but, according to the recollections of the platoon commander of this regiment, Sergei Pavlovich Letuchev, born in 1918, "the Germans opened heavy fire from the right bank, there were many dead."
The commander of the 23rd GKP Guard Lieutenant Colonel N. N. Zhigailov for successful offensive operations near Smolensk was awarded the Order of Suvorov III degree. From the award list:
“During the offensive of the divisions from September 17-30 this year in the regions of the Smolensk region, the regiment under the command of Comrade Zhigailov, successfully carrying out a combat order, inflicted significant damage on the enemy in manpower and equipment.
23.9.43 years in the battle under the hut. Dolgomost regiment with a swift sudden throw shot down the enemy entrenched on the heights, seized the junction of the railway and the Smolensk-Roslavl highway in the Khut region. Putyatinka, having seized the Dolgomostye farm, destroyed 4 enemy firing points, up to 100 soldiers and officers, captured trophies - 1 car, 2 motorcycles and a large amount of ammunition.
On September 25, 1943, in the battle for the Belenka farm, the regiment, having broken the stubborn resistance of the enemy, took possession of the farm and threw the enemy back to the Lastovka River, at the same time cutting off the escape routes of the Nazis through the crossing, while 32 vehicles with ammunition were destroyed, 11 Art. machine guns, up to 200 enemy soldiers and officers, 3 bunkers were broken and 23 enemy soldiers and officers were captured.
On September 26, 1943, the regiment, pursuing the retreating enemy, immediately knocked down the pr-ka from the hut. Drogan, under heavy artillery fire, forced the river. Whirlwind, took possession of the hut. Tikhanovshchina and cut the Smolensk-Krasnoe highway, destroying 7 trucks, 2 motorcycles and up to 60 soldiers and officers. At the same time, 1 car, 2 motorcycles, 12 horses, 39 heads of cattle were seized.
During the period of the offensive, the regiment liberated up to 30 settlements. "
From a letter to A.M. Torgashev to the grandson of O.A. Torgashov from 18.04. 1986:
“Our 32nd division, which was the first to break into the city of Smolensk from the south, was given the name Smolensk. Then our regiment crossed the Dnieper east of Smolensk. I must say, without loss, at night, swim on horseback. " (For comparison, when crossing the Dnieper in the Kiev region, up to 75% of the personnel of the . – approx. Author).
From the front-line diary of Igor Panteleymonov:
« 20.10.43
Two days ago on 18.10.43 Budyonny came to us. We were preparing very hard for his arrival. They brought cleanliness and order. I, Chernov and the clerk did not sleep for almost two days - we were making a diagram of the last operation. The scheme turned out to be huge - 11 m.
But they did it well. "
On October 18, 1943, my grandfather recalled the arrival of Budyonny's (commander-in-chief of cavalry) corps: “In addition to the usual review and inspection, a concert was arranged in front of the soldiers, during which the lady and Semyon Mikhailovich himself came out to dance. I remembered that he was short, but, despite his age (60 years), very mobile, lively, even squatted down. " Before receiving a new order in early November, the corps was reviewed by the front commander, General Eremenko. They even arranged obstacle races.
“Our 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps received an order to make a 300 km march on its own to the town of Nevel, Pskov Region. We achieved this goal and became part of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of General Baghramyan. We walked there through the city of Velikiye Luki, all in ruins. Our corps helped liberate the city of Nevel, then in mid-November 1943 we were sent to a "bag" south of Nevel, and we entered Belarus. "
Since the capture of Nevel at the junction of the German army groups "North" and "Center", the Dno - Novosokolniki - Nevel railroad (running parallel to the front) ceased to operate. The German command lost the ability to maneuver on its own. The Kalinin (from October 20 - 1st Baltic) Front opened the way for a further offensive on Vitebsk and Polotsk.
The enemy tried to restrain the offensive impulse of our armies by transferring additional forces under Gorodok, which was located between Nevel and Vitebsk: two infantry divisions from near Leningrad, five infantry and one tank division from the southern wing of Army Group Center. The enemy's air grouping was also strengthened. As a result of stubborn battles at the end of October, the Red Army liberated the first settlements of the Marchensky, Rudnyansky, Gazbinsky village councils of the Gorodok district.
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