Resettlement of Chechens in 1944. Deportation. Why did Stalin resettle the Chechens, Ingush and Crimean Tatars (1 photo). Separation from the land of our ancestors at the cost of thousands of lives

At 2 a.m. on February 23, 1944, the most famous ethnic deportation operation began - the resettlement of residents of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, formed ten years earlier by uniting the Chechen and Ingush Autonomous Regions.

There were deportations of “punished peoples” before this - Germans and Finns, Kalmyks and Karachais, and after - Balkars, Crimean Tatars and Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians living in Crimea, as well as Meskhetian Turks from Georgia. But Operation Lentil to evict almost half a million Vainakhs - Chechens and Ingush - became the largest.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR motivated the decision to deport Chechens and Ingush by the fact that “during the Great Patriotic War, especially during the actions of the Nazi troops in the Caucasus, many Chechens and Ingush betrayed their Motherland, went over to the side of the fascist occupiers, and joined the ranks of saboteurs and intelligence officers , thrown by the Germans into the rear of the Red Army, created armed gangs at the behest of the Germans to fight against Soviet power, and also taking into account that many Chechens and Ingush for a number of years participated in armed uprisings against Soviet power and for a long time, being not engaged in honest labor, carry out bandit raids on collective farms in neighboring regions, rob and kill Soviet people.”

These two peoples had difficult relations with the authorities even before the war. Until 1938, there was not even a systematic conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the Red Army - no more than 300-400 people were conscripted annually.

Then the conscription was significantly increased, and in 1940-1941 it was carried out in full accordance with the law on universal conscription.

“The attitude of the Chechens and Ingush towards Soviet power was clearly expressed in desertion and evasion of conscription into the Red Army. During the first mobilization in August 1941, out of 8,000 people subject to conscription, 719 people deserted. In October 1941, out of 4,733 people, 362 evaded conscription. In January 1942, when the national division was formed, only 50 percent were recruited personnel. In March 1942, out of 14,576 people, 13,560 deserted and evaded service, went underground, went to the mountains and joined gangs. In 1943, out of 3,000 volunteers, the number of deserters was 1,870,” wrote L.P. in a memo. Beria's deputy people's commissar, state security commissioner of the 2nd rank B.Z. Kobulov.

According to him, there were 38 sects in the republic, numbering over 20 thousand people. These were mainly hierarchical organized Muslim religious brotherhoods of murids.

“They are conducting active anti-Soviet work, sheltering bandits and German paratroopers. When the front line approached in August-September 1942, 80 members of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) quit their jobs and fled, including 16 leaders of district committees of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), 8 senior officials of district executive committees and 14 chairmen of collective farms,” wrote Bogdan Kobulov.

After the start of the war, the mobilization of the Chechens and Ingush was actually thwarted - “believing and hoping that the USSR would lose the war, many mullahs and teip authorities agitated for evasion of military service or desertion,” says the collection of documents “Stalin’s Deportations. 1928-1953".

Due to mass desertion and evasion from service, in the spring of 1942, by order of the USSR NGO, the conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the army was canceled.

In 1943, the conscription of approximately 3 thousand volunteers was authorized, but two-thirds of them deserted.

Because of this, it was not possible to form the 114th Chechen-Ingush Cavalry Division - it had to be reorganized into a regiment, however, even after this, desertion was widespread.

According to data as of November 20, 1942, in the Northern group of the Transcaucasian Front there were all 90 Chechens and Ingush - 0.04%.

Heroes of War

At the same time, many Vainakhs who went to the front showed themselves with the best side and contributed to the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War in 1941-1945.

The names of three Chechens and one Ingush are immortalized in Memorial complex defenders of the Brest Fortress. But, according to various sources, from 250 to 400 people from Checheno-Ingushetia took part in the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress, which became a symbol of fortitude and courage. Together with other units of the Red Army, the 255th Chechen-Ingush Regiment and a separate cavalry division fought in Brest.

One of the last and staunch defenders of the Brest Fortress was Magomed Uzuev, but only in 1996, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, was he posthumously awarded the title of Hero Russian Federation. Magomed’s brother Visa Uzuev also fought in Brest.

Two defenders of the Brest Fortress are still alive in Chechnya - Akhmed Khasiev and Adam Malaev

Sniper Abukhaji Idrisov destroyed 349 fascists - an entire battalion. Sergeant Idrisov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Star, he was awarded the title Hero Soviet Union.

Chechen sniper Akhmat Magomadov became famous in the battles near Leningrad, where he was called “the fighter of the German occupiers.” There are more than 90 Germans on his side.

Khanpasha Nuradilov destroyed 920 fascists at the fronts, captured 7 enemy machine guns and personally captured 12 fascists. For his military exploits, Nuradilov was awarded the Order of the Red Star and Red Banner. In April 1943, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

During the war years, 10 Vainakhs became Heroes of the Soviet Union. 2,300 Chechens and Ingush died in the war.

Anti-Soviet protests

With the beginning of the war, gangs in the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic became more active. In October 1941, two separate uprisings took place, covering the Shatoevsky, Itum-Kalinsky, Vedensky, Cheberloevsky and Galanchozhsky districts of the republic. At the beginning of 1942, the leaders of the uprisings, Khasan Israilov and Mairbek Sheripov, united, creating the “Provisional People's Revolutionary Government of Checheno-Ingushetia.” In its statements, this rebel "government" viewed Hitler as an ally in the fight against Stalin.

As the front line approached the border of the republic in 1942, anti-Soviet forces began to act more actively. In August-September 1942, collective farms were dissolved in almost all mountainous regions of Chechnya, and several thousand people, including dozens of Soviet functionaries, joined the uprising of Israilov and Sheripov.

After the appearance of German landing forces in Chechnya in the fall of 1942, the NKVD accused Israilov and Sheripov of creating pro-fascist parties, the National Socialist Party of the Caucasian Brothers and the Chechen-Mountain National Socialist Underground Organization.

In the eight teams of fascist paratroopers with a total number of 77 people dropped onto the territory of the republic, the majority were recruited Chechens and Ingush. But there was no widespread participation of Chechens and Ingush in anti-Soviet gangs. The NKVD registered 150-200 gangs of 2-3 thousand bandits on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia. This is approximately 0.5% of the population of Chechnya. From the beginning of the war until January 1944, 55 gangs and 973 bandits were liquidated in the republic, 1901 bandits, fascists and their accomplices were arrested.

"Lentils"

Operation Lentil began preparations in October-November 1943. Initially, resettlement was planned in the Novosibirsk and Omsk regions, in the Altai and Krasnoyarsk region. But then it was decided to resettle the Chechens and Ingush to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

On January 29, 1944, the head of the NKVD Lavrentiy Beria approved the “Instructions on the procedure for the eviction of Chechens and Ingush.” On February 1, the issue was discussed by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Disagreements arose only over the timing of the start of the operation.

Beria personally led the operation. On February 17, 1944, he reported from Grozny that preparations were being completed and 459,486 people were to be evicted. The operation was designed to last eight days, and 19 thousand operatives of the NKVD, NKGB and SMERSH and about 100 thousand officers and soldiers of the NKVD troops were involved in it.

On February 22, Beria met with the republic’s top leadership and senior clergy and told them about the government’s decision and “the motives that formed the basis for this decision. After this message, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars Mollaev “teared up, but promised to pull himself together and promised to fulfill all the tasks that would be given to him in connection with the eviction,” Beria reported to Stalin.

Beria proposed to the highest clergy of Checheno-Ingushetia “to conduct necessary work among the population through mullahs and other local “authorities” associated with them.

The influence of the mullahs was enormous. Their preaching, wrote the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs N.P. Dundorov in the mid-1950s, could improve labor discipline and even double productivity.

“Both the party-Soviet and clergy we employ have been promised some resettlement benefits (the norm of things allowed for export will be slightly increased),” Beria said.

The operation, according to his assessment, began successfully - 333,739 people were removed from populated areas within 24 hours, of which 176,950 were loaded onto trains. A faster eviction was prevented by heavy snow that fell on the afternoon of February 23.

Nevertheless, by February 29 (1944 was a leap year), 478,479 people were evicted and loaded into wagons, including 91,250 Ingush and 387,229 Chechens.

“177 trains have been loaded, of which 159 trains have already been sent to the place of the new settlement,” Beria reported the results of the operation.

During the operation, 2,016 “people of anti-Soviet element” were arrested, and more than 20 thousand firearms were confiscated.

“The population bordering Checheno-Ingushetia reacted favorably to the eviction of Chechens and Ingush,” said the head of the NKVD.

Residents of the republic were allowed to take with them 500 kilograms of cargo per family. The special settlers had to hand over livestock and grain - in exchange they received livestock and grain from local authorities at their new place of residence.

There were 45 people in each carriage (for comparison, the Germans were allowed to take a ton of property during deportation, and there were 40 people in each carriage without personal belongings). The party nomenklatura and the Muslim elite traveled in the last echelon, which consisted of normal carriages.

And just months later, in the summer of 1944, several spiritual leaders of the Chechens were summoned to the republic to help persuade the gangs and Chechens who had evaded deportation to stop resisting.

Incidents

The deportation did not take place without incidents - according to various sources, from 27 to 780 people were killed, and 6,544 residents of the republic managed to evade deportation. The People's Commissariat of State Security reported "a number of ugly facts of violation of revolutionary legality, arbitrary executions of old Chechen women who remained after the resettlement, the sick, the crippled, who could not follow."

According to a document published by the Democracy Foundation, in one of the villages three people were killed, including an eight-year-old boy, in another - “five old women”, in the third - “according to unspecified data” “arbitrary execution of the sick and crippled up to 60 people "

IN last years There were reports of the burning of from 200 to 600-700 people in the Galanchozhsky district. Two commissions were created to investigate the operation in this area - in 1956 and 1990, but the criminal case was never brought to an end. The official report of the 3rd rank State Security Commissioner M. Gvishiani, who led the operation in this area, spoke only of several dozen killed or died along the way.

As for the mortality of displaced persons, as the leadership of the NKVD convoy troops reported, 56 people were born on the way to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, “1,272 people died, which is 2.6 people per 1,000 transported. According to a certificate from the Statistical Directorate of the RSFSR, the mortality rate in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1943 was 13.2 people per 1,000 inhabitants.” The causes of death were "elderly and early age resettled", the presence of sick people among the resettled chronic diseases", the presence of physically weak people.

Toponymic repressions

On March 7, 1944, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic itself was liquidated. In place of the areas inhabited by Chechens, the Grozny Okrug was created as part of the Stavropol Territory.

Part of the territory of the republic was divided between Georgia and North Ossetia. All Ingush place names were repressed - they were replaced with Russian and Ossetian names.

Opinion of historians

Despite a number of incidents, in general the eviction of the whole passed calmly and did not push the Chechens and Ingush into a terrorist war, although, according to historians, there were all the possibilities for this.

Some historians explain this by saying that the harsh punishment was at the same time gentle towards the people. According to the laws of war, desertion and evasion from military service deserved severe punishment. But the authorities did not shoot the men, “cut off the roots of the people,” but evicted everyone. At the same time, the party and Komsomol organizations, recruitment into the army was not stopped.

However, most historians consider it unacceptable to punish an entire people for the crime of some of its representatives. Deportations of peoples as repressions were extrajudicial in nature and were aimed not at a specific person, but at a whole group of people, and a very large one at that. Masses of people were torn out of their usual habitat, deprived of their homeland, and placed in a new environment, thousands of kilometers from the previous one. Representatives of these peoples were evicted not only from their historical homeland, but also from all other cities and regions, and demobilized from the army.

Rehabilitation and return

The ban on returning to their homeland for Chechens and Ingush was lifted on January 9, 1957 by decree of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the RSFSR. These decrees restored Chechen-Ingush autonomy, and an Organizing Committee was created to organize repatriation.

Immediately after the decree, tens of thousands of Chechens and Ingush in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan quit their jobs, sold off their property and began to seek emigration to their previous place of residence. The authorities were forced in the summer of 1957 to temporarily suspend the return of Chechens and Ingush to their homeland.

One of the reasons was the tense situation developing in the North Caucasus - local authorities were not prepared for the massive return and conflicts between the Vainakhs and settlers from Central Russia and land-poor regions of the North Caucasus who occupied their homes and lands in 1944.

The restoration of autonomy provided for a new, complex redrawing of the administrative-territorial division of the region. Outside the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was the Prigorodny district, which remained part of the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and at the end of the 1980s turned into a hotbed of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.

The authorities planned to return 17 thousand families to the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1957, but twice as many returned, and many sought to be placed in exactly the same villages and houses in which they lived before deportation. This led to ethnic confrontation. In particular, in August 1958, after a domestic murder, riots broke out, about a thousand people seized the regional party committee in Grozny and staged a pogrom there. 32 people were injured, including four employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, two civilians died and 10 were hospitalized, almost 60 people were arrested.

Most Chechens and Ingush returned to their homeland only in the spring of 1959.

The Chechens and Ingush were completely rehabilitated according to the RSFSR law of April 26, 1991 “On the rehabilitation of repressed peoples.” The law provided for “the recognition and implementation of their right to restore the territorial integrity that existed before the unconstitutional policy of forcibly redrawing borders, to restore the national-state entities that existed before their abolition, as well as to compensate for damage caused by the state.”

At the same time, the law provided that the rehabilitation process should not infringe on the rights and legitimate interests of citizens currently living in these territories.

Then the conscription was significantly increased, and in 1940-1941 it was carried out in full accordance with the law on universal conscription.

“The attitude of the Chechens and Ingush towards Soviet power was clearly expressed in desertion and evasion of conscription into the Red Army. During the first mobilization in August 1941, out of 8,000 people subject to conscription, 719 people deserted. In October 1941, out of 4,733 people, 362 evaded conscription. In January 1942, during the formation of the national division, only 50 percent of the personnel were recruited. In March 1942, out of 14,576 people, 13,560 deserted and evaded service, went underground, went to the mountains and joined gangs. In 1943, out of 3,000 volunteers, the number of deserters was 1,870,” wrote L.P. in a memo. Beria's deputy people's commissar, state security commissioner of the 2nd rank B.Z. Kobulov.

According to him, there were 38 sects in the republic, numbering over 20 thousand people. These were mainly hierarchical organized Muslim religious brotherhoods of murids.

Due to mass desertion and evasion from service, in the spring of 1942, by order of the USSR NGO, the conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the army was canceled.

In 1943, the conscription of approximately 3 thousand volunteers was authorized, but two-thirds of them deserted.

Because of this, it was not possible to form the 114th Chechen-Ingush Cavalry Division - it had to be reorganized into a regiment, however, even after this, desertion was widespread.

According to data as of November 20, 1942, in the Northern group of the Transcaucasian Front there were all 90 Chechens and Ingush - 0.04%.

Heroes of War

At the same time, many Vainakhs who went to the front showed their best side and contributed to the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War in 1941-1945.

The names of three Chechens and one Ingush are immortalized in the Memorial Complex of the Defenders of the Brest Fortress. But, according to various sources, from 250 to 400 people from Checheno-Ingushetia took part in the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress, which became a symbol of fortitude and courage. Together with other units of the Red Army, the 255th Chechen-Ingush Regiment and a separate cavalry division fought in Brest.

One of the last and staunch defenders of the Brest Fortress was Magomed Uzuev, but only in 1996, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, was he posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation. Magomed’s brother Visa Uzuev also fought in Brest.

Two defenders of the Brest Fortress are still alive in Chechnya - Akhmed Khasiev and Adam Malaev

Sniper Abukhaji Idrisov destroyed 349 fascists - an entire battalion. Sergeant Idrisov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Star, and was given the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Chechen sniper Akhmat Magomadov became famous in the battles near Leningrad, where he was called “the fighter of the German occupiers.” There are more than 90 Germans on his side.

During the war years, 10 Vainakhs became Heroes of the Soviet Union. 2,300 Chechens and Ingush died in the war.

Anti-Soviet protests

"Lentils"

Operation Lentil began preparations in October-November 1943. Initially, resettlement was planned in the Novosibirsk and Omsk regions, in the Altai and Krasnoyarsk territories. But then it was decided to resettle the Chechens and Ingush to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Beria suggested that the highest clergy of Checheno-Ingushetia “carry out the necessary work among the population through the mullahs and other local “authorities” associated with them.”

The influence of the mullahs was enormous. Their preaching, wrote the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs N.P. Dundorov in the mid-1950s, could improve labor discipline and even double labor productivity.

“Both the party-Soviet and clergy we employ have been promised some resettlement benefits (the norm of things allowed for export will be slightly increased),” Beria said.

Nevertheless, by February 29 (1944 was a leap year), 478,479 people were evicted and loaded into wagons, including 91,250 Ingush and 387,229 Chechens.

“177 trains have been loaded, of which 159 trains have already been sent to the place of the new settlement,” Beria reported the results of the operation.

During the operation, 2,016 “people of anti-Soviet element” were arrested, and more than 20 thousand firearms were confiscated.

“The population bordering Checheno-Ingushetia reacted favorably to the eviction of Chechens and Ingush,” said the head of the NKVD.

Incidents

In recent years, there have been reports of the burning of from 200 to 600-700 people in the Galanchozhsky district. Two commissions were created to investigate the operation in this area - in 1956 and 1990, but the criminal case was never brought to an end. The official report of the 3rd rank State Security Commissioner M. Gvishiani, who led the operation in this area, spoke only of several dozen killed or died along the way.

As for the mortality of displaced persons, as the leadership of the NKVD convoy troops reported, 56 people were born on the way to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, “1,272 people died, which is 2.6 people per 1,000 transported. According to a certificate from the Statistical Directorate of the RSFSR, the mortality rate in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1943 was 13.2 people per 1,000 inhabitants.” The causes of mortality were “the advanced and early age of those resettled,” the presence of chronic diseases among those resettled,” and the presence of physically weak people.

Toponymic repressions

Part of the territory of the republic was divided between Georgia and North Ossetia. All Ingush place names were repressed - they were replaced with Russian and Ossetian names.

Opinion of historians

Some historians explain this by saying that the harsh punishment was at the same time gentle towards the people. According to the laws of war, desertion and evasion from military service deserved severe punishment. But the authorities did not shoot the men, “cut off the roots of the people,” but evicted everyone. At the same time, party and Komsomol organizations were not disbanded, and recruitment into the army was not stopped.

Rehabilitation and return

Most Chechens and Ingush returned to their homeland only in the spring of 1959.

At the same time, the law provided that the rehabilitation process should not infringe on the rights and legitimate interests of citizens currently living in these territories.

Course of events

On January 31, 1944, Resolution No. 5073 of the State Defense Committee of the USSR was adopted on the abolition of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the deportation of its population to Central Asia and Kazakhstan “for complicity to the fascist invaders" The Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was abolished, from its composition 4 districts were transferred to the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, one district was transferred to the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Grozny region was formed on the rest of the territory.

On January 29, 1944, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Lavrentiy Beria approved the “Instructions on the procedure for the eviction of Chechens and Ingush”, and on January 31 a decree was issued State Committee Defense about the deportation of Chechens and Ingush to the Kazakh and Kyrgyz SSR. On February 20, together with I. A. Serov, B. Z. Kobulov and S. S. Mamulov, Beria arrived in Grozny and personally led the operation, where, under the guise of “exercises in mountainous areas,” an army of 100 thousand people was transferred, including 18 thousand officers and up to 19 thousand operatives of the NKVD, NKGB and Smersh. On February 21, he issued an order to the NKVD for the deportation of the Chechen-Ingush population. The next day, he met with the leadership of the republic and senior spiritual leaders, warned them about the operation and offered to carry out the necessary work among the population. Beria reported this to Stalin:

“It was reported to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, Mollaev, about the government's decision to evict the Chechens and Ingush and about the motives that formed the basis for this decision.
Molaev shed tears after my message, but pulled himself together and promised to complete all the tasks that would be given to him in connection with the eviction. Then in Grozny, together with him, 9 leading officials from the Chechens and Ingush were identified and convened, to whom the progress of the eviction of the Chechens and Ingush and the reasons for the eviction were announced.
…40 republican party and Soviet workers from Chechens and Ingush were assigned to 24 districts with the task of selecting from local activists for each locality 2-3 people for campaigning.
A conversation was held with the most influential senior clergy in Checheno-Ingushetia B. Arsanov, A.-G. Yandarov and A. Gaisumov, they were called upon to provide assistance through mullahs and other local authorities.”

The deportation and dispatch of trains to their destinations began on February 23, 1944 at 02:00 local time and ended on March 9 of the same year. The operation began with the code word "Panther", which was transmitted by radio.

On a frosty morning, all adults were called to places of collective gatherings: clubs, schools, city and rural squares. It was Red Army Day and people, unsuspectingly, were in a festive mood. It was a public holiday and was used as an excuse for gatherings. Throughout the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia, against the backdrop of aimed machine guns and machine guns, a decree-sentence on the deportation of Chechens and Ingush was announced. We were given only 10-15 minutes to get ready. Showing dissatisfaction and attempting to escape was punishable by execution on the spot.

The deportation was accompanied by few attempts to escape to the mountains or insubordination on the part of the local population. The NKGB also reported on “a number of ugly facts of violation of revolutionary legality, arbitrary executions of old Chechen women who remained after the resettlement, the sick, the crippled, who could not follow.” According to the documents, in one of the villages three people were killed, including an eight-year-old boy, in another - “five old women”, in the third - “according to unspecified data” “arbitrary execution of the sick and crippled up to 60 people.” There is also information about the burning of up to 700 people alive in the village of Khaibakh in the Galanchozhsky district.

180 trains were sent with a total of 493,269 people resettled. 56 people were born along the route, 1,272 people died, “which is 2.6 people per 1,000 transported. According to a certificate from the Statistical Directorate of the RSFSR, the mortality rate in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1943 was 13.2 people per 1,000 inhabitants.” The causes of death were the “old and young age of those being resettled,” the presence of “sick people with chronic diseases” among those resettled, and the presence of the physically weak. 285 patients were sent to medical institutions. The last to be sent was a train of passenger cars containing former executives and religious leaders of Checheno-Ingushetia, who were used in the operation.

According to official data, during the operation 780 people were killed, 2,016 “anti-Soviet elements” were arrested, and more than 20 thousand firearms were confiscated, including 4,868 rifles, 479 machine guns and machine guns. 6,544 people managed to hide in the mountains.

Chechens and Ingush were evicted not only from their historical homeland, but also from all other cities and regions who were in the ranks of the army, demobilized and also exiled.

After the deportation, over 80 rebel groups continued to operate on the territory of the former Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and several thousand Chechens and Ingush remained.

Link

On March 20, 1944, after the arrival of 491,748 deportees, contrary to the instructions of the central government, the local population, collective farms and state farms did not provide or were unable to provide food, shelter and work to the settlers. The deportees were cut off from their traditional way of life and had difficulty adapting to life on collective farms.

Upon arrival at the places of exile, any movement at a distance of more than three kilometers from the place of residence was strictly prohibited. Twice a month, the special settler had to report to the commandant’s office, confirming that he was in place. Violation of the rules and regulations of residence was punishable by imprisonment for up to 20 years without trial.

In 1949 - five years after the deportation - the Vainakhs, along with other Caucasian “special settlers”, were forbidden to leave the areas of the commandant areas where they were registered. The ban applied to all persons over 16 years of age, and its violation was punishable by up to 25 years in prison.

Essentially, the special settlers were deprived of their civil rights.

Doctor of Economic Sciences, famous Russian scientist Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov writes:
According to the statistical census of 1939, there were 697 thousand Chechens and Ingush people. Over five years, if the previous population growth rates were maintained, there should have been more than 800 thousand people, minus 50 thousand people who fought on the fronts of the active army and other units of the armed forces, that is, the population subject to deportation, there were at least 750-770 thousand people . The difference in numbers is explained by the mass mortality in this short period of time. During the period of eviction, about 5 thousand people were in inpatient hospitals in Checheno-Ingushetia - none of them “recovered” or were reunited with their families. We also note that not all mountain villages had stationary roads - in winter, neither cars nor even carts could move along these roads. This applies to at least, 33 high-mountain villages (Vedeno, Shatoy, Naman-Yurt, etc.), in which 20-22 thousand people lived. What their fate turned out to be is shown by facts that became known in 1990 related to tragic events, the death of the inhabitants of the village of Khaibakh. All its inhabitants, more than 700 people, were driven into a barn and burned.

Of those who arrived (according to official reports) in March 1944 Central Asia 478,479 Vainakhs. 12 years after the resettlement in 1956, 315 thousand Chechens and Ingush lived in Kazakhstan, and about 80 thousand people lived in Kyrgyzstan. This results in a loss of 83 thousand 479 people. It is known that from 1945 to 1950. More than 40 thousand children were born into Vainakh families. For 12 years, died various reasons about 130 thousand people.

After Stalin's death, restrictions on movement were lifted from them, but they were not allowed to return to their homeland. Despite this, in the spring of 1957, 140 thousand forcibly deported returned to the restored Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. At the same time, several mountainous regions were closed to their residence, and the former inhabitants of these territories began to be settled in lowland villages and Cossack villages

Memories

“In “veal wagons” overcrowded to the limit, without light and water, we followed for almost a month to an unknown destination... Typhoid went for a walk. There was no treatment, there was a war going on... During short stops, on remote deserted sidings near the train, the dead were buried in snow black from locomotive soot (going further than five meters from the carriage threatened death on the spot)..." (department head North Ossetian Regional Committee of the CPSU Ingush X. Arapiev)

“People from all the surrounding farms and villages were gathered in the Chechen village of Khaibakh. Those who could not walk were ordered by an NKVD officer to go into the stables. They say it’s warm there, hay has been brought in for insulation. Old people, women, children, the sick, and also healthy people looking after sick and elderly relatives. This happened before my eyes. All other residents of the area were sent on foot through the village of Yalkhoroy under escort to Galashki, and from there to railway station. When a healthy part of the population was taken away, the stable gates were locked. I hear the command: “Fire!” A flame broke out and immediately engulfed the entire stable. It turns out that the hay was prepared in advance and doused with kerosene. As the flames rose above the stable, the people inside, with unnatural cries for help, knocked down the gate and rushed out. They immediately started shooting people running out with machine guns and light machine guns. The exit to the stables was littered with corpses.” (Dziyaudin Malsagov, born 1913).

3-4 days after the eviction of people from the village of Mushe-Chu, the soldiers found an old Zaripat lying in an empty house. She was shot with a machine gun. Then, tying a steel wire around his neck, he was dragged out into the street, broke the fence, covered his body with it, and burned him. Zakriev Salambek and Said-Khasan Ampukaev buried her along with this noose. She was my father’s sister...” (Selim A, born 1902).

“In Kazakhstan, we were unloaded into an open field. Let's go look for a place to hide from the frost. We found an abandoned shed. We returned, and in the place where the neighboring family remained - a mother and five children - there was a snowdrift. They dug up, but everyone was already dead. Only the one-year-old girl was still alive, but she too died two days later.” (Adlop Malsagov).

“In the first days of deportation, people did not die from disease, but froze to death. Somewhere we found a large cast iron frying pan and lit a fire in it. And around, wrapped in some rags, sat children and women. The men began to dig dugouts, which was not easy to do in 30-degree frost. I sat with my mother, covered with a sheepskin coat, which she miraculously took out of the house. The first feeling that I experienced then and that accompanied me long time- this is fear." (Dagun Omaev).

“Mom fell ill. We had a red blanket and there were a lot of lice crawling on it. I lay down next to her, clinging to her, she was so hot. Then my mother sent me to ask someone for whey and make cakes from corn flour and bake them. I went, but in those houses in which the doors were opened for me, they did not understand what I wanted: I did not know either Russian or Kazakh.

Somehow I still managed to make a flat cake. She lit the straw and put a piece of dough there. You can imagine how he got baked there. But she still broke off a piece. I see mom lying with open mouth. I put this piece of dough there and lay down next to her. I didn’t understand that my mother was already dead. For two days I lay next to her, snuggling with her, trying to warm myself.

Finally, the cold forced me to go outside. Undressed, hungry, I stood in the bitter cold and cried. A Kazakh woman passing by clasped her hands and ran away somewhere. After some time, another woman, a German, came with her. She gave me a cup of hot milk, wrapped me in a blanket, sat me on the stove, and she began to work to bury my mother. I was four years old at the time.” (Lidiya Arsangireeva).

“In that first winter, almost a third of the special settlers died from typhus, hunger and cold. Many of our close relatives also died. But we children never saw our mother cry. And only once, when Father Oman died, we saw through a crack in the barn how my mother, locked there, holding back her sobs, beat herself with a stick in order to drown out the mental pain with physical pain.” (Gubati Galaeva).

Why were Chechens and Ingush deported?
Chechen volunteer from the eastern battalions of the Wehrmacht

Almost everyone knows about the deportation of Chechens and Ingush, but few know the true reason for this relocation

Almost everyone knows about the fact of the deportation of Chechens and Ingush, but few know the true reason for this relocation.
The fact is that since January 1940, the underground organization of Khasan Israilov operated in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, whose goal was to separate the North Caucasus from the USSR and create on its territory a federation of a state of all the mountain peoples of the Caucasus, except the Ossetians. The latter, as well as the Russians living in the region, according to Israilov and his associates, should have been completely destroyed. Khasan Israilov himself was a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and at one time graduated from the Communist University of the Working People of the East named after I.V. Stalin.

Israilov began his political activity in 1937 with a denunciation of the leadership of the Chechen-Ingush Republic. Initially, Israilov and eight of his associates themselves went to prison for libel, but this soon changed local leadership The NKVD, Israilov, Avtorkhanov, Mamakaev and his other like-minded people were released, and in their place they imprisoned those against whom they had written a denunciation.

However, Israilov did not rest on this. During the period when the British were preparing an attack on the USSR (for more details, see article"How England Loved Russia"), he creates an underground organization with the aim of raising an uprising against Soviet power at the moment when the British land in Baku, Derbent, Poti and Sukhum. However, British agents demanded that Israilov begin independent actions even before the British attack on the USSR. On instructions from London, Israilov and his gang were to attack the Grozny oil fields and disable them in order to create a shortage of fuel in the Red Army units fighting in Finland. The operation was scheduled for January 28, 1940. Now in Chechen mythology this bandit raid has been elevated to the rank of a national uprising. In fact, there was only an attempt to set fire to the oil storage facility, which was repulsed by the facility’s security. Israilov, with the remnants of his gang, switched to an illegal situation - holed up in mountain villages, the bandits, for the purpose of self-supply, from time to time attacked food stores.

However, with the beginning of the war, Israilov’s foreign policy orientation changed dramatically - now he began to hope for help from the Germans. Israilov’s representatives crossed the front line and handed the German intelligence representative a letter from their leader. On the German side, Israilov began to be supervised by military intelligence. The curator was Colonel Osman Gube.

This man, an Avar by nationality, was born in the Buynaksky region of Dagestan, served in the Dagestan regiment of the Caucasian native division. In 1919 he joined the army of General Denikin, in 1921 he emigrated from Georgia to Trebizond, and then to Istanbul. In 1938, Gube joined the Abwehr, and with the outbreak of war he was promised the position of head of the “political police” of the North Caucasus.

German paratroopers were sent to Chechnya, including Gube himself, and a German radio transmitter began operating in the forests of the Shali region, communicating between the Germans and the rebels. The first action of the rebels was an attempt to disrupt mobilization in Checheno-Ingushetia. During the second half of 1941, the number of deserters amounted to 12 thousand 365 people, evading conscription - 1093. During the first mobilization of Chechens and Ingush into the Red Army in 1941, it was planned to form a cavalry division from their composition, but when it was recruited, only 50% (4247) were recruited people) from the existing conscript contingent, and 850 people from those already recruited upon arrival at the front immediately went over to the enemy. In total, during the three years of the war, 49,362 Chechens and Ingush deserted from the ranks of the Red Army, another 13,389 evaded conscription, for a total of 62,751 people. Only 2,300 people died at the fronts and went missing (and the latter include those who went over to the enemy). Half the size of the Buryat people, who German occupation did not threaten in any way, lost 13 thousand people at the front, and the Ossetians, who were one and a half times inferior to the Chechens and Ingush, lost almost 11 thousand. At the same time when the decree on resettlement was published, there were only 8,894 Chechens, Ingush and Balkars in the army. That is, ten times more deserted than fought.

Two years after his first raid - on January 28, 1942, Israilov organized the OPKB - “Special Party of Caucasian Brothers”, which aims to “create a free fraternal Federative Republic of states in the Caucasus fraternal peoples Caucasus under the mandate of the German Empire." He later renamed this party the “National Socialist Party of the Caucasian Brothers.” In February 1942, when the Nazis occupied Taganrog, an associate of Israilov, the former chairman of the Forestry Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Mairbek Sheripov, raised an uprising in the villages of Shatoi and Itum-Kale. The villages were soon liberated, but some of the rebels went to the mountains, from where they carried out partisan attacks. So, on June 6, 1942, at about 17:00 in the Shatoi region, a group of armed bandits on the way to the mountains fired at a truck with traveling Red Army soldiers in one gulp. Of the 14 people traveling in the car, three were killed and two were wounded. The bandits disappeared into the mountains. On August 17, Mairbek Sheripov’s gang actually destroyed the regional center of the Sharoevsky district.

In order to prevent bandits from seizing oil production and oil refining facilities, one NKVD division had to be brought into the republic, and during the most difficult period of the Battle of the Caucasus, military units of the Red Army had to be removed from the front.
However, it took a long time to catch and neutralize the gangs - the bandits, warned by someone, avoided ambushes and withdrew their units from the attacks. Conversely, targets that were attacked were often left unguarded. So, just before the attack on the regional center of the Sharoevsky district, an operational group and a military unit of the NKVD, which were intended to protect the regional center, were withdrawn from the regional center. Subsequently, it turned out that the bandits were protected by the head of the department for combating banditry of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Lieutenant Colonel GB Aliyev. And later, among the things of the murdered Israilov, a letter from the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of Checheno-Ingushetia, Sultan Albogachiev, was found. It was then that it became clear that all Chechens and Ingush (and Albogachiev was Ingush), regardless of their position, were dreaming of how to harm the Russians. And they did harm very actively.

However, on November 7, 1942, on the 504th day of the war, when Hitler’s troops in Stalingrad tried to break through our defenses in the Glubokaya Balka area between the Red October and Barrikady factories, in Checheno-Ingushetia, by the forces of the NKVD troops with the support of individual units of the 4th Kuban Cavalry Corps carried out a special operation to eliminate gangs. Mairbek Sheripov was killed in the battle, and Gube was captured on the night of January 12, 1943 near the village of Akki-Yurt.

However, bandit attacks continued. They continued thanks to the support of the bandits by the local population and local authorities. Despite the fact that from June 22, 1941 to February 23, 1944, 3,078 gang members were killed and 1,715 people were captured in Checheno-Ingushtia, it was clear that as long as someone gave the bandits food and shelter, it would be impossible to defeat banditry. That is why on January 31, 1944, the USSR State Defense Committee Resolution No. 5073 was adopted on the abolition of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the deportation of its population to Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

On February 23, 1944, Operation Lentil began, during which 180 trains of 65 wagons each were sent from Checheno-Ingushenia with a total of 493,269 people resettled. 20,072 firearms were seized. While resisting, 780 Chechens and Ingush were killed, and 2016 were arrested for possession of weapons and anti-Soviet literature.
6,544 people managed to hide in the mountains. But many of them soon descended from the mountains and surrendered. Israilov himself was killed on December 15, 1944.

YOU WILL SOW LENTILS AND YOU WILL REAP A TRAGEDY

OLEG MATVEEV, IGOR SAMARIN

12.07.2000

In February 1944, at the direction of Joseph Stalin, the NKVD of the USSR carried out a special operation under code name"Lentil", as a result of which people were hastily evicted from the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic to the regions Central Asia all Chechens, and the republic itself was abolished. Previously unknown archival documents, only now published figures and facts clarify the argumentation used by the Generalissimo to justify his cruel decision.

DEVIDERS

In 1940, law enforcement agencies identified and neutralized the rebel organization of Sheikh Magomet-Hadji Kurbanov that existed in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. A total of 1,055 bandits and their accomplices were arrested, and 839 rifles and revolvers with ammunition were confiscated. 846 deserters who evaded service in the Red Army were brought to trial. In January 1941, a large armed uprising was localized in the Itum-Kalinsky region under the leadership of Idris Magomadov.

It is no secret that the leaders of the Chechen separatists, who were in an illegal situation, counted on the imminent defeat of the USSR in the war and waged widespread defeatist campaigning for desertion from the ranks of the Red Army, disruption of mobilization, and putting together armed formations to fight on the side of Germany.

During the first mobilization from August 29 to September 2, 1941, 8,000 people were to be conscripted into construction battalions. However, only 2,500 arrived at their destination in Rostov-on-Don.

By decision of the State Defense Committee, from December 1941 to January 1942, the 114th national division was formed from the indigenous population in the Chi ASSR. According to data at the end of March 1942, 850 people managed to desert from it.

The second mass mobilization in Checheno-Ingushetia began on March 17, 1942 and was supposed to end on March 25. The number of persons subject to mobilization was 14,577 people. However, only 4,887 were mobilized by the appointed date. In connection with this, the mobilization period was extended until April 5. But the number of mobilized people increased only to 5,543 people. The reason for the failure of mobilization was the massive evasion of conscripts and desertion en route to assembly points.

On March 23, 1942, Daga Dadaev, a deputy of the Supreme Council of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, who had been mobilized by the Nadterechny RVC, disappeared from the Mozdok station. Under the influence of his agitation, 22 other people fled with him.

By the end of March 1942, the total number of deserters and those who evaded mobilization in the republic reached 13,500 people.

In conditions of mass desertion and the intensification of the rebel movement on the territory of the Chi ASSR, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR in April 1942 signed an order to cancel the conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the army.

In January 1943, the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the Chisinau of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic nevertheless approached the NGOs of the USSR with a proposal to announce an additional recruitment of military volunteers from among the residents of the republic. The proposal was accepted, and local authorities received permission to call up 3,000 volunteers. According to the order of the NGO, conscription was ordered to take place from January 26 to February 14, 1943. However, the approved plan for the next conscription failed miserably this time.

Thus, as of March 7, 1943, 2,986 “volunteers” were sent to the Red Army from those recognized as fit for combat service. Of these, only 1,806 people arrived at the unit. Along the route alone, 1,075 people managed to desert. In addition, another 797 “volunteers” fled from regional mobilization points and along the route to Grozny. In total, from January 26 to March 7, 1943, 1,872 conscripts deserted from the so-called last “voluntary” conscription into the Chi ASSR.

Among those who escaped were representatives of district and regional party and Soviet activists: the secretary of the Gudermes RK of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Arsanukaev, the head of the department of the Vedensky RK of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Magomayev, the secretary of the regional committee of the Komsomol for military work Martazaliev, second secretary of the Gudermes Republic Committee of the Komsomol Taimakhanov, chairman of the Galanchozh regional executive committee of Khayauri.

UNDERGROUND

The leading role in disrupting the mobilization was played by the Chechen political organizations operating underground - the National Socialist Party of the Caucasian Brothers and the Chechen-Mountain National Socialist Underground Organization. The first was led by its organizer and ideologist Khasan Israilov. With the beginning of the war, Israilov went underground and, until 1944, led a number of large gangs, while supporting close connection with German intelligence agencies.
The other was headed by the brother of the famous revolutionary A. Sheripov in Chechnya - Mairbek Sheripov. In October 1941, he also went illegal and gathered around himself a number of bandit detachments, which included deserters. In August 1942, Sheripov raised an armed uprising in Chechnya, during which the administrative center of the Sharoevsky district, the village of Khimoi, was destroyed.

In November 1942, Mairbek Sheripov was killed as a result of a conflict with accomplices. Some of the members of his bandit groups joined Kh. Israilov, and some surrendered to the authorities.

In total, the pro-fascist parties formed by Israilov and Sheripov had over 4,000 members, and the total number of their rebel detachments reached 15,000 people. In any case, these are the figures Israilov reported to the German command in March 1942.

ABWERH MESSENGERS

Having assessed the potential of the Chechen rebel movement, the German intelligence services set out to unite all gangs.

The 804th Regiment of the Brandenburg-800 Special Purpose Division, sent to the North Caucasus section of the Soviet-German front, was aimed at solving this problem.

It included the Sonderkommando of Oberleutnant Gerhard Lange, conventionally called the "Lange Enterprise" or "Shamil Enterprise". The team was staffed by agents from among former prisoners of war and emigrants of Caucasian origin. Before being deployed to the rear of the Red Army to carry out subversive activities, the saboteurs underwent nine months of training. The direct transfer of agents was carried out by Abwehrkommando 201.

On August 25, 1942, from Armavir, a group of Lieutenant Lange of 30 people, staffed mainly by Chechens, Ingush and Ossetians, was parachuted into the area of the villages of Chishki, Dachu-Borzoi and Duba-Yurt, Ataginsky district of the Chisinau Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to commit sabotage and terrorist acts and organizing the rebel movement, timing the uprising to coincide with the beginning of the German offensive on Grozny.

On the same day, another group of six people landed near the village of Berezhki, Galashkinsky district, led by a native of Dagestan, former emigrant Osman Gube (Saidnurov), who, in order to give due weight among Caucasians, was named in the documents as “Colonel of the German Army.” Osman Guba was to become the coordinator of all armed gangs on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia.

Once in the rear, the saboteurs virtually everywhere enjoyed the sympathy of the population, who were ready to provide assistance with food and accommodation for the night. The attitude towards them was so loyal that they could afford to walk behind Soviet lines in German military uniforms. A few months later, Osman Gube, who was arrested by the NKVD, during interrogation described his impressions of the first days of his stay on Chechen territory: “... In the evening, a collective farmer named Ali-Magomet and with him another named Mahomet came to our forest. At first they did not believed who we were, but when we took an oath on the Koran that we were really sent to the rear of the Red Army by the German command, they believed us. They told us that it was dangerous for us to stay here, so they recommended leaving for the mountains of Ingushetia, because it will be easier to hide there. After spending 3-4 days in the forest near the village of Berezhki, we, accompanied by Ali-Magomet, headed into the mountains to the village of Khay, where Ali-Magomet had good friends. One of his acquaintances turned out to be a certain Ilaev Kasum, who took us to himself, and we stayed overnight with him. Ilaev introduced us to his son-in-law Ichaev Soslanbek, who took us to the mountains...

Abwehr agents received sympathy and support not only from ordinary peasants. Both the chairmen of collective farms and the leaders of the party-Soviet apparatus eagerly offered their cooperation. “The first person with whom I spoke directly about the deployment of anti-Soviet work on instructions from the German command,” Osman Gube said during the investigation, “was the chairman of the Dattykh village council, a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Ibrahim Pshegurov. I told him that we were dropped by parachute from the German plane and that our goal is to assist the German army in liberating the Caucasus from the Bolsheviks and carrying out further struggle for the independence of the Caucasus. Pshegurov recommended establishing contacts with the right people, but to come out openly only when the Germans take the city of Ordzhonikidze."

A little later, the chairman of the Akshinsky village council, Duda Ferzauli, came to “receive” the Abwehr envoy. According to Osman, “Ferzauli himself came up to me and proved in every possible way that he is not a communist, that he undertakes to carry out any of my tasks... At the same time, he asked to take him under my protection after their area was occupied by the Germans.”

Osman Gube’s testimony describes an episode when local resident Musa Keloev came to his group. “I agreed with him that it would be necessary to blow up a bridge on this road. To carry out the explosion, I sent with him a member of my parachute group, Salman Aguev. When they returned, they reported that they had blown up an unguarded wooden railway bridge.”

UNDER THE GERMAN ACCORDINA

The Abwehr groups thrown into the territory of Chechnya came into contact with the rebel leaders Kh. Israilov and M. Sheripov, and a number of others field commanders and began to fulfill their main task - organizing uprisings.

Already in October 1942, German paratrooper non-commissioned officer Gert Reckert, who had been dropped a month earlier in the mountainous part of Chechnya as part of a group of 12 people, together with the leader of one of the gangs, Rasul Sakhabov, provoked a massive armed uprising of residents of the villages of the Vedeno district of Selmentauzen and Makhkety. Significant forces of regular units of the Red Army, which were defending at that moment, were deployed to localize the uprising. North Caucasus. This uprising was prepared for about a month. According to the testimony of captured German paratroopers, enemy aircraft dropped 10 large shipments of weapons (over 500 small arms, 10 machine guns and ammunition) into the area of the village of Makhkety, which were immediately distributed to the rebels.

Active actions by armed militants were observed throughout the republic during this period. The scale of banditry in general is evidenced by the following documentary statistics. During September - October 1942, the NKVD liquidated 41 armed groups with a total number of over 400 bandits. Another 60 bandits surrendered voluntarily and were captured. The Nazis had a powerful support base in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan, populated predominantly by Akkin Chechens. For example, in September 1942, residents of the village of Mozhgar brutally killed the first secretary of the Khasavyurt district committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Lukin, and the entire village fled to the mountains.

At the same time, an Abwehr sabotage group of 6 people led by Sainutdin Magomedov was sent to this area with the task of organizing uprisings in the regions of Dagestan bordering Chechnya. However, the entire group was detained by state security agencies.

VICTIMS OF TREASON

In August 1943, the Abwehr sent three more groups of saboteurs into the Chi ASSR. As of July 1, 1943, 34 enemy paratroopers were listed on the territory of the republic as wanted by the NKVD, including 4 Germans, 13 Chechens and Ingush, the rest represented other nationalities of the Caucasus.

In total, in 1942-1943, the Abwehr sent about 80 paratroopers to Checheno-Ingushetia to communicate with the local bandit underground, more than 50 of whom were traitors to the Motherland from among former Soviet military personnel.

And yet, at the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944, some peoples of the North Caucasus, including the Chechens, who had provided and could provide the greatest assistance to the Nazis in the future, were deported to the rear.

However, the effectiveness of this action, the victims of which were mainly innocent old people, women and children, turned out to be illusory. The main forces of the armed gangs, as always, took refuge in the inaccessible mountainous part of Chechnya, from where they continued to carry out bandit attacks for several years.

I have long wanted to write my vision of such an event as the forced eviction (deportation) of some peoples of the North Caucasus. Moreover, tomorrow will be the next 72nd anniversary of the deportation of the Chechen people.

Almost everyone knows about the fact of resettlement of Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Karachais and Ingush, but the real reason this deportation is practically unknown. But everyone has seen similar pictures...

So, why in 1943-44. Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Karachais, Crimean Tatars and Kalmyks were deported and taken from their homes. And why did this not affect the Ossetians and the peoples of Dagestan?

Why Stalin evicted the Chechens

It’s strange, but there is often an opinion that the bloodthirsty tyrant Stalin decided to take revenge on the highlanders for their hospitable meeting of the Germans and after the liberation of the Caucasus from the Nazi troops, he gave the order to forcibly evict the Caucasians and Kalmyks.

Oral stories persist about how Chechen elders allegedly gave Hitler a handsome white stallion. As a child, I myself heard a lot of stories about how the Chechens rejoiced at the arrival of the Germans, for which they paid with eviction.

They say that the bloodthirsty despot Stalin ordered his no less bloodthirsty henchman Larentiy Beria to drive everyone into cattle cars and take them to Siberia and Kazakhstan.

And these mythical justifications are quite suitable for contemporaries who did not live in that era and do not understand the situation, as well as people with a broken cause-and-effect part.

Those who have not forgotten how to think with their own heads and know at least a little the history and situation of those years will not argue that Stalin was a very practical statesman.

And he wanted to end the war as quickly as possible, not only because he was tired of it, but because... that at any moment the balance of power could change, he knew 100% that the Germans were one step (!!) away from creating an atomic bomb (just like the Americans), Germany had already begun production of jet fighters...

In 1943 - 1944 There were persistent bloody battles on the territory of Ukraine and Belarus... every soldier counted! Every wagon that brought reinforcements and ammunition to the front, is it really possible that Stalin, out of personal revenge, pulled an army of 100,000 people, including 19,000 SMERshevites, from the fronts, put them in wagons and sent them to the North Caucasus to amuse his vanity and "take revenge" on the Chechens and Karachais?!

This can only be invented by the children and grandchildren of the Trotskyists, whom Stalin destroyed without pity in the 30s and who still take revenge on him when he was dead and invent tall tales about his illiteracy and incompetence!

By the way, can you imagine how many carriages were required for so many soldiers with all the weapons?! And then it took about two hundred trains with deported citizens, who were transported not 100 kilometers, but thousands of kilometers to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Komi!!

And this is just for the sake of revenge? Bullshit!

And this nonsense was believed by fooled citizens who were subjected to massive processing by liberal writers and historians, those who, since the time of the scoundrel Khrushchev, destroyed and falsified documents in the archives in order to accuse Stalin of all mortal sins.

Yes. He was no angel. But he really wanted to win that terrible war as quickly as possible, so sending 100,000 soldiers and officers to the Caucasus should be considered solely from this logic.

Deportation of the Chechen people

So why was it necessary to disrupt the army, not only with rifles and machine guns, but also with machine guns and cannons... was there a logical basis for such a special operation called “Lentil”?

Yes. Unfortunately, there were good reasons for such forced relocation of peoples. Not even just weighty, but reinforced concrete!

After all, in the rear, an operation was being planned to destroy the Grozny oil fields, and if lucky, also the Baku ones, as a result of which the army would be completely deprived of fuel, which means the tanks and aircraft would be immobilized! There was nowhere to get gasoline and diesel fuel from then!

And how, for their part, our British “allies” deprived us of the oil fields of Romania by bombing Ploiesti as soon as the Red Army approached it, this is generally a classic of cynicism and betrayal.

How the operation for the anti-Soviet uprising and destruction of oil production was prepared, as well as about German saboteurs and gangs in Chechnya here
How Chechen gangs collaborated with the Nazis
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