Cruiser "Varyag". During the Soviet era, there would hardly have been a person in our country who had never heard of this ship. For many generations of our compatriots, the Varyag became a symbol of the heroism and dedication of Russian sailors in battle.
However, perestroika, glasnost and the “wild 90s” that followed came. Ours was subject to revision by all and sundry, but people began to throw mud at it fashion trend. Of course, “Varyag” also got it, and in full. His crew and commander were accused of everything! It was already agreed that Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev deliberately (!) sank the cruiser where it could be easily raised, for which he subsequently received a Japanese order. But on the other hand, many sources of information have appeared that were not previously available to historians and lovers of naval history - perhaps their study can really make adjustments to the history of the heroic cruiser, familiar to us from childhood?
This series of articles, of course, will not dot all the i’s. But we will try to bring together information about the history of the design, construction and service of the cruiser up to and including Chemulpo, based on the data available to us, we will analyze the technical condition of the ship and the training of its crew, possible breakthrough options and various scenarios of action in battle. We will try to figure out why the commander of the cruiser, Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, made certain decisions. In light of the above, we will analyze the postulates of the official version of the Varyag battle, as well as the arguments of its opponents. Of course, the author of this series of articles has formed a certain view of the feat of the “Varyag”, and it will, of course, be presented. But the author sees his task not in persuading the reader to any point of view, but in giving maximum information, on the basis of which everyone can decide for himself what the actions of the commander and crew of the cruiser "Varyag" are for him - a reason be proud of the fleet and your country, a shameful page in our history, or something else.
Well, we’ll start with a description of where such an unusual type of warship came from in Russia, such as high-speed armored cruisers of the 1st rank with a normal displacement of 6-7 thousand tons.
The ancestors of the armored cruisers of the Russian Imperial Navy can be considered the armored corvettes “Vityaz” and “Rynda” with a normal displacement of 3,508 tons, built in 1886.
Three years later, the Russian fleet was replenished with a larger armored cruiser with a displacement of 5,880 tons - it was the Admiral Kornilov, ordered in France, the construction of which began at the Loire shipyard (Saint-Nazaire) in 1886. However, then there was a slowdown in the construction of armored cruisers in Russia a long pause - almost a decade, from 1886 to 1895, the Russian Imperial Navy did not order a single ship of this class. Yes, and the Svetlana (with a displacement of 3828 tons), laid down at the end of 1895 at the French shipyards, although it was a quite decent small armored cruiser for its time, was still built rather as a representative yacht for the admiral general, and not as a ship , corresponding to the doctrine of the fleet. “Svetlana” did not fully meet the requirements for this class of warships by Russian sailors, and therefore was built in a single copy and was not replicated at domestic shipyards.
What, strictly speaking, were the fleet’s requirements for armored cruisers?
The fact is that the Russian Empire in the period 1890-1895. began seriously strengthening its Baltic Fleet with squadron battleships. Before this, in 1883 and 1886. two “battleships-rams” “Emperor Alexander II” and “Emperor Nicholas I” were laid down, and then only in 1889 - “Navarin”. Very slowly - one armadillo every three years. But in 1891 the Sisoy the Great was laid down, in 1892 - three squadron battleships of the Sevastopol type, and in 1895 - Peresvet and Oslyabya. And this is not even counting the laying of three coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Senyavin type, from which, in addition to traditional solutions to problems for this class of ships, they were also expected to support the main forces in the general battle with the German fleet.
In other words, the Russian fleet sought to create armored squadrons for a general battle, and of course, such squadrons required ships to support their operations. In other words, the Russian Imperial Navy needed reconnaissance officers attached to the squadrons - it was precisely this role that armored cruisers could quite successfully perform.
However, here, alas, dualism had its say, which largely predetermined the development of our fleet at the end of the 19th century. When creating the Baltic Fleet, Russia wanted to get a classic “two in one”. On the one hand, forces were required that were capable of giving a general battle to the German fleet and establishing dominance in the Baltic. On the other hand, they needed a fleet capable of entering the ocean and threatening British communications. These tasks were completely contradictory to each other, since their solution required different types of ships: for example, the armored cruiser Rurik was excellent for ocean raiding, but was completely inappropriate in a linear battle. Strictly speaking, Russia needed a battle fleet to dominate the Baltic and, separately, a second cruising fleet for war in the ocean, but, of course, the Russian Empire could not build two fleets, if only for economic reasons. Hence the desire to create ships capable of equally effectively fighting enemy squadrons and cruising in the ocean: a similar trend affected even the main strength of the fleet (the Peresvet series of “battleship cruisers”), so it would be strange to think that armored cruisers would not be supplied similar task.
As a matter of fact, this is exactly how the requirements for the domestic armored cruiser were determined. He was supposed to become a scout for the squadron, but also a ship suitable for ocean cruising.
Russian admirals and shipbuilders at that time did not at all consider themselves “ahead of the rest”, therefore, when creating a new type of ship, they paid close attention to ships of a similar purpose, built by the “Mistress of the Seas” - England. What happened in England? In 1888-1895. Foggy Albion built a large number of 1st and 2nd class armored cruisers.
At the same time, 1st class ships, strange as it may sound, were the “successors” of the Orlando-class armored cruisers. The fact is that these armored cruisers, according to the British, did not live up to the hopes placed on them; due to overload, their armor belt went under the water, thereby not protecting the waterline from damage, and in addition, in England, William took the post of chief builder White, opponent of armored cruisers. Therefore, instead of improving this class of ships, England in 1888 began building large armored cruisers of the 1st rank, the first of which were the Blake and Blenheim - huge ships with a displacement of 9150-9260 tons, carrying a very powerful armored deck (76 mm, and on bevels - 152 mm), strong weapons (2 * 234 mm, 10 * 152 mm, 16 * 47 mm) and developing a very high speed for that time (up to 22 knots).
Armored cruiser "Blake"
However, these ships seemed to their lordships to be excessively expensive, so the next series of 8 cruisers of the Edgar type, which entered the stocks in 1889-1890, was smaller in displacement (7467-7820 tons), speed (18.5/20 knots at natural /forced traction) and armor (the thickness of the bevels decreased from 152 to 127 mm).
All these ships were formidable fighters, but they, in fact, were cruisers not for squadron service, but for the protection of ocean communications, that is, they were “defenders of trade” and “raider killers,” and as such, were not very suitable for the Russian fleet. In addition, their development led the British to a dead end - in an effort to create ships capable of intercepting and destroying armored cruisers of the Rurik and Rossiya type, the British in 1895 laid down the armored deck Powerful and Terrible, which had a total displacement of over 14 thousand. etc. The creation of ships of this size (and cost), without vertical armor protection, was obvious nonsense.
Therefore, the analogues for the newest Russian armored cruisers were considered to be the English 2nd class cruisers, which had similar functionality, that is, they could serve with squadrons and perform overseas service.
Since 1889-1890 Great Britain laid down as many as 22 Apollo-class armored cruisers, built in two subseries. The first 11 ships of this type had a displacement of about 3,400 tons and did not carry copper-wood plating of the underwater part, which slowed down the fouling of ships, while their speed was 18.5 knots with natural draft and 20 knots when boosting the boilers. The next 11 Apollo-class cruisers had copper-wood plating, which increased their displacement to 3,600 tons, and reduced their speed (natural thrust/boosted) to 18/19.75 knots respectively. The armor and armament of the cruisers of both subseries was the same - an armored deck with a thickness of 31.75-50.8 mm, 2 * 152 mm, 6 * 120 mm, 8 * 57 mm, 1 * 47 mm guns and four 356 mm torpedo tubes apparatus.
The next armored cruisers of the British, 8 ships of the Astraea type, laid down in 1891-1893, became a development of the Apollo, and, in the opinion of the British themselves, not a very successful development. Their displacement increased by almost 1,000 tons, reaching 4,360 tons, but the additional weight was spent on subtle improvements - the armor remained at the same level, the armament “increased” by only 2 * 120 mm guns, and the speed decreased further, amounting to 18 knots with natural thrust and 19.5 knots with forced thrust. However, they served as the prototype for the creation of a new series of British 2nd class armored cruisers.
In 1893-1895. The British are laying down 9 cruisers of the Eclipse type, which we called the “Talbot type” (the same “Talbot” that served as a stationary on the Chemulpo roadstead along with the cruiser “Varyag”). These were much larger ships, the normal displacement of which reached 5,600 tons. They were protected by a somewhat more solid armored deck (38-76 mm) and they carried more solid weapons - 5 * 152 mm, 6 * 120 mm, 8 * 76- mm and 6*47 mm guns, as well as 3*457 mm torpedo tubes. At the same time, the speed of the Eclipse-class cruisers was frankly modest - 18.5/19.5 knots with natural/forced thrust.
So, what conclusions did our admirals draw from observing the development of the armored cruiser class in the UK?
Initially, a competition was announced for the cruiser project, and exclusively among domestic designers. They were asked to present designs for a ship with a displacement of up to 8,000 tons and a speed of at least 19 knots. and artillery, which included 2*203 mm (at the extremities) and 8*120 mm guns. Such a cruiser for those years looked excessively large and strong for a reconnaissance officer attached to a squadron; one can only assume that the admirals, knowing the characteristics of the English 1st class armored cruisers, were thinking about a ship capable of resisting them in battle. But, despite the fact that during the 1894-1895 competition were received very interesting projects(7,200 – 8,000 tons, 19 knots, 2-3*203 mm guns and up to 9*120 mm guns), further development they did not receive it: it was decided to focus on British armored cruisers of the 2nd rank.
At the same time, it was initially planned to focus on Astraea-class cruisers, with the obligatory achievement of 20 knot speeds and “a possibly larger area of operation.” However, almost immediately a different proposal arose: the engineers of the Baltic Shipyard presented MTK with preliminary studies of designs for cruisers with a displacement of 4,400, 4,700 and 5,600 tons. All of them had a speed of 20 knots and an armored deck 63.5 mm thick, only the armament differed - 2 * 152- mm and 8*120 mm on the first, 2*203 mm and 8*120 mm on the second and 2*203 mm, 4*152 mm, 6*120 mm on the third. A note accompanying the drafts explained:
“The Baltic Shipyard deviated from the English cruiser Astrea prescribed as an analogue, since it does not represent the most advantageous type among other new cruisers of different nations.”
Then the Eclipse-class cruisers were chosen as a “role model”, but then data became known about the French armored cruiser D'Entrecasteaux (7,995 tons, armament 2 * 240 mm in single-gun turrets and 12 * 138 mm , speed 19.2 knots). As a result, a new cruiser design was proposed with a displacement of 6,000 tons, a speed of 20 knots and armament of 2 * 203 mm and 8 * 152 mm. Alas, soon, by the will of the Admiral General, the ship lost its 203-mm guns for the sake of uniformity of calibers and... thus began the history of the creation of domestic armored cruisers of the Diana type.
It must be said that the design of this series of domestic cruisers has become an excellent illustration of where the road paved with good intentions leads. In theory, the Russian Imperial Navy was supposed to receive a series of excellent armored cruisers, superior to the British ones in many respects. The armored deck of a single 63.5 mm thickness provided at least equivalent protection to the English 38-76 mm. Ten 152-mm guns were preferable to the 5*152-mm, 6*120-mm English ship. At the same time, “Diana” was supposed to become significantly faster than “Eclipse” and this was the point.
Tests of warships of the Russian fleet did not include boosting the boilers; Russian ships had to show the contract speed using natural thrust. This is very important point, which is usually missed by the compilers of ship personnel directories (and behind them, alas, the readers of these directories). So, for example, data is usually given that the Eclipse developed 19.5 knots, and this is true, but it is not indicated that this speed was achieved by boosting the boilers. At the same time, the contract speed of the Diana is only half a knot higher than that of the Eclipse, and in fact, cruisers of this type were only able to develop 19-19.2 knots. From this we can assume that the Russian cruisers turned out to be even less fast than their English “prototype”. But in fact, the “goddesses” developed their 19 knots of speed on natural thrust, at which the speed of the “Eclipses” was only 18.5 knots, that is, our cruisers, with all their shortcomings, were still faster.
However, let's return to the Diana project. As we said earlier, their protection was expected to be no worse, their artillery better, and their speed one and a half knots greater than that of the British Eclipse-class cruisers, but that was not all. The fact is that the Eclipses had fire-tube boilers, while the Dianas were planned to have water-tube boilers, and this gave our ships a number of advantages. The fact is that fire tube boilers require much more time for distributing vapors, it is much more difficult to change operating modes on them, and this is important for warships, and in addition, flooding a compartment with a working fire tube boiler would most likely lead to its explosion, which threatened the ship with immediate destruction (as opposed to the flooding of one compartment). Water tube boilers were free of these disadvantages.
The Russian fleet was one of the first to switch to water tube boilers. Based on the results of research by specialists from the Naval Department, it was decided to use boilers designed by Belleville, and the first tests of these boilers (the armored frigate Minin was converted in 1887) showed quite acceptable technical and operational characteristics. It was believed that these boilers were extremely reliable, and the fact that they were very heavy was perceived as an inevitable price to pay for other advantages. In other words, the Navy Department realized that there were boilers of other systems in the world, including those that could provide the same power at significantly less weight than the Belleville boilers, but all this had not been tested and therefore raised doubts. Accordingly, when creating armored cruisers of the Diana type, the requirement to install Belleville boilers was completely categorical.
However, heavy boilers are not at all the best choice for a high-speed (even relatively high-speed) armored cruiser. The weight of the “Dian” machines and mechanisms amounted to an absolutely absurd 24.06% of their normal displacement! Even the later-built Novik, which many spoke of as a “destroyer weighing 3,000 tons” and a “case for cars,” whose combat qualities were obviously sacrificed for speed - and its weight of cars and boilers was only only 21.65% of normal displacement!
The Diana-class armored cruisers in their final version had 6,731 tons of normal displacement, developed 19-19.2 knots and carried an armament of only eight 152 mm guns. Without a doubt, they turned out to be extremely unsuccessful ships. But it’s hard to blame the ship’s designers for this - the supermassive power plant simply did not leave them enough room to achieve the rest of the planned characteristics of the ship. Of course, the existing boilers and engines were not suitable for a high-speed cruiser, and even the admirals “distinguished themselves” by authorizing the weakening of the already weak weapons for the sake of saving a penny on the scales. And, what’s most offensive, all those sacrifices that were made for power plant, did not make the ship fast. Yes, despite not reaching the contract speed, they were, perhaps, still faster than the British Eclipses. But the problem was that the “Mistress of the Seas” did not often build really good ships (the British were just good at fighting with them), and the armored cruisers of this series certainly could not be called successful. Strictly speaking, neither the 18.5 Eclipse nodes nor the 20 contract Diana nodes in the second half of the 90s of the 19th century were sufficient to serve as a reconnaissance unit for the squadron. And the armament of eight openly standing six-inch guns looked simply ridiculous against the background of two 210-mm and eight 150-mm cannons located in the casemates and turrets of the German armored cruisers of the Victoria Louise type - these are the cruisers that the Dianas would have to fight with in the Baltic in in case of war with Germany...
In other words, the attempt to create an armored cruiser capable of performing the functions of a scout for a squadron and, at the same time, “pirating” in the ocean in the event of a war with England, was a fiasco. Moreover, the inadequacy of their characteristics was clear even before the cruisers entered service.
The Diana-class cruisers were laid down (officially) in 1897. A year later, a new shipbuilding program was developed, taking into account the threat of a sharp strengthening of Japan: it was planned, to the detriment of the Baltic Fleet (and while maintaining the pace of construction of the Black Sea), to create a strong Pacific Fleet capable of neutralizing the emerging Japanese naval power. At the same time, the MTK (under the leadership of the Admiral General) determined the technical specifications for four classes of ships: squadron battleships with a displacement of about 13,000 tons, reconnaissance cruisers of the 1st rank with a displacement of 6,000 tons, “messenger ships” or cruisers of the 2nd class with a displacement of 3,000 tons and destroyers 350 tons.
In terms of creating armored cruisers of the 1st rank, the Maritime Department took a rather logical and reasonable step - since the creation of such ships on its own did not lead to success, it means that an international competition should be announced and the lead ship should be ordered abroad, and then replicated in domestic shipyards, thereby strengthening the fleet and acquiring advanced shipbuilding experience. Therefore, the competition put forward significantly higher tactical and technical characteristics than those of the Diana-class cruisers - MTK formed an assignment for a ship with a displacement of 6,000 tons, a speed of 23 knots and an armament of twelve 152-mm and the same number of 75-mm mm guns. The thickness of the armored deck was not specified (of course, it had to be present, but the rest was left to the discretion of the designers). The conning tower was supposed to have 152 mm armor, and the vertical protection of the elevators (feeding ammunition to the guns) and the bases of the chimneys was 38 mm. The coal reserve had to be at least 12% of the normal displacement, the cruising range was not less than 5,000 nautical miles. The metacentric height was also set with a full supply of coal (no more than 0.76 m), but the main dimensions of the ship were left to the discretion of the competitors. And yes, our specialists continued to insist on using Belleville boilers.
As you can see, this time MTK did not focus on any of the existing ships of other fleets of the world, but sought to create a very powerful and fast cruiser of moderate displacement that had no direct analogues. When determining the performance characteristics, it was considered necessary to ensure superiority over the Elswick cruisers: as follows from the “Report on the Naval Department for 1897-1900,” domestic armored cruisers of the 1st rank were to be built: “like Armstrong’s fast cruisers, but superior their displacement (6000 tons instead of 4000 tons), speed (23 knots instead of 22) and the test duration at full speed increased to 12 hours.” At the same time, the armament of 12 rapid-firing 152-mm cannons guaranteed it superiority over any English or Japanese armored cruiser of similar or smaller displacement, and its speed allowed it to escape from larger and better armed ships of the same class (“Edgar”, “Powerfull”, “ D'Entrecasteaux”, etc.)
As a matter of fact, this is how the story of the creation of the cruiser “Varyag” begins. And here, dear readers, a question may arise - why was it necessary to write such a long introduction, instead of immediately getting to the point? The answer is very simple.
As we know, a competition for designs for armored cruisers of the 1st rank took place in 1898. It seemed that everything should have gone as planned - many proposals from foreign companies, selection of the best project, its modification, contract, construction... No matter how it goes! Instead of the boring routine of a well-established process, the creation of “Varyag” turned into a real detective story. Which began with the fact that the contract for the design and construction of this cruiser was signed even before the competition. Moreover, at the time of signing the contract for the construction of the Varyag, no cruiser project yet existed in nature!
The fact is that soon after the competition was announced, the head of the American shipbuilding company William Crump and Sons, Mr. Charles Crump, arrived in Russia. He did not bring any projects with him, but he undertook to build the best warships in the world at the most reasonable price, including two squadron battleships, four armored cruisers with a displacement of 6,000 tons and 2,500 tons, as well as 30 destroyers. In addition to the above, Charles Crump was ready to build a plant in Port Arthur or Vladivostok, where 20 destroyers from the above 30 were to be assembled.
Of course, no one gave such a “piece of the pie” to Ch. Crump, but on April 11, 1898, that is, even before the competitive designs of armored cruisers were considered by the MTK, the head of the American company, on the one hand, and Vice Admiral V.P. Verkhovsky (head of GUKiS), on the other hand, signed a contract for the construction of a cruiser, which later became the Varyag. At the same time, there was no design for the cruiser - it still had to be developed in accordance with the “Preliminary Specifications”, which became an annex to the contract.
In other words, instead of waiting for the project to be developed, reviewing it, making adjustments and changes, as has always been done, and only then signing a construction contract, the Maritime Department, in fact, bought a “pig in a poke” - it signed a contract that provided development of a cruiser project by Ch. Crump based on the most general technical specifications. How did Ch. Crump convince V.P. Verkhovsky that he is capable of developing the best project of all that will be submitted to the competition, and that the contract should be signed as quickly as possible so as not to waste precious time?
Frankly speaking, all of the above indicates either some kind of childish naivety of Vice Admiral V.P. Verkhovsky, or about the fantastic gift of persuasion (on the verge of magnetism) that Ch. Crump possessed, but most of all it makes you think about the existence of a certain corrupt component of the contract. It is very likely that some of the arguments of the resourceful American industrialist were extremely weighty (for any bank account) and could rustle pleasantly in the hands. But... not caught - not a thief.
Be that as it may, the contract was signed. On what happened next... let's just say, there are polar points of view, ranging from "brilliant industrialist Crump, struggling through the bureaucracy Tsarist Russia, is building a first-class cruiser of breathtaking qualities" and to "the scoundrel and swindler Crump, through deception and bribery, handed over a completely worthless ship to the Russian Imperial Navy." So, in order to understand, as impartially as possible, the events that happened more than 100 years ago, the dear reader must imagine the history of the development of armored cruisers in the Russian Empire, at least in the very shortened form in which it was presented in this article .
To be continued...
FIGHT IN CHEMULPO
Life is for the Motherland,
Soul to God
Honor - no one .
Motto on the margin of the Varyag logbook
By the beginning of 1904, relations between Russia and Japan had deteriorated to the limit. War could break out over the slightest trifle. Therefore, the command was strictly forbidden to take any initiative, so as not to provoke the Japanese.
At first, the Varyag’s service at the Chemulpo roadstead proceeded very calmly. On January 5, he was joined by the gunboat “Koreets” under the command of Captain II Rank G.P. Belyaev. On January 14, telegraph communication with Port Arthur was interrupted. On January 26, the “Korean” tried to leave Chemulpo, but was stopped at sea by a Japanese squadron. Having no order to engage in battle, Belyaev decided to turn back. And the next morning, Russian sailors learned about the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War.
The commander of the Japanese squadron, Rear Admiral S. Uriu, sent messages to the commanders of the warships of neutral countries located in Chemulpo - the English cruiser Talbot, the French Pascal, the Italian Elba and the American gunboat Vicksburg - messages with a request to leave the raid due to possible military operations against the "Varyag" and "Korean". The commanders of the first three ships protested that fighting in the roadstead would be a flagrant violation of Korea's formal neutrality, but it was clear that this was unlikely to stop the Japanese.
Early in the morning of January 27, 1904, V.F. Rudnev took part in a meeting of ship commanders, which took place on board the Talbot. Despite the obvious sympathy on the part of the British, French and Italians, they could not provide the Russian sailors with any obvious support for fear of violating neutrality.
Convinced of this, V.F. Rudnev told the commanders gathered on the Talbot that he would make an attempt to break through and take the fight, no matter how great the enemy’s forces were, that he would not fight in the roadstead and did not intend to surrender.
Returning to the cruiser, the commander announced to the officers the start of hostilities. The general opinion of the officers was to break through, and in case of failure, to blow up the ship, but under no circumstances give it to the enemy. Everyone had, however, a faint hope that the Japanese, offering to “leave the port,” would allow the ship to go to sea, where there was a greater chance of success than in a narrow, shallow roadstead or in the fairway, which deprived any freedom of maneuver.
At 10.45 V.F. Rudnev addressed the team lined up on the deck. Reporting the Japanese ultimatum, the commander said: “There can be no talk of surrender - we will not surrender the cruiser to them, nor ourselves, and we will fight to the last opportunity and to the last drop of blood. Each one perform his duties accurately, calmly, and slowly, especially the gunners, remembering that each shell must harm the enemy. If there is a fire, extinguish it without publicity, letting me know.” The sailors of the Varyag supported the commander’s speech with a thunderous “hurray.” The “Korean” team greeted the news of the battle with the same enthusiasm. “I remember with reverence,” the Varyag doctor M.L. Banshchikov later recalled, “the unforgettable picture of the general enormous uplift of spirit; there seemed to be no barrier to these transformed people.”
At 11.20 on January 27, 1904, the cruiser “Varyag” and the gunboat “Koreets” raised anchors and headed towards the exit from the roadstead. The teams of foreign ships, lined up in front on the decks of their ships, paid tribute to the courage of the Russians going into a hopeless battle to the Russian anthem. “We saluted these heroes who walked so proudly to certain death,” the commander of the French cruiser Pascal, V. Sene, later wrote in a report.
The distance between the ships was maintained by 1-2 cables, the speed was approximately 6-7 knots. The weather that day was calm and frosty, and the sea was completely calm. At 11.25, Captain 1st Rank V.F. Rudnev ordered the combat alarm to be sounded and the topmast flags to be raised. The Japanese squadron was guarding the Russians at the southern tip of Phillip Island. The “Asama” was closest to the exit, and it was from it that the “Varyag” and “Koreets” walking towards them were discovered. Rear Admiral S. Uriu at this time received an officer from the Talbot on board the cruiser Naniva, who delivered documents from the commanders' meeting. Having received the news from the Asama, the commander quickly ended the conversation and ordered the anchor chains to be riveted, since there was no time to raise and remove the anchors. The ships began to hastily pull out onto the reach, forming combat columns as they went, in accordance with the disposition received the day before.
The Asama and Chiyoda were the first to move, followed by the flagship Naniwa and the cruiser Niitaka, somewhat behind. Destroyers from one of the detachments were walking abeam the non-firing side of the Naniva. The remaining destroyers with the cruisers Akashi and Takachiho, having developed a large speed, rushed in a southwestern direction. Advice "Chihaya" together with the destroyer "Kasasagi" were on patrol at the exit from the 30-mile fairway. Russian ships continued to move
The Japanese admiral offered a signal to surrender, but the commander of the Varyag did not consider it necessary to respond, and then, at 11.45, the first shot from the cruiser Asama fired from an 8-inch gun, after which the entire Japanese squadron opened fire. "Varyag", in turn, upon leaving the neutral roadstead, having carried out zeroing, opened fire with armor-piercing shells from a distance of 45 cables.
"Asama", observing the breakout cruiser on the port side, approached without stopping fire. He was actively supported by Naniva and Niytaka. At the same time, "Chiyoda" attacked "Korean". The Russian ships energetically responded with their starboard guns. The gunboat initially fired high-explosive shells from the right 8-inch gun alternately at the lead cruiser and Takachiho. Soon, the reduction in distance allowed the Korean to use the stern 6-inch gun.
One of the first Japanese shells destroyed the upper bridge of the Varyag and broke the fore shrouds. In this case, midshipman Count Alexey Nirod died, and all the rangefinders of station No. 1 were killed or wounded.
Subsequent shots from the Japanese knocked out a 6-inch gun, and all the gun and supply personnel were killed or wounded. At the same time, the plutong commander, midshipman Gubonin, was seriously wounded in the leg; he refused to go for a bandage and continued to command the plutong until, exhausted, he fell.
The cruiser began to burn. A fire broke out on the quarterdeck and was quickly extinguished by midshipman Chernilovsky-Sokol. Cartridges with smokeless powder, the deck and whaleboat No. 1 caught fire. The fire was caused by a shell that exploded on the deck, and 6 guns were knocked out. Other shells almost demolished the battle mainsail, destroyed rangefinder station No. 2, knocked out several more guns, and set fire to the armored deck lockers.
At 12.12, the signal “P” (“Rest”) was raised on the surviving halyards of the foremast, which meant “Turning to the right.” From that moment on, a chain of tragic events followed, accelerating the end of the battle. First, one enemy shell broke the pipe in which all the steering gears were laid. As a result, the uncontrollable ship rolled into circulation onto the rocks of Yodolmi Island. Almost simultaneously, a second shell exploded between Baranovsky's landing gun and the foremast. In this case, the entire crew of gun No. 35 died, as well as quartermaster I. Kostin, who was at the wheelhouse. The fragments flew into the passage of the conning tower, mortally wounding bugler N. Nagle and drummer D. Korneev. The cruiser commander escaped with only a slight injury and concussion. Further control of the ship had to be transferred to the aft steering compartment.
Suddenly a grinding sound was heard, and the ship, shuddering, stopped. In the conning tower, instantly assessing the situation, we gave the car the fullest reverse, but it was too late. Now the Varyag, turning to the enemy on its left side, was a stationary target. The Japanese commander, noticing the plight of the Russians, raised the signal “Everyone turn to approach the enemy.” The ships of all groups lay down on new course, while simultaneously firing from the bow guns.
The Varyag's position seemed hopeless. The enemy was quickly approaching, and the cruiser sitting on the rocks could not do anything. It was at this time that he received the most severe injuries. At 12.25 a large-caliber shell, having pierced the side under water, exploded in coal pit No. 10, and at 12.30 an 8-inch shell exploded in coal pit No. 12. The third stoker began to quickly fill with water, the level of which approached the fireboxes (water poured into the stoker through open doors of the coal pit from which coal was taken). The stoker quartermasters Zhigarev and Zhuravlev, with remarkable dedication and composure, battened down the coal pit, stopping the access of water to the stoker. At the same time, senior officer Captain 2nd Rank Stepanov and senior boatswain Kharkovsky, under a hail of shrapnel, began placing plasters under the holes. And at that moment the cruiser itself, as if reluctantly, slid off the shoal and reversed away from the dangerous place. Without further tempting fate, Rudnev ordered to take a reverse course.
However, the situation still remained difficult. Although the water was pumped out by all means, the Varyag continued to list to the left side, and a hail of enemy shells showered it. One of them hit the third chimney, killing two gunners from the servants of the 75-mm gun on the left side. On the poop, the fire division unsuccessfully fought the fire in the provision department - flour was burning there, ignited by the explosion of an 8-inch shell (this fire was extinguished only after the cruiser returned to the roadstead). Soon another source of fire arose - the bed nets between the first and second chimneys ignited. But, to the surprise of the Japanese, the Varyag, having increased its speed, confidently moved towards the raid.
Due to the narrowness of the fairway, only the cruisers Asama and Chiyoda could pursue the Russians. “Varyag” and “Koreets” fired back furiously, but due to the sharp heading angles, only two or three 152-mm guns could fire. At this time, an enemy destroyer appeared from behind Yodolmi Island and rushed to attack. It was the turn of small-caliber artillery - from the surviving Varyag and Koreets guns they opened dense barrage fire. The destroyer turned sharply and left without causing any harm to the Russian ships.
This unsuccessful attack prevented the Japanese cruisers from approaching the Russian ships in a timely manner, and when the Asama again rushed in pursuit, the Varyag and Koreets were already approaching the anchorage. The Japanese had to cease fire as their shells began to fall near the ships of the international squadron. Because of this, the cruiser Elba even had to move deeper into the raid. At 12.45 the Russian ships also ceased fire. The fight is over.
In total, during the battle, the Varyag fired 1,105 shells: 425 152 mm, 470 75 mm and 210 47 mm. The effectiveness of its fire, unfortunately, is still unknown. According to official Japanese data published during the Russo-Japanese War, there were no hits on the ships of the Uriu squadron, and no one from their crews was injured. However, there is every reason to doubt the truth of this statement. So, on the cruiser "Asama" the bridge was destroyed and caught fire. Apparently the rear turret was damaged, as it ceased firing for the rest of the battle. The cruiser Takachiho also received serious damage. The cruiser "Chiyoda" was sent to the dock for repairs. After the battle, the Japanese brought 30 dead to A-san Bay. This information was obtained from Italian and English sources, as well as from the official report of our envoy in Korea. According to the official document (sanitary report for the war), the losses of the Varyag amounted to 130 people - 33 killed and 97 wounded. The "Korean" did not receive any damage and had no losses in the crew - it is clear that all the attention of the Japanese was turned to the "Varyag", after the destruction of which they expected to quickly finish off the boat.
Information about losses in personnel of the cruiser "Varyag"
In total, the cruiser was hit by 12-14 large high-explosive shells. Although the armored deck was not destroyed and the ship kept moving, it should be recognized that by the end of the battle the Varyag had almost completely exhausted its combat capabilities for resistance due to large losses in personnel and numerous serious damages.
The commander of the French cruiser Pascal, Victor Sene, who boarded the Varyag immediately after the battle, later recalled: “I will never forget this stunning sight that presented itself to me: the deck is covered in blood, corpses and body parts are lying everywhere. Nothing escaped destruction: in places where shells exploded, the paints were charred, all the iron parts were broken, the fans were knocked down, the sides and bunks were burnt. Where so much heroism had been shown, everything was rendered unusable, broken into pieces, riddled with holes; The remains of the bridge hung deplorably. Smoke was coming from all the holes in the stern, and the list to port was increasing.”
When inspecting the cruiser, in addition to the damage listed above, the following were also revealed:
- all 47 mm guns are unfit for firing;
- five 6-inch guns received various serious damages;
- seven 75-mm guns had their knurlings, compressors and other parts and mechanisms completely damaged;
- the upper bend of the third chimney was destroyed;
- all fans and lifeboats were destroyed;
- the upper deck was broken in many places;
- the command room was destroyed;
- damaged fore-mars;
- Four more holes were discovered.
Naturally, all this damage in the conditions of a besieged port could not be repaired and corrected on its own.
Rudnev, on a French boat, went to the English cruiser Talbot to negotiate the transportation of the Varyag crew to foreign ships and report on the supposed destruction of the cruiser right in the roadstead. The commander of the Talbot, Bailey, objected to the explosion of the Varyag, motivating his opinion by the large crowding of ships in the roadstead. At 13.50 Rudnev returned to the Varyag. Hastily gathering officers, he announced his intention and received their support. They immediately began transporting the wounded, and then the entire crew to foreign ships. At 15.15, the commander of the Varyag sent midshipman V. Balk to the Koreets. G.P. Belyaev immediately convened a military council, at which the officers decided: “The upcoming battle in half an hour is not equal, will cause unnecessary bloodshed... without harming the enemy, and therefore it is necessary... to blow up the boat...”. The crew of the Korean moved to the French cruiser Pascal. The Varyag team was divided into Pascal, Talbot and the Italian cruiser Elba. Subsequently, the commanders of the foreign ships received approval and gratitude from their envoys for their actions.
At 15.50, Rudnev and the senior boatswain, having walked around the ship and made sure that there was no one left on it, got off it along with the owners of the hold compartments, who opened the kingstons and flood valves. At 16.05 the Koreets was blown up, and at 18.10 the Varyag lay on its left side and disappeared under water. The team also destroyed the Russian steamship Sungari, which was in the bay.
The crews of the Russian ships were taken by foreign stationers to Shanghai, and from there they were sent to Russia on neutral transports. The sailors “Varyag” and “Korean” were greeted in triumph in Odessa. A special train transported the heroes across the country, and an enthusiastic reception awaited them at every station.
On April 14, 1904, the heroes of Chemulpo were solemnly welcomed in Moscow. On the Garden Ring in the area of the Spassky barracks was erected Triumphal Arch in honor of this event. Two days later, the teams of “Varyag” and “Koreyets” make a ceremonial march along Nevsky Prospect from the Moscow Station to the Winter Palace, where they are met by the Emperor. Next, the gentlemen officers were invited to breakfast with Nicholas II in the White Hall, and lunch was arranged for the lower ranks in the Nicholas Hall of the Winter Palace.
In the concert hall, a table with gold service was set for the highest persons.
Nicholas II addressed the heroes of Chemulpo with a speech: “I am happy, brothers, to see you all healthy and safely returned. Many of you, with your blood, have entered into the chronicle of our fleet a deed worthy of the exploits of your ancestors, grandfathers and fathers, who accomplished them on the Azov and Mercury. Now, with your feat, you have added a new page to the history of our fleet, adding to them the names “Varyag” and “Korean”. They will also become immortal. I am confident that each of you will remain worthy of the reward that I gave you until the end of your service. All of Russia and I read with love and trembling excitement about the exploits that you showed at Chemulpo. Thank you from the bottom of my heart for supporting the honor of St. Andrew’s flag and the dignity of Great Holy Rus'. I drink to further victories of our glorious fleet. To your health, brothers!”
Rudnev nominated the officers and sailors who distinguished themselves in battle for awards, and the emperor not only approved the submitted submissions, but also awarded orders to all participants in the battle in Chemulpo without exception.
There is hardly a single person who has not heard about the Russian cruiser Varyag, which entered into an unequal battle with the Japanese squadron. For a long time it was believed that the crews of the cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" showed their best qualities, becoming the personification of professionalism, fearlessness and self-sacrifice. Much later, already in our time, another version began to be heard more and more often, according to which the commander of the Varyag, captain 1st rank V.F. Rudnev, is considered almost a traitor. What happened on February 9, 1904 in the Korean port of Chemulpo?
Chemulpo on the eve of the war
Chemulpo Port (currently Incheon) is located on the west coast of Korea on the Yellow Sea. The location of the port, just 30 km from Seoul, made it an important strategic object, so warships of countries that had their own interests in Korea were constantly present at the roadstead. There were also Russian ships in Chemulpo, as well as coal warehouses with fuel reserves for the Russian Pacific squadron.
On January 12, 1904 (all dates are given according to the new style), the 1st rank cruiser “Varyag” arrived from Port Arthur to Chemulpo to replace the cruiser “Boyarin” that had previously been there. The Varyag was commanded by Captain 1st Rank Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev. On January 5, he was joined by the gunboat "Koreets" under the command of captain 2nd rank Grigory Pavlovich Belyaev. From now on, these two ships were subordinate to the Russian ambassador in Seoul - actual state councilor Alexander Ivanovich Pavlov.
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The cruiser "Varyag" in June 1901
Source: kreiser.unoforum.pro
Gunboat "Korean" in the Nagasaki roadstead
Source: navsource.narod.ru
In addition to the Varyag and the Korean, the English 2nd-class cruiser Talbot (under the command of Commodore L. Bailey, arrived in Chemulpo on January 9), the French 2nd-class cruiser Pascal (commander – captain 2nd rank V. Sene), Italian cruiser 2nd class “Elba” (commander – captain 1st rank R. Borea), American gunboat “Vicksburg” (commander – captain 2nd rank A. Marshall) and the Japanese cruiser "Chiyoda" (commander - Captain 1st Rank K. Murakami). Despite the difficult international situation, friendly relations were quickly established between the ship commanders. Despite outward manifestations of friendliness, already from January 16 at the Chemulpo radiotelegraph station, in accordance with the directive of the Ministry of Communications of Japan, they began to delay the sending of international telegrams for up to 72 hours.
On January 21, the “Korean” went on reconnaissance to Asanman Bay to check the information received by Pavlov about the presence of a large detachment of Japanese ships in the bay. The information turned out to be false, and in the evening of the same day the gunboat returned to Chemulpo. Her sudden disappearance caused a great commotion on board the Japanese cruiser, and the naval agent of the Japanese mission was literally knocked off his feet, looking for the “Korean”. In the evening of the same day, a dinner was held on board the Chiyoda, to which the commanders of all the stationers on duty at the port were invited. The Japanese commander made every possible diplomatic effort to assure those present that his country was filled with the most peaceful intentions.
Armored cruiser Chiyoda
Source: tsushima.su
In the second half of January, the situation at the roadstead changed dramatically. The Japanese community of Chemulpo began to build food warehouses, communication points and barracks on the shore. A large amount of cargo was transported from transports to the shore, which was immediately stored at new storage points. On the Chiyoda, with the onset of darkness, the guns were deployed into firing position; servants were on duty at the guns, fully prepared to immediately open fire. Torpedo tubes were also brought into combat position. It should be noted that the commander of the Japanese cruiser drew up a plan for a surprise attack on Russian ships with torpedoes and artillery right in the roadstead, without waiting for a declaration of war. Only a direct order from the Japanese Navy Minister not to show aggression towards Russian ships before the start of hostilities stopped Captain Murakami from implementing this plan.
Meanwhile, on February 5, telegraph communication between Chemulpo and Port Arthur was completely interrupted. The next day, rumors appeared about the severance of diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia. This was true, but Russian sailors and diplomats in Chemulpo could not contact their superiors to confirm this information and receive new instructions. However, on February 7, Rudnev invited Pavlov, along with other embassy employees, to immediately leave Seoul on the Varyag and Koreyets - without the appropriate permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pavlov rejected this very reasonable offer. Rudnev himself was bound by the governor’s instructions not to leave Chemulpo under any circumstances without orders and could not do anything on his own.
On the night of February 7-8, unexpectedly for everyone, the Chiyoda weighed anchor, left the port and moved out to sea to join the 4th Combat Detachment, which was already approaching Chemulpo. The disappearance of the Japanese cruiser finally prompted the Russian ambassador to compose a dispatch to the governor and send it to Port Arthur aboard the Korean. However favorable time It was already lost to leave; the port of Chemulpo was blocked by a Japanese squadron approaching from the sea.
Composition of the Japanese squadron
On February 6, a Japanese transport detachment consisting of the Dairen-maru and Otaru-maru transports, carrying 2,252 people from the 12th Infantry Division, left the port of Sasebo. The detachment's goal was the port of Chemulpo, where the landing was to take place. To guard the transports, the 4th Combat Detachment was assigned under the command of Rear Admiral Uriu Sotokichi. Under his command were the armored cruisers Naniwa (flagship), Takachiho, Akashi and Niitaka. To strengthen the detachment, they were temporarily given the armored cruiser Asama.
Armored cruiser "Asama"
Source: tsushima.su
On February 7, the 9th (Aotaka, Hato, Kari and Tsubame) and 14th (Hayabusa, Chidori, Manazuru and Kasasagi) destroyer detachments and transports joined the detachment "Kasuga-maru" and "Kinshu-maru". On February 8, the detachment approached Chemulpo directly, where it met the cruiser Chiyoda, which came out to meet it. Next, according to the plan, a landing was to take place in the port, but unexpectedly for itself, the Japanese squadron met with the “Korean”, which led to an incident during which the first shots of the Russo-Japanese War were fired.
The first shots of the war. Attack on "Korean"
Having received a dispatch from the governor on board, on February 8 at 15:40, the “Korean” weighed anchor and set off for Port Arthur. Soon after leaving the Korean, a Japanese squadron was discovered, moving in full force towards Chemulpo. The Japanese marched in two columns: on the right - cruisers and transports, on the left - the destroyers Aotaka, Hato, Kari and Tsubame (9th destroyer detachment). A corresponding signal was immediately sent to the Varyag about the appearance of the Japanese.
Since hostilities between the two countries had not yet begun, both sides tried to disperse on a narrow fairway. The “Korean” moved to the right, leaving room for the Japanese squadron to pass. The Japanese transports also evaded to the right, and "Asama", on the contrary, having left the column and turned 1800, took a position between the "Korean" and the transports. The Japanese admiral could not know Belyaev's intentions and tried to protect the landing ships from a possible attack from the Russians. Later, Belyaev would write in a report that the Asama blocked the path of the Korean, but the path to the sea remained open for the Russian ship. The guns on the Japanese ships were uncovered and deployed in the direction of a possible enemy.
Meanwhile, the commander of the 9th destroyer detachment, Yashima Djunkichi, after his ships passed on the left side of the Korean, turned them on the opposite course and began pursuit. This was done so that at the slightest threat to the transports from the “Korean”, they would immediately attack it. The destroyers split up: “Hato” and “Aotaka” ended up on the left side of the “Korean”, “Kari” and “Tsubame” on the right, but when turning, the “Tsubame” ran into a rocky shoal, damaging the propellers. The torpedo tubes on the Japanese ships were loaded and deployed towards the enemy.
Considering such maneuvers as a signal that the Japanese did not want to release the “Korean” from Chemulpo, Belyaev began to turn his ship to the right, on the opposite course. At that moment, a torpedo was fired from the destroyer "Kari" at the "Koreyets", passing astern at a distance of 12-13 m. The clock was 16:35. "Hato" and "Aotaka" also began to turn to the right after the "Korean", which sounded the combat alarm. The Hato also fired a torpedo, which also passed behind the stern of the Russian gunboat. At this moment, several shots were fired from the 37-mm Koreyets cannons; no hits were recorded. Belyaev’s report also speaks of a third torpedo, which went directly to the starboard side of the “Koreyets”, but for some unknown reason sank before reaching the target a few meters. The logbook of the "Korean" speaks of only two fired torpedoes, the same is stated in the Japanese report, so, apparently, a foam wake from a wave was mistaken for the wake of the third torpedo, which often happens in a tense combat situation.
Soon after the first shots, the combat alarm was sounded on the Koreyets, as the boat was already entering neutral waters. Soon the "Korean" anchored in its place. Japanese ships also entered the roadstead and stood in close proximity to the Russian ships, which were immediately monitored closely.
The destroyer Hayabusa in Kobe, 1900. Destroyers of the 9th and 14th detachments belonged to ships of this type
Source: tsushima.su
It is worth noting that the commander of the Japanese destroyers did not receive an order to torpedo the Koreets - his main task was to ensure the safety of transport ships. Thus, launching torpedoes at the Korean was the personal initiative of the Japanese commander. Apparently, the Japanese were provoked by the fact that the “Korean” began to turn, thereby pinching the destroyer “Kari” between itself and the shore. It is also possible that the Japanese commander simply lost his nerve, and he considered the current situation the most favorable for launching an attack - it is now impossible to confirm or refute this version. It is only worth noting that if the “Korean” had not turned back to the roadstead and continued on its way to Port Arthur, the Japanese destroyers would have pursued and attacked it south of the island of Phalmido, according to at least, this intention is stated in the report of the commander of the 9th destroyer detachment.
There were no casualties as a result of this incident, although the Japanese side essentially lost one ship - the destroyer Tsubame, which damaged its propellers so much that it could not reach speeds above 12 knots.
Actions of the parties after the incident
Immediately upon arrival at the parking lot, Belyaev went aboard the Varyag, where he reported to Rudnev about what had happened. In turn, Rudnev went aboard the Talbot for clarification. The commander of the Talbot, as a senior officer in the roadstead, in turn, went aboard the Japanese cruiser Takachiho, where he was told that there had been no incident, attributing everything to a misunderstanding.
At about 17:00 in the evening, armed troops began landing on the shore from transports. Since there was no news of the outbreak of hostilities, the Russian sailors, in accordance with the instructions of the governor, did not take any action towards the Japanese ships and looked indifferently at the capture of the port. However, both ships had a watch at the guns, watertight bulkheads were battened down, and the crew was in full readiness for the start of hostilities. By evening, almost all the Japanese cruisers left the roadstead, anchoring near the island of Phalmido. During the entire landing, Japanese destroyers were on duty near the Russian ships in full readiness to attack them if they decided to interfere with the landing operation.
At 2:30 the landing was completed, and early in the morning the Japanese ships began to leave the roadstead. By 8:30, only the cruiser Chiyoda remained in Chemulpo - its commander in turn visited all the ships of the international squadron, handing them a notification of the start of the war between Japan and Russia. The letter reported a requirement for Russian ships to leave the port before 12 noon, otherwise at 16 o'clock they would be attacked right in the roadstead. After the notice was delivered to all foreign ships, the Japanese cruiser left the port.
The commander of the Varyag was warned about the Japanese ultimatum by the commander of the French cruiser Pascal, after which Rudnev informed Belyaev about the start of the war. Soon, a meeting of ship commanders (with the exception of the American one) was held on board the Talbot, at which it was decided that if the Russians did not leave the port, then foreign ships would leave the raid before 12 o’clock, so as not to suffer as a result of a possible battle. A protest was sent to the Japanese admiral against a possible attack by Russian ships in the roadstead, which he received a few minutes before the start of the battle. When Rudnev asked to accompany his ships until they left neutral waters, the commanders of the foreign cruisers refused, as this would violate their neutrality. Thus, Rudnev had only two options: go to sea and fight the Japanese squadron, or stay in the roadstead and take the fight there. Rudnev chose the first option, telling the commanders of the foreign ships that he would go to sea before noon. He had no right to sink or blow up his ship without a fight and receiving appropriate instructions from above. At the same time, on board the Talbot, Rudnev was finally given a Japanese notification of the outbreak of war, delivered through the consul.
At 10 o'clock Rudnev returned aboard the Varyag. A military council was held on the cruiser, at which the commander's decision to fight was unanimously approved by the officers. The commander of the “Korean” was not invited to the meeting and was not privy to Rudnev’s plans, but in battle he was given complete independence. In case of an unsuccessful breakthrough, it was decided to blow up the cruiser. On board the Korean, a similar council had already taken place earlier, after Belyaev’s return from the Varyag. At 11 o'clock the cruiser's crew was assembled on the quarterdeck, where Rudnev gave a speech, announcing the beginning of the war and that the cruiser was going to sea for a breakthrough. The crew greeted the captain's speech with great enthusiasm; the morale of the Russian sailors was very high. Before the battle, furniture and unnecessary wooden objects were thrown overboard from the ships, and improvised protection against shrapnel was installed. The topmasts of the Koreyets were cut down to prevent the enemy from accurately determining the distance in battle.
To break through to the open sea, Russian ships had to overcome a long and narrow winding channel about 2 cables wide and about 30 miles long. This channel was replete with shoals and underwater rocks and was considered difficult to navigate even in peacetime. The Japanese squadron occupied a tactically very advantageous position ahead of the Russian ships in a place where the fairway widened (about 10 miles from Chemulpo itself). Thus, “Varyag” and “Korean” should first get closer to the enemy under enemy fire, then, maintaining high speed, follow a parallel course for some time, ahead of the Japanese, and only after that go into the lead. Considering that the Asama alone was qualitatively superior to both Russian ships in both protection and armament, the task facing the Russian sailors was very difficult. It should be noted that the maximum speed of the Korean was 13 knots, so this ship could not have escaped even the slowest Japanese cruisers - Naniwa and Takachiho. Why Rudnev took him into the breakthrough remains a mystery. However, the acceleration of the movement of Russian ships could be facilitated by a strong ebb current, which could add another 2 to 4 knots to their own speed.
Battle
At 11:20 (11:55 Japanese time) “Varyag” and “Korean” began to weigh anchor. The weather was calm and the sea was completely calm. For some time, the “Korean” walked ahead, then took a place behind the “Varyag”. On their way, Russian ships passed by cruisers of neutral powers. The crew on them lined up along the sides, saluting the Russian sailors who, in their opinion, were heading to certain death. Soon the neutral ships remained astern, with the enemy waiting ahead.
“Varyag” and “Korean” go to battle
Source: tsushima.su
The speed of the “Varyag” and “Korean” was gradually increased to 12 knots. At 11:25 (12:00) the combat alarm was sounded, the team took up positions according to the combat schedule. The entry of the Russian ships into the fairway came as a surprise to the Japanese - they were sure that the Varyag and the Koreets would remain in the roadstead, and were preparing to attack the enemy there. Despite the suddenness of the enemy's appearance, the Japanese confusion did not last long. A signal was raised on the mast of the cruiser Asama: "Russian ships go to sea". Hastily riveting the anchor chains, the Japanese squadron began moving towards the Russian ships. Closest to the Varyag were Asama and Chiyoda, which formed a separate detachment that maneuvered together. “Naniwa” and “Niitaka” also joined into a detachment that stayed behind and somewhat to the right of “Asama” and “Chiyoda”. The cruisers Akashi and Takachiho rushed in a southwestern direction to block the Russians' access to the sea. The destroyers of the 14th detachment "Hayabusa", "Chidori", "Manazuru" took only a formal part in the battle, all the time staying outside effective artillery fire.
Scheme of the battle of Chemulpo. Reconstruction by A.V. Polutov. The diagram indicates Japanese time
Source: tsushima.su
At 11:45 (12:20, Japanese time is given here and below in parentheses), the Asama began firing high-explosive 203-mm shells. According to the Japanese, the distance between him and the Varyag was 37–38 kab (approximately 7000 m), according to Russian data, the distance at the moment of opening fire was 45 kab - thus, the error in determining the distance was about 10 kab, which predetermined further inaccurate firing of Russian ships. It should be noted that the Varyag was equipped with two new devices for that time for determining the distance to the enemy - optical rangefinders from Barr and Strood with a base of 1.34 m, but, unfortunately, the crew of the cruiser did not learn how to use them before the war. managed. The very first Japanese shells landed next to the Varyag, exploding upon impact with the water. For several minutes there was no response from the Varyag, closing the distance. Finally, the guns of the Russian ships began to speak. The Varyag fired from the starboard side with armor-piercing shells. The fire from the "Korean" was soon stopped, since its shells were still landing with large undershoots.
Since most of the Japanese ships had not yet managed to get within effective fire range of the Russians, the firefight took place mainly between the Asama and the Varyag. It can be argued that in this phase of the battle the shooting on both sides was not very intense - the opponents were still shooting, and, moreover, the firing line was periodically blocked by the island of Phalmido.
At approximately 12:00 (12:35) "Varyag" caught up with the island, which ceased to serve as shelter for it, and soon after that it turned slightly to the left - apparently in order to put all the starboard guns into action. At that moment, he was hit by the first Japanese shell, which hit the aft bridge area and caused a fire. According to the Japanese, it was a 203-mm high-explosive projectile from the Asama. The Asama itself had by that time reached the middle of the fairway and began to make a series of successive turns to the right, so that the Varyag found itself behind its stern, and then on its starboard side. Other Japanese ships joined the battle - Chiyoda opened fire on the Varyag, and later on the Koreyets. After the Asama turned on a course parallel to the Varyag, the closest Japanese ship to it was the Naniva, from which they also fired at the Varyag, achieving one hit in the middle of the hull. The Niytaka also opened fire; its shooting was frequent, but completely inaccurate - it did not achieve a single hit.
The battle entered its climax phase. At this moment, the Varyag opened fire on the Japanese with maximum intensity, bringing all the starboard artillery into action. Unfortunately, the shooting accuracy turned out to be zero, and there were several reasons for this. Firstly, almost immediately with the start of the intense phase of the battle, a Japanese shell (according to Rudnev, “one of the first to board the cruiser”) destroyed the bow rangefinder post along with its commander, midshipman Alexei Nirod, and two sailors (another was mortally wounded). Secondly, the excitement of the inexperienced team in the first battle took its toll; the fire was conducted in great haste and without adjustment, despite the commander’s instructions before the battle (“shoot... accurately, calmly, slowly... remembering that every shot must harm the enemy”). Thirdly, the Japanese fire turned out to be unexpectedly strong and accurate, and the shells filled with shimosa, upon explosion, raised huge columns of water, shrouded in black smoke. Great amount the smallest fragments incapacitated the artillerymen, jammed the guns and made it impossible to aim calmly. All this led to the fact that during the entire battle not a single Russian shell hit the Japanese ships.
"Asama" under fire from "Varyag". Perhaps the only photo of the battle of Chemulpo
Source: tsushima.su
At 12:03 (12:38) “Varyag” began turning to the right, following the course of the fairway. Soon, the cruiser was hit almost simultaneously by several 152-mm shells from the Asama. One of them, according to Rudnev, broke the pipe in which the steering drives were laid. Another, exploding on the deck, destroyed the entire crew of the 63-mm landing gun No. 35 and killed Quartermaster Kostin, who was transmitting orders from the control room. Its fragments, flying into the clearing of the conning tower, mortally wounded two more sailors. Received minor injury and shell shock and Rudnev himself. It was during this period of the battle that the Varyag received the most severe damage.
A fire broke out on the cruiser’s quarterdeck from a shell that had hit there earlier—the 75-mm gun cartridges that were ready for firing caught fire. The crew of the 47-mm gun on the combat main top was completely destroyed by shrapnel; another shell from the Asama disabled the 152-mm gun No. 3, located under the forecastle. The ship, which had temporarily lost control, began to circulate and begin to approach the Phalmido rocks. Then, according to Rudnev, the Varyag landed on the rocks of the island, losing momentum for some time. This fact is not recorded in the logbook, and none of the participants in the battle mentions it. According to the observations of the Japanese, the “Varyag” did not sit on the rocks and did not lose speed. Most likely, the Varyag only touched one or more rocks surrounding the island with its bottom on the left side. Perhaps, in order to avoid a direct collision with the island, the Russians had to reverse for some time, which led to a short-term decrease in speed.
The Japanese ships, which by that time had moved away from the Varyag, did not immediately notice the cruiser’s plight. However, soon Uriu gave the order to all ships to approach the enemy - the battle distance began to shrink. New shells fell on the Varyag. One of them tore the third chimney, the other (203 mm caliber) exploded near the waterline on the port side (between the second and third chimneys), forming a semi-underwater hole with an area of about 2 m2. Through this hole two coal pits were flooded. The fastening of the right anchor was broken, which fell into the water with a roar. There was no longer any talk of any breakthrough into the open sea. At 12:13 (12:48) “Varyag” completed the turn.
The cruiser's course was back to the roadstead, and a noticeable list appeared on it to the left side. A fire was raging at the stern from a shell that hit the officers' cabins and exploded in the aft provision cellar. Despite serious damage, the Varyag was able to develop quite a high speed during its return to the roadstead (at least 15–16 knots). The “Korean” tried his best to keep up. "Asama" rushed after them. "Chiyoda" also tried to speed up, but due to low-quality coal, it was able to reach a speed of no higher than 5-7 knots and fell far behind. The remaining Japanese cruisers also did not take part in the pursuit. Another large-caliber shell, entering from the left side, pierced the bunk nets and exploded between the first and second chimneys of the Varyag. The force of the explosion threw a 75-mm gun onto the deck, and the bed nets caught fire. The distance between the Varyag and Asama at that moment was about 25 cabs. At 12:40 (13:15) “Varyag” crossed the border of international waters, ceasing fire. The Japanese also stopped firing as shells began to fall dangerously close to the foreign ships.
01/27/1904 (02/09). – The heroic death of the cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" in an unequal battle with the Japanese squadron
Our proud "Varyag" does not surrender to the enemy
Impressed by the feat of the crew of the cruiser "Varyag", the Austrian writer and poet Rudolf Greinz wrote the poem "Varyag" dedicated to this event. It was published in the German magazine Jugend (1904, No. 10). In April 1904 N.K. Melnikov and E.M. Studenskaya published translations of this poem. The translation of E. Studenskaya was considered more successful by Russian society. And soon the musician of the 12th Astrakhan Grenadier Regiment A.S. Turishchev, who took part in the ceremonial meeting of the heroes of "Varyag" and "Korean", set these poems to music.
The song was first performed at a gala reception held in honor of the officers and sailors of the Varyag and the Korean.
The song became very popular in Russia. Military sailors especially loved her. Over the years, the third verse was removed from the song, since the Japanese were already allies in this war. And they also tried to forget about the author of the song.
Under the rule of the Bolsheviks, many military songs of Tsarist Russia were banned and only with the beginning many of them were returned, including the song about “Varyag”.
Up, you, comrades, everyone is in place,
The last parade is coming.
Our proud “Varyag” does not surrender to the enemy,
Nobody wants mercy!All the pennants are waving and the chains are rattling,
Raising the anchors up,
The guns are preparing for battle in a row,
Sparkling ominously in the sun!From the faithful pier we go into battle,
Towards the death that threatens us,
We will die for our homeland in the open sea,
Where the yellow-faced devils wait!It whistles and thunders and rumbles all around.
The thunder of guns, the hiss of shells,
And our immortal and proud “Varyag” became
Like absolute hell.Bodies tremble in their death throes,
The thunder of guns, and smoke, and groans,
And the ship is engulfed in a sea of fire,
The moment of farewell has come.Farewell, comrades! With God, hurray!
The boiling sea is below us!
Brothers, you and I didn’t think yesterday,
That today we will die under the waves.Neither the stone nor the cross will tell where they lay down
For the glory of the Russian flag,
Only the waves of the sea will glorify alone
Heroic death of the “Varyag”!Original German text:
Auf Deck, Kameraden, all" auf Deck!
Heraus zur letzten Parade!
Der stolze Warjag ergibt sich nicht,
Wir brauchen keine Gnade!An den Masten die bunten Wimpel empor,
Die klirrenden Anker gelichtet,
In stürmischer Eil` zum Gefechte klar
Die blanken Geschütze gerichtet!Aus dem sichern Hafen hinaus in die See,
Fürs Vaterland zu sterben
Dort lauern die gelben Teufel auf uns
Und speien Tod und Verderben!Es drohnt und kracht und donnert und zischt,
Da trifft es uns zur Stelle;
Es ward der Warjag, das treue Schiff,
Zu einer brennenden Holle!Rings zuckende Leiber und grauser Tod,
Ein Aechzen, Rocheln und Stöhnen -
Die Flammen um unser Schiff
Wie feuriger Rosse Mähnen!Lebt wohl, Kameraden, lebt wohl, hurra!
Hinab in die gurgelnde Tiefe!
Wer hätte es gestern noch gedacht,
Dass er heut` schon da drunten schliefe!Kein Zeichen, kein Kreuz wird, wo wir ruh`n
Fern von der Heimat, melden -
Doch das Meer das rauschet auf ewig von uns,
Von Warjag und seinen Helden!
Discussion: 15 comments
This is a great song. It was necessary to write the anthem of the new Russia to its melody - jubilant, bright, memorable! It is wrong, we are not using such a treasure in a proper manner. It is songs like these that bring people together.
I am looking for translations of "Varyag" into other languages. Who can help?
Thank you in advance.
Vladimir
Even some 100 years ago, our enemies showed at least some manifestations of honor and respect for the enemy. What will happen after our children?
Thank you for the article! I read everything, very interesting. You are doing the right thing. To my shame, I must admit that I knew nothing about the author of the text! And I dedicated this poem to the heroism of Varyag. Here is the link to it http://www.stihi.ru/2009/06/12/5729
HURRAY, HURRAY, HURRAY. Glory to our wars!
May God rest all the fallen defenders of the honor of the Navy and forgive them everything... And grant them Your kingdom
Speech by cruiser commander V.F. Rudnev before the battle: “Today I received a letter from the Japanese admiral about the start of hostilities with a proposal to leave the raid until noon. Of course, we are going for a breakthrough and will engage in battle with the squadron, no matter how strong it is. There can be no questions about surrender - we will not surrender the cruiser, nor ourselves, and we will fight to the last opportunity and to the last drop of blood. Perform your duties accurately, calmly, without haste, especially gunners, remembering that every shell must harm the enemy. In case of fire, extinguish it quietly, letting me know. Let us pray to God before the campaign and with firm faith in God’s mercy, let us boldly go into battle for the faith, the Tsar and the fatherland. Hurray!” [source: [Rudnev V.F.] “The Battle of the Varyag near Chemulpo on January 27, 1904.” – St. Petersburg, 1907 – pp. 11-12]
At the end of the commander’s speech, the ship’s priest said a prayer “for the granting of victory.” The music played the anthem and the team expressed their willingness to fight to the death.
After 15 minutes, 2 Russian ships entered the battle against 14 Japanese, 726 Russian sailors - against 2,680 Japanese. The outcome of the battle was predetermined in advance...
“Even at the very beginning of the Russian-Japanese War, the priest on the cruiser “Varyag” declared himself a courageous, selfless hero. Mikhail Rudnev. Every minute during the fierce battle at Chemulpo, putting his life in danger, he fearlessly walked along the deck of the ship, covered in blood, littered with the wounded and mutilated corpses of the dead, admonishing the dying, consoling the suffering and inspiring those fighting. He also helped most actively in caring for the wounded.” [N. Petrov. "Heroes-priests. (Anniversary memories.)" // "Kherson Diocesan Gazette". dept. unofficial - No. 13-14 – Odessa – July 15, 1914 – p. 443] What is the courage of being under fire? According to the report of Dr. M. L. Banshchikov, published in the collection ["Sanitary report on the fleet for the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905." – part 1 – Kronstadt., 1915 – p. 321] of those under the armor protection of the cruiser “Varyag”, only 5 sailors were injured. But “out of 263 people who were on the upper deck and on the tops,” 125 sailors were injured - almost every second!
“Few people know that when the Russian sailors left the sinking cruiser “Varyag”, the last one left was not the ship’s captain, but the ship’s priest, who continued to stand on the bridge with the cross raised up to the end. Such facts were simply thrown out of our history by Soviet historians.” [Archpriest Alexander Sychev. “The Army of Christ” // “Master Gun” - No. 54 – M., 2001 – p. 60]
The Varyag's feat delighted the Japanese. At the end of the war, the Japanese government created a museum in Seoul in memory of the heroes of “Varyag” and awarded V. F. Rudnev with the Order Rising Sun. The cruiser raised by the Japanese became a training ship, where groups of Japanese sailors came on excursions as an example of courage.
Yes, there is rightfully something to be proud of.
Blokhin Pyotr Pavlovich. I was not lucky enough to serve in the navy, although it was the dream of my childhood and stupid youth. However, I remember the history of the Russian Navy and the exploits of Russian sailors forever. And the feat of the Russian sailors of the cruiser "Svetlana" (1905) is in no way inferior to the valor of the battleship "Eustathius" from the squadron of Admiral Spiridov in the Battle of Chesma. The feat of the Baltic sailors during the evacuation of Tallinn is also a feat. It is easy to be a hero when you win. And to criticize those who, at the cost of their lives, only slightly brightened up the bitterness of defeat and everyone tried to forget about them, or worse, hang all dead dogs on them - this, guys, is disgusting. We have reached the point where we criticize our best generals and naval commanders. Everyone fancies himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the outside. How humiliated even in official historiography is Rear Admiral Vitgeft, who died heroically on the battleship "Tsesarevich". If the Nazis had not turned General D. Karbyshev into an ice floe, I think no one would have remembered him, although in captivity he behaved like a thrice HERO. Therefore, it seems to me wildness to look for mistakes, flaws and unseemly actions among our HEROES OF THE FATHERLAND. This is a crime against the GOD OF THE MOTHERLAND and one’s descendants. And therefore, I consider the controversy surrounding the actions of the commander of the “Varyag” V.F. Rudnev immoral and criminal.
How enduring are stupid fairy tales in Russia... including about the feat of the armored cruiser of the 1st rank "Varyag" that never existed in reality, which has already been repeatedly exposed in the same Russian Empire immediately after the Russo-Japanese War... and they came forward with the revelations participants in this war.
For example, in 1906, E.I. Martynov’s book “From the Sad Experience of the Russian-Japanese War” was published in St. Petersburg, in which he, in particular, spoke out about the false campaign organized in the country to honor the crews of the Varyag and the Korean " (I quote): "The dissatisfaction among the officers became even stronger when it later became clear that in general in the indicated battle the crew of the Varyag did not accomplish any feat, and there were even almost no losses on the Koreyets." (end of quotation).
But Russian rabid lies are still alive and well - apparently to dumb down the younger generation of Russia.
You posted 5 huge texts here, but the comment format is not intended for this. Briefly state the essence of your objection and provide a link to the published material.
Explain the essence of my five texts in in brief It’s difficult, because I’ve already reduced the topic to a minimally substantiated state. If you shorten it further, then the cause-and-effect relationships will no longer be visible and the entire logic of events will fall apart. And how then can you prove that everything is not as it is briefly stated in your article “The heroic death of the cruiser “Varyag” and the gunboat “Koreets” in an unequal battle with the Japanese squadron”?
There are enough references to sources in my texts (if you read them) ... In particular, Russian reports, reports, acts and partly Japanese documents are given in the book of a great enthusiast of the cruiser "Varyag" V.I. Kataev ("Cruiser "Varyag", Publishing House " Collection", "Yauza", "Eksmo", Moscow, 2008). Kataev wrote a whole trilogy on the theme of "Varyag" (gradually moving to more and more prosaic and unheroic conclusions, although he did not refuse to state the "feat"), and also published a separate monograph about the gunboat “Koreets”... and even visited the scene of the event - the port of Incheon, to which the Chemulpo region adjoins, and walked along the fairway along which these Russian ships once went into battle.
In addition (from what is not given in my previous five texts) I can refer to journals in which Japanese documents and a description of Japanese actions at Chemulpo were published, as well as a version of a neutral party (although now I only have an American one, but in Russian Both French and English have been published).
"Naval Campaign", number 7 of 2007, article " Landing operation Japanese army and navy in Incheon on February 8-9, 1904 (part 1)". New information about the Russo-Japanese War: preparation of the landing operation in Chemulpo (Incheon).
"Naval Campaign", number 10 of 2007, article "Amphibious operation of the Japanese army and navy in Inchon on February 8-9, 1904 (part 2)." The Battle of Chemulpo: a view from the Japanese side.
"Naval War", number 2 from 2008, article "Events in Chemulpo. A view from under the Stars and Stripes." Handwritten diary, reports, received letters and telegrams from the commander of the American gunboat (stationary in Chemulpo) "Vicksburg" W.A. Marshall.
You sent several huge texts again. Give me an email. links to their publications on the Internet, so as not to overload the comments here.
I do not know the addresses on the Internet for the sources of information I named in the previous message (which detail the background, history and post-history of the battle of Chemulpo and the tactical and technical details of this battle), since all these sources are in my hands in the form of ordinary paper media - printed books and magazines with diagrams, tables and photographs.
However, if I have an “extra hour” to spare, I’ll look, although it’s a very tedious task to dig through our domestic trash heap, called the Runet.
However, you yourself can compare, for example, photographs of the Russian cruiser Varyag, which was well preserved after the battle, and the German light cruiser Emden after an unequal battle in November 1914 - a pile of shapeless, twisted metal. And all because “Varyag” simply imitated a breakthrough attempt “for form’s sake,” while “Emden” fought for real...
To Andrey Ulybin... Is it okay that Martynov, to whom you so carelessly refer, himself behaved at the REV, to put it mildly, “inappropriately”? At least there were considerable complaints from his colleagues against him, and after the war the subject simply decided to make a career out of criticism. As for the Varyag, something can only be brought against Rudnev for a biased report on the events and for the “sinking” of the cruiser, but not for the battle itself. However, in the RIF they committed similar acts both before him and after him, didn’t they?
When in 1891, the heir to the Russian throne, Nikolai Alexandrovich, made a trip to the Far East, among the escort ships was the gunboat "Koreets", which entered service in 1887 and was assigned to the ships of the Siberian flotilla. By the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the “Korean” had already served enough for science—a bay on the island of Lichangshan and a strait near this island in the Yellow Sea were named in its honor—and for its direct military purpose: the boat participated in the transportation of the Russian landing corps from Port Arthur to Dagu during the suppression of the Yihetuan uprising in Northern China in 1900. "Varyag", built in the USA in 1899, appeared on Far East much later and immediately became a pride Pacific Squadron. When Russian-Japanese negotiations regarding the division of spheres of influence in Korea and Manchuria resumed on July 29, 1903, the light cruiser Varyag was stationed in Port Arthur.On December 29, 1903 (January 11, 1904 according to the present day), the Varyag arrived in Chemulpo, having on board a special detachment to guard the Russian embassy in Seoul. A week later, he was joined by the seaworthy gunboat "Korean". These ships replaced the light cruiser "Boyarin" and the gunboat "Gilyak", which were there as stationers, and themselves remained on duty in this capacity.
Chemulpo was considered a neutral port, since on January 3 the Korean government announced that it would remain neutral in a possible Russian-Japanese conflict. In addition to Russian warships and the Sungari steamer, which belonged to the CER, there were cruisers from third countries in the port: the British cruiser Talbot, the French cruiser Pascal, the Italian Elba and the American advice note Vicksburg.
The task of attacking Russian ships was assigned by the Japanese command to Rear Admiral Uriu. While the main forces of the Japanese United Fleet, under the leadership of Vice Admiral Togo, rushed to Port Arthur, the Uriu detachment went to Chemulpo. A landing force was landed from his transports, which captured Seoul on the same day, and Uriu's ships went to sea to wait for the Varyag and the Korean. Early in the morning of January 27, the Japanese consul in Korea handed over an ultimatum to the Russian vice-consul Zinovy Mikhailovich Polyanovsky, which contained a notification of the start of hostilities and a demand to leave the port roadstead before noon, otherwise both Russian ships would be attacked at 16.00 at the anchorage. At the same time, Uriu warned the commanders of ships belonging to third countries about this intention, recommending them to leave the port before the specified time of attack. Having received the Japanese demand at about half past ten in the morning, the commander of the Varyag V.F. Rudnev drew the attention of the raid chief, Lewis Bailey, to the Japanese violation of norms international law. Bailey convened a meeting of the commanders of the warships located in Chemulpo, at which Rudnev was asked to leave the raid before 14.00. Otherwise, foreign sailors reserved the right to withdraw their ships from the roadstead so as not to suffer themselves. “Varyag” and “Korean” had only one thing to do - to go through the line of Japanese ships without escort, because the Englishman, and under his influence the others, refused to lead the Russians to the border of Korean neutral waters as a sign of protest against the violation of international law.
Two Russian ships in this legendary battle opposed by six Japanese cruisers and eight destroyers. Sea battle, perhaps the most famous in the history of the Russian fleet, has been repeatedly described in the literature. So, Yu.V. The treble in the book “Port Arthur” gives the following details: “At 11.20, to the sounds of the orchestra, accompanied by loud greetings from the French, English, Italian and American sailors gathered on the decks of their ships (on the cruisers “Pascal” and “Elbe” the orchestras performed the Russian anthem) , both Russian ships set off for the open sea... Uriu, noticing the Russian ships leaving, raised a signal on the yards of the flagship Naniva: “I propose to surrender without a fight.” However, Rudnev refused and at 11.45, when the distance between the detachments decreased to 8,300 meters, the first shots were fired from the Japanese side. Seven minutes later, the Varyag entered the battle, walking 180 meters ahead of the Korean, and it was on it that the Japanese detachment brought down the full force of its fire. 55 minutes later, Japanese artillery shells seriously damaged the Varyag; About half of all the guns placed on the deck without armored cover were disabled, the cruiser lost its foremast and third chimney, and fires started on it.” By the end of the battle, the crew counted 22 killed and 108 wounded, of whom 11 subsequently died.
The damage received by the Varyag, especially the holes below the waterline, which created a strong list to the left side, made the continuation of the battle futile, and the cruiser, controlled by machines, turned back to the port. Now the “Korean” was covering it, because it had closed with the Japanese to twenty-two cables (1 cable = 185.2 meters), and at this distance its two eight-inch guns (203 mm) were already able to operate. The Russian ships did not cause any noticeable damage to the Japanese, although the Japanese still (!) keep secret information about the number of hits on their ships from the Varyag and Koreyets and the nature of the damage caused by these hits. At the same time, they refer to the loss of control documents - log books and repair sheets.
Varyag after the battle
The Russian sailors faced a difficult choice: either, having moved the heavy guns of the "Korean" to the "Varyag", repair and try to break through to Port Arthur again, or sink the ship and go ashore either unarmed, meaning the neutrality of Korea, or with weapons , because by that time there were already Japanese military units in Chemulpo numbering about 3,000 people. An inspection of the cruiser revealed that the cruiser was unsuitable for battle, and Rudnev decided to blow it up right there in the roadstead, but Bailey asked to choose some other method, since an explosion in the relatively cramped space of the roadstead could damage foreign ships. At the same time, he stated that foreign ships would leave him before 16.00, because at that time Admiral Uriu threatened to resume the battle already in the roadstead. It was decided to transfer the crews of the “Varyag”, “Koreyets” and the steamship “Sungari” to foreign ships, as to neutral territory. The board of officers of the "Korean" agreed with the decision of the commander of the "Varyag". The crew of the "Korean" was transported to the French cruiser "Pascal", the crew of the "Varyag" - to the English "Talbot" and the Italian "Elba". The Chemulpo settlement formed a flying squad of the Red Cross to provide first aid to the wounded of the warring powers. A steam boat under the flag of this detachment delivered the crew of the Russian steamer Sungari to the Elba, and brought 24 seriously wounded from the Varyag to Chemulpo, where two of them died from their wounds. The Japanese agreed to consider these wounded shipwrecked and placed them in their Red Cross hospital.
"Korean" was blown up at 16.05. The Varyag's seams were opened, and at 18:00 it sank into the water with its flag and jack raised. Rear Admiral Uriu demanded that the commanders of neutral cruisers hand over the Russian sailors as prisoners of war, but all of them, not without pressure from teams that sympathized with our compatriots, resolutely refused him. The Japanese had no choice but to inform the world that both ships were sunk in battle along with their crews. Nevertheless, it is known that on behalf of Admiral Uriu, the flagship doctor of the Japanese squadron, Yamamoto Yei, visited the Russian wounded in the Japanese hospital and even gave them gifts. The Japanese agreed to release the crews of the “Varyag” and “Koreyets” from Chemulpo on the condition that all military personnel sign a contract agreeing not to take part in hostilities against Japan. Russian sailors could give such a subscription only with the Highest permission, which was received from Emperor Nicholas. Only the senior officer of the cruiser “Varyag” V.V. Stepanov refused to give such a subscription.
Korean is blown up
It was not until January 28 that Japan officially declared war. “True to their eastern customs,” recalled Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, “The Japanese first struck, and then declared war on us.”
In 1907, Rear Admiral V.F. Rudnev - while retired - was awarded the Japanese Order of the Rising Sun in recognition of the heroism of Russian sailors, becoming one of the first Europeans and the first Russian to receive this order.
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