“Excursion to the Military Gallery of the Hermitage” (for the 250th anniversary of the Hermitage) Performed by: Student group No. 19 Koveshnikov Danila Supervisor: Teacher of history and social studies Vituleva Valentina Ivanovna
The Military Gallery is one of the galleries of the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. The gallery consists of 332 portraits of Russian generals who participated in the Patriotic War of 1812.
F. Kruger Portrait of Emperor Alexander I
F. Kruger Portrait of the Prussian King Frederick William III
P. Kraft Portrait of the Austrian Emperor Franz I
IN Soviet time the gallery was supplemented with four portraits of palace grenadiers, special troops created in 1827 to guard the veterans' home Patriotic War. These portraits were also painted by George Dow. D. Dow Portrait of the palace grenadier Ilya Yamnik
The hall in which the gallery is located was designed by the architect Carlo Rossi Architect Carlo Rossi (1775-1849)
The fire that started in the Winter Palace on December 17, 1837 destroyed the decoration of all the halls, including the Military Gallery. But not a single portrait was damaged. B. Green. Fire in the Winter Palace on December 17, 1837
The gallery opened under Nicholas the First in 1826. Portrait of Emperor Nicholas I
More than three hundred images of generals and field marshals are presented here. 150 portraits were painted from life, 150 from engravings, since the heroes had already died. 13 frames are empty: they are signed, but they could not find images of people.
Mikhail Andreevich Miloradovich (1771-1825), infantry general
Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration (1765-1812), infantry general
Denis Vasilievich Davydov (1784-1839), lieutenant general
Alexander Ivanovich Osterman-Tolstoy (1770-1857), lieutenant general
Kulm Cross At the same time, a new award appeared - the Kulm Cross. Initially, it was made from trophies - metal helmets of French cuirassiers. Now the Hermitage houses two such crosses.
Sergei Grigorievich Volkonsky (1788-1865), major general
Alexey Andreevich Arakcheev (1769-1834), count
Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov (1745-1813), Field Marshal General
Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly (1761-1818), Field Marshal General
P. von Hess “Battle of Borodino” The gallery also contains paintings depicting the main battles of the war.
P. von Hess “The French retreat across the Berezina River”
The Russian Tsar has a chamber in his palace: It is not rich in gold or velvet; It is not in it that the diamond of the crown is kept behind glass: But from top to bottom, in full length, all around, the artist painted it with his free and wide brush. There are no rural nymphs, no virgin madonnas, no fauns with cups, no full-breasted wives, no dancing, no hunts - but all are cloaks, swords, and faces full of warlike courage. In a crowded crowd, the artist placed here the leaders of our people's forces, covered with the glory of a wonderful campaign and eternal memory twelfth year. Often I wander slowly among them, and I look at their familiar images, and, I imagine, I hear their warlike cries. A.S. Pushkin
Literature: 1. Set of postcards “Heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812”, M., art, 1990 2. http://www.liveinternet.ru/users/ustava51/post301475690/ 3. http:// library.pgups.ru/jirbis2/images/gallery_1812.pdf
The editorial office of Novosibirsk News received a letter from Yuri Shishkov, Honored Worker Russian Federation, chief designer of the Novosibirsk State Design Institute. Yuri Andreevich has long been interested in the topic of the exploits of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War. “Novosibirsk News” publishes the text of an investigative letter on the topic of the heroism of Panfilov’s men.
Instead of a preface
Maxim Zharov, author of a publication entitled “Krivitsky should have been sent to the Gulag for this myth” Lenta. Ru (July 12, 2015) asked historian Alexey Isaev: “... two years ago you understood this history and participated in discussions. You said then that the case about the 28 Panfilovites must be confirmed or refuted on the basis of not only ours, but also German documents. Are there any German documents about that battle at the Dubosekovo crossing?”
“Yes, they exist. These documents say that the Germans drove through Dubosekovo without noticing anything in particular. No people who knocked out 18 tanks from them are mentioned in these documents... we know nothing about them, including due to the loss of documents and the death of participants in these battles.”
The answers to this and many other possible questions on the topic raised are set out in the attached article.
Of the 28 Panfilovites, not all died, 6 survived. It is not clear why their evidence was not taken into account, for example, the transcript of the conversation with I.R. Vasiliev, adopted as the basis for this article. The same goes for other participants in the battle. Is this ever forgotten?
According to their information, Panfilov’s positions were attacked by the enemy three times, and twice the Germans retreated, suffering losses in manpower and equipment. And according to the historian A. Isaev, they drove past, “not noticing anything.”
Where is the logic and truth? Let us assume that the number of destroyed tanks could have been overestimated (especially in the last tank attack), although this does not change the essence of the matter, since at the same time the participants in the battle confirmed that during the first attack, German tanks, having met stubborn resistance from Panfilov’s men, turned back. The question then is why this happened, and how many of the 20 tanks had to be destroyed in order to force the remaining tanks to retreat without following the order.
The most important thing is that Dubosekov had a fight. If he really didn’t exist, it would be a crime in a tank-dangerous direction.
List of soldiers of the 2nd platoon nominated for the title of Heroes Soviet Union, was compiled by the commander of the 4th company, Captain P. M. Gundilovich (who was awarded three military orders, died on April 10, 1942). Considering the lack of accurate information and the age of time, some inaccuracies and even errors are possible when compiling this list, but deliberate falsification of the fact that in reality there was no battle at the Dubosekovo crossing (and that it was fictitious) is excluded.
It is very important to say that the feat of Panfilov’s 2nd platoon was symbolic in the sense that, occupying positions on cutting edge defense, they did not retreat, fighting to the last. Other Panfilov men of the 1075th regiment (especially the 4th company of the 2nd battalion) and the entire division also fought courageously as heroes, many of them died, but those who survived were forced to retreat under enemy pressure. Subsequently, they also received awards for this fight. But it was unrealistic to present everyone to the title of heroes (for example, the entire 4th company of 140 people).
Commander of the 8th Guards Rifle Division of the Guard, Major General I.V. Panfilov (left) at the division headquarters in the village of Gusenevo (Western Front, November, 1941). Photo: politikus.ru
The main argument for the period of presentation: according to available information, it was believed that at the Dubosekovo crossing, all 28 Panfilov men of the 2nd platoon died and therefore were awarded posthumously.
The survivors, senior sergeant Vasiliev I.R. and foreman Shemyakin G.M., after appropriate verification, received the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union. Also Red Army soldier I.D. Shadrin after inspection in September 1942. Red Army soldier D. F. Timofeev passed the test, but did not have time to receive the award, as he died in 1947.
Information about the testimony of Colonel I.V. Kaprov and the work of the prosecutor's team, the conversation with Marshal G.K. Zhukov can be found in the article by Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences G.A. Kumanev, published on the Kr. website. ru July 22, 2015. Why “the members of the prosecutor’s team set themselves one goal - to debunk the feat of 28 Panfilov’s men” remained a mystery to me personally, as, obviously, to many others.
Near Moscow. October 1941
At the end of October 1941, during the attack on Moscow, German troops reached the near approaches to our capital, resulting in a real threat its complete encirclement and capture by the enemy. Both sides were preparing for a decisive battle. From remote areas of the country (Siberia, Far East, Central Asia etc.) new military formations were urgently transferred to the front near Moscow.
Battle of Moscow. Photo: istmira.com
During the fighting in the Volokolamsk direction, German troops also suffered heavy losses and, in need of replenishment with reserves, as of November 2, 1941, they temporarily went on the defensive, and then launched a new offensive in mid-November. A mortal danger looms over the country.
As subsequent military operations showed, the defeat of the Nazi troops near Moscow largely depended on the high morale of our soldiers and their massive display of heroism, which is discussed in this article using the examples of the battle of Panfilov’s men at the Dubosekovo crossing, as well as the exploits of other heroes.
Dubosekovo. November 1941
Here, at the Dubosekovo junction, 7 km southeast of Volokolamsk, 75 years ago on November 16, 1941, during the Battle of Moscow, a small group of our soldiers, just one platoon of the 4th company of the second battalion of the 1075th regiment of the 316th Infantry division of Major General I.V. Panfilov accomplished a legendary feat that went down in the history of the Great Patriotic War, becoming an example of courage and perseverance.
It is probably also important to take into account that in the first half of November 1941 (about two weeks ago) The 4th company had just left Volokolamsk from encirclement. The company was commanded by Senior Lieutenant P. Gundilovich. The platoon was led by company political instructor V. Klochkov and sergeant Dobrobabin. The personnel of the platoon are known by name, as well as the biographies of the soldiers who died in battle on November 16 or survived.
It must be said that the description of this battle and the participation of some Panfilov heroes in it means mass media and investigative authorities involved in identifying the authenticity of the events of that time, was interpreted differently. In 2011, a newspaper published an article claiming that
“...there were no 28 heroic Panfilov men,...there was no battle at the Dubosekovo crossing...".
Even earlier, in an extract from archival materials of the post-war years, in 1948 in particular, it was noted that there are no operational documents about the feat and death of 28 Panfilov men.
This also happened in the war, especially since the situation at the front was very difficult and difficult. The day before, an order was given and read to the troops for our counter-offensive on this section of the front, which coincided with the beginning of the second offensive of the Nazi troops on Moscow. Thousands of people died at the front every day.
How serious the situation was is evidenced by the fact that the commander of the 316th Infantry Division, Major General I.V. Panfilov, also died in battle 2 days later.
Map of military operations on the near approaches to Moscow in November 1941.
7 years later, during the investigation in 1948, the former regiment commander, Colonel I.V. Kaprov, obviously, under pressure from the prosecutor’s commission, could really say that on that day he was personally in another sector and data on the progress of the platoon’s battle at the Dubosekovo crossing doesn't have it.
But it is still necessary to note that operational maps describing the fighting on the left flank of the 316th Infantry Division were published in the book “The defeat of German troops near Moscow” (Moscow operation of the Western Front November 16, 1941-January 31, 1942). 4.1./ edited by Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov, M., 1943. p.42-43.
This work, published during the war years, with a foreword by A.V. Zhavoronkov, was republished in 2006 by the publishing house of the Moscow Main Archive, 535 pages.
There is also a description of the battle of the Panfilov heroes at the Dubosekovo crossing.
The regiment occupied the defense at the turn of height 251.0, Petelino, Dubosekovo crossing. The book talks about the deaths of political instructor Klochkov and Sergeant Dobrobabin.
Probably, then and especially now, the exact number of its participants, which of them and how many destroyed enemy machine gunners and burned tanks, who and what words were spoken to their comrades at those moments, is not so important. It is important that there was a battle at Dubosekovo, Panfilov’s heroes fought to the death to the last, the enemy was detained for 4 hours.
Of the 28 soldiers nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 22 soldiers died a brave death in battle, 6 others, as it turned out later, were wounded or shell-shocked (including Sergeant Dobrobabin) survived, which was unknown when the decree on the award was issued in July 1942 and the publication of the above book.
Retreat of the German army from Moscow (December 1941) Military equipment abandoned by the Nazis on the roads near Moscow. Photo: politikus.ru
Political instructor Klochkov’s liaison officer, a participant in the battle on November 16, 1941, Red Army soldier of the 2nd platoon Daniil Aleksandrovich Kozhubergenov, was unlucky in being awarded the title of hero. It so happened that he remained alive, but by mistake the decree named another Kozhubergenov Askar, although his company colleagues confirmed Daniil Kozhubergenov’s participation in this battle (see Kumanev G. A. “Feat and Fraud”: pp. 145-147).
What else is very important to consider? As Kumanev G.A. writes in TsAMO there is a document dated May 18, 1942, which lists 28 heroes of the Panfilov division who fell on November 16, 1941 at the Dubosekovo crossing, presented for a government award. Why don’t the media report this, doubting the authenticity of the heroic deed of Panfilov’s heroes?
How can this be, because there are eyewitness accounts of direct participants in the battle at the Dubosekovo crossing. Moreover, the stories were told not after the war, but, depending on the circumstances, immediately or just a year later. A few days later, Private Ivan Natarov, who was seriously wounded and died in the medical battalion, spoke about this, and a year later - Private Illarion Vasilyev, and later other eyewitnesses.
The article uses information based on a transcript of a conversation with him. How can you not believe him, a Siberian? Selected excerpts from the above transcript dated December 22, 1942 with Private Vasilyev Illarion Romanovich (born in 1910 in the village of Mungat, now Krapivinsky district, Kemerovo region) with reference to archival sources published in the book A. M. Samsonova " Great Battle near Moscow. 1941-1942", Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences, M., 1958 (pp. 134-136) are given below, and the data from I. Vasiliev’s story, although not completely, is practically unchanged. The author in this article outlines the available information about the engineering preparation of positions for defense, the course of the battle with the repulsion of enemy attacks and briefly about the fate of our soldiers (using publications by various authors, including our own, in the newspaper Trudovaya Pravda).
A unit of the 82nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 5th Army of the Western Front is attacking the last enemy strongholds in Mozhaisk (January 1942). Photo:politikus.ru
The successful actions of the platoon on the new line of defense at the Dubosekovo junction were due to the following: there were few of them, but they were “fired”, already experienced and brave warriors who had survived previous mortal battles with the enemy. Having successfully chosen a position on both sides of the road leading to the junction, they were securely entrenched at the line. Despite the fact that it was already the month of November, they literally dug into the ground, digging trenches, and were not too lazy, as they say, to cover them in places with sleepers in two rolls.
Many articles do not even mention this, as well as the meeting with German machine gunners at the beginning of the battle, the parliamentary officer and other details told by an eyewitness. It is unlikely that this can be forgotten or distorted deliberately, especially since at that time there were no reproaches against the surviving Panfilovites.
This is how I. Vasiliev himself told about it (hereinafter the recording of his memories is preserved verbatim).
“They ordered us to dig in near the Dubosekovo crossing. We dug in... We took horses and sleighs and let’s carry sleepers and make fortifications. On our right flank there was a hollow, and on our left flank there was a large meadow that approached the line railway. The road just came from the village of Zhdanovo... We dug in and fortified ourselves on this road. They rolled two rows of sleepers and camouflaged them.”
In the early morning of November 16, after a heavy air raid and bombing that did not cause any harm to them special harm, they were attacked by a company of German machine gunners, walking across the field at full height as if for a walk, and without the support of tanks. We walked using hidden approaches to the terrain from the left flank of our positions, which were defended by the main forces of the platoon. Having risen in front of the positions, the hillock became visible in full view.
Apparently, the Germans walked without reconnaissance and simply “ran into” our positions. At the command of Sergeant Dobrobabin, with targeted fire, unexpected for the enemy, they were practically shot at point-blank range. The attack failed, the Germans fled back, leaving dead and wounded on the battlefield.
I. Vasiliev remembers. “Our soldiers allowed the enemy to get very close, and only then assistant platoon commander Sergeant Dubrovarin (correctly Dobrobabin) gave the command. We opened fire on the machine gunners... We repulsed the machine gunners. Here we had a short fight. They killed up to 80 people. There was no time to count, there was no need to count (according to other sources, 70 machine gunners were destroyed).
After this attack, political instructor Klochkov approached our trenches and began to talk. He greeted us.
How did you cope with the fight?
Nothing, they survived.
We thought that, having repelled the attack of the machine gunners, we would have to move forward. But they didn’t give us any orders ahead.”
This beginning greatly contributed to the subsequent successful fight against German tanks. There were a lot of them for a platoon, but the tanks had to be pulled into a narrow neck along the road to the junction between the railway embankments and the platoon positions to reach the Volokolamsk highway. And they were able to do this, as it turned out, only with heavy losses and a time delay.
When repelling an attack by machine gunners, the battle was led by Sergeant I. Dobrobabin, and the next two tank attacks were led by political instructor V. Klochkov, who ordered the soldiers to prepare anti-tank grenades, bundles of grenades and Molotov cocktails, and also to form a chain one behind the other. Conducting continuous observation of the advance of enemy tanks and the progress of the battle, he necessary cases gave commands to the soldiers to rush out of the trench and blow up the tanks. In such a situation, it was simply impossible not to carry out the order.
Political instructor Klochkov noticed a column of tanks. He says: “The tanks are moving, we’ll have to endure another fight here.”
“It’s okay,” says the political instructor, “we’ll be able to repel the attack”...
“The tanks began to advance towards our trenches, they advanced very close... The officer got out of the tank and shouted: “Rus, surrender!” Then they fired several volleys at it at once.” At that moment, a coward was discovered among the soldiers, who came out of the trench, “raised his hands in the air, and panicked. When we went to the front, we said that alarmists and cowards have no place on Soviet soil, they must be punished by their own hand...”
"I shotI myself am personally involved in it,” adds I. R. Vasiliev.
The battle with Nazi tanks began. “They fired from the right flank with an anti-tank rifle, but we did not have an anti-tank rifle. I had to jump out of the trench. The political instructor gave the command... to throw bunches of grenades under the tanks... They threw bottles of fuel on the crews. I don’t know what was exploding there, only big explosions were in the tanks.”
“We repulsed this attack, destroyed 15 tanks (according to official data 14). 5 tanks retreated to reverse side behind the village Zhdanovo"...
According to the memoirs of I. Dobrobabin (in a 1989 recording aired on television on November 20, 2016) the use of Molotov cocktails was very effective. In this battle, he personally set fire to several tanks. After this battle there was a short respite, about 30 minutes. And again, political instructor Klochkov noticed the approach of the enemy - the second batch of tanks.
“Comrades,” he said, “we will probably have to die here for the glory of the Motherland”...
The tanks began to approach us very close “... “You jump out of the trench and run, gritting your teeth. You think it’s all the same: die like this, die like this, beat like that. It was with this mood that we jumped out of the trenches and walked.”
“In this last attack,” said I. R. Vasiliev, “I blew up two tanks. I remember throwing a bunch of grenades. This is where I got hurt."
Describing the course of the battle, it must be said that the German tank crews also had a difficult task. When they drove onto the hill, they saw in front of them many dozens of bodies of their soldiers, among whom there could be wounded. It was necessary to maneuver between them or put pressure on them. They were unable to destroy our defenders or did not have the time to do so; ours responded to the offer of surrender with fire, the Nazis had an order, and the tanks went forward. (Every minute counts in battle; other troops followed the tank column).
The results of the battle are known. Our soldiers who survived the first attack destroyed 4 more tanks in the second. In total, 18 tanks were destroyed.
On September 15, 2011, Komsomolskaya Pravda published a letter to this newspaper from Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov under the heading “Marshal Dmitry Yazov: 28 Panfilov heroes - a fiction? Who stopped the Germans then?” It could hardly be said better.
“The battle of these heroes at the Dubosekovo crossing was not only a feat of courage; it was of great tactical importance, as it delayed the Germans’ advance for many hours, gave our other units the opportunity to take more convenient positions, etc.” (“The defeat of Nazi troops near Moscow”, 2006, p. 45).
Many years ago, the whole country learned about the feat of the Panfilov heroes thanks to the initiative of war correspondents. The memory of them and other heroes in the battle for Moscow is still alive.
Dubosekovo, German look: “The not-too-strong enemy stubbornly defends” November 17th, 2016
Original taken from afirsov in Dubosekovo, German view: “The enemy, not too strong, stubbornly defends himself”
Exactly 75 years ago, on November 16, 1941, a well-known battle took place at the Dubosekovo crossing to the Soviet people. In the post-Soviet period, as part of the “fight against myths,” opinions began to “take shape” that there was no battle at Dubosekovo at all, and the Germans “drove by and didn’t notice” (c). Yes, and in our documents (which are known, for a moment!) of combat units there is no mention of the battle at Dubosekovo...
However, in Lately German documents related to the battle in this direction began to be put into circulation, in particular the combat logs of the divisions (LCD) directly conducting the battle in the dispersal area. A German view is offered, mainly from the side of the 2nd TD - the enemy of the 1075th Infantry Regiment, defending at the crossing, to which the 4th company of political instructor Vasily Klochkov belonged.
Why Dubosekovo? The fact is that here the railway runs through rather rough terrain - either along an embankment or in a recess (see map), which form natural obstacles to the movement of enemy armored vehicles. Among the few “flat places” where tanks could cross the railway was the Dubosekovo crossing. Yes, on German maps there really is no such name: there is simply no one there settlement- two rows of rails, two switches and a 3rd class station for 1908, what is there to celebrate?
From the ZhBD of the 2nd TD of the Germans for 11/16/1941:
6.30 Start of the offensive.
From 7.00 attack aviation support.
...
8.00 Report of the 74th artillery regiment (A.R.74): Morozovo and Shiryaevo are occupied by battle group 1. Enemy resistance is quite weak.
Shiryaevo had only military outposts, so it was not difficult to occupy it. In the 2nd German TD, three “battle groups” were formed before the offensive. Of these, the first was the main striking force and included a battalion of tanks from the 3rd Tank Regiment. 
From ZhBD 2nd TD:
9.13 Battle group 1 reaches Petelinka.
10.12 Combat group 1 reaches the edge of the forest 1 km north of Petelinka.
Now, if you look at the map, it really seems that the Germans passed Dubosekovo and did not notice, 
However, we read further from the ZhBD:
13.30 intermediate report to the V Army Corps: Battle Group 1 engages an enemy that is stubbornly defending on the forest edges south of the highway, along the line north of Shiryaevo - 1.5 km south of Petelinka.
The same entry in the railway database: 
It turns out that after five hours of battle, the Germans still did not overcome the positions of the 4th and 5th companies of the 1075th joint venture, and “1.5 km south of Petelino (Petelinka)” is the Dubosekovo crossing, which, as we remember, is not on German map. Moreover, in the intermediate conclusions further in the ZhBD it is written:
Impression: south of the highway not too strong enemy defends stubbornly using forested areas.
That is, contrary to modern myths that there was no feat at Dubosekovo, the Germans noticed “Panfilov’s men” there, and how!
What happened, and why, having already advanced beyond Petelino (Petelinki) to the right of the 4th company, the enemy gets stuck in front of the “Shiryaevo line - 1.5 km south of Petelinka”?
The answer is partially given by a conversation with one of the “Panfilov men”, a participant in the battle - B. Dzhetpysbaev (transcript January 2, 1947). Why are his opinions important to us? Dzhetpysbaev was illiterate, did not read newspapers, did not know anything about what was written about the “feat of 28 Panfilov’s men” - in fact, his memories turned out to be free from the “phantoms” of propaganda and the opinions of other participants in the battle.
Dzhetpysbaev: “My company stood 500 meters from Klochkov. Klochkov stood with his company right next to the railway, I stood to the left. On the morning of November 16, the battle began. 4 German tanks approached us. Two of them were knocked out, two escaped. The attack was repulsed. Most of the tanks went to the Dubosekov junction... We saw: they turn and the tanks go there. There was a battle there..."
That is, faced with the defense of the 5th company along the edge of the forest, reinforced by rubble and minefields (again from reinforced concrete - « 10.30 Report of the 74th artillery regiment (A.R.74): The forward line of battle group 1 along the outskirts of the forest 300 m north of Shiryaevo. There is an enemy in the forest. Patrols scout the road»
), the Germans from the 1st BG began to gradually “shift” their efforts more and more to the left - first to the patrol (“to Klochkov” - the 4th company). And the Germans managed to make a breakthrough in the defense in the sector of the 6th company - its positions were actually in an open field already behind the railway - simply an ideal place for the bulk of the tanks of the 1st BG of the Germans. The remnants of the 6th company after the attack, according to the testimony of the commander of the 1075th joint venture, Karpov, retreated behind the railway embankment. 
After this, three companies of the 2nd battalion actually found themselves in a “sack”, having in the rear only a forest without roads, difficult to pass in winter. Such isolation from the main forces, apparently, led to the fact that in our documents - in the division and above, there is no data about the battle at Dubosekovo. It was simply impossible to “send the information to the top.” And then there will simply be no one...
Next, the 3rd battle group of the 2nd TD of the Germans comes into action. It consists of a company of tanks, as well as artillery, including the “new product of the season” - six-barreled rocket mortars. Quote from the ZhBD for 11/14/1941 about the statement of the task:
Fireteam 3 follows Battlegroup 2 and clears the area to Battleteam 1's location.
That is, BG 3 strikes along the remaining defenses of the 1075th Regiment, “cleaning up” those who survived.
From ZhBD 2nd TD:
13.30 intermediate report to the V Army Corps: ... Combat Group 3 with its right flank clears the area west of Nelidovo-Nikolskoye.
Next, the 3rd BG was supposed to strike the remnants of the 2nd battalion of the 1075th regiment.
This is how Jetpysbaev recalls it: « Before sunset One liaison soldier runs up: “Klochkov is dead, they’re asking for help.” We have few people left. Many killed and wounded. We are fighting off attacks in front, but behind us, a German tank is coming straight towards us. Tanks bypassed And appeared from behind…»
Indeed, the 3rd BG struck at the rear of the 5th company of the Dzhetpysbaevs, and the positions of the 4th company were apparently “collapsed”.
Until how long did Panfilov’s men hold out at Dubosekovo? Dzhetpysbaev says, until “sunset.” This is indirectly confirmed by the neighbors of the “Panfilovites” on the left - the 50th Cavalry Division of Dovator’s Corps. Here is a quote from the memoirs of her military journey (the battle is for the already familiar village of Morozovo, which the Germans allegedly occupied in the morning):
"Despite the fact that already it's almost dark, the attacks continued with unabated force. Enemy chains advanced on our positions, rolled back, reformed, replenished and rushed forward again. The roar of artillery cannonade was joined by new sounds, not yet familiar to the horsemen - the Nazis put into action six-barreled mortars»
*
.
A battery of six-barreled mortars somewhere in winter
The fact is that the 2nd TD had six-barreled mortars only as part of the 3rd BG, and the 5th TD of the Germans, which Dovator’s cavalry mostly fought with, did not use them - this (the firing noise “creaks”), you see , do not forget! 
From these facts we can conclude that the resistance at Dubosekovo lasted almost the entire daylight hours and only by sunset the Germans managed to “collapse” the defense of the 2nd battalion of the 1075th regiment there. In fact, the battle ended with the death of all three companies: according to Kaprov, 100 out of 140 people in the 4th company were killed; according to Dzhetpysbaev, out of 75 people in his 5th company, only 15 left the battle.
As a result, at 19.00 the commander of the 1075th infantry regiment, Kaprov, was forced to leave his command post outside Dubosekovo, having only managed to radio: “Surrounded. They only defend the command post!”
In a few days, only 120 people will remain from the entire regiment...
PS . Now the “debunkers of the myth of 28” have retreated to reserve positions: now the battle is described in one phrase: “The Germans completed the task of the day.” Like, “all the provinces sneezed at your music” (c)
In Soviet times there was such a children's joke:
A soldier prays in a trench: “Lord, make me a Hero of the Soviet Union.”
- OK! - said the Lord. And there was one soldier with two grenades against three tanks!
It was clear then who this joke was about. Here is also Kaprova’s regiment with reinforcements - two guns that cannot even be transported - they were unloaded and left at the station next to Dubosekov, and they allocated as many as 20 armor-piercing shells (that’s about 80 German tanks), and they gave them as many as a platoon of anti-tank rifles with a coefficient durability, well, at the maximum - 0.3, and with all this “wealth” they left under the German tank division, under the bombing of fifty “Junkers” and shelling by “creaky”. For all day.
And then they will say: “Well, what feat is this? The Germans completed the task.”
P.S.S.
The invoice was honestly stolen from LiveJournal dms_mk1
.
________
* - About the 50th kvd (Sergey Nikolaevich Sevryugov, So it was... Notes of a cavalryman (1941-1945)
Thanks to the author for the detailed (with map) analysis of the battle. True, it seems to the author that he confirmed the “feat of 28 Panfilov’s men.” But in fact, the facts he cited completely refute the myth. There was no “unprecedented feat” when 28 people with only anti-tank rifles and grenades stopped the advance of 50 tanks, supported by infantry and artillery fire. It wasn’t, because it’s simply physically impossible. It is a myth. During the fierce battles for Moscow at the end of 1941, his appearance could be justified by the desire to psychologically support our retreating units. But it is not surprising that after the war, the army, which had fought four difficult years, abandoned it. What looked plausible in the fifth month of the war could not seem so after the end of this most difficult war.
But in a real combat situation on November 16, 1941 there was a different feat. Not “unprecedented”, but real. There was a heroic performance of military duty by three companies of the 1075th Infantry Regiment, most of personnel who died or went missing. Three companies, at the cost of the lives of most of the soldiers, delayed the enemy's onslaught for a day and this was very important - we were gaining time. The Germans also completed their combat mission, but in the long term they lost. From thousands of such bloody battles, when at the cost of their lives our soldiers gained time for the country, and a future victory took shape. And it is this feat of soldiers and officers that must be honored. And the myth is for the propagandists of that harsh time. After 70 years, it is time to honor the truth.
75 years ago, in mid-November 1941, the German Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock resumed its attack on Moscow. The position of the capital became critical. It was in those fateful days when the question of the future of our country and our people was being decided that political instructor Vasily Klochkov said: “Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat - Moscow is behind us!” and with a bunch of grenades he stepped towards a German tank and... into immortality.
Myth and fact about Panfilov's heroesOf course, it is necessary to argue about what exactly and how happened on November 16, 1941 at the Dubosekovo junction and the village of Nelidovo, it is necessary to find out the details, compare them, clarify the numbers and circumstances, but it is completely pointless to fight the legend, Maxim Kononenko is sure.Battle at the Dubosekovo crossing
The 316th Rifle Division of Major General Ivan Panfilov, numbering 11,700 people before the Battle of Moscow, lost 3,620 killed and 6,300 wounded in battles on the outskirts of the capital of the Soviet Union. “Red Star” spoke about one of the exploits of Panfilov’s men in the article “The Testament of 28 Fallen Heroes” on November 28, 1941 - a week before the start of the Soviet counter-offensive near Moscow.
There are still people accusing Alexander Krivitsky, the author of this article, of having invented the battle of 28 Panfilov men at the Dubosekovo crossing. At the same time, Krivitsky’s accusers refer to the Certificate-report prepared in May 1948 by the chief military prosecutor of the USSR Armed Forces Nikolai Afanasyev. And he quotes the words of the former commander of the 1075th Infantry Regiment of the 316th Infantry Division, Ilya Kaprov, who, under pressure from investigators, testified: “There was no battle between 28 Panfilov men and German tanks at the Dubosekovo crossing on November 16, 1941 - this is a complete fiction. "On this day, at the Dubosekovo crossing, as part of the 2nd battalion, the 4th company fought with German tanks, and really fought heroically. Over 100 people from the company died, and not 28, as was written about in the newspapers."
Let's analyze Kaprov's words. Starting with the statement sought by military prosecutors, he then not only confirmed that the mentioned 28 fighters were real fighters who fought heroically, but testified that there were many more Panfilov heroes at the Dubosekovo crossing. A company fought against German tanks, not 28 soldiers!
It is significant that after Andrei Zhdanov, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, became familiar with Afanasyev’s tendentious and poorly substantiated conclusions, the prosecutor’s document was sent to the archives. It seems that this was done with the knowledge of Stalin and other leaders of the USSR.
And the story about the feat of 28 Panfilov men took its place in history textbooks.
Mistakes and truth of Alexander Krivitsky
But why did Krivitsky write about only 28 heroes? “The existing discrepancies in the interpretation of facts and figures, as well as circumstances that came to light later (for example, about the fate of the surviving Sergeant Dobrobabin) are not explained by the “evil intent” of the “Red Star” journalist Alexander Krivitsky, who spoke about the feat of Panfilov’s men. The fact is that at the time of writing of the famous article (published on November 28, 1941), the correspondent, for objective reasons, had only the information that he managed to obtain then,” notes Doctor of Historical Sciences Mikhail Myagkov in the magazine “Historian”.
Indeed, war journalists, especially in the initial period of the war, worked in extreme conditions, often under bullets and fragments of enemy shells and bombs. Opportunities for a short time collecting and comprehensively analyzing the entire array of information related to a particular event was not often provided to them. As a rule, they wrote the truth, but not the whole truth. It couldn’t have been otherwise under those conditions.
As a result, the country learned about some heroes quickly, while others learned about them years later. I will give one, vivid and chronologically very close example.
On November 29, 1941, in the village of Petrishchevo, Ruza district, near Moscow, the Nazis hanged a girl. Since the execution was public, and the heroine’s body hung for a long time, local residents knew about the tragedy. They told journalist Pyotr Lidov about her, who wrote the essay “Tanya” in Pravda. It soon became clear that Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya called herself Tanya. Already on February 16, 1942, she was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But on the same day, November 29, a few kilometers from Petrishchevo, the Germans also hanged intelligence officer-saboteur Vera Voloshina - from the same special purpose military unit No. 9903 as Zoya. But due to a combination of circumstances, information about Vera for a long time did not have. As a result, only in 1994 Voloshina was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.
Did Krivitsky greatly distort the real events in his article dated November 28? No, in the main thing he is faithful to the truth. And this is clear to every conscientious researcher.
In addition, we must not forget that at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, one of the problems was “tank fear”. Soldiers, especially those who were recently called up and poorly trained, did not always know how to resist the fire-breathing machines that brought death.
The press tried to raise the spirit of the defenders of the Fatherland. Chief Editor“Red Star” David Ortenberg testified: “The question of the fortitude of Soviet soldiers during that period acquired special significance. The slogan “Death or Victory,” especially in the fight against enemy tanks, was the decisive slogan. The feat of Panfilov’s soldiers is an example of such fortitude. Based on this I suggested that Krivitsky write an editorial about the heroism of Panfilov’s men, which was published in the newspaper on November 28, 1941.”
Unfortunately, Major General Panfilov could not read the article. The commander of the 16th Army, Konstantin Rokossovsky, in which Panfilov’s men fought, recalled: “On November 18, when Panfilov’s men, with the tenacity of heroes, repulsed the enemy who had wedged themselves into their defenses, General Panfilov died at his observation post. It was a heavy loss. He did not live just a few hours Ivan Vasilyevich to a joyful moment - the division that he so gloriously led into battle received the title of Guards. The unparalleled heroism and courage of the soldiers and officers of the 316th, the outstanding merits of its commander were highly appreciated by the party and the government. We just heard in a Moscow radio broadcast Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on awarding the division the Order of the Red Banner. It was renamed the 8th Guards. And suddenly - a message about the death of the general..."
Pro-Western "truth" of Sergei Mironenko
The achievements of Stalin’s military prosecutor were remembered after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the wake of denigration Soviet history. It is typical that when domestic liberals want to say something nasty about the times of the USSR, they use both the reports of Stalin’s prosecutors and the statements of the main liar and provocateur of the Third Reich, Joseph Goebbels (for example, on Katyn).
In June 2015, on the eve of the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow, the then director of the State Archives of the Russian Federation Sergei Mironenko, speaking at the XVII World Congress Russian press, issued: the story of the feat of 28 Panfilov men was made up! And when the voices of journalists who disagreed with him were heard, he declared: “My moral duty is to tell the truth. I have already been told that I am not a patriot because I am talking about these studies. What to do! It’s hard to tell the truth.”
But Mironenko easily repeats the hackneyed cliches of Western anti-Soviet and anti-Russian propaganda. For example, this: “Life in Soviet times was not worth anything. The whole truth must be told about his responsibility. The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact would be more correctly called the Hitler-Stalin Pact. This pact is Stalin’s biggest strategic miscalculation, if not a crime.”
The Nazi attack on the USSR is the most important episode of the war, having direct relation to the present. Moreover, an episode that has not yet received an adequate assessment in the world of humanities, says Vladimir Lepekhin.Mironenko also claimed that in the first days of the war, Joseph Stalin allegedly fell into prostration and fled to his dacha in Kuntsevo. Moreover, he reproduced this Khrushchev tale both at the XVII World Congress of the Russian Press, and a month earlier, on the eve of the 70th anniversary Great Victory, in an interview with Kommersant. The ex-director of the archive was not even embarrassed by the fact that this was refuted by long-published entries in the “Log of Visits to Comrade Stalin’s Office”, and therefore all those who nowadays replicate Nikita Khrushchev’s gossip look simply stupid.
Long ago introduced into scientific circulation and Certificate-report of the chief military prosecutor of the USSR Afanasyev. It is not a reason to rewrite the Moscow Anthem, which contains the following words:
We will remember the harsh autumn,
The grinding of tanks and the glare of bayonets,
And twenty-eight will live for centuries
Your bravest sons.
It is correct that the station, opened on November 8 on the Moscow Central Circle, is called Panfilovskaya.
Today, in the conditions of the hybrid war unleashed by the West against Russia, the feat of Panfilov’s men and the words of political instructor Klochkov “Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat, Moscow is behind” highest degree relevant. They unite and mobilize the people.
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